Capture fishers and aquaculturists often come up against operational difficulties and controversial issues which must be overcome if capture fisheries are to remain a stable source of food and income and if aquaculturists are to meet the consumer demand for an ever-increasing stream of aquatic products.
Access to and the use of natural resources are the main subject of controversy, in which there are two basic points at issue:
This review starts with the general and moves on to more specific aspects of the issues discussed. The first topic to be considered is that of governance of the fisheries sector. Here, governance is understood to be the legal and institutional framework designed to guarantee that the role played by capture fisheries and aquaculture is considered appropriate by society as a whole. Governance should also set rules to ensure that, within the sector, competition is constructive and access to resources equitable.
The questions addressed under governance are discussed in more detail as part of the next two issues which deal with the creation of an enabling environment for aquaculture, and the integration of fisheries into coastal zone management. The final two issues - how to match fishing capacity with available resources, and how to manage by-catch and discarding - need to be resolved by the capture fisheries sector, although they have attracted considerable attention outside the fisheries sector.
Ninety percent of the global fish catch is taken within zones of national jurisdiction, owing primarily to the higher productivity and proximity of the coastal and shelf areas. It follows, therefore, that these are the areas where the bulk of fisheries management problems occur.
Such problems are not a new development: for 50 years at least, recognition has been given to the need for governments to be aware of the state of their fisheries, to implement effective policies aimed at preventing resource depletion and the wastage of fisheries inputs and, increasingly, to facilitate stock rehabilitation.
With about 60 percent of the main monitored commercial stocks considered to require improved or new management, the current state of world fisheries indicates a need for better governance. The challenge for governments is to manage fisheries in such a way that ensures the optimum and sustainable use of resources as well as economic efficiency and widespread social benefits. Furthermore, it is increasingly recognized that the responsibility for management should not rest with governments alone but rather be a shared responsibility, involving those operating in the fisheries sector as well as others who consider they have a right to participate in decisions concerning humanity's natural heritage.
In the 1980s, it was widely anticipated that fisheries governance would improve substantially in parallel with the establishment of extended national jurisdiction under the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This was the case for countries that were able and had the will to strengthen their governance. Very often they were already engaged in exclusive economic zone (EEZ) fisheries or had readily available capacity (e.g. trained fishers, investment capital and infrastructure) within the sector to do so. Subsequent experience has shown that, even under the most favourable circumstances, achieving good governance is a protracted process. Those governments that now have soundly managed fisheries generally owe this achievement to 20 to 40 years of continuous effort and adjustment (see Box 4, The evolution of fisheries management in New Zealand).
In many countries, governance has continued to languish for a variety of reasons, including a scarcity of the human, institutional and financial resources required to devise and implement management programmes; a lack of understanding, by both governments and fisheries participants, of the potential benefits that good management can generate; and the reluctance of governments to make unpopular decisions. Through aid and financial assistance projects, the international community continues to direct substantial efforts towards improving the capabilities of the fisheries institutions in such countries. The countries with the poorest governance are those whose populations face more pressing, fundamental problems such as war, civil disturbances, natural disasters and weak government.
The prerequisites for good governance in the fisheries sector are generally well recognized: the need for a strategy explicitly aimed at ecological, economic and social sustainability; effective fisheries agencies and research institutions (producing, inter alia, reliable and up-to-date information on the sector); a cooperative, organized and informed fisheries sector; adequate laws and legal institutions, including deterrent monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS); and linkages with the appropriate regional and international bodies. Since the early 1980s, attention has been paid to giving the fisheries sector joint responsibility with government in the management of fisheries. In many instances, this has been recognized by law, as in the creation of statutory committees (e.g. on management formulation, licensing and appeals) whose members include representatives from the fisheries sector. In some countries, this has been extended to the creation of semi-autonomous fisheries management authorities acting under joint industry and government boards of control (see Box 5, Industry participation in management in Australia).
This joint management process has been facilitated by a number of important evolutionary trends. In many countries, the fisheries sector has become better organized and hence more effective in liaising with government and in representing collective viewpoints. A more recent impetus has come from management regimes that establish either real or quasi ownership "rights", such as the right to trade - buy, sell or lease - an entitlement to engage in a managed fishery. In such circumstances, those with an entitlement have more of a vested interest in good management, as the "monetary" value of their entitlement will be directly influenced by the performance of the fishery. Accordingly, titleholders have demanded a major role in the formulation of management.
Another important and related trend concerns the financing of fisheries research and management. An underlying concept gaining wider acceptance is that financing should come from those who benefit, including fisheries participants in the case of managed fisheries. Again, there has been added impetus from the creation of "rights-based" fisheries, where it would clearly be anomalous for governments - using funds from the broader community - to be the sole financing entity. Accordingly, the joint financing of fisheries governance has been most readily accepted in the case of rights-based fisheries. As might be expected, fisheries participants have demanded a role in deciding how the money is spent, leading to more focused spending and systems of accountability. The consequence has invariably been better governance.
A recent trend in management-oriented research is for the scientific arm of management to have more autonomy when providing advice and for there to be more transparency as to what action is taken on the strength of that advice. There has also been a related move towards "privatizing" certain functions of governance, a development that is most advanced in the case of fisheries research institutions, which are becoming progressively more reliant on non-government sources of finance. There have been rare instances in which countries have hired out the functions of licensing and enforcement to private sector entities, although the government has invariably taken a major shareholding in the entities selected. This has met with mixed success so far, but probably reflects the direction that governance will take in the future. Fisheries governance is now benefiting from computer-assisted "networking", for example through e-mail and the World Wide Web, which allows both researchers and managers ready access to the knowledge and experiences of "outsiders". Although related to private sector services, this development is not exactly part of privatization but rather a consequence of globalization.
These trends are most apparent in countries whose capacity for governance is well evolved. The approaches nevertheless are globally applicable. A major constraint to their wider application in practice is a lack of organization within fishing communities, including an insufficient understanding of the potential benefits to be gained through good management. The paradox for some countries is that systems of community-based management, which provided cohesion in the past, have now disappeared. Aid and financial assistance projects as well as other efforts are now aimed at reversing this process, often through the conferring of "rights" exclusively on active members of the community or on the community as a collective. Such an approach will be most problematic - if not impossible in the short term - in areas where there is a high population density and acute poverty because of the high social cost to those excluded from fisheries. The priority in this event is to enhance the welfare of the wider community (e.g. through job creation), and this is a task that requires intervention from "outside" agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community.
