Commerce and Diplomacy
The First Year of American Foreign Policy 1775-1776
European nations established colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as methods of increasing economic power.
It was understood in political and diplomatic circles that colonies existed
for the sole purpose of supplying the parent country with its exported
wealth and resources. Practice dictated that the greater the colony in
terms of labor, resources, or manufacturers, the greater the wealth and
world influence of the colonizing nation.
Britain's North American colonies had created an incredibly dynamic commercial
operation upon which Britain established its empire during the eighteenth
century. French and Dutch traders in the Caribbean Islands and West
Indies traded sugar for New England rum. English ship manufacturers
purchased much of North Carolina's extensive pine and lumber exports
for ship masts and planks. France craved Virginia tobacco while southern
Europeans paid handsomely for South Carolina's rice and indigo exports.
Furthermore, American colonists were major purchasers of British manufactures.
In 1770 alone, British exports to the colonies were worth more than 1.7
million pounds sterling. 
Historian Theodore Draper termed the increasing influence of American
commerce on Britain as the "Americanization" of British trade. He concluded
that the decline of British trade with European nations coincided with
an increase in trade with America. "Together," wrote Draper, "these trends
pushed the American colonies into the forefront of British economic and
political concerns." 
However, British efforts to control American commerce became more exclusive
and widespread during the early 1770s. These efforts, considered excessive
by colonists, motivated colonial leaders to seek trade alternatives. With
the outbreak of war in 1775, American colonists were faced with the necessity
of having to develop a foreign policy in which to secure their commercial
The diplomatic atmosphere among European nations was a complicated mixture
of political intrigue, familial obligations, tenuous economic codependency,
and precarious alliances. Diplomacy was a challenging environment for
nations with centuries of foreign policy experience from which to draw
upon, much less the American colonies whose relative political immaturity
must have seemed infantile to the aged monarchies of Britain, France,
and Spain. However, what America lacked in diplomatic finesse and experience
was compensated by the power of its commercial prowess ñ an enticing attraction
to European nations eager to weaken Britain's long-standing commercial
and naval dominance.
The foreign policy idea to blossom out of these commercial concerns was
simple: allow unlimited access to American commerce to Europeans nation
willing to trade in exchange for war materials such as weapons, tents,
uniforms, and gunpowder. This foreign policy would not contain agreements
of mutual defense, pledges of troop support, or any other potential for
entangling alliances, only free trade. Considering their established commercial
success, it is easily understood why American leaders considered such
a commercially oriented approach to foreign policy. However, historians
have criticized their emphasis on commerce. In his overview of American
diplomacy during the Revolution, Lawrence S. Kaplan claimed that a policy
based on commercialism was "the mouthings of colonial bumpkins innocent
of the realities of international politics, or empty bravado of a frightened
government pinning its hopes on impossible dreams to divert itself from
its perils." 
Jonathan R. Dull considered such a policy naÔve, especially when used
to acquire French support: "such facile optimism about the attractiveness
of a commercial alliance was based on a naÔve overestimation of the importance
of American trade."  James H. Hutson, in his examination
of the powerful influence John Adams wielded on American foreign policy
during the Revolution, argued that the only attraction of commerce for
European nations was not so much the pure lure of financial gain but subsequently,
the potential for American commerce to neutralize Britain and maintain
the balance of power in Europe.  Even Adams' "Model Treaty," drafted in late 1776 as a
blueprint for commercial alliances, was not so much a foreign policy success
but rather only "the natural offspring of the union between revolutionary
necessity and revolutionary aspiration." 
The entrance of France in the war in 1778 as an American ally formally
thrust the American colonies from behind the door of covert assistance
into the open world of eighteenth-century European diplomacy. Although
these criticisms of early American foreign policy take into consideration
the colonies' historic commercial success and the encumbering restrictions
of British commercial policies, one important question remains. What response
did American leaders receive during their first year of diplomatic efforts
to encourage such a substantial emphasis on commerce? This examination
demonstrates that American leaders received an overwhelmingly favorable
response from foreign nations to their commerce proposals during their
first year of diplomatic explorations. Such a favorable response encouraged
and supported American efforts at defeating British political and military
might and securing American independence.
