For the Persian Wars of 490 and 480–479 we have a detailed account from Herodotus; for the Peloponnesian War (chapters 8–13) we have detailed accounts from Thucydides to 411 and thereafter from Xenophon; but for the Pentecontaetia, the (not quite) fifty years between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War, we are much less well informed. Thucydides includes in I. 89–118. ii a sketch of the growth of Athenian power, to justify his view of the truest reason for the Peloponnesian War. He remarks that this period was not treated by his predecessors except in the Athenian history of Hellanicus, whose account was brief and not chronologically precise (I. 97. ii): Hellanicus’ account has not survived, but that comment is certainly applicable to Thucydides’ own account. Two later writers are particularly important for this period: Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch in hisParallel Lives (cf. p. 8). For the Delian League, usually they and other writers give more information, of varying reliability, on episodes mentioned by Thucydides rather than information on episodes not mentioned by him. Diodorus’ narrative is organised in an annal-istic framework, but where it can be checked his assignment of episodes to years is unreliable; we should take more seriously for dating (but still not believe uncritically) those sentences, apparently from a chronological table, which briefly mention events other than the main episode of a year. Inscriptions will become important for the history of the Delian League from the 450’s (cf. pp. 51–6).
Greeks and Persians
For some centuries the main barbarian power in western Asia Minor was the kingdom of Lydia, with its capital at Sardis. Under the Mermnad dynasty, beginning with Gyges in the second quarter of the seventh century, the Lydians made themselves overlords of the Greek cities on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, but in a benign way, so that (for instance) they made dedications at Greek sanctuaries. The Lydian kingdom was overthrown in the middle of the sixth century by the Persians. Originally a small kingdom to the east of the Persian Gulf, under Cyrus II (559–530) they defeated the Medes to their north in 550. The Lydian Croesus hoped to expand into the vacuum which that created, but he was defeated and Lydia was conquered by Cyrus c.546. The Greek cities of the mainland submitted to Persia after that; the offshore islands may have made formal submission then but were not effectively conquered until c.520–515, when the Persians brought a fleet into the Aegean. In 539 Cyrus conquered Babylon, and his restoration of the Jews to Judaea indicates that he claimed to rule as far as the Mediterranean (Hdt. I). Cambyses (530–522) between 525 and 522 conquered Egypt, in which there had been Greek involvement for a century and a half (cf. p. 49: Hdt. III. 1–26). Darius I (522–486) conquered the Aegean islands off the coast of Asia Minor, and c. 514 ventured into Europe for an unsuccessful campaign against the Scythians north of the Danube, after which the Persians acquired nominal control of Thrace and Macedon (Hdt. IV. 1-V. 27).
In 499 Aristagoras, ruling in Miletus as a Persian vassal, incited the Persians to an unsuccessful attack on the island of Naxos in the middle of the Aegean (Hdt. V. 28–34). This was the first time the Persians had shown any interest in moving into the rest of the Greek world. At the time of Cyrus’ conquest the Spartans had commanded him not to harm the Greeks, but had not followed the command with action (Hdt. I. 141. iv, 152–153. ii). Athens, when Sparta had become hostile after the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7, appealed to Persia for an alliance, but was angry when its envoys gave (or at any rate proposed that Athens should give) earth and water, tokens of submission, to the Persians (Hdt. V. 73); and a little later, when a Spartan proposal to reinstate the expelled Athenian tyrant Hippias had failed to gain Peloponnesian support and Hippias had taken refuge with the Persians, Athens protested in vain against their harbouring him (Hdt. V. 96).
After the failure of the attack on Naxos, Aristagoras led the Asiatic Greeks in the Ionian Revolt against Persia, obtaining help from Athens (which perhaps already regarded itself as the mother city of the Ionian Greeks: cf. p. 21) and Eretria but failing to persuade Sparta. In 498 the Greeks captured and burned the outer city of Sardis, but were defeated during their return to the coast; and in 497 they sent forces to support Greek-inclining cities in Cyprus (cf. p. 18), and won a naval battle. After that, however, substantial Persian forces arrived and began to recover control, helped by the fact that the various Greek cities did not cooperate effectively. The revolt ended after the Persians’ defeat of a disintegrating Greek fleet at Lade, near Miletus, in 495 and their capture of Miletus in 494 after a siege (Hdt. V. 35-VI. 43. iii).
