The threats of the new century are international in character and indeterminable in length, and they require an international response. Alone, the United States cannot win the long war against transnational terrorism, nor can it respond effectively to the other emerging national security concerns of the 21st century. America needs allies. America's greatest strength is strength in numbers: the number of free nations that share its commitment to peace, justice, security, and--above all--freedom.
Building strong alliances requires a proactive strategy that reinforces rather than undermines the sovereignty of the state and at the same time strengthens the bonds of trust and confidence between free peoples, enabling them to act in their common interest. The focus of this strategy should be on building enduring alliances, not just "coalitions of the willing." As part of a comprehensive alliance-building strategy, the Administration and Congress should undertake initiatives to establish international partnerships that more closely resemble those with America's traditional long-standing allies during the Cold War.
American Alliances in History
George Washington was America's first great strategist. He understood well how to deal with the complex challenge of balancing ends (the goals of a strategy), ways (how the goals will be accomplished), and means (the resources that will be used to support the strategy). For that reason, Americans rightly took seriously his cautious approach to global alliances. "It is our true policy," Washington declared in his farewell presidential address, "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."
Washington recognized that while America attempted to build a fledgling democracy, it would be unwise to become deeply embroiled in the conflicts between European states that had little interest in seeing the American experiment succeed. However, he did not intend to declare an immutable principle of statecraft. As a strategist, he knew that, as global conditions changed, America's strategy for engagement with the rest of the world would need to change with it.
The Framers also recognized that the United States required the capacity to undertake formal joint actions with other nations when they included the Treaty Clause in the Constitution: "The President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties...." They understood that the ability to form alliances was an essential element of statecraft, but they wanted to ensure that America did so only when it was clearly in American interests. Specifically:
The Framers believed that treaties should be strictly honored...because the United States could not afford to give the great powers any cause for war....
The fear of disadvantageous treaties also underlay the Framers' insistence on approval [of treaties] by two-thirds of the Senate. In particular, the Framers worried that one region or interest within the nation, constituting a bare majority, would make a treaty advantageous to it but prejudicial to other parts of the country and to the national interest.
Thus, the Constitution envisioned a strong executive responsible for guiding foreign relations with appropriate checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches.
Even at the dawn of the 20th century, American policymakers remained skeptical of the value of alliances. One of the lessons that many took from the outbreak of the First World War was that Europe's rigid alliance structure had contributed significantly to the rapid escalation of the conflict. These concerns contributed to America's rejection of the League of Nations and return to pre-war isolationist policies.
America's alliance strategy evolved considerably after the United States emerged as a true global power after the Second World War. During the Cold War, formal alliances became an important element of blocking the expansion of Soviet power. In particular, NATO served as the cornerstone of efforts to ensure peace, prosperity, and security in Western Europe and uphold wider U.S. strategic global interests. At the same time, U.S. bilateral relations with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea proved vital in protecting the interests of America and its allies in Asia.
The need for enduring alliances came under intense security after the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. As Paul Kennedy has argued, the post-Cold War world had become a "multipolar" place where nations would be less dependant on U.S. power and less interested in aligning with the United States.
Nor were many analysts confident that alliances like NATO would endure only on the basis of providing collective security to their members. "Collective security," Henry Kissinger wrote, "defines no particular threat, guarantees no individual nation, and discriminates against none." They endure only if the participating nations share nearly identical views and are committed to using force based only on the merits of the case, regardless of the impact on national interests--conditions that were unlikely to prevail after the collapse of the Soviet menace.
Many thought that "coalitions of the willing" (groupings of states to deal with particular problems) would become far more commonplace. The first Gulf War, in which the United States successfully fought with an ad hoc alliance, appeared to validate the utility of employing temporary coalitions. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States made specific reference to the growing importance of coalitions of the willing. Such coalitions were to be the coin of the realm for international relations in the 21st century whereby the problem would determine the coalition.
Alliances in the Long War
The experience of the past decade, however, argues the opposite. The most concerted efforts to promote stability in the post-Cold War world and combat transnational terrorism have been by the United States and its traditional Cold War allies. America's strongest military partners in Iraq have been its longest-standing military allies, Great Britain and Australia. Meanwhile, in Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan have remained steadfast U.S. partners. Even Canada and European nations, which have differed significantly from the United States in their policies toward Iraq and how the war on terrorism should be fought, in practice have offered significant cooperation in combating transnational terrorism and supporting operations in Afghanistan.