The significant break in the delicate balancing act between Britain and
America occurred in 1774 when Britain closed Boston harbor in retaliation
for the Sons of Liberty having tossed more than 300 chests of British
tea into Boston harbor. A series of subsequent legislation, nicknamed
the Coercive Acts and the Intolerable Acts by colonists, further impacted
colonial commerce by restricting the destination of American exports to
British ports only. These acts increased American suspicion of British
objectives and further eroded American-British relations.
Colonists responded to these acts by boycotting goods manufactured in
Britain and withholding exports of American goods to British ports. The
colonists had previous success with boycotts. In the late 1760s, for example,
their non-importation boycott against the Townshend duties created a drop
in trade worth 700,000 pounds sterling.  This time, however,
the boycott and non-export agreement impacted American trade and created
hardships for laborers and merchants alike.
Opposition to the boycott increased. Members of the Pennsylvania Committee
of Safety, for instance, submitted a proposal to the Second Continental
Congress requesting a modification to the non-export agreement to allow
local merchants to trade for war materials.  Such events raised serious questions among delegates about
the future of America's commercial interests.
The American non-exportation agreement meant no commodities except rice
destined for re-export was allowed to clear for Britain, Ireland, or the
West Indies. 
Rice was an exception as roughly half of America's annual crop was exported
directly to southern Europe, bypassing Britain altogether.  Benjamin Franklin, a leading figure in American diplomatic
efforts, proposed opening ports to foreign trade for two years if Britain
did not repeal the restraining legislation. However, most congressional
delegates considered such a concept too audacious when it was first proposed
in 1775. Conventional wisdom held that American commerce was in many ways
still under Britain's authority.
Ironically, the belief in American commercial subservience was not uncommon.
Franklin informed Lord Chatham, a Member of Parliament sympathetic to
colonial interests, that Americans were not entirely dissatisfied with
the guidance of British navigation laws nor necessarily against commercial
regulation by Parliament.  Rather, the display of military might by British leaders
and the armed conflict being waged on American soil were motivating factors
to warrant Americans to entertain ideas of commercial independence.
Franklin wrote to a friend in July 1775 that the Americans "have not
yet applied to any foreign power for assistance, nor offered our commerce
for their friendship. Perhaps we never may; yet it is natural to think
of it, if we are pressed."  Nevertheless, discussions on the subject were postponed
and for the remainder of the year, American ports would officially remain
closed to foreign nations.  However, congressional delegates took actions to explore
the possibility of trade with foreign nations.
In November 1775, delegates established a committee of five members,
known as the Committee of Secret Correspondence, to maintain correspondence
with friends in Europe and "know the disposition of foreign powers towards
Many American statesmen believed commerce would become a leading element
in European diplomatic relationships. That was certainly true among the
five members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence as it was composed
of influential merchants and diplomats such as Robert Morris and Benjamin
Franklin. These men had political contacts in Europe, and among the first
they wrote to were Arthur Lee and Charles Dumas.
Arthur Lee had been in Britain for several years and most recently had
worked with Franklin on various proposals to British administrators prior
to Franklin's return to America earlier in the year. In December 1775,
he was the only colonial representative living in London.
Charles Dumas was a Dutch intellectual who was sympathetic to America's
democratic vision. Dumas' residence in The Hague, Netherlands, was an
ideal location for American diplomatic interests. The presence of diplomatic
attaches who represented many leading European nations created an environment
where the intricacies of affairs of state could be accessed relatively
easily and used to forecast the political winds with impressive accuracy.
Franklin informed Dumas that arms and ammunition were much wanted in
the colonies and that "any merchants who would venture to send ships laden
with those articles might make great profit."  This suggestion was a major enticement for Dutch
navigators as they were eager to weaken British naval dominance after
losing their maritime influence to the British in the middle of the seventeenth
century. Both Lee and Dumas agreed to explore European attitudes toward
the colonies. Foremost among potential commercial partners was France.
