The Vicksburg Campaign
Ulysses S. Grant, General, U. S. A.
It is generally regarded as an axiom in war that all great armies moving in an enemy's country should start from a base of supplies, which should be fortified and guarded, and to which the army is to fall back in case of disaster. The first movement looking to Vicksburg and the force defending it as an objective was begun early in November, 1862, and conformed to this axiom. It followed the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, with Columbus, Kentucky, as a base, and soon after it started, a cooperating column was moved down the Mississippi River on trans ports, with Memphis as its base. Both these movements failing, the entire Army of the Tennessee was transferred to the neighborhood of Vicksburg, and landed on the opposite or western bank of the river at Milliken's Bend.
The Mississippi flows through a low alluvial bottom many miles in width; and is very tortuous in its course, running to all points of the compass, sometimes within a few miles. This valley is bounded on the east side by a range of high land rising in some places more than two hundred feet above the bottom. At points the river runs up to the bluffs, washing their base. Vicksburg is built on the first high land on the eastern bank below Memphis, and four hundred miles from that place by the windings of the river.
The winter of 1862-63 was unprecedented for continuous high water in the Mississippi, and months were spent in ineffectual efforts to reach high land above Vicksburg from which we could operate against that stronghold, and in making artificial waterways through which a fleet might pass, avoiding the batteries to the south of the town, in case the other efforts should fail.
In early April, 1863, the waters of the Mississippi having receded sufficiently to make it possible to march an army across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, I determined to adopt this course, and moved my advance to a point below the town. It was necessary, however, to have transports below, both for the purpose of ferrying troops over the river and to carry supplies.
These had necessarily to run the batteries. Under the direction of Admiral Porter this was successfully done. On the 29th, Grand Gulf, the first bluff south of Vicksburg on the east side of the river, and about fifty miles below, was unsuccessfully attacked by the navy. The night of the same day the batteries of that place were run by the navy and transports, again under the direction of Admiral Porter, and on the following day the river was crossed by the troops, and a landing effected at Bruinsburg, some nine miles below.
I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. I had with me the Thirteenth Corps, General McClernand commanding, and two brigades of Logan's division of the Seventeenth Corps, General McPherson commanding ; in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. These were soon reenforced by the remaining brigade of Logan's division and by Crocker's division of the Seventeenth Corps. On the 7th of May I was further reenforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the Fifteenth Corps.
My total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, Haynes's Bluff, and Jackson, with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. My first problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base, and then if possible beat the enemy in detail outside the fortifications of Vicksburg. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg, and was connected with it by a railroad. Haynes's Bluff is eleven miles north, and on the Yazoo River, which empties into the Mississippi some miles above the town.
Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us, and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg; and as it is a navigable stream, and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more than doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip or even two. But the landing of the Thirteenth Corps and one division of the Seventeenth was effected during the day, April 30th, and early evening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour before sunset, and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting-point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson.
McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles south of Port Gibson at Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men under General Bowen. His hope , was to hold me in check until reenforcements under Loring could reach him from Vicksburg ; but Loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corps followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battle-field whenever the Thirteenth Corps could be got out of the way.
The country W this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. Where there are no clearings, the sides of the hills are covered with a ver y heavy growth of timber, and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one.
Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson divides, taking two ridges, which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. This made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. One flank could not reenforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads.
McClernand put the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch, and Osterhaus on the left. I was on the field by 10 A. M., and inspected both flanks in person. On the .right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. On the left, however Osterhaus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed, with some loss.
As soon as the road could be clear ed of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who was close upon the r ear of the Thirteenth Corps with two brigades of Logan's division. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade (General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge, and when Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine Osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy loss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset.
While the movement to our left was going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reenforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. I had been upon the ground, and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook us, about two miles from Port Gibson ; then the troops went into bivouac for the night.
We started next morning [May 2d] for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road.
We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pier re. At this time the water was high, and the current rapid. What might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. Colonel James H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generally joined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed, and marched eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery which had been left behind, with infantry supports, to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing, and to reach the North Fork to repair the bridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reenforced by Crocker's division McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping, except to get two days' rations. McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi River guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until Sherman's command should relieve it.
