The birth of the term,
some information about them,
concentrating on the motti's in the southern area of the Finnish IV Corps.
The birth of the
term "Motti" in military language
The term "Motti" is today a part of the Finnish military
slang, and its also sometimes used in everyday language. It means
today a surrounded/encircled military unit or a place, where that
unit is surrounded/encircled. The term "Motti" has some
older meanings in Finnish language, the most widely known is "one
cubic meter of firewood".
There are several theories of how the term was adopted to mean what
it means today. One of these (the one that I think is the most credible)
is based on an article titled "Motti", written by A.Suvantola
in 1952, and published in the "Suomen Sotilasaikakausilehti"-magazine.
During the Winter War, A.Suvantola served as a captain in the HQ
of the 13th division as the chief of the operative department ("operatiivinen
toimisto" in Finnish) .
| When writing the article, he was relying partly
on his memory, so even his version isn't flawless, and he
admitted directly; "...at the time when the term was
born, no-one had the time to think about it as we were kind
of busy already and the few moments of rest were spent sleeping..."
On Jan 4th, the order to launch the counterattack, was
given by the HQ of the IV Corps. It contained orders about
the order of battle and preparations. The order included,
in the part concerning communications, an order to establish
a communications center named "Motti" in the area
west of Lemetti. The center was to be established and running
in one hour of the seizure of the area. It's unknown who
was the officer that came up with that name or why it was
even called that, but as the area, in where it was presumed
to be established, was one of the largest pockets of Soviet
resistance ("Lemetti läntinen", "Western
Lemetti" in English) , it's quite understandable that
the name was adopted to mean that pocket. The next step
was adopting the term to all pockets in the area, first
by the IV Corps and later on by the whole Army.
The term was quick to spread among the troops, and the
Soviet soldiers in the motti's were often referred as "mottiryssä"
(a rough translation in English would be "Motti-Russki")
. But regardless of the exact person or time when the term
was "invented", it's proven beyond doubt that
the term was "born" in the IV Corps during the
January 1940 and quickly spread to every corner of the country.
Back to Top !
of the Motti's
This and the following sections
are about the motti's and the fighting in the so-called
"Motti Area" North of Lake Ladoga.
The major counteroffensive of the Finnish IV Corps, started on Jan
6th, was projected against the flank of the enemy, already deployed
along the Uomaa-road. The Finns had the element of surprise on their
side, since the tactical decision to conduct the attack was undoubtedly
somewhat unique and the goals unlike anything the Soviet commanders
This time, the attacking Finnish units bypassed the first Soviet
strong points, and continued their advance without any clear geographical
secondary objectives. During the counteroffensive, and in the battles
following it, many pockets ("Motti's") of Soviet troops
were formed. The actual term "Motti" was born during these
battles (see the following section ) .
Note that the Finns used encirclement as the basis of their tactics,
which is understandable as the Soviet troops were deployed along the
roads, in long "columns" while stretching only a few hundred
meters from the road to the woods. But it's wrong to assume that the
intention was to create these motti's, instead the intention was to
quickly destroy the enemy.
|As Major General Hägglund (later Lt.Gen)
wrote after the war: "...It's important to remember, that
the only "Motti" that was intentionally created was
the "Great Motti of Kitilä", where the bulk of the Soviet
168th division was surrounded. The rest were more like "byproducts"
of the attack, born when the Soviet commanders decided to stay
put, instead of withdrawing. The creation of these numerous motti's
was an unpleasant surprise for us, since we of course had hoped
to achieve quick results...".
"Talvisodan Pikkujättiläinen", p.518
| The individual motti's received
many names, used during the battles (different names were used mostly
to deceive Soviet intelligence) , but in time, they all received an
"official" name, usually according to the nearest place-name.
On the left is a picture of the famous "Lemetti
crossroad" (the photographer is facing east, towards Uomaa).
The"grave of the three Generals"lies
in the woods on the other side of the crossroad, past the signs.
Back to Top !
A rough map showing
the motti's between Kitilä and Uomaa, end of January
| The Soviet troops
along the road up to the crossroad west of Lemetti wasn't
yet sliced into two smaller motti's ("Lemetti crossroad"
and "Regimental") .
(Note also that the motti's of "Uomaa"
and "Siira" held out until the end of the war.)
In the text, the following places are names come
up; Pitkäranta (which lies some 6-8 km south along the road
on Ladoga's coast) and Käsnäselkä (which lies not far east
Back to Top !
The defense of
(The text in this section doesn't
reflect the situation in the "Great Motti of Kitilä", since
almost the entire 168th division was trapped in there, making it powerful
enough to even improve it's own situation towards the war's end)
When the motti's were "created", neither side could influence
to what was actually trapped inside. It was more or less random of
what was trapped and where exactly, so all motti's were unique, some
had only infantry while some had mostly support elements.