The promotion of traditional or community-based management practices has gained momentum in artisanal and small-scale fisheries, which often involve thousands of fishers, hundreds of fishing communities and a plethora of landing points. The communities involved have very little mobility and are liable to be extremely disadvantaged by the social and economic consequences of bad governance. Management that is directed at safeguarding a community's welfare is most likely to be sensitive to issues at the local level, and hence to the importance of improving benefits from fisheries without causing undue social disruption. The community-based management approach therefore seeks to build on existing customary and traditional practices, adopting the concept of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFS).
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) is promoting the revival of traditional marine tenure and resource allocation mechanisms in the region. As part of this effort, SPC puts out an information bulletin dealing with traditional marine resource management and knowledge. However, the pace of socio-economic change in the region is such that it is uncertain what the need for fish resources will be when all population groups have become urban wage earners.
Recent advances in the management of industrial fisheries at the national level have focused on the conferring of rights. Most commonly, these rights have included the ability to trade (buy, sell or lease) the entitlement to fish in a particular managed fishery. In most cases, entitlements have been provided in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) or as a subset of a limited number of licences to fish. This strategy is being introduced successfully in a growing number of countries, including Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand and the United States. The adoption of rights-based management is also being encouraged by international institutions such as the World Bank.
Chile has introduced experimental ITQs in its deep-water shrimp and its toothfish fisheries, making it the only country in Latin America to have a functioning ITQ system. The government would like to expand the system to other fisheries but it faces resistance from operators in the fisheries concerned.
A High-Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries, which met at FAO headquarters in January 1998, stressed the relevance of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries1 for governance. The participants concluded that the Code and its guidelines are technically credible to fisheries experts and readily understood by non-experts and, therefore, constitute an important reference for improved fisheries governance.
The 1996 annual meeting of the South Pacific Forum (SPF), held in the Marshall Islands, recommended the development of comprehensive arrangements for the sustainable management of the region's fisheries across the full geographical range of stocks, including those of high seas. This recommendation reflects countries' increasing concern about the governance of high seas resources.
Countries in the Pacific are working together with Distant-Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs)2 to develop a mechanism for the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the Central and Western Pacific Ocean. It is envisaged that the negotiations will result in a commission for the management of the stocks concerned.
Southeast Atlantic countries are discussing, among themselves and with DWFNs, the establishment of a regional fisheries organization to manage fish stocks in the high seas of the Southeast Atlantic.
Members of the South Pacific Permanent Commission3 are negotiating how to conserve and manage high seas resources in the Southeast Pacific.
The conclusion that the world's main commercial fisheries need more and better management is neither surprising nor necessarily derogative of national governance worldwide. Ultimately, all fisheries require management as, where it is lacking, wastage of fish resources and fisheries inputs is inevitable. The benefits realized from good governance are most obvious in the developed countries and this has been the case for some time because their capacity for governance is more evolved. Furthermore, these countries have much to gain from improved of fisheries performance. Much of the global fishing capacity and most of the world's mature fisheries - with stocks near to being or already fully exploited - are located in the fishing zones of these countries or in other zones exploited by them.
With increasing fishing pressure and a better knowledge of stocks, the joint management of shared stocks will become a priority in the future (see Box 6, Shared stocks - how to improve management).
As developing countries are becoming major participants in global fisheries, the focus is likely to shift to include improvements in their fisheries governance. This will require the enhancement of technical and administrative capabilities, enabling the formulation and implementation of appropriate fisheries management plans and assessments of the outcomes and needs for follow-up action. A fundamental policy consideration in this regard is capacity building and institutional strengthening within the fisheries institutions. At the same time, it must be accepted that improved benefits will not be an immediate outcome from better governance. The structural adjustments that are required in many fisheries will take a long time to become effective. Fisheries management is a process that evolves over time in response to changing circumstances.
In line with recent trends, the governance of fisheries will progressively include the direct involvement of fisheries participants, the conferring of user rights, the devolution of management functions away from government - without detracting from its stewardship role - and the financing of governance from within the sector.
Few countries have appropriate legal frameworks and policies for aquaculture. Often, comprehensive policies and associated legal frameworks have been overlooked because development has been seen mainly in technical terms and support has been largely focused on technical aspects of production. Also, policy-makers have often treated aquaculture in isolation from other sectors, thus ignoring important linkages, including externalities. The need to incorporate political, economic, social, environmental and legal aspects has been neglected, usually with negative consequences for the sector. The recent emergence of industrial aquaculture, the growing competition for resources and the continuing rapid growth of the sector have focused attention on the need for policy measures and regulatory frameworks.
It is essential for appropriate operational conditions to be established at all levels (international, regional, national, local and farm) to make the exploitation of aquaculture in a sustainable manner attractive to farmers, fishers and other entrepreneurs. Governments need to create and maintain a suitable climate for sustainable growth of the sector, i.e. they need to provide an "enabling environment". Such an environment comprises economic, legal, social and physical components and should ensure, inter alia, fair access to resources, mechanisms for conflict resolution and access to information, credit and markets. This presupposes that there are functioning channels of communication with institutions and representatives of other competing sectors of the economy.
In creating an "enabling environment", it is essential to strike a balance between the need for development and growth and the need for ecosystem conservation. In this context it is necessary to recognize and deal with the increasing competition for resources. The diminishing role of the public sector as a promoter of development and the globalization of markets must also be taken into consideration.
The complex task at hand is to put the principles of the Code into operation; i.e. to clarify how sustainability choices might work in practice; to incorporate the Code's principles into development policies and plans; and to elaborate specific codes of responsible practice containing norms, standards and guidelines agreed on by all stakeholders. Given the diversity of aquaculture practices and of the political, social and economic conditions in which they take place - not to mention the different perceptions of sustainability - balanced and informed approaches are required to address developmental and environmental issues effectively at any one location. Furthermore, the applicability of various approaches needs to be assessed carefully, particularly where many small-scale farmers are involved and also in view of the often highly decentralized nature of the aquaculture industry.
Existing administrative and legal frameworks need to be reviewed and adjusted to address the specific characteristics and needs of the sector and to set forth clearly the privileges and responsibilities of aquaculturists. However, because aquaculture is frequently regulated by many agencies under a variety of laws, developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for the sector is often legally and institutionally complex. Typically it involves drafting or amending legislation that addresses a variety of issues and establishing institutional arrangements to ensure the cooperation and coordination of many different institutions with jurisdiction over natural resources, animal and public health, environment, etc.