Some analysts have tried to depict U.S. and Canadian-European policies as contrasting poles, describing U.S. efforts as unilateral, preemptive, and utopian and European measures as multilateral, consensual, and realistic. In practice, however, the ends, ways, and means employed by the United States and its traditional allies are marked by many more similarities than differences.
Not only have America's traditional allies been more important than ever, but so have other countries that have worked more closely with the United States in recent years. India and Poland have demonstrated greater interest in developing deep political, economic, social, and cultural ties rather than just participating in casual military and security cooperation. In short, they have shown an inclination to be more partners in an enduring alliance than participants in an ad hoc coalition.
That traditional alliances have re-emerged as an important element of statecraft should come as no surprise. "Alliances always presume a specific adversary," wrote Kissinger, unlike collective security, which "defends international law in the abstract." Unlike coalitions of the willing, an alliance produces an "obligation more predictable and precise than an analysis of national interest."
In other words, when facing real dangers, nations turn to other nations with which they share trust, confidence, and a common view of what needs to done. The dangers of transnational terrorism, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, and the emergence of potential regional hegemons that demonstrate a propensity to take power by force have served as catalysts for renewed interest in establishing enduring alliances as a hedge against the emerging threats of the 21st century.
Shortfalls in Alliance-Building
Since most national security threats today are international in character, U.S. alliance-building skills are more important than ever. Yet the talents and instruments used to build enduring alliances during the Cold War have become rusty at best. In part, this has happened because of efforts to thwart U.S. policies by attempting to undermine America's legitimate efforts to exercise sovereignty and act in its own interests as it sees fit.
Some analysts call this "lawfare," misusing or reinterpreting laws to make American actions appear illegitimate in the eyes of the world. In some cases, America's difficulty in sustaining traditional allies and nurturing new alliances reflects failures of public diplomacy that poorly articulate and defend U.S. goals and actions. In large part, however, America has been without a serious, deliberate strategy that employs all the elements of national power to build enduring alliances.
Building alliances is not about gaining consensus in international action or allowing U.S. sovereignty to be overseen by multinational institutions. Indeed, abrogating the state's responsibility for national security is the surest way to undermine a nation's capacity to secure the safety, prosperity, and freedom of its citizens over the long term. Rather, building enduring alliances requires proactive initiatives that build common interests between states by developing deep cultural, economic, social, and military ties between established free-market democracies.
Learning from the Special Relationship
America has found its strongest, most enduring alliance in its Special Relationship with Great Britain. This relationship has been defined by consistent and recurring cooperation, systematic engagement, and enduring bilateral relations that emerged from common values and obvious interests. Mutual recognition of the value of democratic government, the rule of law, individual rights, and the market economy combines with a single historical and cultural experience until 1776, continued cultural intermingling since then, and a common language before and after. As Douglas Johnson explains, "The two nations are very closely related by blood and philosophy."
Shared Values. Ultimately, the Special Relationship is special because the shared values and common interests that bind the two countries reach far beyond the philosophical utopia prefacing speeches by European Union (EU) elites dreaming of a European superstate. The common political, diplomatic, historical, and cultural values shared between Americans and Britons actually mean something.
Further still, Britain and America are prepared to defend these values--with military force if necessary. Common values really mean something only if both parties are ready to defend them. Winston Churchill coined the term "Special Relationship" in his 1946 "Sinews of Peace Address" in Fulton, Missouri, after Britain and America had both just spilt horrendous amounts of blood and treasure in an unwavering defense of their shared values.
The tenets of classical liberalism formed the bedrock of a deeply held common political tradition between the two countries from the outset. In modern terms, this has come to mean essentially the rights of the individual over the state--or, as President Ronald Reagan so ably argued, viewing government as the problem rather than the solution.
This concept should not be dismissed. The British and American peoples are naturally suspicious of government and do not believe that they derive their rights from the government, but rather that government derives its legitimacy from the people. The European Constitution, wherein government grants the individuals their rights in exchange for ensuring vast swathes of social rights, illustrates how the mindset of most Western Europeans differs from the Anglo-American mindset.