When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon-train. The train, still west of the Mississippi, was carried around, with proper escort; by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times, seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation servants, mess, chest, and everything except what I had on, were with this train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg, which I borrowed with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. I had no other for nearly a week.
It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could be taken from the country ; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed therefore, immediately on landing, that all the vehicles and draught animals , whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the tops with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plow-harness, straw-collars, rope lines, etc. ; long coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped for the time.
No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured, when time could be spar ed to observe them.
During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at 5 the next morning. Before the leading brigade was over, it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position ; but they were soon driven off. It was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's Ferry, over the Big Black, was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress.
McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's Ferry before night, seized the ferry-boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of the road going to Vicksburg with the road from Gr and Gulf to Raymond and Jackson was reached, Logan, with his division, was turned to the left toward Grand Gulf.
I went with him a short distance from this junction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of Port Gibson, and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle ; but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to hold Hankinson's Ferry, and the road back to Willow Springs, J. with one division ; General McClernand who was now in the rear was to join in this, as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear .
On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into the one from Vicksburg to the same place, six or seven miles out, I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry.
Admiral Porter had already arrived with his fleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.
When I reached Grand Gulf, May 3d, I had not been with my baggage since the 27th of April, and, consequently, had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers, and get a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan, commanding above Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About 12 o'clock at night I was through my work, and started for Hankinson's Ferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard from Banks, who was on the Red River, and he said that he could not be at Port Hudson before the 10th of May, and then with only fifteen thousand men. Up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf as a base of supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and cooperate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson.
The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. To wait for his cooperation would have detained me at least a month. The reenforcements would not have reached 10,000 men, after deducting casualties and necessary river-guards, at all high points close to the river, for over 300 miles. The enemy would have strengthened his position and been reenforced by more men than Banks could have brought.
I therefore determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg, and invest or capture the city.
Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base, and the authorities at Washington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove this course ; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. The time it would take to communicate with Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. Even Sherman, who afterward ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four States of the Confederacy, with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's Ferry ; advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.
He urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be Jammed, as sure as life." To this I replied : " I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can and make the country " ' furnish the balance. We started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations and received no more from our own supplies for some days ; abundance was found in the meantime. A delay would give the enemy time to reenforce and fortify.
McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies to give them three days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry, and forage were found in abundance.
Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country but bread and coffee could not be secured in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we were stopping day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by the troops nearest by; so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo, above Vicksburg.
While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations, I ordered reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with a view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and attack the city at once.
On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf, and crossed his command that night and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up from Grand Gulf for the advanced troops, and were issued. Orders were given f or a f or war d movement the next clay. Sherman was directed to order up Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times with two brigades.
The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send 200 wagons with General Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt, and 100,000 pounds of salt meat.
On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his comm and to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river, so that there would be no delay.
During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky Springs, Utica, and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both at Rocky Springs, ten miles from Hankinson's Ferry. McPherson remained there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's Ferry. The 8th McPherson moved to a point within a few miles of Utica; McClernand and Sherman remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica ; Sherman to Big Sandy,-McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th McClernand was at Five Mile Creek ; Sherman at Auburn ; McPherson five miles advanced from Utica. May 12th McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek ; Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek ; McPherson at Raymond, after a battle. Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, and about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond, eighteen miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding ; Sherman in the center on Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across ; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of Edwards's Station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force, and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. McClernand's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.
McPherson encountered the enemy, 5000 strong, with 2 batteries, under General Gregg, about 2 miles out of Raymond. This was about 2 P. M.
Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. The order was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position for assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field, not to appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.
In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing, nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.
I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army, and both equal to a much higher command. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption. when he volunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick-report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the close of the Rebellion.
When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown, my position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the whole column toward Jackson and capture that place without delay.
Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson. Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to Raymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. On the 10th I received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking reenforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance, with a part of his fleet, on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements, as long as the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as a waste of time and material. General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th, from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reenforcements from the south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck, " Information from the other side leaves me to believe 'the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma." Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary.
McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th, and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of the town.
McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edwards's Station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. On the night of the 13th McPherson was or der ed to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.
Sherman was given the same order ; but he was to move by the direct road from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on, and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which at that time defended the city. McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs,- following Sherman's line,-and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siege-guns, four in number, with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClernand's position was an advantageous one, in any event. With one division at Clinton, he was in position to reenforce McPherson at Jackson rapidly if it became necessary. The division beyond Mississippi Springs was equally available to reenforce Sherman. The one at Raymond could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If this last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg, and on three different roads leading to the latter city. But the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. ' This I expected him to do; as shown farther on he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.
I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the 14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf, through an unprotected country.
Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night, and arranged to reach Jackson at the same hour . It rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water . But the troops never murmur ed. By 9 o'clock Crocker , of McPherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of the intrenchments, in a strong position, and proved to be the tr oops that had been driven out of Raymond.
Johnston had been reenforced during the night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men and he , was expecting still more.
Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south and south-west of Jackson, confronting the Confederates behind their breastworks ; while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg Railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division, while he deployed Crocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on the right. By 11 A. M. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body , when they returned to their proper regiment, and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his command into line, and reconnoiter to determine the next move. It was now about noon.
While this was going on, Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching-the Mississippi Springs road-and commanded a bridge spanning the stream over which he had to pass. - By detaching right and left the stream was forced, and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west, and south sides, from the Pearl River north of the city to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted by a sufficient force to hold us back. Appearances did not justify an assault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoiter as far as to the Pearl River. This force - Tuttle's division-not returning, I rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line.
Tuttle's movement or McPherson's pressure had, no doubt, led Johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. Tuttle had seen this, and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in rear of the artillerists confronting Sherman, and captured them, with ten pieces of artillery. I rode immediately to the State House, w here I was soon followed by Sherman. A bout the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns, and, moving on, hoisted the National flag over the Confederate capital of Mississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the Confederate retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. .
Our loss in this engagement was : McPherson, 36 killed, 229 wounded, 3 missing; Sherman, 6 killed, 22 wounded, and 4 missing. The enemy lost 845 killed, wounded, and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fir e their storehouses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's Fourth Division. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. I slept that night in the room that Johnston had occupied the night before.
About 4 in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders, and directed the disposition to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain in Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad center and manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most effectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle, nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager, or of the operatives (most of whom were girls). We looked on awhile to see the tent-cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with C. S. A. woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton in bales stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they might leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington, while I was President, to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. I declined.
On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to Pemberton at Edwards's Station :
" I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to establish communication, that you may be reenforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important."
This dispatch was sent in triplicate by different messengers. One of the messengers happened to be a loyal man, who had been expelled from Memphis some months before, by Hurlbut, for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a good deal of parade about this expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston's dispatch to McPherson, who forwarded it to me.
Receiving this dispatch on the 14th, I ordered McPherson to move promptly in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I also informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson, and sent him the following orders :
" It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this. Turn all your forces toward Bolton Station, and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."
And to Blair I wrote :
" Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train."
Johnston stopped on the Canton road, only six miles north of Jackson, the night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following dispatch (given here in part) :
" Can he [Grant] supply himself from the Mississippi ? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him ? As soon as the reenforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy."
The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. Of McClernand's command one division (Hovey's) was on the road McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles ; one (Osterhaus's) was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near Champion's Hill ; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with Osterhaus's, but, being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained thereby ; the fourth (Smith's, with Blair's division) was near Auburn, with a different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and moved promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past 9 in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.
The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton ; Carr and Osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west ; Smith was north of Raymond, with Blair in his rear.
McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at 7 o'clock, and by 4 reached Hovey and went into camp. Crocker bivouacked just in Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman, with two divisions, was in Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges, and military factories. I rode in person out to Clinton.. On my arrival I ordered McClernand to move early in the morning on Edwards's Station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy, and not to bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success.
I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do, but I felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from Edwards's Station, and get between me and my base. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edwards's Station ; but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford , it, and the bridges were washed away. Thus brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected.
About 5 o'clock in the morning (16th) two men who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad were brought to me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. They reported him to have 80 regiments of infantry and 10 batteries ; in all about 25,000 men.