Prior to the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), France entertained strong
hopes of controlling the wealth of Britain's thirteen colonies but French
resources in America were sorely inadequate for such a task. The isolated
nature of French settlements along the St. Lawrence River basin and in
the Hudson River Valley and Mississippi River Valley severely inhibited
any capacity for an effective military defense, population expansion or
foundation for economic stability.
Unlike their English neighbors, French settlers did not receive any consistent
or organized support from their leaders. French colonial policy in the
New World lacked a defined course without any achievable objectives. These
conditions, in conjunction with their defeat in the Seven Years War, permanently
extinguished any dreams of French control in the New World.
However, whatever spark of hope for revenge that lay smoldering beneath
the surface of French diplomacy was certainly fanned by America's congressional
delegates and foreign agents. Julien-Alexandre Achard de Bonvouloir, a
French nobleman on an unofficial visit to Philadelphia in late 1775 on
behalf of the French ambassador, informally assured American leaders that
his nation was taking a particular interest in America's struggle.
By the end of the year, two French commercial agents signed contracts
with Congress for the purchase of munitions and powder to be paid for
by exports of American produce.  Forty American merchants had also signed contracts with
the committee to deliver gunpowder and other supplies for American troops.  Within a few months, French ships arrived in Philadelphia
loaded with foreign goods,  and agent Arthur
Lee assured the Committee of Secret Correspondence "that the French Government
will wink at the exportation of arms and ammunition." 
In early 1776, news of additional British acts aimed at restraining American
commerce formally convinced many congressional delegates of Britain's
firm intention to destroy American trade.  Coinciding with this news was the publication
of Thomas Paine's Common Sense. Paine was able to argue a convincing
case for complete independence from Britain that American leaders had
failed to articulate adequately among the colonial population. The widespread
popularity of Common Sense assisted congressional delegates in
their hand wringing discussions over the wisdom and practicality of opening
American ports to foreign nations.
The impact of Common Sense in terms of advocating complete American
independence was felt in Parliament. One member warned, "ÖAmerica aimed
at independence. It was plain, from the pamphlet called Common Sense."  More importantly,
Paine underlined the importance of diplomacy in winning the war against
Britain.  He declared that "our plan is
commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship
of all Europe."  The impact of
Paine's impassioned pleas on the American populace and the threatening
actions of British policy makers persuaded congressional delegates of
the need for commercial opportunities other than Britain. On April 6,
1776, America formally opened its ports to foreign nations. 
Playing into the hand of American foreign policy leaders was a strong
belief that British citizens were sympathetic to America's cause, and
that they understood America's struggle was against corruption in the
British government, not against the British people per se. American overseas
agents routinely forwarded information based on conversations, observations,
and intelligence that widespread support existed for Americans among several
members of Parliament and the English people.  After all, British merchants
directly benefited from American trade and traditionally, eighteenth-century
parliaments and commercial boards were sensitive to the political views
of merchants.  British merchants
had already played an important role in defending American commercial
interests. The Society of Merchant Venturers in Bristol helped repeal
the Stamp Act due to their financial loss.  Franklin even cited various expressions of support America
had received from British merchants in a defense he wrote against accusations
that American merchants neglected their financial obligations to British
Furthermore, the Committee of Secret Correspondence had been informed
that British troops boarding ships for the colonies were reluctant to
go and were generally unenthusiastic about fighting rebelling colonists
in America. 
Arthur Lee had reported that members in Parliament who were sympathetic
to America had tried on various occasions to discern possible terms of
reconciliation but reported that "unconditional surrender is the language
and intention of the court." 
This uncompromising attitude was particularly evident in British commanders
stationed in North America. Lord Howe, for example, informed Franklin
that Britain sought to establish some semblance of a reconciliation with
its errant children except that "the deep rooted prejudices of America
and the necessity of preventing her Trade from passing into foreign Channels,
must keep us still a divided People."  Franklin responded in a language
that elevated the struggle from a commercial dispute to an issue of principle:
To me it seems that neither the obtaining or retaining of any trade,
how valuable soever, is an Object for which Men may justly Spill each
other's Blood; that the true and sure means of extending and securing
Commerce is the goodness and cheapness of Commodities; and that
the profits of no trade can ever be equal to the Expence [sic]of
it, and of holding it, by Fleets and Armies. 