The economic relationship that binds the U.K.- U.S. alliance is special in two separate but equally important ways.
First, whereas Brussels regularly squares off against Washington, British-American disputes are largely played out in private to augment the relationship between the world's two largest outward investors, who are also the largest investors in each other's economies.
Second, the sheer contrast of the free-market Anglo-American economic model with the highly statist Rhineland model demonstrates the shared economic traditions of the Special Relationship in especially marked comparison to Europe. The fact that many European nations are still trying to regulate themselves out of disaster--matched by the complete failure of the EU's Lisbon agenda--illustrates that these already deep divisions are deepening even further. While German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks about making a more social Europe with "good jobs," Britain and America are actually getting on with the job of driving the economic engine of world growth.
Past Challenges to the Special Relationship. The Special Relationship has faced repeated challenges. In addition to occasional disagreements, events have produced passivity and indifference at times. On occasion, each country has put its national interest above the other's interests, but these events should not be interpreted as threatening the relationship. For instance, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan notably disagreed over the U.S. invasion of Grenada but still went on to cooperate fully in fighting--and eventually winning--the Cold War.
In fact, the Thatcher-Reagan era demonstrates some of the most enduring features of the Special Relationship. Thatcher's ability to be both a steadfast partner and cautionary critic during times of cooperation and conflict is not just an example of her undoubted mastery of statecraft, but a testament to the strength of the alliance. Shared beliefs do not prevent quarrels, even among allies; but more often than not, they yield the right result for both sides. Critics saw Reagan's eventual support for the British liberation of the Falkland Islands as dissenting from America's long-held Monroe Doctrine, but Reagan came to see that supporting Britain's sovereign assertion in defense of an existing possession had greater merit and value than did supporting the existential, geographical pull of Argentina.
The passivity of the 1990s came to an end as the United States and United Kingdom came to cooperate extremely closely in the war on terrorism, markedly in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recurring pattern is of each finding the other a necessary, indispensable ally in times of need, regardless of left-right orientation or prevailing political conditions.
The underlying traditions and historic cooperation shared between Britain and America essentially negate any short-term threat to this enduring alliance. Indeed, while it was the French who proclaimed "Nous sommes tous Américains" in the wake of 9/11, it is Anglo-American political, cultural, military, and diplomatic solidarity that has outlasted this initial show of strength from America's European allies.
Modern Threats. Significant threats to the Special Relationship do exist in the modern era. Britain's geographic position as a European power but history as a great global power makes for a unique situation. The EU's relentless supranational drive has demanded a surrender of British national sovereignty in areas such as trade, the economy, and public health.
However, the institutional and political constraints demanded by further European integration will severely limit Britain's ability to make foreign policy, especially in international alliance-making. In political, diplomatic, and financial terms, no good has come from limiting Britain's geopolitical outlook to the European continent, and certainly no benefit can de derived from deeper EU absorption that limits Britain's historical and proven links with the United States.
In fact, large parts of the EU policy agenda-- such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy--are designed precisely to serve as counterweights to the American "hyperpower." Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the perceived need for another power to counterbalance the United States has consistently motivated advocates of European integration.
The recent investigation by the European Parliament into America's renditions policy visibly demonstrates the anti-American direction of current EU policymaking. The EU believes that supranational institutions like itself and the United Nations should be the sole arbiters of the use of force and should determine the rules of engagement for both symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts. This thinking was nakedly displayed by the EU during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, with powerful European nations, including France and Germany, not just critiquing, but also actively obstructing American foreign policy. EU accession countries were even threatened with delays to their accession for supporting the war. Underlying this diplomatic crisis was the message that Europe's time had come to directly challenge a sovereign foreign policy decision of the United States in an attempt to contain American power.
A major threat to the Special Relationship is also posed by rising levels of anti-American sentiment in Britain. Favorable opinion toward the United States has dropped from 83 percent in 1999-2000 to just 56 percent in 2006. The British press regularly ridicules Tony Blair as President George W. Bush's poodle. The Conservative Party under David Cameron's leadership has called on Britain to adopt a less "slavish" relationship with America, and Kendall Myers, a leading U.S. State Department adviser, recently described the Special Relationship as a "myth," arguing that Tony Blair got "nothing, no payback" for supporting President Bush in Iraq.