Although new national laws to regulate aquaculture comprehensively may be desirable in many countries, other options are now being explored because developing and passing new comprehensive legislation often takes several years, while the prospect of rapid development of the sector has created an urgent need for regulation. These options include the enactment of regulations under existing legislation, and voluntary approaches such as guidelines and codes of practice.
The formulation of appropriate regulations in many countries is constrained by a shortage of information on the interaction of aquaculture production systems with the environment and on the environmental and financial efficiency of alternative approaches to production management. Even where information is available, reliable predictive models for aquaculture-environmental interactions still require considerable improvement with regard to their accuracy, general applicability and affordability.
There is also an associated need to strengthen institutional capacity to manage the sector and to expand the knowledge base in order to enable sustainable development policies and plans. There is a general recognition of the need for interdisciplinary and intersectoral approaches to development and resource management in aquaculture. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that sustainable aquaculture development cannot be regulated solely by governments but must involve many interest groups at the national, regional and international levels, including new institutional arrangements and partnerships (consultative frameworks). This is being highlighted by ongoing structural change, namely privatization and the contraction of governments' role in development.
Consequently, there is a growing and urgent need to create new knowledge and to synthesize information from a broad spectrum of disciplines so that decisions can be based on a much broader perspective and understanding. It is also important to ensure a flow of information among different sectors and interest groups.
International trade, including in aquaculture products, is governed, inter alia, by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). This agreement recognizes the right of World Trade Organization (WTO) members to apply legitimate measures to protect the life and health of their populations from hazards in food, but stipulates that these measures must not be unjustifiably trade-restrictive. SPS measures must be based on risk assessment, taking into consideration the techniques being developed by relevant international organizations. In regard to food safety, the relevant international body is the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC); in regard to animal (including fish) health and disease, the relevant organization is the International Office of Epizootics (OIE). International safety standards and procedures specific to aquaculture products are increasingly being developed in the context of these instruments. It is important to note, for example, that application of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system to fish processing operations is becoming mandatory in a number of countries. The application of the same system to large-scale and/or intensive aquaculture production systems is currently being explored and applied in some countries. However, use of the HACCP system in small-scale and subsistence aquaculture is far from a reality at present, as the application of aquatic animal health and disease control regulations is constrained by poor diagnostic capacity (including trained human resources, standardized diagnostic techniques and infrastructure) in many developing countries as well as a lack of reliable information on pathogens and diseases of concern to traded species.
In regional and international trade in aquaculture products, friction over differences in environmental standards among countries is best attenuated through improved coordination and harmonization. If environmental standards are to be raised over time, countries - particularly those with less demand for environmental goods - will need to be encouraged to raise their standards through a variety of appropriate support mechanisms, for example guarantees for expanded access to the markets of countries with higher standards.
The expected increase in competition for, and regulation of, natural resources clearly calls for greater production efficiency and the conservation of critical inputs. This should be a priority topic for systems research. Efficiency in resource use may also be achieved by integrating aquaculture with irrigation systems and agriculture as well as by utilizing inland surface waters and floodplains for certain forms of aquaculture production.
New forms of integrated aquaculture-agriculture systems as well as other innovative systems that can effectively respond to resource and environmental challenges need to be developed. In this connection, attention should be given to resolving the economic and environmental challenges of stock enhancement and ranching as well as of offshore cage culture.
The reduced role of government in financing fisheries and aquaculture has resulted in the cessation of public support to resource-poor fish farmers, the negative effects of which may be counteracted by special policy instruments designed to promote training and equitable income distribution and to facilitate access to information, credit and inputs needed in production.
The Code is beginning to have a worldwide influence on the development of an enabling environment for sustainable aquaculture; however, much remains to be done. More progress can be expected as guidelines are developed on how to strike a balance among economic, social and environmental concerns, how sustainability choices apply in practice and how to analyse the economic cost of resulting actions.
Certain states have initiated national measures such as workshops to promote the Code and some NGOs, including producer groups, have developed or are developing codes of conduct and practice for particular aspects of aquaculture. Examples of these are: an implementation plan for the code for marine fisheries and marine aquaculture in the United States;4 a code of practice for mangrove protection by the Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA);5 a code of practice for Australian prawn farmers;6 codes of practice for cage culture of finfish and pond culture of shrimp in Malaysia;7 and guidelines for sustainable industrial fish farming.8
Over the last few years, there has been a growing interest in many countries to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for aquaculture that will protect the industry, the environment, other resource users and consumers. This interest is being driven by a variety of factors, including: greater political attention as the economic importance and potential of aquaculture become more apparent; greater awareness that inappropriate laws and institutional arrangements can significantly constrain the development of the sector; evidence of environmental damage and social disruption as a result of rapid and largely unregulated expansion of some high-value species in certain coastal areas; and a growing emphasis on assuring the quality and safety of aquaculture products in international trade. Some of these issues were debated at an FAO Technical Consultation on Policies for Sustainable Shrimp Culture, held in Bangkok at the end of 1997.
Progress is also being made in the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks for aquaculture in individual countries. Among these are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Suriname. The Government of India has set up an Aquaculture Authority, which will license the adoption of improved technology for increased production and the establishment of new farms within and outside the Coastal Regulation Zone. In India, the Tamil Nadu Aquaculture (Regulation) Act of 1995 sets out conditions to improve siting and management of aquaculture facilities and establishes an Ecorestoration Fund, supported by deposits from aquaculturists, to remedy environmental damage caused by aquaculture farms.
Concerning quality and safety of aquaculture products, FAO is currently involved in revising the FAO/WHO Code of Hygienic Practice for the Products of Aquaculture under the auspices of the Codex Committee on Fish and Fishery Products. International meetings continue to be held as part of efforts to develop risk analysis for food safety, synthesize and disseminate information on food safety (including food production from aquaculture) and address any related issues.9
Meetings focused exclusively on aquaculture have covered subjects such as the use of chemicals,10 environmental impacts of coastal aquaculture11 and food safety issues associated with products from aquaculture.12
In the United States, the industry and government have succeeded in developing comprehensive HACCP plans for cultured catfish, crayfish and molluscs. A similar approach is being introduced in Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Norway and Thailand. The EC currently imposes detailed conditions on the handling, slaughter, inspection, processing, packaging, identification and storage of fishery products,13 and applies stringent controls to the animal health conditions applicable to the marketing of aquaculture animals and products.14 FAO, the Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA) and OIE are collaborating to develop guidelines on aquatic animal quarantine and health certification to be applied in Asia when moving live aquatic animals.