I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to complete his work. But, getting the above information, I sent him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train, on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road. At the same time I , dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Edwards's Station. McClernand was directed to embrace Blair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part of the Fifteenth Army Corps (Sherman's) ; but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. The Fifteenth Corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads, about three miles apart, converging at Edwards's Station over which to march his troops.
Hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand ,was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move cautiously, with skirmishers in the front to feel for the enemy. Smith's division on the most southern road, was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets, and forced them back to the main line.
About the same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to Join Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation and expressed the wish that I was up. By 7:30 I was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle.
McClernand was in person on the middle road, and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word by a staff-officer to push forward and attack. These orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's advance.
Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, -was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine, running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edwards's Station road turns almost due south at this point, and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile, then, turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual, and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit, west of the road.
From Raymond there is a direct road to Edwards's Station, some three miles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton, and leading direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair, of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey, of McClernand's command, was with McPherson farther north on the road from Bolton direct to Edwards's Station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to Baker's Creek the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the other s until it reaches Edwards's Station. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy, and confronted his left.
By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position, and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible Logan in front - and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reenforced Hovey with one brigade from his division ; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reenforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution.
From Logan's position now a direct forward movement would carry him over open fields in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey, where we were the most heavily pressed ; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right, around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat ; Hovey, reenforced by two brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, cover ed their left flank ; McClernand, two hours before, had been within two and a half miles of their center with two divisions, and two divisions-Blair's and A. J. Smith's-were confronting the rebel right; Ransom , with a brigade of McArthur's division, of the Seventeenth Corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this Juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for mor e reenforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey.
This uncovered the Confederate line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy.
During all this time Hovey, reenforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between 3 and 4 o'clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division Just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south, and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation, and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could, Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark.
The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours of hard fighting, preceded by two or three hour s of skirmishes, some of which rose almost to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and of McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that (as described before). Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as 7: 30. Their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff-officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the road separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward, but he did not come. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle, and substantially over the same ground. Of course, I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.
We had in this battle about fifteen thousand men actually engaged. This excludes those that did not get up - all of McClernand's command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1844 wounded, and 187 missing.
Hovey alone lost twelve hundred killed wounded and missing,-one-third , of his division.
Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterward, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over 3000 killed and wounded , and about 3000 captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring's division which , was the right of Pemberton's line was cut off from the retreating army, and , never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop before midnight, and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1300 prisoners and 11 guns. Hovey captured 300, under fire, and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded, whom he paroled, thus making 1200.
McPherson Joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battle-field, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edwards's Station and Blair was about three miles south, east. Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff, and kept in advance until after night.
Finding our selves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house.
As no troops came up we moved back a mile or more, until w e met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital, and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.
While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand and the ten thousand, with great composure. But after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as of a friend.
We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without the possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might indeed have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the brigade there, and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us, and finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformity with Johnston's orders to Pemberton .
Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th, and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear-guard did not get in until 2 A. M. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded, in care of surgeons and attendants however. At Bolton he was informed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on, to Bridgeport, on the Big Black River, some eleven miles above where we expected to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to Join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible.
This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected, and Sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, and thus open a crossing for the remainder of the army. I W formed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.
The advanced division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at 3: 30 A. M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus ; McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land. The east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When the river is full, water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. All this time there was a foot or two of water I n it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou, by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land, which afforded a cover for a portion of our men.
Carr's division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme right, and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus's division was deployed to the left of Carr, and covered the enemy's entire front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in whenever he could be of assistance.
While the troops were standing as here described, an officer from Banks's staff ~ came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to forward to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf, and to cooperate from there with Banks, against. Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it then if he knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position, when I heard great cheering to the right of our line, and, looking in that direction, saw Lawler, in his shirt-sleeves, leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch, I think not even to this day.
The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind them, leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Many tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured, and 1751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded, and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defenses around Vicksburg.
As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. It was but little after 9 o'clock A. M. when the capture took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by Lieutenant Peter C. Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson himself, and on e by General hansom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft-bridge ; McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers for pontoons ; and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton-gins, and wherever found , for this purpose. By 8 o'clock on the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.
Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th, and found Blair with the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance, and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night, and the third the following morning.
On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops, and as soon as possible Joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's line of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before, when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious with my self. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column, and well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from Haynes's Bluff had not all got past on their way to Vicksburg. At all events, the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time.
In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before,-on the ground where his command lay so helpless for offensive action [Chickasaw Bayou]. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. This, however, he said, was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history, and I ought to make a report of it at once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken ; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman's language, but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this incident will appear farther on.
McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left, and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's Ferry to Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three corps up to the works built for the defense of Vicksburg on three roads,-one to the north, one to the east, and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of May 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. McPherson Joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the ground to his left, and extended as far toward Warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line.
On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly at 2 o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position, and in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River, or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but. began to feel the want of bread. I remember, that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I hear d him, `` Hard-tack." In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard-tack! ! Hard-tack!" !" I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.
I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reenforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he might not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reenforcements, which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was : the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.
The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at 10 o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonading from every battery in position.
All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy, and in planting their battle-flags upon them ; but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reenforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reenforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the Seventeenth Corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor oi McClernand. This last attack only served to increase our casualties, without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark, our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg.
I now determined upon a regular siege to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no mor e losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position, the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war, to what they had on hand. These could not last always.
The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18th of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles-besides continuous skirmishing-had been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had fallen. and its arsenals, military manufactories, and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed ; an average of about 180 miles had been marched by the tr oops engaged ; but 5 days' rations had been issued, and no f or age ; over 6000 prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; 27 heavy cannon and 61 field-pieces had fallen into our hands 250 miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson had be, come ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than 43,000 men. One division of these--Blair's-only arrived in time to take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade-Ransom's-of McPherson's corps reached the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in their own country, where no rear-guards were necessary. The country is admirable for defense, but difficult to conduct an offensive campaign in.
All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail : at Port Gibson, 7000 or 8000 ; at Raymond, 5000 ; at Jackson, from 8000 to 11,000; at Champion's Hill, 25,000; at the Big Black 4000. A part of those met at Jackson were all that were left of those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time was :
Killed Wounded Missing Port Gibson 131 719 25 South Fork, Bayou Pierre 1 Skirmishes, May 3rd 1 9 Fourteen Mile Creek 6 24 Raymond 66 339 37 Jackson 42 25 7 Champion's Hill 410 1844 187 Big Black 39 237 3 Bridgeport 1 Total (in all, 4379) 695 3425 259
Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time. After the unsuccessful assault on the 22d, the work of the regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right, starting from the river above Vicksburg; McPherson the center (McArthur's division now with him) ; and McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line.
In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition ; ground had been selected and cleared, on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. With the two brigades brought up by McArthur, which reached us in rear of Vicksburg, and Lauman's division brought from Memphis, and which had just arrived, we had now about forty thousand men for the siege. Prentiss and Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston.
I knew that Johnston was receiving reenforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere.
My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haynes's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence south to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reenforced, we required a second line of defense facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man these. But General Halleck appreciated the situation, and, without being asked, forwarded reenforcements with all possible dispatch.
The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defense. On the north it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point, and very much cut up by the washing rains the ravines were grown up I with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. But here, too, it was cut by ravines and small streams. The enemy's line of defense followed the crest of a ridge, from the river north of the city, eastward, then southerly around to the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city ; thence in a south-westerly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defenses.
As there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains, along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point ; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.
The work to be done to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line, I directed that all officers who had been graduated at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should, in addition to their other duties , assist in the work.
The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army [General Robert Macfeely), begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for, unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large man,-weighs two hundred and twenty pounds and is not tall.
We had no siege-guns except six 32-pounders, and there were none in the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns, of large caliber, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries, where they would occupy commanding positions ; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible ; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short ; and their infantry was kept down by our sharp-shooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.
In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets, far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about. erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharp-shooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket-balls, thinking, no doubt, that, bur sting over the men in the trenches, they would do some execution ; but I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of the shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them.