Neither Blair nor Bush has properly made the case for the fruits of the Special Relationship, which has in fact operated to mutual advantage especially in the new era of transnational terrorism. High-level intelligence exchange is possible only in an atmosphere in which both sides exercise a high degree of trust. Undoubtedly, the plots to detonate liquid explosives on up to 10 transatlantic flights in summer 2006 were foiled only because of key transatlantic intelligence exchange and cooperation. As Tony Blair said at the time, "There has been an enormous amount of co-operation with the U.S. authorities which has been of great value and underlines the threat we face and our determination to counter it."
Both sides need to make the case for the Special Relationship much more aggressively, demonstrating the effectiveness and substantial value of the close British-American cooperation. Both sides could learn from the golden days of Thatcher- Reagan, as well as those of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, each of whom regarded the other as an indispensable, critical partner.
The Special Relationship demonstrates that common interests can overcome past enmities and occasional conflict. Britain and America have stood shoulder to shoulder in the hardest of times and continue to enjoy the fruits of a solid relationship. As Nile Gardiner has stated, "The U.S.-British alliance continues to operate as a strikingly successful partnership of two great nations built on the solid foundations of a common heritage, culture, and vision."
This history suggests grounds for optimism about the Special Relationship in the future, in spite of today's considerable anti-American feeling in Britain. The anti-Americanism of the 1980s as the Reagan Administration installed Trident missiles in Europe gave way to the British-American-led victory in the Cold War. The passivity of the 1990s gave way to a post-9/11 period of enormous diplomatic and military unity. While hostility and indifference prove passing and ephemeral, the common interests and values that produce the Special Relationship prove enduring time and again, but their very historicity and commonality are therefore equally difficult to replicate.
The U.S. needs a clear and proactive strategy for nurturing and building new enduring alliances. The Administration and Congress can undertake initiatives now to support that strategy, establishing better economic, social, cultural, and security relationships with other free-market democracies of geostrategic importance to the United States.
Building Bridges Between Peoples. Anenduring alliance transcends governments, building bonds of trust and confidence between people based on shared values and personal experiences. Frequent people-to-people interaction is essential and that requires improving opportunities for safe and open international travel.
Since 9/11, Congress has done far too little to encourage foreign visitors to come to the United States. Foreign travel to America has still not recovered to pre-9/11 levels, and congressional inaction threatens to undermine the competitiveness of U.S. society. Both to reestablish America's reputation as an opening and welcoming country and to make the nation more secure against foreign threats, Congress and the Administration should:
End the requirement that 100 percent of visa applicants be interviewed. Congress recently required that every visa applicant be interviewed by a consular officer. In many parts of the world, the interview requirement represents a significant burden in terms of the expense and inconvenience of reporting and waiting for the interview and lost time from work. Likewise, the issuing officers are under pressure to speed through the interviews and make snap judgments that might deny visas to legitimate travelers or miss a serious security threat.
Congress should amend the law to require the Department of State to conduct interviews based on a risk-based assessment conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The departments should have the option to waive interviews for countries, classes of travelers, and frequent visitors from trusted companies, governments, and academic institutions.
Establish electronic travel authorization. It is long past time for the United States to join the 21st century by updating its means of issuing and monitoring visas. Other nations, such as Australia, already use electronic travel authorization.
For low-risk countries and classes of travelers, the United States should implement online visa applications. This would greatly facilitate travel to the United States, significantly reducing the cost and inconvenience of personally applying for a visa.
Expand the Visa Waiver Program. The Visa Waiver Program allows most visitors from participating countries to enter the United States for up to 90 days without a visa as long as they have valid passports from their countries. In turn, U.S. citizens with valid passports do not need visas to visit these countries. Currently, 27 countries participate in the program. Adding countries to the program increases security because these nations must pledge to maintain the same security standards as the United States.