There is increasing interest and hence a growing experience in the incorporation of aquaculture activities in resource management for coastal and inland areas. Integrated resource management forces long-term planning (e.g. through the designation of zones where different users will have priority), which provides predictability required for any long-term investment while also reducing conflicts among actual and potential users. A variety of tools are being used in the planning process, including: geographic information systems (GIS); predictive systems for assessing carrying capacity (particularly for finfish cage culture and mollusc culture); and environmental and social impact assessments.
An example of what can be done to integrate aquaculture into resource use plans is provided by the Australian State of Tasmania. Under new legislation (notably the 1995 Marine Farming Planning Act and the 1995 Living Marine Resources Act), marine farming development plans must be designed to cover areas rather than sites, and broad community participation in the preparation of such plans is also provided for by laws. An environmental impact assessment must be carried out and a marine farming zone established before leases are granted to marine farms. (Box 7 provides an example of environmental management of aquaculture in the Republic of Korea.)
Progress towards participatory planning has been reflected in the growing participation of NGOs, farmers' associations, researchers and public officials in national, regional and international fora, particularly for the development of codes of practice and conduct and the formulation of regulations and legislation. There has also been progress in the development and testing of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and rapid rural appraisal (RRA) methodologies, and of concepts and possible local structures for community management of resources.
Sustainable development is the overriding strategic issue and challenge to all economic sectors, including aquaculture, and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. Issues of sustainability can be expected to change our perceptions of desirable forms of aquaculture development and management, and new ways of farming that strike a balance between food security and the environmental and resource costs of production will have to be adopted. In the future, and with the growing trend towards ecolabelling, the longstanding goal of producing particular species at competitive prices is, in itself, likely to be insufficient for realizing full market potentials. In the future, acceptable sustainability credentials will probably be as essential as quality and safety standards are today.
In the short term, the elaboration of legal and regulatory frameworks, particularly in developing countries, will be the probable outcome of local social pressure and environmental and public health standards associated with trade in aquaculture products (e.g. in the case of shrimp and Atlantic salmon). This development will provide a window of opportunity to begin the process of providing the sector with a specific identity in national development - which could eventually be expanded to cover the entire sector.
Politically, food production will remain an overriding priority, and intensification as well as diversification in food production will both constitute important approaches to development. The move towards intensification in aquaculture is evident in many countries, and this trend will probably continue. This will promote investment in research, which will eventually lead to improved production efficiency, as in the case of Atlantic salmon and American catfish. It will also enhance integration with agriculture for the compatible multiple use of resources and for the utilization of by-products and unconventional inputs in general. In industrialized countries, competition for quality freshwater and suitable production sites will lead to an increased use of recycling systems and to more intensive research in open sea aquaculture. The extent of the challenge to aquaculture development will depend on the nature and magnitude of available resources as well as on the existing competition for these resources and the aquaculture development policies adopted at the national level. Finally, increasing privatization and the contraction of the role of governments in development are likely to worsen the situation of resource-poor artisanal and subsistence fish farmers.
The World Resources Institute (WRI) reported in 1996 that about 34 percent of the world's coasts are at high potential risk of degradation and another 17 percent are at moderate risk.15 As an estimated 90 percent of the world's marine capture fisheries production is dependent on coastal habitats, the relevance to fisheries is obvious. Moreover, coastal fishing communities are typically characterized by intense competition for scarce resources (e.g. for access to and use of fishing grounds, water or land), which is often associated with unregulated access to these resources.
The known consequences of habitat damage include a loss or lowering of productivity and the associated threat to local food security; contaminated aquatic food products; reduced economic viability; increased levels of conflict involving fishers; sometimes physical displacement of communities; increased unemployment; and the loss of trade opportunities. Heightened anxieties within the communities affected lead to frequent disputes - and in extreme cases physical violence.
While fisheries is the sector that is most frequently disadvantaged, it is also a contributor to environmental damage and to the exacerbation of conflict. The use of bottom trawls, dredges and explosives and the careless anchoring of craft are examples of fisheries practices that have a negative impact on aquatic habitats. They may negatively affect bottom fauna such as sea grass beds and coral reefs. Likewise, some aquaculture practices have caused negative environmental effects, such as the physical destruction of ecologically sensitive habitat, excessive nutrient and organic enrichment of seabeds owing to the release of wastes from cage and pond farms, and the introduction of harmful alien species.
Conflicts over coastal fisheries resources occur between groups of fishers. A frequently occurring example is conflict over the use of shrimp trawlers in the near-shore areas frequented by artisanal fishermen using traditional methods. Apart from reduced catches, the artisanal fishers risk damage to their gear. In such cases, their response may not always be rational, as when they intensify their exploitation of juvenile fish in nursery areas or employ destructive fishing methods to maintain their livelihoods.
Often, the fisheries sector and its institutions do not have the necessary economic and institutional clout needed to guide and coordinate management. Many instances exist where government agencies have insufficient expertise to undertake the necessary integrative evaluations and planning. There may even be a lack of basic knowledge about the fisheries in question.
However, as other economic sectors expand in the coastal zone, the relative economic importance of fisheries declines, a process that may be speeded up as a result of damage to habitat and spatial competition. Naturally, this acts to weaken further the influence of the fisheries agencies in determining policy.
Integrated planning and institutional coordination are frequently listed as the primary requirements for effective coastal management. In practice, both have proved difficult to achieve and both entail significant costs. These difficulties relate to what are often cumbersome bureaucratic structures and procedures of government agencies; the complexity of the scientific, technical and economic issues involved; and the potentially large number of informed decisions that need to be taken. Notwithstanding, there are few coastal management schemes where the interests of the fisheries sector are not considered.
Coastal management can be properly addressed through the formulation of soundly based management plans, the provision and enforcement of appropriate environmental legislation, a transparent consultative process involving users and potentially affected groups and monitoring of the subsequent development impact. The role of fisheries agencies should include participation in:
The costs of a formal process of preparing a management plan are almost always justified. However, as a rule it will be essential to strengthen expertise in environmental impact assessment, the economic evaluation of alternative resources uses, rapid appraisal techniques and ecological-economic modelling.
Experience shows that fisheries interests are best served when they are represented early on in the coastal management process. Therefore, the delegation of responsibility to elected bodies of lower government levels can also be important in ensuring greater awareness at the local level (see Box 8, Participatory approach to the management of lagoon fisheries in Benin). Ideally, municipal governments should have considerable influence in matters relating to fisheries and aquaculture, in the way that they normally do with respect to siting and specifications of any industrial, commercial or housing structure. However, the municipal decision-makers will need to be provided with the appropriate technical expertise and an understanding of fisheries matters - which is something that can be done by specialist agencies, research institutions and NGOs.