Despite these differences between America and Britain in terms of resolving
their differences, growing interest in American commerce by some European
nations began to make discussions of possible reconciliation irrelevant.
In the spring of 1776, Dumas reported that both French and Spanish officials
were interested in trading with America as Britain's "enormous maritime
power fills them with apprehension." Dumas spoke with the French minister
as to the possibility of his nation mediating a solution to America's
conflict with Britain. France was unwilling to mediate the conflict while
Americans were still subjects of Britain. Dumas then inquired as to French
interest in commerce. Since France was theoretically at peace with England,
French officials were unwilling to enter into the fray as an ally, knowing
full well that such an action would commit France to open conflict with
However, French diplomats suggested that Americans should apply to France
for exports of needed materials, as these nations would consider secretly
encouraging and tolerating war materials shipped to the colonies via French
and Spanish ports in the West Indies.  France even stationed a naval squadron off the Channel
Ports and the French West Indies to help American ships in distress.  Dumas forwarded
a list of desperately needed items for America's war effort.  The French minister reminded Dumas at a later meeting
that "the Colonies have no need that either France or Spain should enter
into this war. Commerce alone will furnish to the Americans all that they
want to defend themselves." 
The Committee of Secret Correspondence sent Silas Deane to Europe in
the spring of 1776 to assist Lee in his negotiations with France. Deane's
instructions reflect the hope placed in French support in the event that
America gained independence:
France would be looked upon as the power, whose friendship
it would be fittest for us to obtain and cultivate, That the commercial
advantages Britain had enjoyed with the Colonies had contributed
greatly to her late wealth and importance. That it is likely great part
our commerce will naturally fall to the share of FranceÖand that as our
trade was rapidly increasing with our increase of people, and in a
greater proportion, her part of it will be extremely valuable. 
Deane posed as a merchant in Paris to buy military supplies on credit
and inquire about political and military support. Deane met with the chief
secretary of the French ambassador who informed Deane that "the importance
of American commerce was well known and that no country could so well
supply the Colonies and in turn receive their produce, as France."  Deane reminded the secretary
that an enormous surplus of American produce existed as a result of the
cessation of Anglo-American trade and that the Americans were exploring
how to dispose of it. 
Some French officials warned the French foreign minister that American
failure in the war against Britain would eventually lead to a joint Anglo-American
assault on the French sugar islands in the West Indies. Nevertheless,
France agreed to secret assistance and convinced King Charles III of Spain
to contribute support as well. The French established a commercial house
to handle transactions with America and assigned a correspondent in each
French port to provide storage for any American goods destined to other
nations in Europe. The chief secretary promised that he would "remove
all obstacles that may oppose your wishes from the politics of Europe"
and that "my indefatigable zeal shall never be wanting toÖfacilitate
all operations of a commerce which my advantage, much less than yours,
has made me undertake with you." 
To further assist in these efforts, France created the "Rodrigue Hortalez
and Company," a sham trading company through which war materials could
be shipped. American tobacco was the one commercial export the French
repeatedly made application for through this company. The tobacco market
was worth twenty-four million livres to France and British interference
with American shipping had frustrated French efforts to procure this export.
Lee informed the Committee of Secret Correspondence that France was likely
to tell British officials that if they could not furnish tobacco to the
French market that the French would send for it themselves. Lee prompted
the committee to consider "what an important instrument that is in your
An example of the role that French demand for tobacco played in securing
American war materials is evident in the following case. Under the shipping
umbrella of Rodrigue Hortalez and Company, a French vessel arrived at
the island of San Domingo in the West Indies loaded with munitions and
other merchandise valued at more than 25,000 pounds sterling destined
for America. In return, France requested that America "send a ship loaded
with good Virginia tobaccoÖwhich I can no more do without than your friend
can do without what I send him."  France would eventually ship 200,000 livres worth of
arms and ammunition through "Monsieur Hortales." 
