Part 2 (B)
Recovery, Spacecraft Redefinition, and First Manned Apollo Flight
MSC estimated the effect of the Apollo 204 fire on program costs for FY
1967 and 1968, in reply to April 26 instructions from NASA Apollo
Manager Samuel C. Phillips. Estimates were:
|Command and service modules||$25 million|
|Lunar module||$21 million|
Further, the program extension resulting from the accident would
require an additional budget allocation during FY 1969 and continuing
through program runout. A May 4 message from MSC confirmed the
information telephoned to Headquarters May 1.
The following ground rules had been used in estimating the cost impact:
TWXs, NASA Hq. to MSC, "Cost Impact of 204 Accident," April
26, 1967; MSC to NASA Hq., "Cost Impact of the 204 Accident,"
May 4, 1967.
- All changes planned as of May 1 for the command and service modules
and the lunar module were included.
- Vehicle delivery dates were as of April 29. Guidance and navigation
schedules were adjusted to support revised CSM and LM need dates.
The Space and Information Systems Division of North American Aviation,
Inc., was renamed Space Division, effective May 1.
TWX, North American Aviation Space Div., Downey, Calif., to NASA Hq.,
MSFC, MSC, and KSC, "Redesignation of S&ID as Space
Division," May 9, 1967.
George C. White, Jr., NASA OMSF Director of Apollo Reliability and
Quality, told Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips that an MSC
presentation on April 29 had restored confidence in Apollo's future, but
three areas caused him concern as possible compromises with crew safety
and mission success in the interest of near-term schedule and cost
considerations. They were:
White urged close management attention to ensure quality. Memo, White
to Phillips, "MSC plan presented on April 29, 1967," May 1,
- Soldered joints in coolant system plumbing. Design of the joints was
basically wrong; the insertion of the tubing into the sleeve was less
than the tube diameter. Shear strength of the solder had to be depended
upon for mechanical integrity against bending and vibration as well as
for sealing. Insertion should be two to three times the diameter so that
bending could be carried by the bearing of the tube in the sleeve, and
the solder would only have to seal.
- Wiring harnesses. Wiring in the Block II spacecraft had a number of
problems, the real significance of which was difficult to evaluate.
Numerous instances of damaged insulation (bare conductor) had been found
and the repairs had, in turn, resulted in more damage. At least once,
split insulation (bare conductor) had been found inside a wire bundle;
it could have been in the wire as received or could have resulted from
- Modification procedure. MSC planned to make the changes in the
Block II spacecraft by working directly from mockup to the spacecraft,
using sketches and a minimum of paper work. While this kind of an
operation could get a job done in a hurry, it required a strong leader,
thoroughly experienced in working with engineering and factory people
and procedures, and rigorous adherence to a minimal streamlined paper
system. All "engineering" must be on drawings and all
fabrication work must be inspected at least as rigorously as in a
normal manufacturing process.
The Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory Systems Program Office
requested that MSC present a briefing to selected office and contractor
personnel on NASA's progress in safety studies and tests associated with
fire hazards aboard manned space vehicles. Information was requested for
the MOL program to help formulate studies and activities that would not
duplicate MSC efforts. The briefing was given at MSC May 10.
TWXs, MOL Systems Program Office, Los Angeles, to MSC, "Request
for Briefing on Safety Studies and Associated Tests," May 2, 1967;
MSC to Space Systems Div., USAF, May 3, 1967.
ASPO Manager George M. Low asked the Chairman of the Apollo 204 Review
Board to consider releasing CM 014 for use in the Apollo program. If the
Review Board had a continuing need for the CM, Low requested that
consideration be given to release of certain individual items needed for
the Apollo Mission Simulator program. Board Chairman Floyd L. Thompson
notified Low on June 22 that the CM mockup and CM 014 were no longer
required by the Review Board and that their disposition might be
determined by the ASPO Manager.
Memo, Low to Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board, "Release of
Command Module 014," May 2, 1967; TWX, Thompson to MSC, Attn:
George M. Low, June 22, 1967.