The process of management requires trade-offs between competing uses, with the negotiation of trade-offs normally involving consideration of the respective contributions from the competing users to national economic and social well-being. This in turn requires consideration of the current and potential (i.e. optimally managed) economic value of resources. It is important for all the potential impacts to be valued, not just those that are easily determined. For example, those discharging untreated sewage into the sea should bear the cost of associated catch losses to any nearby fishing community.
Some countries have enacted planning legislation that assigns priority to coast-dependent development. Its application provides a first rationale for allocating scarce coastal resources by giving added weight to uses (or sectors) that, by their very nature, are dependent on the inherent attributes of the coastal zone. Capture fisheries and aquaculture clearly fall within this category whereas many activities of other sectors may not.
A major international workshop on integrated coastal management (ICM) in tropical countries was held in 1996 in Xiamen, China, to discuss experiences with and lessons drawn from ICM efforts. The workshop generated an overview of the processes of formulating, designing, implementing and extending ICM within East Asia as well as other regions. It also produced a set of Good ICM Practices.16 In addition, the IMO/FAO/UNESCO - IOC/WMO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) has provided guidance on the role of science in coastal management. There has also been an assessment of the current objectives of and methods for evaluating coastal management projects and programmes that are funded by international donors.17
A group of experts recently compared the coastal management guidelines used by five different international entities (the World Bank, the World Coast Conference, UNEP, the World Conservation Union [IUCN] and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) and subsequently wrote a "Consensus set of ICM guidelines".18
International concern for the management of coastal (and catchment) areas was given formal recognition at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). In the same year, the International Conference on Responsible Fisheries called for the development of a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The Code includes principles and provisions to encourage states and their agencies to consider and implement legal, institutional, policy and economic measures. This is in order to promote the proper integration of fisheries interests into coastal management planning and development.
In its efforts to strengthen the capacity of governments, NGOs and the private sector in coastal zone management, FAO has collaborated with a range of institutions, including the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), NACA, the United Nations Statistics Division, IUCN and other UN agencies sponsoring GESAMP activities.
The joint initiatives mentioned have included the testing of alternative management approaches through pilot projects and the publication of guidelines on managing the environmental impact of aquaculture, integrated economic and environmental accounting, objectives and strategies of coastal fisheries management and the application of scientific methods to coastal zone management. There have also been jointly sponsored technical consultations attended by stakeholders and other interested parties.
Where there is no constraint on levels of exploitation (i.e. in situations of open access), the utilization of natural resources - whether by fishers or others - is inconsistent with their sustainable use. In the case of fisheries, an emerging consensus is that sustainability can be best achieved through the establishment of specific use or property rights. This is valid despite the many difficulties in defining and enforcing rights-based management. Some countries have modified fisheries law to accommodate the formal allocation of user rights to fishing communities, and this trend is expected to continue, allowing such communities greater control over the factors affecting their well-being.
In the absence of appropriate action by governments and users, the overexploitation and degradation of coastal resources will increase further as a result of population pressure and associated levels of economic activity. The greatest progress in coastal management can be expected in the developed countries, as developing countries that suffer acute poverty and unemployment within their coastal zones will need to strengthen their national economies substantially before much attention can be paid to coastal management.
Several of the world's most important fisheries are subject to excess fishing capacity, and this a cause of growing concern. Excess capacity means that, in many of the world's fisheries, fleets are not only larger than they need to be to catch and land (at the lowest cost) the volumes of fish currently available, but they would also exceed the requirements for fishing in the event of stocks being permitted to recover in size. Not only does this threaten the sustainability of the fish stocks being exploited but it also constitutes a potential threat to other stocks. This situation has resulted from investors purchasing additional vessels to generate more returns - even when the fleet size is optimal from a general socio-economic point of view. Excess fishing capacity is thus caused by a lack of control over fishers' access to fish stocks. Additionally, in some countries, it is also brought about by public funding of investments in new vessels and/or the rehabilitation of old ones, although recent FAO studies on public funding of the fishing industry indicate a declining trend in these expenditures.
Overcapacity is generally caused by excessive investments and an indiscriminate use of fishing inputs. Two manifestations of excess capacity are poor economic performance, or inefficiency, and biological overfishing. Overcapitalization in capture fisheries wastes investment capital and therefore leads to high fishing costs. Similarly, overexploitation of stocks wastes fish resources.
Attempts to control overfishing can be negated - at least partially - by the practical difficulties associated with the measurement of fishing capacity, whether expressed as inputs (fishing units) or output (potential catch). A lobster fishing vessel with 60 pots, for example, has more effect, or fishing capacity, than a vessel with 20 pots; added to this are factors such as the size of the pots and whether they are emptied more than once during a shift. Subtleties such as these have made it difficult to control fishing capacity by applying checks to fisheries inputs, and this has been one of several factors leading to an increased interest in the control of capacity through limits on fisheries outputs, i.e. on landings of fish (see Box 9, Capacity control in Australian prawn fisheries).
A fundamental problem for many countries is the lack of reliable data on the numbers and characteristics of craft and gear. Also important is the extent to which the vessels may be moved between fisheries, as action taken to reduce capacity in one fishery may be the direct cause of overcapacity in another, owing to the rapid relocation of the excess capacity. Unfortunately, this has been a common outcome in countries that have sought to reduce capacity solely on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The problem has been recognized in some countries, for example New Zealand, and country groupings, such as the EC, which have chosen to reduce capacity concurrently in each fishery as well as globally at aggregated fleet levels. The necessary precursor in these instances has been to undertake an evaluation of capacity levels in all the relevant fisheries.
From a broader view, efforts made by some developed countries to reduce fishing capacity have led to the relocation of vessels in the fisheries of other (usually developing and least developed) countries. On a global scale, this does not constitute a reduction in capacity. Furthermore, there are several reasons why these relocations might be detrimental to many of the importing countries. For instance, the vessels are usually purchased at a low price, and hence can be operated profitably (at least temporarily) even when fish stocks are depleted - a situation that is conducive to the further depletion of stocks. There have been many cases of local conflicts arising over the fact that such imported vessels - which are usually of an industrial type - operate in direct competition with artisanal fleets.
Fishing capacity is in excess in most regions of the world. For example, with increasing fishing pressure in South Asia, many coastal pelagic and demersal fish stocks in the Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Thailand, and the South China Sea are fully exploited or overfished. This is evident, inter alia, in the increasing proportion of low-value species and juveniles of high-value species being caught.