However willing a nation sought to support America through trade, it
was the prospect of interfering with internal British colonial policy
and contending against British naval power that sent European diplomats
scurrying to the shelter of supporting America through covert trade.  The fact that
the colonies had not formally declared independence from Britain weighed
heavy in the decision discussions of European courts. Once America formally
declared its independence, advised France's chief secretary, the colonies
"may obtain all the countenance and assistance they wish for in the most
open and public manner and the most unlimited credit with the merchants
of this kingdom." 
Although some Americans expressed concern that trading with France would
lead to entangling alliances, John Adams reminded them that "I am not
for soliciting any political connection, or military assistance, or indeed
naval, from France.
I wish for nothing but commerce, a mere marine treaty with them."  Furthermore, American leaders
could not deny their need for French war materials to conduct operations
against the British. For example, Franklin assured General Horatio Gates
in August 1776 that "arms and ammunition are also continually arriving,
the French having resolved to permit the exportation to us, as they heartily
wish us success; so that in another year we shall be well provided."  Once French assistance began to arrive, Dutch
aid was not far behind.
Deane had cautioned Dumas in his negotiations with Dutch officials that
"The United Colonies ask no aid or alliances."  Such a diplomatic warning was unnecessary as the potential
for quick profits was the major enticement for Dutch merchants.  The Netherlands
had pursued a policy of neutrality since the Treaty of Utrecht with France
in 1713. However, exactly what neutrality entailed was subjective as it
depended on which country defined it.
The English blockade of major American ports as a result of the Boston
Port Act had interrupted Dutch commercial interests in America.  Some Dutch merchants were able to supply war
materials directly to the North American colonies even though sailing
directly to American harbors defied British prohibitions. Dutch merchants
creatively counteracted this restriction by shipping to their various
colonies in the West Indies and in the Caribbean, a practice considered
legal by British authorities.  However delicate the political and diplomatic
maneuvering was in this region due to this precarious arrangement, British
officials were more than displeased that Governor Johannes de Graaf of
the Dutch island of St. Eustatius openly supported American ships entering
its harbor and allowed them to use the harbor facilities. 
The British navy had investigated Dutch ships that traded with France
during the Seven Years War and Dutch merchants received the same harassment
by English privateers in 1775 and 1776. These merchants demanded protection
from Prince William V of Orange, the Stadholder of the Netherlands and
a strong supporter of English interests.  The governing board of the Dutch West India Company made
the first complaints to the Netherlands' ruling assembly, the States General,
about pressuring Britain to lift its blockade of American ports. New England
products were in high demand in the Dutch colonies in the Caribbean, and
the governing board warned that famine was possible.  This debate between the pro-English
Stadholderians and the pro-American merchant class as to whether to increase
the Dutch navy and army in response to British harassment became a "burning
issue" after the French formally entered the war in 1778. Until then,
Dutch merchants were considered not to be in breach of any treaty agreement
- so long as war did not break out.  As the Netherlands and France
began to reap profits form their commerce with America, other nations
expressed interest in American trade.
Writing from Paris, Deane was able to encourage Dumas and the Secret
Committee of Correspondence that "our commerce is now on as good a footing
in this kingdom and in Spain as the commerce of any other nation, and
I trust will very soon have an important preference."  Shipmasters in Spain offered services to profit from
gun running and trade.  Although Portugal was reliant on England for much of
its trade and protection, Deane was granted an interview with the proposed
ambassador of Portugal on commercial affairs.  Deane learned that the King
of Prussia possessed ports around the Baltic Sea but that "he is ambitious
of becoming a maritime powerÖbut without commerce it is impossible to
effect the design, and no commerce can put him so directly in the road
as the American." 
The demand for coffee, sugar, and other products originating from the
West Indies was increasing fast in northern Europe and "an application
to the King of Prussia will do no harm."  Another agent proposed acquiring military stores from
Russia, which had been a minor market for American naval stores, provided
commodities such as hemp, iron, and masts on Dutch and French ships, much
to the annoyance of British observers.  Britain demanded
that Spain, France, and Portugal deliver American ships at anchor in their
European authorities dragged their feet in response to this demand. Franklin
advised agents to remind these nations that "the time has been when they
stood much in need of American Supplies, that such time may come again"
and that "it is evidently their interest to encourage our Commerce, so
we hope you'l [sic] be able to influence them by One Means or other
to protect and License it in the utmost extent."  Only Hungary remained aloof from American commercial
enticements. Empress Queen of Hungary issued a strong edict against the
export of arms and munitions to America from her states.  Despite such a resistance, however,
American leaders had secured the commercial opportunities they sought.