NASA Block II Redefinition Task Team group leaders and CSM Program
Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht arrived at North American Aviation Space
Division at Downey May 2, followed by Task Team Manager Frank Borman the
next day. Borman met with North American management May 4 to ensure
understanding of the team plan and objectives. An afternoon meeting with
NASA and North American Task Managers and group leaders reviewed the
status of the Block II Redefinition task.
Following is a summation of the technical status at the time:
Borman reported on plans and schedules:
- Ninety-five percent of the wires and break points had been defined,
including additional wires for changes (approximately 200) plus the
existing open items on spacecraft 101. Schematics for manufacturing and
preparation of integrated schematics were to be available May 30.
- AiResearch environmental control system components had been reviewed
by North American and direction transmitted for materials changes.
- North American was planning no compartment closeouts behind the
front panels. This was unacceptable to NASA and closeouts would be
- North American definition and review of all spacecraft materials
applications were in progress, but Borman reported the progress was too
slow to date and that a plan for expediting was under consideration.
- Fire extinguisher interfaces had not yet been identified. A meeting
was planned during the next week to resolve the problem.
- NASA reaffirmed to North American the intention that DITMCO (an
inspection process) of the completed installed harness be performed as
late as possible and that harness protection be reinstalled immediately
after DITMCO. Connectors which could not be DITMCOed must be reviewed
with NASA, connector by connector.
- NASA reaffirmed that a crew compartment fit and function test was
required on each spacecraft at Downey.
- Two meetings had been held on the Downey spacecraft 101 test and
checkout. Definition of requirements was progressing rapidly and was
expected to be completed and signed off by May 5. A schedule would be
prepared for distribution on May 9, for the preparation, review and
final approval of the operational checkout procedures necessary for the
approved test requirement. The launch site test plan for spacecraft 101
would be discussed in a meeting at Downey May 9, and this meeting would
be followed by a discussion of spacecraft 2TV-1 Downey test requirements
as related to the Houston tests for the spacecraft 101 mission.
- The Test Group of the Task Team planned to work closely with the
Checkout Working Group and would be represented in its next meeting in
Downey on May 11.
- Rework resulting from the wiring inspection of spacecraft 101 was
not proceeding as rapidly as desired; however, Borman reported that more
efficient procedures were being prepared and would be carried out as
soon as possible.
- The Apollo spacecraft quality requirements were being reviewed and
the North American Quality Plan would be checked against these
requirements in detail.
Critical open items were:
- A documentation center was being established to provide
configuration documentation to the North American and NASA teams. A
master change status board would be maintained in the NASA Task Team
Office, and Block II specifications would be updated to provide the
- North American had released Master Development Schedule-10 ahead of
its May 12 schedule, and detailed engineering, manufacturing, and Apollo
test operation schedules were being prepared.
- TV monitor requirements and interfaces,
- flashing beacon mechanization and requirements,
- material for the lithium hydroxide canister,
- emergency oxygen mask mechanization,
- water chlorination mechanization,
- rapid repressurization-mechanization or surge tank, and
- cabin recirculation valve requirement.
TWX, RASPO at Downey, Calif., to distr., "Block II Redefinition Daily
Report No. 1, dated May 4, 1967," May 5, 1967.
NASA's Space Science Steering Committee approved establishment of a
facility on the moon consisting of arrays of solid corner reflectors.
The first array was to be established by the earliest possible lunar
landing mission, with other arrays to be carried on subsequent
missions. Until the Committee and Manned Space Flight Experiment Board
agreed on assignment of priorities among the various lunar science
experiments, this experiment was to be considered a contingency
experiment to be carried on a "space available" basis. The
facility on the moon would be available to the principal investigator -
C. O. Alley, University of Maryland - as well as to other
TWX, NASA Hq. to MSC, Attn: Robert Piland, May 3, 1967.
Directions had been prepared to designate mission AS-501 formally as
Apollo 4, AS-204/LM-1 as Apollo 5, and AS-502 as Apollo 6, NASA Apollo
Program Director Samuel C. Phillips informed Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller. Phillips said he thought it was
the right time to start using the designations in official releases and
appropriate internal documentation. Mueller concurred.
Note, Phillips to Mueller, May 4, 1967.
Circuit breakers being used in both CSM and LM were flammable, MSC ASPO
Manager George Low told Engineering and Development Director Maxime A.