The open-access nature of high seas fisheries creates a particularly difficult situation with respect to the control of fishing capacity. In the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular, the issue of fishing capacity is largely ignored. The 1995 UN Agreement19 reinforces the obligation of flag states to adhere to the management regimes of the regional fisheries organizations, but does not empower the organizations to deny the access of vessels from non-member states that agree to respect the conservation and management measures in place and do not undermime the work of the regional fishery organizations. Furthermore, there are important high seas stocks that do not come under the purview of the existing regional organizations. In the event of any future efforts to exert controls on the capacity of the high seas fleets, the collation of vessel information at the global level, provided for under the FAO Compliance Agreement, should prove useful.
Effective control of fishing capacity presupposes an understanding of its links with related issues, of which the most important are: the impact of subsidies, the effects of fleet mobility and the effects of the methods that can be used to regulate access to fish stocks. While considerable experience has been acquired in the management of fisheries, most of the methods or tools used control catch or effort, and not capacity per se. The relative effectiveness of these methods in controlling fishing capacity is now better understood, and it is clear that effective control needs regular assessments of stock biomass and an understanding of fleet dynamics, based on a monitoring of the fleet size and its use.
In the developed countries, considerable experience has been built up in the use of alternative fisheries management methods to control fishing capacity. A consensus is emerging in favour of using ITQ management where practicable. In its common form, ITQ management entails limiting the number of fishing units (e.g. vessels), allocating a quota (or share of the TAC) in respect to each and allowing the sale or lease of the right to quotas. A virtue of this system is that it creates an incentive for the voluntary reduction of excess capital by the vessel owners, as attention is drawn away from increasing catches and focused more on reducing costs as the means of enhancing income. This would occur, for example, if an owner purchased and merged the quota entitlements from two boats, with one of the boats being retired. ITQ management can nevertheless prove difficult, particularly when applied to mixed species fisheries, for which it is usually necessary to have complex schemes to offset the increased incentive to discard by-catch.
Not all fisheries are amenable to quota management, however. The difficulties in enforcing adherence to quotas can be substantial. The most frequent alternative has been licence limitation, particularly as applied to controlling the number and power of the fishing units. In most cases this has been done in association with allowing the sale or lease of the rights to a licence. This is of relevance in the purchasing and retirement of licence entitlements - through buy-back schemes - as a means to reduce fishing capacity. It also facilitates (as in the case of ITQ management) the voluntary reduction of capacity by vessel owners. This would occur, for example, when several gear entitlements are merged into a single craft. Voluntary reductions in capacity are usually slow, however, so some form of government intervention is usually required.
Where the control of fishing capacity is exerted through fisheries inputs, experience suggests that capacity is likely to continue increasing, despite the best efforts of the management agencies. This arises because, while it is not difficult to limit the number and size of the units of fishing capacity, it is extremely difficult to control the fishing power of the units. Fishers are continuously striving, often with success, to increase fishing power. There are many examples where agencies have adopted - paradoxically - management measures aimed at reducing the power of the fishing units to offset the gains in fishing power achieved by fishers.
To handle this issue, the management body must monitor the development of technology and its impact on fishing capacity, and do so in concert with the industry. Indeed, management through control of fisheries inputs has been most successful and gained the widest acceptance where the industry has participated in a substantial comanagement role with government.
The majority of countries in the Asia and Pacific region have fisheries management frameworks of varying degrees of efficiency. In general, they are in need of substantial improvement (see Box 10, Improving fisheries management frameworks).
It is in the highly populous countries suffering from acute poverty and unemployment that controlling capacity is most problematic. In the case of artisanal fisheries, even when fisheries agencies can establish that economic benefits would accrue from reduced capacity, an appreciation of the negative social consequences has invariably prevented such action being taken. A lack of alternative employment opportunities encourages the attraction of fisheries as an employer of last resort, and it is in circumstances such as these that fisheries agencies have shown interest in management that empowers the local communities themselves - in particular through the allocation of user rights - to make the difficult decisions concerning fishing capacity and the sharing of the benefits generated by fisheries. This approach is now commonly referred to as "community-based management". (See Box 11, Community-based management in the Negombo Lagoon, Sri Lanka).
A growing number of countries have acted to make substantial reductions in their fishing capacity. In the EC, Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP) have been in force since the mid-1980s. Initially, they were designed to control and restrict fleet expansion; more recently they have been designed to reduce capacity. The MAGP targets for fishing capacity are set in terms of vessel tonnage and engine power which, between 1991 and 1996, were reduced by 15 and 9.5 percent, respectively.
In New Zealand, reductions in fishing capacity since the mid-1980s were undertaken in association with ITQ management. In the subsequent decade, the number of vessels engaged in the country's inshore fisheries was halved (see Box 4). The reductions in fishing capacity achieved in Australia are more at the individual fishery level. Some countries, in particular Japan, have strengthened regulations concerning fleet disposal and access to high seas fisheries.
In Latin America, Argentina, Chile and Peru have recently introduced programmes aimed at reducing fishing capacity. To date, however, these countries have met with considerable resistance from industry associations, with which negotiations related to these programmes are proving complex and time-consuming.
From 1995 to 1997, FAO undertook an assessment of the economic viability of selected fleets (see Box 12) shows that fishing remains profitable in most major fisheries. This would seem to indicate that reduced yields have been compensated by higher prices and lower costs, the latter caused by technological improvements, but still in some cases through transfers of public funds to the sector.
The longer-term objective for FAO is to develop, within the framework of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI), an international Plan of Action for the Management of Global Fishing Capacity. As a step towards developing such a plan, in April 1998 an FAO Technical Working Group of international experts met in La Jolla, United States, to review issues concerning fishing capacity.20 Countries considered the results of these discussions at a meeting held at FAO headquarters from 22 to 24 July 1998.
Many developed countries and a small number of developing countries have successfully taken the important and difficult steps needed to control and, where needed, reduce fishing capacity effectively. Other countries can be expected to follow. Notwithstanding, the reduction of capacity in some countries has not necessarily led to a reduction of the global fishing capacity, owing to the relocation of capacity and the continuing expansion of capacity in other countries. In the short term, the control of capacity will occur mostly in EEZ waters other than those of the highly populous and least developed countries where the control of fishing capacity will remain secondary to employment considerations. In a few countries, commercial fisheries will be displaced as preference is given to recreational activities and tourism.
