It is a perfect example of how Austrians are still mired in the false and misleading quantity theory of money, and all its mistaken assumptions.
He uses the following graph (which can be opened in a separate window) showing M2 money supply growth rates with the CPI inflation rates.
The key to understanding and interpreting this graph are the theories of
(1) endogenous money andFurthermore, the supply shocks and wage-price spirals of the 1970s – the historically specific factors – cannot be ignored either.
(2) mark-up pricing.
First, let us dispose of the quantity theory of money and explain endogenous money theory.
There are two main versions of quantity theory, as follows:
(1) The Equation of Exchange: MV = PT,A number of assumptions have to be made for the quantity theory to explain changes in the price level, as follows:
M = quantity of money;
V = velocity of circulation;
P = general price level, and
T = total number of transactions.
(2) the Cambridge Cash Balance equation: M = kd PY,
M = supply of money;
kd = demand to hold money per unit of money income;
P = general price level, and
Y = volume of all transactions in the value of national income.
(1) prices are flexible and respond to demand changes in either (1) both the short and long run, or (2) at least in the long run. Related to this is a tacit assumption that the economy is near equilibrium in the sense of full use of resources and high employment, where stocks and capacity utilization are not fundamental methods that firms use to deal with changes in the demand for their products.So how realistic are these assumptions?
(2) money supply is exogenous;
(3) under the equation of exchange, for an increase in M to lead to a proportional increase in P, both V and T must be assumed to be stable.
Under the Cambridge Cash Balance equation, M and P are causally related, if kd and Y are constant (Thirlwall 1999).
(4) the direction of causation. The quantity theory assumes the direction of causation runs from money supply increase to price rises.
(5) in some extreme forms there is the assumption, following from (1), that money supply increases induce direct and proportional changes in the price level. (I will just note as an aside that Austrians already reject this, because they emphasise Cantillon effects, the idea that price level changes caused by increases in the quantity of money depend on the way new money is injected into the economy, and actually where it affects prices first.)
The answer is not very realistic at all:
(1) most prices are mark-up prices and relatively inflexible with respect to demand changes in both the short and long run. Most capitalist economies are far from full use of resources, and even in booms businesses make use of stocks and capacity utilisation to manage demand changes, rather than changes in prices.We can see here why broad money supply growth precedes inflation or real output changes.
(2) money supply is largely endogenous;
(3) The velocity of money and demand for money are unstable, subject to shocks and move pro-cyclically (Leo 2005; Levy-Orlik 2012: 170);
(4) the direction of causation. Under an endogenous system the direction of causation is generally from credit demand (via business loans to finance labour and other factor inputs) to money supply increases (Robinson 1970; Davidson and Weintraub 1973).
Therefore the direction of causation generally runs:credit demand → broad money supply increase → base money increase. (Moore 2003: 118).This is true, as noted above, since the money supply is endogenous: most of the money supply is “broad money” or bank money, and that is increased by credit expansion in the form of bank loans.
(5) that money supply growth necessarily or generally induces direct and proportional changes in the price level is empirically false (De Grauwe and Polan 2005).
The reason is that (1) money is largely endogenous and (2) growth in the broad money supply is generally caused by credit growth. Many businesses finance their wage and other factor input bills with credit from banks, so that before real output grows money supply will grow.
Cost-push inflation happens in the same way: when (1) workers or unions demand higher wages and businesses agree to these increases and/or (2) prices of other factor inputs rise, then businesses will need to obtain higher levels of credit from banks. Hence broad money supply growth rates rise, but this rise precedes price increases because businesses will generally raise mark-up prices to maintain profit margins at a later time, given that most firms engage in time-dependent reviews and changes of their prices at regular intervals.
The process of a wage–price spiral involves actually this type of phenomenon, but in a vicious circle.
This crucial point about the direction of causation in the relationship between money supply and output/prices is discussed by Joan Robinson:
“The correlations to be explained [sc. in the relationship between money supply and real output] could be set out in quantity theory terms if the equation were read right-handed. Thus we might suggest that a marked rise in the level of activity is likely to be preceded by an increase in the supply of money (if M is widely defined) or in the velocity of circulation (if M is narrowly defined) because a rise in the wage bill and in borrowing for working capital is likely to precede an increase in the value of output appearing in the statistics. Or that a fall in activity sharp enough to cause losses deprives the banks of credit-worthy borrowers and brings a contraction in their position. But the tradition of Chicago consists in reading the equation from left to right. Then the observed relations are interpreted without any hypothesis at all except post hoc ergo propter hoc.” (Robinson 1970: 510–511).Secondly, we need to understand mark-up pricing.
Many businesses – and probably a majority in any given developed capitalist economy – set their prices mainly as a profit mark-up on total average unit costs (that is, fixed plus variable costs).
Prices tend to change when total average unit costs change or when the firm wants to change its profit mark-up, and therefore supply costs are the important factor causing price changes (the overwhelming empirical evidence proving that mark-up pricing is prevalent throughout the developed world is here).
Although demand-side inflation is a real and important phenomenon, it is not the only major cause of inflation. In fact, often demand-side inflation is a grossly overestimated cause of inflation and the really important cause is increases in mark-up prices by cost-push inflation: for mark-up prices are, generally speaking, not responsive to changes in demand (Kaldor 1976: 217).
In the post-WWII world when unions were much stronger, collective bargaining in wages prevalent, and cost of living clauses standard in wage contracts, a sufficiently large rise in wages or spike in energy or raw materials costs could set off wage–price spirals, as businesses maintained their profit margin by simply raising their mark-up prices.
Now we have sketched the two theories we need to understand inflation, in addition to demand-led inflation, we can turn to an actual explanation of the 1970s inflation from its origin in the late 1960s until 1975.