The enemy could not resort to the method we did to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon, and used it freely. Splinter s from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind.
There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city ; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pounder shells, and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.
The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes - who came within our lines and who were paid for their work, but details from the troops had often to made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covet ed from the fire of the enemy, the batteries were advanced.
By the 30th of June there were 220 guns in position, mostly light field pieces, besides a battery of heavy gums belonging to, manned, and commanded by the navy. We were now as strong f or defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us. But I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reenforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger force than I had prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.
As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal ; members of the Christian and Sanitary Commissions came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated; many soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks, and turkeys, without bread, during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good.
Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois [Yates), with most of the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at the lines-possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled-there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knot about Sherman and around me, and I hear d Sherman repeating in the most animated manner what he had said to me, when we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the land below, on the 18th of May, adding : " Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign ; I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it." But for this speech it is not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitled him to a full share of all the credit due for its success.
He could not have done more if the plan had been his own.
On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
The country was rich, and full of supplies of both fruit and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire ; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles, and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I requested Porter at this time to send the Marine brigade - a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful - up to Haynes's Bluff to hold it until reenforcements could be sent.
On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reenforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. (1) Of course I could not comply with his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger of an I attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no ,army organizing in his ; rear to raise the siege. On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General Nathan Kimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of Haynes's Bluff, and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair's return from up the Yazoo, ,: been sent to the same place-with instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.
On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about three thousand men from Richard Taylor's Trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of the gunboats these were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well.
On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under General Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haynes's Bluff, and General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that point.
On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left, while Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through this opening, no doubt, the Confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night.
On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's corps, (2) and was immediately dispatched to Haynes's Bluff. These latter troops Herron's and Parke's -were the reenforcements already spoken of, sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrived none too soon.
I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposed of across the peninsula, between the Yazoo, at Haynes's Bluff, and the Big Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west, from the crossing of the Jackson road to Baldwin's Ferry, and below.
There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and the immediate sides of which our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.
On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and on the 18th one from McPherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome congratulatory or der published by General McClernand to the Thirteenth Corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign.
This order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of McClernand's command, until brought in this way. I at once wrote McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.
On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haynes's Bluff to the Big Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reenforce Sherman. Haynes's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black, at the railroad crossing, batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits, where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.
We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. When we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result.
We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him ; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.
From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three points on the Jackson road in front of Ransom's brigade a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet.
In fact, this parapet was also our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates ; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them.
Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill, consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June, at 3 o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy, having tailed to reach our mine, had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the counter-mine, which was still being pushed to find ours.
All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work, when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but was terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up.
" Dunno, Massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was the reply.
General Logan commanded at this point, and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did ser vice to the end of the siege.
As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized upon by two regiments of our troops who were near by, undercover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. From here, however , they threw hand-grenades which did some execution. The compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and then roll them down upon us ; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy , so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left ; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells) the fuses of which they would light with port-fires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work Another mine was consequently started, which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants, and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. We lost none in the second.
From this time forward the work of mining and of pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.
At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us, in order to relieve the garrison of Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no forcible effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to each other where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets - that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night ; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the " Yankees " to cut their way out ; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. Afterward this story was verified. On entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.
All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made ; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made, the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned or made prisoners on the Louisiana side.
General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to cooperate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. We had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force.
By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to 100 yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of July'. The debouches were ordered widened to afford 9 easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank and sand-bags, the latter filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches.
On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him.
On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders :
" Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."
Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same ; they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so ; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement.
On the 3d, about 10 o'clock A. M., white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming toward our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me :
" I have the honor to propose an armistice for hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major General John S. Bowen."
It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases, and, worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern papers that came to them, saying all their suffering was in vain, Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end, and the Union sure to be saved.
Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favor ably before the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that if Pemberton desired it I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps, at 3 o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton's letter :
"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."
At 3 o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff accompanied me. Our ,place of meeting was on a hill-side within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root, and limb had disappeared, the fragments being taken as trophies. Since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as " The True Cross." Pemberton and I had served in the same division during a part of the Mexican war. I knew him very well, therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter.
Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, `` The conference might as well end " and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, " Very well." General Bowen saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. His manners and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose.
Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving some distance away toward the enemy's lines, were in conversation. After a while Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out, with the honors of war, carrying their small-arms and field-artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, I agreeing, how ever, to send a letter giving final terms by 10 o'clock that night. I had sent word to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton had commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. It was agreed on my parting with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence should cease.
When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. (Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.) I informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply, and the substance of the interview, and was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. This was the near est to a " council of war" I ever held. Against the general and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent the following letter :
"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A. M. tomorrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing ; and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking-utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two-horse or mule teams as one will be , allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners."
By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded, as soon as possible, to either Aiken's Landing below Dutch Gap, on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate Commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender, there would have been over thirty-odd thousand men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi ; thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore ; thence again by steamer to Aiken's-all at very great expense. At Aiken's they would have to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west ; I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes.
Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter :
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between ns. At 10 o'clock A. M. to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."
This was received after midnight ; my reply was as follows :
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations.
The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening ; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men."
Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.
During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as " Johnnies " ; all Union troops as " Yanks." Often " Johnny " would call, " Well, Yank, when are vou coming into town ? " The reply was sometimes : " We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there." Sometimes it would be : "We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them" ; or, `` We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the 4th. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made, and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.
The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the 4th, in speaking of the "Yankee" boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking rabbit was, " First ketch your rabbit." The paper at this time, and for some time previous, was printed on the plain side of wall paper. The last was issued on the 4th and announced that we had " caught our rabbit." I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the 3d for the twofold purpose; first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday,-the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence. Holding out for better terms, as he did, he defeated his aim in the latter particular.
At the 4th, at the appointed hour. the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of' their works, and formed line in front, stacked arms, and marched back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.
Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to mar ch in, and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly toward the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the energy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.
Pemberton says in his report : " If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock, A. M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would take 24 hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the 4th. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out some time-my recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.
On the 3d, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman, and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State, and destroy his army if he could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified.
I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living under-ground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay, of great tenacity. Where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left, and stand as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city, night and day, without intermission. I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move them into the town until the 6th. On the afternoon of the 4th I sent Captain William M. Dunn, of my staff, to Cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows : " The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman , with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the State. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside." At the same time I w rote to General Banks informing him of the fall, and sending him a copy of the terms, also saying I would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of Port Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the, National forces, saying that he had been informed of the surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that if this was true it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banks gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudson, with nearly 6000 prisoners, 51 guns, and 5000 small-arms and other stores, fell into the hands of the Union forces. From that day on, the river remained under National control.
Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, National and Confederate), signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for each soldier, and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing, and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative.
Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton, hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him.
He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. This request was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hoped that they would do. I told him, however, I would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. By the 11th, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed, and the Confederate garrison marched out. Many deserted ; fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners been sent to the James River to be paroled.
As soon as our troops took possession of the city, guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. The prisoners w ere allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments.
No restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. I believe there was a feeling of sadness among the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists.
The day before the departure the following order was issued: "Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here tomorrow. They will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge and move from there to Edwards's Ferry, and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed."
On the 8th a dispatch was sent from Washington by Halleck, saying : "I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders.'' Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of Major Watts, Confederate Commissioner for the Exchange of Prisoners.
At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoner s were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets, and a large amount of ammunition. The small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old United States flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in the war almost as dangerous to the per son firing it as to the one aimed at - and a few new and improved arms. These were of many different calibers a fact , that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement.
The enemy had generally new arms, which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels, whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms, and replace them with the latter. A large number of arms, turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were these arms that had really been used by the Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.
In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officer s, dead and alive, whose ser vices entitle them to special mention. Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole, officer s and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly, at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commander s ; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies.
General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend, a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in the campaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive, and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming. I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders, than it was to command one army, officered intelligently, and with subordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.
The navy, under Porter, was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men, without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.
The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war : voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased, and the draft had been resorted to this was resisted, and a defeat, or backward movement would , have made its execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, and make New Orleans a base ; and, with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting-point, move our combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reenforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.
With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reenforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made ; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.
Source: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
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