Resolving the excess capacity in the high seas fisheries is bound to be
a protracted process because of the "open access" nature of these fisheries, the
difficulty of adopting and enforcing internationally (or regionally) agreed measures to
control fishing capacity and the need to establish additional regional management
organizations for those fish stocks outside the purview of existing regional fisheries
management bodies. An emerging issue stems from the increasing participation in high seas
fisheries by coastal states (e.g. countries bordering the Indian Ocean) that often use
lower-technology vessels and gear than the existing distant-water fleets. These countries
are unlikely to collaborate with attempts by regional organizations to control fishing capacity while they are still in the process of establishing their offshore fleets. Ultimately, they might seek to displace the distant-water fleets.
By-catch occurs because most fishing gears and practices are not perfectly selective for the species and sizes being targeted and because target species exist in habitats occupied by a wide range of other species. The target species themselves may be considered as by-catch if they are of the wrong size, the wrong sex or the wrong part of the animal. Shark carcasses are an example of the latter when it is only the fins that are targeted. The definition of "wrong" in these cases is determined either by the market or through regulations applied to the fishery. Similarly, the by-catch of non-target species may be either marketable or non-marketable. In most cases, unmarketable by-catch is discarded, the key exception being where discarding is forbidden.
The discarding of by-catch has long been recognized as wasteful, although inevitable by virtue of the nature of fishing. It constitutes a loss of valuable food, has negative consequences for the environment and biodiversity and can be aesthetically offensive. By-catch was propelled to the forefront of public debate in reaction to the incidental capture of dolphins in tuna purse seine nets, turtles in shrimp trawls and marine mammals, birds, turtles and fish in high seas squid driftnets. The outcome for all the fisheries concerned was dramatic, and not always perceived as rational from the viewpoint of fisheries interests.
An order of magnitude for the quantities of fish discarded was provided for the first time in an assessment published by FAO in 1994.21 Annual discards from the world's fisheries were estimated to range from 17.9 million to 39.5 million tonnes. A subsequent re-evaluation of these estimates, together with adjustments allowing for subsequent reductions in discarding, indicates that current levels are at the lower end of the range. The most recent FAO estimate of 20 million tonnes, if correct, is equivalent to 25 percent of the reported annual production from marine capture fisheries, which are those from which most of the discards derive.
In the Pacific artisanal and subsistence fisheries, fishers generally discard very little of their catch. Most discards in this region are generated by the tuna fisheries, particularly the tuna long-line fisheries for albacore and, to a lesser extent, by the purse seine fisheries for skipjack and yellowfin tunas.
In most respects, the decision by fishers to discard components of their catch is driven by economic factors. In an unregulated fishery, fishers have an incentive to discard if the expected net price, i.e. the real price less landing costs, is negative and if the resultant costs incurred in landing are greater than those incurred by discarding. Furthermore, there is an incentive to discard if the boat has a limited holding capacity. In such cases, fishers tend to discard the low-value components and retain those of higher value, a practice that is often referred to as "high grading".
Management involving the use of catch quotas commonly increases the incentive to discard. This is particularly so in mixed species fisheries where several of the species are subject to a quota. Three forms of discarding can be associated with quota management: the discarding of catch taken in excess of the quota, high grading and price dumping. The latter occurs where all or part of the catch of a species is discarded if a low price is expected. This could occur on the return journey to port, for example, when a fisher may decide to discard the day's catch so as to save the quota for a day when the price is higher.
Discarding is a feature of any management system that does provide for its specific and effective prohibition. In this event, there remains the issue of whether or not the added cost of enforcement is justified in lieu of the benefits and who should pay. In fact, most of the measures aimed at reducing the quantities being discarded carry substantial implementation costs. The rational argument that is gaining general acceptance is that the costs of implementation should be a cost against the fisheries and should therefore be borne - directly or indirectly - by those who clearly benefit directly from those fisheries.
The incentives to discard do not change with the introduction of licence limitation. Nevertheless, if the number of vessels is reduced as a result of licensing, there is likely to be at least a short-term increase in the stock of the by-catch species. Minimum size requirements would normally increase the discarding, particularly if enforcement is carried out at the point of landing. The benefit from enforcement at the point of capture - which is not always practical - is to "encourage" fishers to operate on grounds where there are fewer undersized fish and to employ more selective gears and practices.
Restrictions applied to the number of days at sea can lead to less discarding. This may occur simply as a consequence of reducing the fishing effort, in which case the effects are the same as those brought about by reducing the number of vessels. Additionally, there may be insufficient fishing time to enable the space to be filled with only the higher-value components of the catch, a situation that arises if storage space is limited. In such cases, more of the less valuable components could be retained and hence discarding could be reduced.
At the fishery level, the management measures that seek to reduce discarding fall into two broad categories. The first achieves lower quantities of by-catch through the use of more selective gears and practices, area and seasonal closures and increased by-catch utilization. The second category includes measures aimed at reducing the discarding of by-catch. These may be direct - such as when discarding is prohibited - or take the form of economic incentives to alter discarding behaviour.
The measures to reduce discarding in fisheries under quota management have gained increased prominence, as progressively more fisheries have been placed under ITQ management regimes. They include allowing above-quota catch to be traded - i.e. sold to those with unfilled quotas - as an alternative to discarding. Permissible levels of quota overrun allow fishers to exceed quotas in one year in return for a reduction in quotas for the following year. In New Zealand, permitted quota overruns are limited to 10 percent of the original quota for all species. Also in New Zealand, fishers can land species for which they do not hold a quota and record it against the quota held by other fishers. The voluntary surrender of above-quota catch without penalty is another option. In this event, the fisher may sell the catch in the normal manner, but must pay the "deemed" value (the value realized in excess of the cost of landing) to the management authority.
Norway has imposed a system where the discarding of quota species - including sizes that might otherwise have been discarded - is prohibited and all the catch is deducted from the quota (see Box 13). Individual fishers are responsible for ensuring that they have sufficient unfilled quotas to allow for any by-catch of quota species when targeting other quota species. They are also required to leave a fishing ground if there is a perceived risk of exceeding quotas or if there are abundant juveniles. This aspect of the Norwegian approach has provided a strong incentive to develop and apply more selective gears. In the United States, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council has resolved to prohibit the discarding of walleye pollock, Pacific cod, yellowfin sole and rock sole. This has commenced for the first two species and is to be phased in for the others over a five-year period.
