Gen. Thomas Kelly, who became a folk hero with his daily Pentagon briefings, retired at the end of the gulf war. In retirement, he started immediately on the television circuit: first stop, the Johnny Carson show.
During his Carson appearance, Kelly revealed that before each briefing he and his staff rehearsed every possible question so that he would be ready with the version of the war he wanted the public to receive, standard practice for politicians but not the sort of behavior the public expects from its military leaders.
By the time he met the press, this grandfatherly general with the facts was ready to sell a righteous war against a demonized enemy to an American public that was largely ignorant about the complex political issues of the region.
This war was sold to the American public as an expression of patriotism. But was it patriotism or was it nationalism that moved the public so deeply?
There is a difference, as historian John Lucas points out in his book, ``The Duel`` (Ticknor and Fields, 1990).
``When Dr. Johnson said that `patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,` `` Lucas writes, ``he meant nationalism, a word that did not appear in the English language until more than 60 years after his departure from the world . . . . Patriotism is essentially defensive, while nationalism is aggressive. . . . Patriotism is not a substitute for a religious faith, whereas nationalism often is. It often fills the spiritual and even emotional needs of uprooted men (and women). It is often the result of hatred; and as Chesterton wisely said, it is not love (which is personal and particular) but hatred that united men (and women).``
Within Lucas` definition, it is nationalism, not patriotism, that is the last refuge of a scoundrel precisely because love of country and a willingness to defend one`s borders is an admirable and positive stance, while nationalism, in this context, may replace one`s religion, or perhaps fill a void left by an absence of a personal faith, or in Lucas` terms, ``uprooted`` men and women.
Lucas is writing about the crucial months in the summer of 1940 when Hitler and Churchill faced one another during and after the fall of France. He describes their duel as a conflict between a patriot and a nationalist.
``There was an aggressive strain in Churchill`s character,`` Lucas writes,
``but it was not dominant. Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf that he was a nationalist and definitely not a patriot; Churchill was a patriot rather than a nationalist; and patriotism, unlike nationalism, is not aggressive.``
Was our war in gulf an act of American patriotism to ``liberate`` Kuwait and punish Hussein`s aggression, or was it an act of American aggressive nationalism that tapped into a need for national fulfillment, replacing the hatred of communism that shaped public opinion throughout the Cold War?
President Bush built his case for the gulf war by exploiting an inherent patriotism in our democratic society. To accomplish this, he had to sell the war as a defense of our ideals, protecting Kuwait against aggression. We were American ``patriots`` who restored the emir of Kuwait to his throne.
But if the emir`s sand dunes were not perched atop oilfields, our
``patriotism`` would not have been aroused. Leslie Dunbar, in ``Reclaiming Liberalism`` (Norton, 1991), argues that the only possible rationale for a nation`s going to war is to maintain its ``capability for self-
determination.`` The protection of its own existence is not the same as fighting a war for ``offended national interests,`` he adds, because such claims ``are categorically suspect; any so-called interest that requires military support is almost surely the interest of but one or more of our economic elites.``
Saddam Hussein`s invasion of Kuwait was an aggressive act and needed to be treated as such. He was acting as a nationalist, not as a patriot. He wanted to control Kuwait`s oil. So do we, and we fought this war for this reason. We fought this war with an intensity and dedication that have correctly been admired by the Western world. But imagine even a fraction of this same resolve applied to a campaign to reduce our use of energy. An ongoing economic boycott in conjunction with an intensive campaign to reduce our use of oil might have convinced Saddam Hussein to negotiate his way out of Kuwait. When a thief steals, as Hussein did in Kuwait, he is more likely to be persuaded to give up his booty if he discovers its value reduced.
But this logic was never applied. Instead, from the outset President Bush wanted to unleash his military might on Iraq with the results that are now all too evident. He was free to do this because he was dealing with an American public homesick for the Cold War and eager to be molded into a mean fighting machine against whatever target of ``evil`` the president told it to hate.
And so we continue to wave our flags and fly our ribbons. It was a ``good war`` because we lost so few of our own, and for this we can be grateful. Given a task, our military forces responded efficiently and with courage. But now the war has ended, and over there, virtually out of sight, hundreds of thousands or Iraqis are dead or dying. The American public remains largely indifferent to the mass destruction and long- range suffering caused by this war. A misguided patriotism built on nationalism and public ignorance is now, and always has been, a dangerous and deadly combination.