Research into lethal flu should not have got so far without scrutiny
PHYSICS lost its innocence on 16 July 1945, when researchers involved in the Manhattan Project witnessed the first detonation of an atomic bomb. Years later, Robert Oppenheimer recalled that he was haunted by a verse from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad Gita: "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds."
Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka haven't yet revealed their thoughts on learning that they had created flu viruses that could potentially kill tens of millions of people (see "One mistake away from a worldwide flu pandemic"). But with opinion divided on the wisdom of running the experiments, biology may have crossed a similar line.
The circumstances are very different, of course. Oppenheimer and his colleagues were trying to defeat tyranny. Fouchier and Kawaoka were motivated by a desire for knowledge that they argue will make the world safer.
The trouble is that in the wrong hands, or if handled carelessly, these viruses may be just as dangerous as a nuclear bomb. Fouchier and Kawaoka believe that understanding how the deadly H5N1 virus can become easily transmissible between people is crucial knowledge. Others argue that the experiments don't mimic what might happen in nature, and that the risks outweigh any benefits.
But what is done is done. The question now is, what can be learned from this episode?
First and foremost we must ask how it came to this. The research was first reported at a conference last September, yet the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was not asked for its opinion until later, as two papers describing the work neared publication. The board has now recommended that key details should be withheld from these papers - though whether that will be enough to neutralise any danger is debatable.
While no one doubts the researchers' good intentions, one has to ask how the work progressed so far without a wider debate. In 2007, NSABB drew up a framework for proactively weighing up the risks and benefits of experiments that might provide a recipe for bioterror. It was supposed to serve as a springboard for action, but has simply gathered dust. Before the framework, New Scientist flagged up a grant to Kawaoka which eventually paid for his flu experiments in an article on the pros and cons of such research (14 October 2006, p 20).
The US National Institutes of Health, which funded Fouchier's and Kawaoka's work, says that the US government will now develop a policy to "augment existing approaches" to evaluating such research - though it has not said what this means in practice.
Better late than never. But it is important not to overreact. As we warned more than five years ago, some security specialists see bioterrorists under every bed. If their views were to dominate, important research would become tangled in red tape.
The reality is that a vanishingly small number of projects present such dilemmas. But those that do need to be flagged up earlier in the game and subjected to scrutiny. The scientists involved must also accept that others can legitimately question whether everything that can be done should be done, lest they follow in Oppenheimer's deadly footsteps.
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