British efforts to control America's commercial endeavors during the early
1770s drove colonists towards independence when ironically British colonial
policy was created and implemented to prevent such an event. As colonial
leaders sought a policy in which to engage foreign nations, commerce became
the axle upon which the wheel of foreign policy would revolve. Numerous
American agents scattered throughout European capitols consistently forwarded
news of strong interest in America's commercial offerings. As France, Spain,
and The Netherlands covertly provided war materials in exchange for commercial
opportunities, the American colonies were able to triumph against political
and commercial tyranny. Founding a foreign policy based on commercial opportunity
proved to be a prudent and effective diplomacy.
Simmons, R.C. and
P.D.G. Thomas, eds. Proceedings and Debates of the British
Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754-1783 vol. 6 (Millwood:
Kraus International Publications, 1982).
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Eighteenth-century Dutch City (Cambridge: B. Blackwell,
Carter, Alice Clare.
Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch
Policy 1667-1795 (London: Edward Arnold, 1975).
A Struggle for Power: The American Revolution (New York: Times
Dull, Jonathan R.
A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale
Griffiths, David M.
"American Commercial Diplomacy in Russia, 1780 to 1783," William
and Mary Quarterly
Third Series, Volume 27, Issue 3 (July 1970), 379-410.
Hutson, James H. John
Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution.
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of Kentucky Press, 1980).
Jameson, J. Franklin,
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Jones, Howard. The
Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the
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Kammen, Michael G.
A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).
Kaplan, Lawrence S.
Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy 1763-1801. (New
The Macmillan Company,
Miles. Congress and the Munitions Merchants: The Secret Committee
of Trade during the American Revolution, 1775-1777 (New York: Garland
D., "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William
and Mary Quarterly
Third Series Volume 22 Issue 4 (October 1965), 584-610.
Saul, Norman E., "The
Beginnings of American-Russian Trade, 1763-1766," William
and Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, Volume 26 Issue 4 (October 1969), 596-600.
J. W. The Dutch Republic and American Independence trans. by
Herbert H. Rowen (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
Tuchman, Barbara W.
The First Salute: A View of the American Revolution (New
Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
Walton, Gary M., "New
Evidence on Colonial Commerce," Journal of Economic History
Volume 28 Issue 3
(September 1968), 363-389.
 Theodore Draper, A Struggle for
Power: The American Revolution (New York: Times Books, 1996), 128.
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Colonies into
Nation: American Diplomacy 1763-1801(New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1972), 91.
 Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic
History of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press,
 See James H. Hutson, John Adams
and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: The University
of Kentucky Press, 1980). Although Hutson emphasizes the balance of
power over commercial trade, he nevertheless acknowledges that a major
objective of Adam's Model Treaty, an early blueprint of American foreign
policy, was "to dissolve the British monopoly of American commerce and
to unite all nations, Great Britain not excepted, to trade with the
United States on equal terms." 28.
 Merrill D. Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson
and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly
Third Series Volume 22 Issue 4 (October 1965), 588.
 Michael G. Kammen, A Rope of Sand:
The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 198.
 William B. Willcox, The
Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).,
103, hereafter cited as The Papers of Benjamin Franklin.
 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,
 Gary M. Walton, "New Evidence on
Colonial Commerce," Journal of Economic History Volume 28 Issue
3 (September 1968,) 363.
 "Franklin to Thomson, Secretary
of Congress, London, February 5, 1775," Francis Wharton, ed., The
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1889), 12-13, hereafter cited as Diplomatic
 "Franklin to Josiah Priestly, July
7, 1775," Diplomatic Correspondence, 59.
 Samuel Flagg Bemis,The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 29.