Faget. Low said that although Structures and Mechanics Division was
developing a coating to be applied to the circuit breakers, such a
solution was not the best for the long run. He requested that the
Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Division find replacement
circuit breakers for Apollo - ideally, circuit breakers that would not
bum and that would fit within the same volume as the existing ones,
permitting replacement in panels already built. On July 12 Low wrote
Faget again: "In light of the work that has gone on since my May
5, 1967, memo, are you now prepared to propose the use of
metal-jacketed circuit breakers for Apollo spacecraft? If the answer is
affirmative, then we should get specific direction to our contractors
immediately. Also, have you surveyed the industry to see whether a
replacement circuit breaker is available or will be available in the
future?" Low requested an early reply.
Memos, Low to Faget, "Apollo circuit breakers," May 5, 1967;
"Apollo circuit breakers, continued," July 12, 1967.
After review of operational considerations for a minimum restart
capability in the Saturn launch vehicle's S IVB stage, MSC's Director
of Flight Operations reported to NASA Hq. that an 80-minute restart
capability was believed the best compromise for the early lunar
missions, "for the primary reason of providing sufficient time for
ground support in verifying navigation, and flight crew checkout of CSM
and S-IVB systems prior to TLI [translunar injection], while providing
for two injection opportunities in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
(second and third revolutions). For later missions, consideration
should be given to the hardware implications of providing a restart
capability with minimum (zero) restrictions, so that advantage may be
taken of confidence in onboard systems to gain additional
Ltr., Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to NASA Hq., "S-IVB Restart
Capability," May 5, 1967.
NASA reported to Congress on actions taken on the Apollo 204 Review
Board's findings and recommendations concerning the January 27
spacecraft fire. Administrator James E. Webb, Deputy Administrator
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., and Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight George E. Mueller testified before the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences May 9 and before the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics' Subcommittee on NASA Oversight May 10. (See
also September 21 and Appendix 8.)
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo
Accident: Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pts. 6-7, May 9,
1967; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA
Oversight, , 90th Cong., 1st sess, vol. 3, May 10, 1967;
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968),
MSC responded to a March 29 letter from NASA Hq. concerning two arrays
of Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) experiments. MSC
said it had reviewed schedules, cost, and integration aspects of the
requested configurations and that four areas of the project apparently
should be modified to allow proper inclusion of the configurations:
The cost impact was estimated at $670,000, and completion of the ALSEP
contract was expected to be extended three months to allow for mission
support for the fourth flight.
- extension of mission support efforts by Bendix Aerospace Systems
Division (BxA) for the fourth ALSEP mission;
- extension of KSC's support efforts by BxA for the fourth ALSEP
- extension of the ALSEP prototype test program to encompass three
distinct system configurations rather than the two in the original
- extension of the ALSEP qualification test program to encompass three
distinct configurations rather than the original two.
Ltr., Robert R. Gilruth, Director, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn: Samuel C.
Phillips, "Selection of Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package
System Configurations," May 10, 1967.
NASA Administrator James E. Webb issued a statement on selection of the
Apollo spacecraft contractor: "In the 1961 NASA decision to
negotiate with North American Aviation for the Apollo command and
service modules, there were no better qualified experts in or out of
NASA on whom I could rely than Dr. Robert Gilruth, Dr. Robert C.
Seamans, and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden. These three were unanimous in their
judgment that of the five companies submitting proposals, and of the
two companies that were rated highest by the Source Evaluation Board,
North American Aviation offered the greatest experience in developing
high-performance manned flight systems and the lowest cost.
"In the selection of North American Aviation, the work of the Source
Evaluation Board was not rejected or discarded. It was used as the basis
for a more extensive and detailed examination of all pertinent factors
than the Board had performed at the time its report was presented to Dr.
Gilruth, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden and to me.
"At that point it became the responsibility of NASA's Associate
Administrator, Dr. Seamans; its Deputy Administrator, Dr. Dryden; and
its Administrator, myself, to take all steps necessary to determine
whether the facts then available formed an adequate basis for our
selection of a contractor. We decided in the affirmative and then
proceeded to select the contractor the facts indicated offered the most
to the government."
NASA News Release 67-122, May 11, 1967.