In addition, adding counties would greatly facilitate visiting America. In many places, the price of a U.S. visa is considered exorbitant. In Poland, for example, the visa application fee is a month's salary for an average worker and is nonrefundable because it pays for processing the application. If the visa is denied for any reason, the applicant has simply lost the money. Expanding the Visa Waiver Program to countries in Eastern Europe and Asia, where the United States has growing economic, cultural, and security ties, could both strengthen America's bonds to these nations and enhance travel security.
Building a Shared Common Vision. Enduring alliances can never be complacent in explaining how government policies reflect the common interests of their peoples. Sound public diplomacy programs are essential for explaining the linkage between common interests and current policies.
Public diplomacy is a long-term program to promote dialogue with foreign audiences, nurture institutional relationships, help to educate young democrats and prospective friends, and share ideas. Without this foundation, advocacy for current policies will have little resonance. A model public diplomacy (PD) strategy should therefore:
Define the public diplomacy mission as promoting U.S. interests and security by understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics as well as broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad on a daily, long-term basis. The global war on terrorism should be a priority within this broad mandate.
Establish doctrinal principles to explain how to accomplish the PD mission. These include responding to audience needs, never misleading, disseminating bad news quickly and completely, and ensuring that information always comes from a credible source.
Specify lines of authority. The PD strategy should clearly specify who decides and who acts, or nothing will get done. With collateral agencies engaged in international communications, guidance and arbitration of tactics must come from someone who speaks for the White House and can de-conflict competing, multiagency PD strategies.
Target desired audiences. Priority audiences vary by country and region. A national strategy should identify classes of opinion leaders and populations that are vulnerable to anti-American messages around the globe, not just in the Middle East. The strategy should task U.S. embassy country teams with further segmenting their audiences and specifying the best approaches to dialogue, as U.S. Information Agency (USIA) diplomats once did.
Identify multiple channels. Illiterate populations are likely to listen to radio. Elites may rely on phone text messaging and the Internet. Students get information from textbooks, which are usually in short supply outside industrial democracies. Compact disks and satellite television appeal to the middle classes, while meetings and exchanges help to form opinions one person at a time. The Bush Administration needs to go beyond reliance on the press and utilize different means of outreach more fully.
Create planning, clearing, and assessing processes to establish a workflow across agency boundaries. Polling and country team assessments should tell planners what channels and messages apply to certain audiences. Common clearance procedures known to all agency communications leaders can facilitate rapid reaction to breaking news. Finally, research should be used to assess the effectiveness of all PD efforts. At present, each agency conducts its own limited polling, planning, and evaluation efforts. Research and broad planning should be more centralized and accessible to all PD actors.
Building Mutual Security. After 9/11, the United States incorrectly framed its international security initiatives as "pushing the border out," implying that the United States was forcing other countries to take measures to enhance American security. In fact, improving the security of international trade and travel is about enhancing security for all countries that participate in regimes to thwart terrorist travel and transportation of materials, technologies, and weapons of mass destruction.
Programs that promote mutual security are essential to enduring alliances. The United States needs to reinvigorate the instruments of security assistance and cooperation that it employed during the Cold War and expand these mechanisms to address homeland security as well as military capabilities. Specifically, Congress and the Administration should:
Establish an international homeland security and counterterrorism assistance program. The United States has long maintained the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides low-cost U.S. security assistance to other countries through training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. IMET has also been critical to developing personal and professional relationships among key military personnel and to providing English language training and interoperability. Congress should authorize and fund similar programs for the DHS.
Foster the sharing of homeland security technology. Establishing a database of homeland security technologies and an office in the DHS to facilitate technology sharing is especially urgent. The DHS clearinghouse would describe existing technologies, their capabilities, and their possible missions. A technology clearinghouse would enable partners to know what technologies are available for transfer, provide a method of setting standards so that technologies are understandable, create a forum for interoperable and transferable means for industry-to-industry dialogue, establish predictable export control requirements, and construct acquisition mechanisms such as joint development programs, licensing agreements, and something comparable to the foreign military sales program.
Remove unnecessary technology transfer barriers. Congress should mandate consultations between the State Department and the DHS on proposed technology exports that have a significant homeland security purpose. U.S. export controls should distinguish among technologies with predominantly military, law enforcement, or homeland security applications.