The involvement of Athens and Eretria gave the Persians the incentive to attack Greece. A first attempt, by forces sent round the north of the Aegean in 492, was abandoned after the Persian fleet was wrecked off Athos, the eastern prong of Chalcidice (Hdt. VI. 43. iv-48. i). A second expedition was sent by sea through the Cyclades in 490: Naxos was captured and burned, and Eretria was captured and its inhabitants enslaved, but the Persian army was defeated by the Athenians at Marathon, in the north-east of Attica. The Athenians were helped by the army of nearby Plataea (cf. p. 93); the Spartans promised to come after celebrating a festival, but did not arrive until after the battle (Hdt. VI. 48–124).
Darius died in 486, and his son Xerxes (486–465) inherited the need for revenge (but we must remember, in spite of the Greek sources on which we are overwhelmingly reliant for the narrative of Persian history in the fifth and fourth centuries, that Greece was only one of the Persians’ concerns, and by no means always the most pressing). In 480 a very large force, by land and sea, was taken by Xerxes himself round the north of the Aegean. Many of the Greeks united under Spartan leadership to resist them, but not all; even within the Peloponnese, Argos was not prepared to submit to Spartan leadership (cf. pp. 28–9); Athens, with a new fleet financed from the profits from its silver mines, provided more than half of the Greek navy. A first Greek force sent to halt the invaders in the gorge of Tempe, in Thessaly, arrived too early and had to be withdrawn. A second attempt was made on land at Thermopylae, where there was then a narrow passage between mountains and sea, and at sea at Artemisium, nearby at the north end of Euboea; but the Persians found a high-level route to reach the rear of the Greeks’ land force, after which the Spartans and some others fought and died heroically but these positions, and the Greek mainland north of the Isthmus of Corinth, had to be abandoned, and Athens itself (evacuated by its citizens) was captured and sacked. Later in the year, however, the Greek navy defeated the Persian in the strait between Attica and the island of Salamis. The Persian fleet, and Xerxes with most of the army, then returned to Asia; but in 479 the force left in Greece was defeated by the Greeks at Plataea; and the Greek navy eventually crossed the Aegean, landed on Cape Mycale, in Asia Minor opposite Samos, and defeated a Persian army there (Hdt. VII-IX). A defence which at first looked likely to fail had in the end succeeded:
we know now that the Persians were never to invade Europe again, but at the end of 479 it must have seemed inevitable that they would be even more desirous of revenge, and in due course would return.
The Origins of the League
Various stories told in connection with the battle of Plataea in 479, the battle in which the Persians invading Greece were finally defeated, seem to point forward to later developments. Plataea was one of the Greek states which had sworn to resist the Persians (e.g.Thuc. II. 72. i, 74. ii); and after the battle the commander Pausanias made the allies swear to respect Plataea’s independence and neutrality in return for which Plataea would tend the graves of the fallen Greeks (Thuc. II. 71. ii, III. 58. iv, 68. i). But more than that is found in later sources. An oath claimed to have been sworn before the battle was inscribed on stone in the fourth century as an oath of the Athenians (R&O 88. 21–51), and is quoted as an oath of the Greeks by the fourth-century orator Lycurgus (Leocrates 80–1) and by Diodorus (XL 29. ii-iii), but was rejected as a fabrication by the fourth-century historianTheopompus (FGrH 115 F 153).The literary versions include an undertaking to leave temples destroyed by the Persians in ruins as a war memorial (known also to Isocrates, as a resolution of the Ionians: IV. Paneg. 156).This is one of a number of alleged fifth-century documents for which there is no fifth-century evidence but which were known from the fourth century onwards (the two best known are the alleged decree of Themistocles, of 480, and the alleged Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia, on which see pp. 53–4). The texts which were current later were probably not essentially authentic texts (which had undergone some editing) but later reconstructions, made (not irresponsibly but on the basis of some genuine tradition) to present vividly the achievements of the glorious past. It is likely that there were one or more occasions in 479 when an oath of solidarity was sworn, but it is not likely that the text was preserved, or that there was an undertaking to leave the temples of the gods in ruins.