George M. Low, Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program, notified NASA
Hq. that Grumman was committed to a June 28 delivery for lunar module 1
(LM-1). This date included provisions for replacement of the development
flight instrumentation harness with a new one. Low's assessment was that
the date would be difficult to meet.
TWX, Low, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn: Lee James, "LM-1 delivery
schedule," May 12, 1967.
Anthony W. Wardell of the MSC Flight Safety Analysis Office wrote
Apollo Manager Low that "the May 10 inspection further
substantiates my previous recommendation to replace, rather than
rework, the [spacecraft 101 wiring] harness. In addition to the visual
evidence of wire damage noted, a book containing about 100 outstanding
wire damage MRB (Material Review Board) actions was noted on a work
table near the spacecraft." He did, however, list seven
recommended suggestions to be followed in the event the harnesses were
reworked rather than replaced. The suggestions were passed on to CSM
Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht by Low in a memorandum on May 13. Low
requested that the suggestions be passed to North American Aviation as
soon as possible, with additional suggestions from MSC Quality Control
Chief Jack A. Jones, who had also inspected the harness.
Memos, Jones to Low, "Inspection of SC-101 Wire Harness
Assemblies," May 10, 1967; Wardell to Low, "Inspection of
Spacecraft 101 Wiring Harnesses," May 12, 1967; Low to
Kleinknecht, "Spacecraft 101 wiring," May 13, 1967
Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman Floyd L. Thompson appointed a
subcommittee to examine the final report of Panel 18 and prepare
recommendations regarding its acceptability for inclusion in the Board's
Report. Thompson named Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to chair the subcommittee
and Frank Borman, MSC, George C. White, NASA Hq., and E. Barton Geer,
LaRC, as members. Thompson asked that the subcommittee forward its
recommendations at the earliest possible date and that it also review
the comments of North American Aviation on the validity of the findings
of the Board and its Panels.
TWX, Thompson to addressees, May 12, 1967.
The NASA Block II CSM Redefinition Task Team was augmented by the
assignment of Gordon J. Stoops as Group Leader-Program Control, with
the following functions:
Memo, Manager, CSM, ASPO, to distr., "Block II redefinition,
command and service modules," May 15, 1967.
- Liaison with North American Aviation Program Control and Contracts
to expedite updating of the contract change authorizations and the
issuance of timely program technical direction.
- Liaison with the ASPO CSM project Engineering and Checkout Division
and CSM Contract Engineering Branch at MSC to expedite contract change
authorizations and ensure timely program technical direction.
Prime and backup crews for Apollo 7 (spacecraft 101) were named, with
the assignments effective immediately. The prime crew for the
engineering-test-flight mission was to consist of Walter M. Schirra,
Jr., commander; Donn F. Eisele, CM pilot; and R. Walter Cunningham, LM
pilot. The backup crew was Thomas P. Stafford, commander; John W. Young,
CM pilot; and Eugene A. Cernan, LM pilot. Names had been reported to the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on 9 May.
Memo, Astronaut Office to distr., "Astronaut Technical
Assignments," May 18, 1967; Senate committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st
sess., pt. 6, May 9, 1967.
A Block II spacecraft vibration program was begun to provide confidence
in CSM integrity and qualify the hardware interconnecting the subsystems
within the spacecraft. A test at MSC was to simulate the vibration
environment of max-q flight conditions. The test article was to be a
Block II CSM. A spacecraft-LM adapter, an instrumentation unit, and an
S-IVB stage forward area simulation would also be used.
Memo, Chief, Systems Engineering Div. (MS), to Manager, ASPO,
"Block II spacecraft vibration program," with encl.,
"Block II Spacecraft Vibration Program," May 19, 1967.
MSC notified NASA Hq. that - with the changes defined for the Block II
spacecraft following the January 27 Apollo 204 fire and with CSM
delivery schedules now reestablished - it was necessary to complete a
contract for three additional CSMs requested in 1966. North American
Aviation had responded September 15, 1966, to MSC's February 28 request
for a proposal, but action on a contract had been suspended because of
the AS-204 accident. NASA Hq. on June 27, 1967, authorized MSC to
TWXs, Manager, ASPO, to NASA Hq., Attn: Samuel C. Phillips,
"Authorization for procurement of three additional Block II
CSM's," May 20, 1967; NASA Hq., Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight to MSC, Attn: George Low, June 27, 1967.