The laws and regulations will also need to balance the benefits of sharing American homeland security technologies against the risks of foreign actors employing them either against the U.S. or for inappropriate commercial purposes. If a proposed technology transfer would promote the security of the United States and the recipient and is unlikely to be wrongfully acquired or used, the transfer should be governed by the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations rather than by the more demanding provisions of the U.S. Munitions List, which are administered by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department.
The Way Ahead
Building enduring alliances should be the centerpiece of long-war strategy, but these alliances will not appear by happenstance. It will require a concerted U.S. effort to build:
Bridges between peoples, facilitating safe and secure travel and interchange between America and its friends and allies;
A shared common vision, enhancing public diplomacy so that America can better make its case on the world stage; and
Mutual security by creating new opportunities for security cooperation.
America can do better, but it will require concerted leadership from the Administration and Congress to do the job.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute.
George Washington, "Farewell Address," 1796, in U.S. Information Agency, Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy, at http:// usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm (June 11, 2007).
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988), p. 14.
U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding, and David Forte, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2005), p. 205.
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 58.
This is best described in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). A less persuasive, alternative view of Cold War alliance history was pioneered by William Appleman Williams, whose Tragedy of American Diplomacy, published in 1959, argued that America was engaged in "Open Door Imperialism," a ceaseless quest for economic dominance and the establishment of an informal empire designed to sustain U.S. economic prosperity and prevent revolutionary agitation against the American global system overseas.SeeJustus D. Doenecke, "William Appleman Williams and the Anti-Interventionist Tradition," Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 284. Williams's thesis fails on number of points, the most salient of which is that if the United States was merely "empire building," why did U.S. allies so readily participate and so frequently demur from U.S. leadership when they perceived that their interests differed from U.S. interests? Williams ignores the fact that Cold War alliances were built primarily on common interests and shared democratic practices. For example, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Paul Kennedy, "American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience," in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 175-177.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 247.
For example, see Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing Security Governance," Cooperation and Conflict,Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 5-26.
For example, see Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies," Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 71-92.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The Death of Neutrality: U.S. and European Convergence in Fighting the War on Terrorism," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 956, August 3, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl956.cfm. See also hearing, U.S.-European Cooperation on Counterterrorism: Achievements and Challenges, Subcommittee on Europe and Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 14, 2004, at www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/ 95829.pdf (April 19, 2007).
Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 247.
Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "International Law and the Nation-State at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1961, August 18, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/bg1961.cfm.
Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1645, April 23, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1645.cfm.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Janice A. Smith, "The Muddled Notion of 'Human Security' at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1966, September 1, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/bg1966.cfm.
Douglas V. Johnson II, "The U.S.-UK Special Relationship: Past, Present and Future," Strategic Studies Institute Conference Brief, May 29, 2005, at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub712.pdf (April 19, 2007).
Associated Press, "Merkel Calls for 'Good Jobs' as Europe Looks for More Jobs," International Herald Tribune, March 8, 2007, at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/08/business/EU-FIN-EU-Labor-Reform.php (April 19, 2007).
Former Socialist French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (1997-2002) coined the word "hyperpuissance," meaning hyperpower, to define America's political, military, and economic strength after the Cold War.
See European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Web site, at www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/default_en.htm (June 8, 2007).
Pew Global Attitudes Project, "America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas: No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China," June 13, 2006, at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252 (April 19, 2007).
Nick Assinder, "Blair Battles 'Poodle' Jibes," BBC News, February 3, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/ 2721513.stm (April 19, 2007).
George Jones, "Cameron Distances Tories from Bush," Telegraph (London), September 12, 2006, at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/09/12/ncameron12.xml (April 19, 2007).
Toby Harnden, "Britain's Special Relationship 'Just a Myth,'" Telegraph (London), December 1, 2006, at www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/30/wusuk30.xml (April 19, 2007).
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "A Visa Reform Plan for Congress," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1001, May 25, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em1001.cfm.
Helle C. Dale, "A Plan Forward for U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1018, January 24, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/em1018.cfm.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Jonah J. Czerwinski, and Richard Weitz, Ph.D., "Homeland Security Technology, Global Partnerships, and Winning the Long War," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1977, October 5, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1977.cfm.