In the battles more north, unlike in the Ladoga Karelia, long lasting
motti's weren't created. Tolvajärvi (where the center of the enemy
line was breached, followed by a fast pursuit of the fleeing Soviet
forces) , Suomussalmi and Raate-road (where the enemy, along the roads,
were relatively quickly surrounded and destroyed) , the actions weren't
of the same nature as in the southern area of the IV Corps.
The Finns had hoped, that a successful attack would
create havoc and panic among the isolated Soviet troops. This hope
proved to be wrong, and as the Finns lacked sufficient number of troops
to destroy these pockets right away (nearly all troops were committed
in the thrust forward) , the trapped Soviet troops had time to dig
in, creating powerful pockets with all-round defense, furthermore
helped by the thick snow.
It became quickly evident, that the individual Soviet soldier was
remarkable in his ability to dig in. Regardless of the lack of proper
equipment and bad conditions, the surrounded units managed to erect
relatively adequate field fortified defenses (against small arms fire
and light artillery/mortar fire) .
The defenders were deployed in a perimeter with very powerful all-round
defense. But what they usually lacked was depth, or proper reserves.
(The only exception was the "Motti of East Lemetti", which
had so many tanks, that it could form a mobile reserve and create
several defensive inner circles, capable of supporting the outer defensive
Some Motti's were even able to erect some wire obstacles, to strengthen
the defenses even further. The tanks were a valuable asset to the
defenders. As the Finnish IV Corps Artillery Commander Col. Snellman
described in his letter to the Finnish General HQ; "...our frontal
attacks meet a line of field fortified strongpoint, furthermore supported
by many tanks. The tanks move along plowed roads within the perimeter,
making it nearly impossible to cross these points. Sometimes (e.g.
when they run out of petrol) they are dug into the ground in key terrain
points, forming the backbone of the defense by their superior firepower..."
The artillery pieces in a motti were usually used only in direct
fire -role. During the "Motti battles", none of the motti's
gave any notable support to another motti in the area (one of the
major reasons for this was of course, the shortage of shells) . Also
no long range artillery support was given, although the motti's were
in the range of Soviet heavy artillery stationed in Pitkäranta and
Käsnäselkä (all motti's were within 15 km of these two places) . The
motti's were however supported by bombing and strafing attacks by
the Red Air Force.
As the Soviet troops packed themselves into a tight area (the western
part of the Motti of W-Lemetti, which consisted of 25 tanks, 2 field
guns, 1 AT-gun and one 4-barreled AA-mg, was on an area some 100 m
long and 250 m wide) , making it easy to defend, increasing the "feeling
of security" but making it extremely hard to take any actions
against the besieging Finns. The almost total passiveness of the Soviet
troops in the motti's was a striking feature. The motti's neglected
patrolling, and when some patrols left the "security" of
the motti, they were usually gathering firewood or retrieving supply
torpedoes dropped in no-man's land. Sometimes a motti with hundreds
of soldiers and dozens of tanks were guarded by a few platoons, the
Finnish patrols skiing regularly along the ski tracks around the motti
(any escape left marks on the track) .
The resilience of the Soviet soldier in the motti's earned them
the respect of the Finns. What made it possible that they held on
for weeks while suffering cold, hunger and despair, fighting often
to the last man? This was surely affected by the basic character of
the Soviet soldier as well as the discipline implanted into the Soviet
citizens during the previous years. The Soviet doctrine ordered that
all gained ground should be defended to the last man, so it narrowed
the options of the officers... either violate the doctrine/orders
(and save some of your men, but taking a risk of court martial) or
obey and stay put.
Also the strong measures of the officers and the propaganda about
Finnish atrocities against surrendering Soviet soldiers played a role.
It was of course easier to control the troops, as they were huddled
so tightly, but according to interrogations, the basic fear of the
deep wilderness and the Finnish soldier waiting was one of the main
reasons. Only one motti (the "Motti of Saarijärvi") surrendered
after heavy fighting on Feb 22nd. It was the only motti where the
number of prisoners (391 POW's) exceeded the number of bodies found
(some 250) .
Especially the bigger motti's, which had troops from many different
branches tended to survive longer. They had enough firepower to keep
the Finns at bay, while struggling along by eating the horses and
food dropped by planes. The Soviet troops had usually quite generous
amounts of ammo to start with. As the Finns had virtually no AA (Anti
Aircraft) in the area, the Soviet Air Forces could operate quite freely.
This makes a difference, since if the Finns would've had even some
AA, the drops would've been made from higher altitudes increasing
the chance of missing the drop zone. The food rations in the motti's
were immediately regulated, and as the number mouths to feed fell
daily, some motti's managed to survive, just barely, to the end of
On some occasions, a motti, after using up all their supplies, decided
to make a try to friendly lines. These attempts ended often quite
miserably, and even when small group of stragglers found another motti,
they only increased the food consumption in the motti they arrived
The Soviet High Command, tried to help the motti's by airdrops,
increasing pressure against the Finnish lines, and by sending special
Ski battalions via the wilderness towards the motti's. The Finnish
intelligence recognized these attempts quickly and dispatched units
to meet them. Only some small lone groups of these "relief forces"
ever made it. But they did serve a purpose. Many Finnish battalions
were tied up in the wilderness chasing Soviet Ski-units, and luckily
for the Finns, the Soviet relief attempts were made separately and
not at the same time, enabling the Finns to defeat them one at a time.