The 1995 UN Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks seeks to minimize pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear and catch of non-target fish and non-fish species. This should be achieved, inter alia, through measures such as the development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and techniques. These obligations were reiterated with reference to all fisheries in the Plan of Action produced by the International Conference on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, held in Kyoto, Japan, in 1995.
The Code specifically states that: "States, with relevant groups from industry, should encourage the development and implementation of technologies and operational methods that reduce discards. The use of fishing gear and practices that lead to the discarding of catch should be discouraged and the use of fishing gear and practices that increase survival rates of escaping fish should be promoted." Where selective and environmentally safe fishing gear and practices are used, they should be recognized and accorded priority in establishing conservation and management measures for fisheries.
The Technical Consultation on the Reduction of Wastage in Fisheries,22 held in Japan in October 1996, provided an important forum for a discussion of this issue by international specialists. The participants concluded that there had been significant reductions in discarding worldwide during the past decade. This had come about as a result of less fishing effort, time and area closures of fishing grounds, the use of more selective gears, the utilization of previously discarded by-catch, enforced prohibitions on discarding, and consumer-led actions. There were recommendations made with regard to information gathering, the future estimation of discards, options for fisheries management, the impacts on small-scale and recreational fisheries, gear selectivity and the utilization of by-catch.
At the March 1997 session of COFI, several delegations reported on successful by-catch reduction programmes. Papers23 presented at the international workshop on Solving By-Catch: Considerations for Today and Tomorrow, sponsored by the United States and held in Seattle in 1995, provided many examples of by-catch reduction across a wide range of fishing gears and practices. The by-catch and discard issue, particularly regarding the collection of by-catch data, is being addressed by the regional fisheries organizations, for example by placing observers (from member countries) on the offshore tuna fleets.
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is continuing its substantial involvement in research on dolphin by-catches. The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is increasingly active with respect to the by-catch of sharks (see Box 14).
The process of resolving the by-catch and discards issue will be driven by forces at several levels. The community at large will continue to take offence, particularly where the problem is widely publicized and includes species with a high "aesthetic" value. The continued large-scale use of drift gillnets, for example, whether on the high seas or elsewhere, can be expected to remain a target of dissent. The substantial challenge for fisheries governance is to achieve balanced outcomes that are sensitive to community values but avoid unnecessary losses of benefit from the fisheries themselves. This will require the public to be correctly informed and those responsible for fisheries - including fisheries participants themselves - to establish credibility through continued efforts to reduce by-catch and discarding.
In the highly populous countries, particularly in Asia, where fisheries are characterized by many gears and several species in catches, relatively little of what is caught is not consumed or used as feed in aquaculture. Where wastage does occur, it is not so much the consequence of discarding but rather of some species - possibly many - generating more economic benefit when captured at a larger size. Where this can be established, the best management approaches are likely to include area and time closures and more selective gears. Nevertheless, this situation generally arises in countries where management is intrinsically difficult because fisheries often act as the employer of last resort. Improving the well-being of the fishers in one community would be a short-lived solution if there was a consequential inward movement of fishers from the surrounding communities.
1 Adopted by the Twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Conference in
October 1995, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is referred to throughout this
publication as "the Code".
2 The EC, Japan, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States.
3 Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
4 Government of the United States. 1997. Implementation Plan for the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Marine Fisheries Service. 20 pp.
5 Anon. 1997. Global Aquaculture Alliance formed to guide industry toward environmental sustainability. World Aquaculture, September 1997, p. 48.
6 D.J. Donovan. 1997. Environmental Code of Practice for Australian Prawn Farmers. July 1997. 32 pp.
7 O. Pawaputanon. 1997. Manual for harmonization of good shrimp farm practice. ASEAN Fisheries Network Project.
8 Anon. The Holmenkollen Guidelines for Sustainable Aquaculture. In Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Sustainable Aquaculture, Oslo, 2-5 November 1997. Trondheim, Norway, Norwegian Academy of Technological Sciences. 9 pp.
9 See FAO. 1997. Risk management and food safety. Report of a Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Rome, 27-31 January 1997. FAO Food and Nutrition Paper No. 65. Rome; and FAO. 1998. Animal feeding and food safety. Report of an FAO Consultation, Rome, 10-14 March 1997. FAO Food and Nutrition Paper No. 69. Rome.
10 SEAFDEC/FAO/CIDA. Report and proceedings of SEAFDEC/FAO/CIDA Expert Meeting on the Use of Chemicals in Aquaculture in Asia, 20-22 May 1996, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre, Iloilo, the Philippines. (in preparation)
11 FAO. 1997. Towards safe and effective use of chemicals in coastal aquaculture. GESAMP Reports and Studies No. 65. Rome. 40 pp.
12 FAO/NACA/WHO. Food safety issues associated with products from aquaculture. Report of a Joint FAO/NACA/WHO Study Group on Food Safety Issues associated with Products from Aquaculture, Bangkok, Thailand, 22-26 July 1997. WHO Technical Report Series No. 883. Geneva, WHO. (in press)
13 Directive 91/493/EEC as amended by 95/71/EC.
14 Directive 91/67/EEC as amended by Directives 93/54/EC and 95/22/EC.
15 WRI. 1996. World Resources 1996-1997. WRI/UNEP/UNDP/World Bank. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press. 365 pp.
16 International Workshop on Integrated Coastal Management in Tropical Developing Countries: Lessons Learned from Successes and Failures. 1996. Enhancing the success of integrated coastal management: good practices in the formulation, design, and implementation of integrated coastal management initiatives. MPP-EAS Technical Report No. 2. Quezon City, the Philippines, GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas/Coastal Management Center.
17 J. Sorensen. 1997. National and international efforts at integrated coastal management: definitions, achievements and lessons. Coastal Management, 25: 3-41.
18 B. Cisin-Sain, R.W. Knecht and G.W. Fisk. 1995. Growth in capacity for integrated coastal management since UNCED: an international perspective. Ocean and Coastal Management, 29(1-3): 93-123.
19 The Agreement on the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
20 See FAO Fisheries Department Report of the Technical Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity, La Jolla, United States, 15 to 18 April 1998.
21 FAO. 1994. A global assessment of fisheries by-catch and discards. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 339. Rome.
22 I.J. Clucas and D.G. James, eds. 1997. Papers presented at the Technical Consultation on Reduction of Wastage in Fisheries. Tokyo, 28 October-1 November 1996. FAO Fisheries Report No. 547, Suppl. Rome, FAO. 338 pp.
23 Solving By-Catch: Considerations for Today and Tomorrow. Alaska Sea Grant College Program Report No. 96-03, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.