Diodorus also mentions a vow to celebrate a festival of freedom at Plataea (XL 29. i), and Plutarch writes of an annual meeting with games every fourth year, a Greek contribution (syntaxis, a fourth-century term: cf. pp. 268, 409) to make war on the Persians, and the Plataeans to be sacred and inviolable, sacrificing on behalf of Greece (Plut. Arist. 21. i-ii). The games are not attested until the hellenistic period, and all this looks like later elaboration.
The origins of the League are better sought in the naval campaign of 479. When the Greek fleet was at Aegina in the spring, the Ionians appealed to it to liberate them (Hdt. VIII. 132). After the battle of Mycale a council was held at Samos, at which the Peloponnesians, thinking it impossible to protect the Ionians indefinitely, wanted to transport them to Greece and give them land taken from those who had supported the Persians, but Athens, which claimed to be the mother city of the Ionians, successfully objected. Then Samos, Chios, Lesbos and the other islands were admitted to the Greek alliance (Hdt. IX. 106. ii-iv). After that, the Greeks sailed north to the Hellespont. When they found that the Persians’ bridges had been broken up, the commander, Sparta’s king Leotychidas, and the Peloponnesian contingents returned home; but others, perhaps including some from the Asiatic mainland, stayed on under Athenian leadership and besieged Sestos, on the European side of the Hellespont (Hdt. IX. 114–21, Thuc. I. 89. ii).
Herodotus ends his history there. We think of the Persian Wars as ending there, and we now know that the Persians would never invade Europe again; but nobody knew at the time that the Persian Wars were at an end. The Persians had been defeated and had withdrawn from Greece; but they had been defeated and had withdrawn from Greece in 490, only to return with a larger force ten years later. The Greeks could not believe that the Persian threat had been eliminated.
In 478 the two Spartans who had commanded the Greek alliance in the previous year exchanged commands. Leotychidas took an army to Thessaly to punish those who had supported the Persians (cf. pp. 29–30); and Pausanias, regent for his cousin Plistarchus, took command of the fleet. He campaigned successfully, first outside the Aegean in Cyprus, which was important both as a Persian naval base and as an island some of whose inhabitants were or at least regarded themselves as Greek; then he returned to the Aegean and went through the Hellespont to Byzantium, still occupied by the Persians, and captured that (Thuc. I. 94, cf. 128. v, Aesch. Pers. 891–2). But Pausanias made himself unpopular with the allies. At Plataea he had mockingly contrasted Persian luxury with Spartan austerity (Hdt. IX. 82). Now, Thucydides tells us, he wore Persian costume, he went into Thrace with a ‘Median’ and Egyptian bodyguard (the Greeks frequently referred to the Persians as the Medes), he feasted in the Persian manner and became unapproachable. Thucydides also has him secretly releasing prisoners who were relatives of the Persian King, and exchanging letters with the King, offering to marry his daughter (I. 128–30, cf. 95. i). It is hard to be sure how much of this is true, and, if true, how much belongs to this occasion rather than to Pausanias’ later period in Byzantium (cf. p. 30): on this occasion there can hardly have been time for the exchange of letters, and the offer to marry the King’s daughter looks suspiciously like an improvement on the rumour reported by Herodotus, that he married a satrap’s daughter (V. 32).
But we can accept that his conduct made him unpopular, and that complaints reached Sparta. He was recalled, and we shall look at his further career in a Spartan context (Thuc. I. 95. iii, 128. iii: cf. pp. 30–1). A new alliance was then formed under the leadership of Athens, which had taken the lead against Sestos earlier. According to Thucydides, it was the allies who took the initiative in approaching Athens (I. 95. i-iv, cf. 75. ii, 96. i); other texts suggest that the Athenians took the initiative (Hdt. VIII. 3. ii, Ath. Pol. 23. iv): there must at any rate have been willingness on both sides. By the time the Spartans had sent out a successor to Pausanias, a man called Dorcis, the new arrangements had been made, and Dorcis was rejected. According to Thucydides the Spartans were willing to acquiesce and let the alliance go ahead under Athenian leadership (I. 95. vi-vii), and that is probably true of the majority of the Spartans if not all (cf. p. 30).