MSC ASPO Manager George Low informed Grumman Senior Vice President
George Titterton that he had asked North American Aviation assistance
in improving access to the LM when placed inside the spacecraft-lunar
module adapter (SLA). He also ordered a change request, in response to
Grumman's April 18 request that MSC consider an SLA design change. Low
had visited the pad at KSC Launch Complex 37, agreed action was
necessary, and on May 19 asked North American's Apollo Program Manager
Dale D. Myers for recommendations. Low said improved access to the LM
was needed "both for rapid emergency egress and for normal
An emergency method of cutting through the SLA structure in premarked
locations with a "cookie cutter" portable handsaw device was
adopted - primarily for exit in an emergency occurring after
hypergolics were loaded into the LM.
Ltrs., Titterton to MSC, Apr. 18, 1967; Low to Myers, May 19, 1967; Low
to Titterton, May 22. 1967; memo, ASPO Manager to R. W. Williams,
"Preparation of change request," May 22. 1967; Myers to Low,
Aug. 11, 1967.
MSC submitted requirements to KSC that TV signals from cameras inside
the LM and CM be monitored and recorded during manned hazardous tests,
with hatch open or closed, and tests in the Vehicle Assembly Building,
launch pads, and altitude chambers. A facility camera was to monitor
the propellant-utilization gauging system during propellant loading.
MSC specified that the field of view of the TV camera should encompass
the shoulder and torso and portions of the legs of personnel at the
normal flight stations in both the CM and the LM.
Ltr., Owen G. Morris, MSC, to KSC, "Continuous Television
Recording in Support of Manned Apollo Tests at KSC," May 25,
ASPO Manager George Low told Charles A. Berry, MSC Director of Medical
Research and Operations, that it had been determined there was no
suitable substitute for water glycol as a coolant and it would continue
to be used in the Apollo spacecraft. Low recognized that it was
"essential that the effects of any possible glycol spill be well
defined and that procedures be established to avoid any hazardous
conditions." He asked Berry's office to define the limits of
exposure for glycol spills of varying quantities and for
recommendations concerning cabin purge in the event of a spill. Low
also wondered, assuming development of a smelling agent, if it would be
possible to determine the concentration of water glycol by the strength
of the smell in the spacecraft. Berry's office replied June 22 that it
was working with Crew Systems Division to identify an odor additive for
leak detection. They would begin a program to establish a safe upper
limit for human exposure to ethylene glycol and had asked the National
Academy of Sciences Committee on Toxicity for information. Animal
exposure tests probably would be necessary; if they were needed, a test
plan would be submitted before July 1.
Memos, Manager, ASPO, to Berry, "Water glycol toxicity," May
26, 1967; Berry to Low, June 22, 1967.
NASA Headquarters and MSC officials attended a review of the CSM at
North American Aviation in Downey. Following the North American
briefing, the group visited the wire-harness layout and assembly areas.
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller,
with Anthony W. Wardell and Jack A. Jones of MSC, inspected the wiring
in spacecraft 101 and 2TV-1 in detail.
Mueller stressed the importance of improving spacecraft delivery
schedules, with particular emphasis on spacecraft 020 and the second
and third manned spacecraft, working up to two-month delivery
intervals. He was concerned about the five- to six-week spacecraft 020
hatch delay and stated that Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips
must approve the proposed change. North American pointed out that it
was using the resources of the corporation toward the two-month
delivery schedule, and that a modification task-team approach would be
used as long as it was effective in improving schedules. Tiger teams of
engineering, quality, manufacturing, and materials personnel were
working on wiring and plumbing in spacecraft 101. CSM Manager Kenneth
S. Kleinknecht reviewed the Block II Redefinition Task Team effort for
Mueller and he indicated that Phillips had considered an industry tiger
team to assist in the overall spacecraft effort.
Memo, Kleinknecht to ASPO Manager, "Review of command and service
modules," May 26, 1967.
Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman Floyd L. Thompson wrote NASA Deputy
Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., "The Apollo 204 Review Board
respectfully submits that it has fulfilled all of its duties and
responsibilities as prescribed by the Deputy Administrator's memorandum
of February 3, 1967. Accordingly, it is requested that the Apollo 204
Review Board be dissolved."
Ltr., Thompson to Seamans, "Report of Completion of Apollo 204
Review Board Activities," May 26, 1967.
W. R. Downs, Special Assistant for Advanced Systems, MSC Structures and
Mechanics Division, discovered that bare or defectively insulated
silver-covered copper wires exposed to glycol/water solutions would
ignite spontaneously and burn in oxygen. Copper wire or nickel-covered
copper wire under identical conditions did not ignite. The laboratory
results were confirmed in work at the Illinois Institute of Technology.
In a June 13 memorandum, the Chief of the Structures and Mechanics
Division recommended that if additional testing verified that
nickel-coated wires were free of the hazard, consideration should be
given to an in-line substitution of nickel-coated wires for
silver-coated wires in the LM. It was understood that the Block II CSM
already had nickel-coated wires. In a June 20 memo to the ASPO Manager,
the Director of Engineering and Development pointed out that
silver-plated pins and sockets in connectors would offer the same
hazards. He added that Downs had also identified a chelating agent that
would capture the silver ion and apparently prevent the reaction chain.
In a July 24 memorandum, ASPO Manager George Low said that, in view of
recent spills of ethylene glycol and water mixtures, spacecraft
contractors North American Aviation and Grumman Aircraft Engineering
had been directed to begin actions immediately to ensure that a fire
hazard did not exist for the next manned spacecraft. Actions were to
include identification of the location of silver or silver-covered
wires and pins and of glycol spills.
Memos, Special Assistant for Advanced Systems to Chief, Structures and
Mechanics Div., "Chemical reactivity of silver covered copper
wires with glycol/water solutions compared to copper or nickel covered
copper wires," May 29, 1967 (rev. June 12, 1967); Chief,
Structures and Mechanics Div., to Director of Engineering and
Development, "Silver-covered copper wires as a fire producing
hazard in spacecraft," June 13, 1967; Director of Engineering and
Development to Manager, ASPO, "Silver-covered copper wires as a
fire producing hazard in spacecraft," June 20, 1967; Manager,
ASPO, to distr., "Silver-covered copper wires as a fire producing
hazard in spacecraft," July 24, 1967.
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.'s method of building wiring harness
for the lunar module was acceptable, George Low, MSC Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office Manager, wrote Apollo Program Manager Samuel C. Phillips
at NASA Hq. Low had noted on a visit to Grumman on May 9 that many of
the harnesses were being built on two-dimensional boards. In view of
recent discussions of the command module wiring, Low requested Grumman
to reexamine their practice and to reaffirm their position on two-versus
three-dimensional wiring harnesses.
In his May 31 letter to Phillips, Low enclosed Grumman's reply and said
that, in his opinion, Grumman's practice was acceptable because
Ltrs., Low to Phillips, May 31, 1967; J. G. Gavin to Low, "Use of
Two and Three Dimensional Harness Boards in Fabrication of LM
Wiring," May 24, 1967; Grumman LM Manufacturing Memo, W. B.
Atchison to C. W. Rathke, "Harness Board Design - 2D vs. 3D,"
17 May 1967.
- most wire bundles on the LM were much thinner than the CSM wiring
bundles and were much more flexible;
- portions of the LM harness were often fabricated on a three
dimensional segment of the harness board; and
- connectors were usually mounted on metal brackets with the proper
direction and clocking.
George M. Low told Joseph N. Kotanchik, Chief of MSC's Structures and
Mechanics Division, that actions were pending on Pratt & Whitney
pressure vessel failures. The pressure vessels were used in the Apollo
fuel cell system. Kotanchik had spelled out a list of problem areas in
connection with both the vessels and management interface between MSC
and principal contractor North American Aviation, and between North
American and its subcontractor Pratt & Whitney.
Memos, Chief, Structures and Mechanics Div., to Manager, ASPO,
"Conduct of Pratt and Whitney Aircraft (PWA) on pressure vessel
failure analysis," May 18, 1967; Low to Kotanchik, "Pratt
& Whitney pressure vessel failures," May 31, 1967.