We can break down the inflation trends as follows:
(1) Phase 1: 1967–1971I have not bothered to continue this analysis down to 1980, but it could be easily done.
The US saw a spike in inflation from October 1967 to February 1970. Then inflation turned around and, although high, inflation rates gradually fell right down to June 1972.
This was preceded by a spike in M2 growth rates from January 1967 to January 1968.
In the United States, unemployment had fallen to 3.8% in 1966 and 3.6% in 1968, historically low levels. Low unemployment led to some bidding up of wages in this period in the non-unionised sector. Unionised workers in turn also demanded higher wages. The inflation in the US, then, was driven by unusually higher wage demands (Kaldor 1976: 224), just as it was throughout other Western countries. As Nicholas Kaldor noted, around 1968–1969, similar types of wage rises occurred in Japan, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and from 1969–1970 in Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK, which Kaldor attributed largely to trade union action (Kaldor 1976: 224).
But then the US recession from December 1969 to November 1970 struck, and there was a marked decrease in inflation and M2 growth rates.
From April 1970, acceleration in M2 growth rates began again and (as we would expect) preceded the recovery in real output that ended this recession.
But M2 growth rates soared to a high level from April 1970 to July 1971, as the expansion in the business cycle occurred and higher wage demands continued.
The momentous event that would set the stage for the inflation in the next phase was the end of the Bretton Woods system on August 15, 1971, when Nixon closed the gold window.
The end of Bretton Woods was momentous: inflationary expectations and instability on financial and commodity markets resulted, as well as a rise in commodity speculation as a hedge against inflation. This contributed to the cost-push inflation that was being felt in many countries after 1971.
Nevertheless, the end of Bretton Woods in August, 1971 did not suddenly unleash run-away inflation. As we see in the chart, US inflation rates continued to fall until June 1972.
(2) Phase 2: 1971–1974
The spike in US inflation began again in June 1972 and continued until December 1974.
What caused this? Three major factors did:(1) an explosion in commodity prices from 1972;Let us start with factor (1).
(2) wage–price spirals, and
(3) the first oil shock.
In the late 1960s, the US began dismantling its commodity buffer stock policies that had previously ensured price stability in the golden age of capitalism.
The prelude to stagflation was marked by a significant explosion in commodity prices that occurred in the second half of 1972. Part of the problem was the failure of the harvest in the old Soviet Union in 1972–1973 and the unexpectedly large purchases on world markets by the Soviet state (Kaldor 1976: 228). This could have been averted had the United States not dismantled its commodity buffer stock policies in the 1960s. As we have seen above, the end of Bretton Woods also induced commodity speculation and rises in commodity prices and raw materials costs.
This feed into further price rises, which in turn exacerbated wage–price spirals.
The final factor that explains the surge in inflation down to December 1974 was the first oil shock from October 1973, when various Middle Eastern producers of oil instituted an embargo that lasted until March 1974 (Kaldor 1976: 226). In most countries, the double digit inflation of the 1970s was caused by the oil shocks (both the first and second).
This explains why M2 growth rates, while high, actually fell gradually from January 1973 to June 1974 as a recession struck the US from November 1973 to March 1975. This inflation was a supply-side phenomenon.
The accelerating inflation rates from 1973 to 1974 occurred when the US economy was in recession and this anomaly puzzled many economists at that time.
The new portmanteau word “stagflation” (stagnation + inflation) was increasingly used to describe the phenomenon, which meant the simultaneous occurrence of stagnation or recession (with high unemployment) and accelerating inflation.
The very same factors as described above also explain the second bout of stagflation and the major cause was the Second oil shock.
Philip Pilkington has a great post here on this very subject:
Philip Pilkington, “Animism and Monetarist Thinking: The Inflation in the US in the 1970s,” Fixing the Economists, August 6, 2013.Further Links
“US Inflation Rates (1946–1987), Keynesianism and Stagflation,” March 24, 2013.
“Stagflation in the 1970s: A Post Keynesian Analysis,” June 24, 2011.
“Hans Albert on the Quantity Theory of Money,” March 2, 2014.
“Joan Robinson on the Quantity Theory of Money,” March 3, 2014.
“Endogenous Money: A Bibliography,” April 5, 2012.
“Endogenous Money 101,” April 20, 2013.
“Rochon and Rossi on the History of Endogenous Money,” May 4, 2013.
“Endogenous Money under the Gold Standard,” May 19, 2013.
“Some Empirical Evidence on Endogenous Money,” May 27, 2013.
“Empirical Evidence on Endogenous Money,” August 10, 2013.
“The Quantity Theory of Money is Wrong,” August 7, 2013.
Davidson, Paul and Sidney Weintraub. 1973. “Money as Cause and Effect,” The Economic Journal 83.332: 1117–1132.
De Grauwe, P. and M. Polan. 2005. “Is Inflation Always and Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon?,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107: 239–259.
Kaldor, N. 1976. “Inflation and Recession in the World Economy,” Economic Journal 86 (December): 703–714.
Leo, P. 2005. “Why does the Velocity of Money move Pro-cyclically?,” International Review of Applied Economics 19.1: 119–135.
Levy-Orlik, N. 2012. “Keynes’s Views in Financing Economic Growth: The Role of Capital Markets in the Process of Funding,” in Jesper Jespersen and Mogens Ove Madsen (eds.), Keynes’s General Theory for Today: Contemporary Perspectives. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 167–185.
Moore, B. 2003. “Endogenous Money,” in J. E. King (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 117–121.
Robinson, Joan. 1970. “Quantity Theories Old and New: Comment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2.4: 504–512.
Thirlwall, A. P. 1999. “Monetarism,” in P. Anthony O’Hara (ed.), Encyclopedia of Political Economy: L–Z. Routledge, London and New York. 750–753.