Ath. Pol. 23. v writes of a full offensive and defensive alliance (‘to have the same friends and enemies’), for all time (symbolised by dropping lumps of metal in the sea), made for the Athenians with the Ionians by Aristides in 478/7. Thucydides writes that aproschema (‘pretext’, which might imply a contrast either between professed and real intentions or between original intention and later development) was to get revenge for what they had suffered by ravaging the King’s land (I. 96. i, cf. VI. 76. iii). Not all the allies had had their own land ravaged, as the Athenians had, and few scholars have felt able to believe that the purpose of this permanent alliance was simply raiding to obtain revenge. Thucydides elsewhere has speakers referring to the liberation of the Greeks (III. 10. iii, VI. 76. iv), and that theme occurs in Herodotus’ account of 479: it is very likely that both that and defence against further Persian attacks were intended when the alliance was formed, and why Thucydides wrote only of revenge and ravaging in I. 96 (see box) is an unsolved problem.
The Athenians took over the leadership in this way, with the willingness of the allies, because of their hatred of Pausanias. They determined which of the cities were to provide money against the barbarian and which ships; for the pretext was to get revenge for what they had suffered by ravaging the King’s land. This was when the office of Greek Treasurers [hellenotamiai] was first established for the Athenians, to receive the tribute [phoros] - for that was the name given to the payment of money. The first assessment of tribute was 460 talents. Delos was their treasury, and the meetings took place at the sanctuary. The Athenians were leaders of allies who were at first autonomous and deliberated in common meetings. (Thucydides, I. 96. i–97. i)
There are many other problems in Thucydides’ account of the organisation of the new alliance (I. 96. i–97. i).The Athenians (specifically Aristides: V. 18. v and the later sources) ‘determined which of the cities were to provide money against the barbarians and which ships. … This was when the office of Greek Treasurers (hellenotamiai) was first established for the Athenians, to receive the tribute (phoros) - for that was the name given to the payment of money. The first assessment of tribute was 460 talents.’ The likelihood is that at first the larger states all provided ships, as in other alliances the participants contributed their own forces; but it has been argued that more than half of the eventual members were so small that they could not man even one trireme for a long campaigning season, and most of the smaller states are likely from the beginning to have paid tribute. Aristides will have assessed the obligations of the different members, probably imposing a burden comparable to that imposed by the Persians when they reassessed the tribute of their Greek subjects after the Ionian Revolt of the 490’s (Hdt. VI. 42). But how were obligations in ships and in tribute balanced? And can the first assessment, even if it included a cash equivalent for ships, have amounted to as much as 460 talents, given that in 453, when there were more members and nearly all paid tribute, the total seems to have been under 500 talents? There have been various attempts to reject or explain Thucydides’ figure; he has another surprisingly high figure for 431 (cf. p. 97); the one inscribed assessment list which survives, that of 425, is an optimistic list (IG i3 71: cf. p. 99), and one possible explanation is that Aristides drew up an optimistic list in cash terms which included both actual and potential members, and that that list did indeed total 460 talents. Collecting the tribute, like commanding expeditions, could well have been accepted as a responsibility of the leader, and we need not doubt that the hellenotamiai were Athenians from the beginning.
Thucydides says that Delos, the small island in the southern Aegean with a major Ionian sanctuary of Apollo (whence the alliance’s modern name, Delian League), ‘was their treasury, and the meetings took place at the sanctuary. The Athenians were leaders of allies who were at first autonomous and deliberated in common meetings.’ We know that the treasury was moved from Delos in 454/3 (the first of the ‘Athenian tribute lists’ is that of 453: cf. p. 51). We have no direct evidence for what became of the meetings, but after 454/3 we find Athens taking decisions which ought to have been taken by meetings of the whole alliance if there were any, and we have no positive evidence that there were any, so probably when the treasury was moved the meetings were discontinued. The Mytilenaeans in a speech say that originally the Athenians led on an equal basis, and that the allies were equal in votes (isopsephot), but the large number of votes (polypsephia) made it impossible to resist Athens (Thuc. III. 10. iv-v, 11. iv).Two scenarios have been proposed: that Athens on one side was balanced by a council of allies, so that the allies together were equal in voting power to Athens (somewhat as in Sparta’s alliance, the Peloponnesian League, and in Athens’ fourth-century alliance, the Second Athenian League); or that there was a single body in which each member including Athens had one vote (as in the recent Greek alliance under Spartan leadership to resist the Persians). The recent alliance is the more relevant precedent, and it is easier to accept the claim that Athens led on a basis of equality if there was a single body in which Athens had one vote like the other members.