 "Franklin, et al., committee of
secret correspondence, to Arthur Lee, December 12, 1775," Diplomatic
 "Franklin to Dumas, December 19,
1775," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 66.
 "Arthur Lee to Lieutenant-Governor
Colden, February 13, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 74.
 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,
 R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas,
eds. Proceedings and Debates of the British
Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754-1783
vol. 6 (Millwood: Kraus International Publications, 1982), 504.
 Howard Jones. The Course of
American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the Present (Chicago:
The Dorsey Press, 1988), 6.
 See, for example, "Dumas to the
Committee of Secret Correspondence, August 10, 1776," Diplomatic
 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,
104. See also "Intended Vindication and Offer from Congress to Parliament,
in 1775," 119.
 See "Arthur Lee to Lieutenant-Governor
Colden, February 13, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 73.
 "Arthur Lee to Mrs. Bache (Dr.
Franklin's daughter), March 19, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence,
 "Letter from Lord Howe to Benjamin
Franklin, June 20, 1776," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 484.
 "Letter from Benjamin Franklin
to Lord Howe, July 20, 1776," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,
 "Dumas to Franklin, April 30, 1776,"
Diplomatic Correspondence, 86.
 "Dumas to Franklin, April 30, 1776,"
Diplomatic Correspondence, 87.
 "Dumas to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, May 14, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 91.
 "Instructions to Silas Deane from
the Committee of Secret Correspondence, March 2, 1776," The Papers
of Benjamin Franklin, 372.
 "Deane to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, August 18, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence,
 "R. Hortalez & Co., (Beaumarchais)
to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, August 18, 1776," Diplomatic
Correspondence, 129, 131.
 "A. Lee to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, June 3, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 95.
 "Beaumarchais (under the name of
Rodrique Hortalez & Co.) to A. Lee (under name of Mary Johnston),
June 6, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 97. Some members of
Parliament considered foreign support of America as impossible due to
the perceived lack of financial resources in the colonies from which
to pay foreign nations. As one member of Parliament exclaimed: "America
had no prospect of deriving support from any foreign power, because
she was not able to pay for them; neither France nor Spain would assist
them, unless well paid." Simmons and Thomas, 408.
 Covert trade during the American
Revolution has produced a historiography all its own. Two important
works are Barbara W. Tuchman The First Salute: A View of the American
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988) and Elizabeth Miles
Nuxoll Congress and the Munitions Merchants: The Secret Committee
of Trade during the American Revolution, 1775-1777
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1985).
 "Deane to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, August 18, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence,
 "Franklin to Gates, August 28,
1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 134.
 "Deane to Dumas, August 18, 1776,"
Diplomatic Correspondence, 128.
 Franklin had informed the Dutch
that whoever brought in needed articles of war would carry off the value
in American provisions in the West Indies where they could expect higher
prices than if exported directly from the colonies. See "Franklin to
Dumas, December 19, 1775," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 66.
 Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality
or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy 1667-1795 (London:
Edward Arnold, 1975), 85.
 Carter, 98. For another account
of de Graaf's role, see Tuchman, 5-17. Though dated, Franklin J. Jameson
has written the standard account of the role St. Eustatius played in
the Revolution. See "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," The
American Historical Review, 8:4 (Jul., 1903), 683-708.
 Wayne Ph. Te. Brake, Regents
and Rebels: The Revolutionary World of an Eighteenth-Century Dutch City
(Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1989), 38.
 J. W. Schulte Nordholt
The Dutch Republic and American Independence translated by Herbert
H. Rowen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 34.
 "Deane to Dumas, September 11,
1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 138.
 "Deane to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, August 18, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence,
 David M. Griffiths, "American Commercial
Diplomacy in Russia, 1780 to 1783," William and Mary Quarterly
Third Series Volume 27 Issue 3 (July 1970), 393; see also Norman E.
Saul, "The Beginnings of American-Russian Trade, 1763-1766," William
and Mary Quarterly Third Series Volume 26 Issue 4 (October 1969),
 "Committee of Secret Correspondence
to Silas Deane, October 1, 1776," The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,
 "Dumas to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, May 14, 1776," Diplomatic Correspondence, 91