When Naxos was coerced, after a few years, Thucydides writes of its being ‘enslaved contrary to what was established’ (I. 98. iv: cf. p. 21). States which join an alliance always give up the total freedom to decide their own policy with no reference to others which they might otherwise enjoy, but it was probably not thought necessary to spell out any guarantees of autonomy at the League’s foundation. No previous combination of states in Greece had seriously reduced the members’ freedom; and after the Ionian Revolt, in which strong leadership had been lacking and Athens had supported the Asiatic Greeks for the first year but not afterwards, it must have seemed more likely that the Athenians would withdraw from the war against the Persians than that they would interfere with the allies’ freedom. (The actual word autonomia may have been coined in connection with the allies’ later attempts to retain as much freedom as they could when Athens did start encroaching.)
How large did the League become, and how quickly? The League was represented as a patriotic Greek alliance to fight against the barbarians, formed when the barbarians were on the defensive: support may have been widespread, but we cannot be sure that every single state in and around the Aegean will have been eager to join such an alliance (we happen to have evidence that Adramyttium, on the Asiatic coast facing Lesbos, was still in Persian hands in 421: Thuc. V. 1). Thucydides and other writers refer to the allies as Ionians, a word which could be applied to the eastern Greeks generally, but which attached more strictly to one strand of the Greek people, who could be distinguished from the Aeolians (to the north of them in the Aegean and Asia Minor) and the Dorians (to the south). Delos was Ionian in the strict sense, and it no doubt eased Athens’ relations with Dorian Sparta if it stressed its position as alleged mother city and as leader of the Ionians; but, of the likely early members, the cities of Lesbos were Aeolian and Byzantium was Dorian, and the League can never have been limited to those who were Ionian in the strict sense. Indeed, its members eventually included Carians, in south-western Asia Minor, who were not Greeks though their history had for a long time been bound up with that of the Asiatic Greeks.
The League’s Early Years
Thucydides gives a catalogue of episodes in the early history of the League (I. 98–101). Under the command of Cimon (son of the Miltiades who commanded at Marathon in 490) they captured from the Persians Eïon, on the Thracian coast at the mouth of the River Strymon.The area was important for silver and for ship-building timber, and Plutarch adds the information that Eïon was settled as an Athenian colony (Cim. 7. iii). They captured and the Athenians settled the north Aegean island of Scyros, occupied by a non-Greek people called Dolopians, and situated on the grain route from the Black Sea and the Hellespont to Athens - and Plutarch adds that in response to an oracle Cimon found and brought back to Athens what were said to be the bones of the hero Theseus (Thes. 36. i-iii,Cim. 8. iii-vii). Carystus, at the south end of Euboea and again on the route from the Hellespont to Athens, had been sacked by the Persians in 490 and had supported them in 480: it was attacked and forced to join the League. The Aegean island of Naxos revolted from the League, and was taken by siege and (metaphorically) enslaved: the best indication of what that is likely to mean is what happened to Thasos a little later (below). Thucydides does not say why Naxos revolted, but he attaches to this episode the comment that the Athenians were strict in exacting the allies’ contributions - they were using a permanent alliance to fight a permanent war - and that more and more members lessened their ability to resist by choosing to pay tribute rather than contribute their own forces.
Next came a major victory over the Persians by land and sea, attributed to Cimon again, at the mouth of the River Eurymedon, on the south coast of Asia Minor not quite as far east as Cyprus. To have gone there the Athenians must have felt safe in the Aegean, but Thucydides next mentions the revolt of the north Aegean island of Thasos - because of a dispute with Athens over its trading posts and a silver mine on the mainland. The Athenians besieged Thasos (later sources indicate that Cimon was again in command), and it was only in the third year that Thasos submitted: it had to demolish its city walls, surrender its warships, pay tribute in cash and give up its mainland possessions. The Athenians had tried to found a settlement at Nine Ways, where the Strymon could be crossed, at the time when they occupied Eïon (scholiast [ancient commentator] on Aeschin. II.Embassy 31); they tried again now, but the settlers were defeated and killed by the Thracians when they ventured further inland.
‘In the third year’ is Thucydides’ first indication of time; a later passage (IV. 102. ii-iii) and a probable emendation of schol. Aeschin. will make the three years of the siege 465/4–463/2. There are texts giving 476/5 as the date of the colony at Nine Ways coinciding with that at Eïon (schol. Aeschin.) and of the oracle leading to the capture of Scyros (Plut. Thes. 36. i): some scholars have used other texts to place Thucydides’ whole series of events in the 460’s, but probably we should date Eïon 476 and Scyros 475, and Carystus and Naxos not long after. It is possibly in response to success at the Eurymedon in 469 that Cimon and his fellow generals were invited to judge the tragedians’ competition in the spring of 468 (Plut. Cim. 8. vii-ix). Into this period we have also to fit the reappearance of Pausanias and his occupation of Byzantium until he was dislodged by the Athenians (Thuc. I. 128. ii–131. i): some have placed this before Eïon, on the basis of texts which take Cimon there from Byzantium (e.g. Diodorus XL 60. ii), but it is easier to make sense of his and Themistocles’ careers if we rely on a text which has Pausanias in Byzantium until c.470 (Just.Epit. IX. 1. iii: cf. p. 30). Just before and overlapping with the siege of Thasos, there was fighting involving Cimon against Persians and Thracians in the Chersonese, the tongue of land on the European side of the Hellespont (Plut. Cim. 14. i, cf. the casualty list IG i3 1144).
Thucydides has written a selective account to illustrate the growth of Athenian power: he does not include the last episode mentioned above, and there may well have been many other episodes which he does not include and which we do not know of. At Eïon, at the Eurymedon and in the Chersonese the League fought against the Persians; at Carystus it attacked a city which had earlier supported the Persians; in preventing Naxos from withdrawing it upheld the permanence of a permanent alliance. On the other hand, Eïon was settled by the Athenians; Scyros had nothing to do with the Persians but was of particular interest to Athens and again was settled by the Athenians; the location of Carystus gave Athens a particular interest in that city; at Naxos Athens was using force against a League member (the appearance of Carystonicus and Naxiades, in an Athenian casually list of the 440’s, IG i3 1162. 27, 79, shows that these were seen as achievements to be proud of); and Athens coveted the mainland possessions of Thasos. In that case it is hard to understand how the attack can have been justified to the League, since the large islands off the coast of Asia Minor had similar peraiai, mainland dependencies, which they would not want to lose to Athens. This episode, to which Diodorus attaches his comment on Athens’ growing imperialism (XL 70. ii-iii), was the most blatant case yet of Athens’ using the League to further its own interests.
It is clear that from the beginning the Athenians found ways of advancing their own interests through the League, but that does not prove that they had sinister intentions from the beginning: more probably the anti-Persian intentions were genuine, and continued to be acted on, but opportunities presented themselves and were accepted, and what was decided on one occasion set the pattern for what might be decided on others.
NOTE ON FURTHER READING
On the Delian League as a whole Meritt et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists (with a general narrative in vol. iii part 3), was the major study of the mid twentieth century, showing great boldness in the restoration of fragmentary inscriptions. McGregor, The Athenians and Their Empire, gives a very uncritical account by one of Meritt’s collaborators; Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, is the best single-volume treatment; Rhodes, The Athenian Empire, is a booklet which focuses on the main problems; Low (ed.), The Athenian Empire, is a collection of reprinted articles; Ma et al. (eds.),Interpreting the Athenian Empire, is a collection of new studies.
Different views of the League’s origin and organisation are given by J. A. O. Larsen, ‘The Constitution and Original Purpose of the Delian League’, HSCPli 1940, 175–213 (which I follow); N. G. L. Hammond, ‘The Origins and Nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 BC’, JHS lxxxvi 1967, 41–61, revised as ‘The Organization of the Athenian Alliance against Persia’, in his Studies in Greek History, 311–45.
The chronology of the Pentecontaetia is full of uncertainties: there are similar but not identical date tables in Gomme, Historical Commentary on Thucydides, i. 394–6; Meritt et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists, iii. 175–9; CAH2 v. 506–11; there is a review of the problems in Rhodes, The Athenian Empire, ch. 3; chronologies widely divergent from those of Gomme, The Athenian Tribute Lists and CAH2, v, have from time to time been canvassed but have not gained much support.