Back to Top !
The task of destroying the motti's was quite challenging.
The defenders enjoyed the benefits of defense and usually superior
firepower as well. But it's also evident, that some over-estimations
were made, resulting in too limited actions. Some have criticized
that the motti's should've been attacked and destroyed immediately
(like was done in Raate-road, for instance) , but as the Finns expected
the Soviet troops to retreat, after the situation turns into a hopeless
one, no unit was prepared to the birth of the motti's. And, as e.g.
the two Lemetti motti's, which housed well over 100 tanks, a quick
victory with the equipment that the Finns had, was quite impossible.
As the Finns didn't have the equipment to quickly overcome the opposition,
the following basic general tactic against the motti's was soon adopted.
Concentrate on the weak ones, leaving the softening of the bigger
ones to the cold weather and lack of food. The first motti
to fall, in the area, was the "Motti of Koposenselkä" on
On Jan 27th, a meeting was held in the HQ of the Finnish 13.D, which
has also been referred as the "Motti meeting" ("Mottikokous"
in Finnish) . At that point, the Finnish officers and commanders were
still hopeful about the quick destruction of the motti's. These expectations
were influenced by their attitudes, and they underestimated badly
the firepower of the motti's and the resilience of the Soviet soldier.
As the conclusion of the motti meeting, Major General Hägglund decided
that the motti's of "Pieni-Kelivaara" and "Lemetti
west" would be targeted next and the experience gained would
be used to plan the destruction of the remaining motti's.
Back to Top !
During the first motti battles, it became evident, that a totally
new tactic had to be "invented". The first experiences also
proved that propaganda had little value in affecting the Soviet soldier
in the motti's (the small area of the motti's made it easier for the
political personnel to control the common soldier) . Also, during
the first motti battles the need of (and especially the lack of) heavy
weaponry, namely artillery and AT-weaponry was noted. The biggest
problem was perhaps the lack of maneuverable AT-weaponry (not meaning
grenade bundles, satchel charges or Molotov Cocktails) .
Picture source: "Talvisodan Historia
In some cases, like in "East Lemetti", many tanks
had been dug in leaving only the turret above ground. As these
turrets could support each other, the infantry man's task of
crawling to throwing distance became next to impossible. So
the only practical method to clear a way to a breakthrough was
to use 76 mm field guns or 37 mm AT-guns to destroy these armored
pillboxes. But the task of moving them close enough, through
roadless terrain, and getting them into firing position, took
both time and patience, and good camouflaging.
After the fire support was in order, there were two different options.
1) to quickly break into the motti and destroying it in one decisive
attack, or 2) to slowly chip away the defending positions (usually
at night) , foxhole by foxhole, tightening the perimeter, until the
defenders broke or the remaining motti would be open for a final attack.
| The young conscripts of the "HRR"
("Hämeen Ratsurykmentti" or "Häme cavalry regiment"
in English) , made several bold attempts to break into the
motti of "East-Lemetti", but this led only to big,
even pointless, casualties. (See the map of E-Lemetti)
It was proven, that in the destruction of powerful motti's, the
steady but slow reduction of the opposition based on adequate preparations
was far more important than the actual number of attacking men. Not
all officers liked this slow method, but it was the best way to save
manpower, a thing that all Finnish officers had to keep in mind.
Before the attack was to be made, it was necessary to keep contact
with the motti 24 hours a day. This was necessary to deprive the defenders
from rest, time to improve positions and to make them spend ammunition.
During the dark hours, small heavily armed patrols would perform feint
attacks and destroy outer positions until the motti was considered
to be "soft enough".
Then, powerful teams were used, armed with smg's, Mauser pistols
(very popular as they were easy to handle) , hand grenades, smoke
grenades and 3 - 5 kg satchel charges. These teams infiltrated the
Soviet positions under the cover of darkness, and when among them,
a surprise attack was launched. The Soviet positions were destroyed
one by one without any pause and giving the confused defenders no
time to regroup. This method proved out to be amazingly economical
in terms of losses.
| For comparison, when the "Mylly"
strongpoint in West-Lemetti was destroyed in the final attack,
the Finnish assault teams lost a total of only 3 men, while
the defenders lost several hundred. The total body count inside
"Mylly" was 367 Soviet dead. In this case, it's
quite obvious that the morale and cohesion of the defenders
broke entirely, since otherwise kill rations like that aren't
If some doubt these figures, it's good to remember, that
the bulk of the defenders fought from dug in positions and
shelters, that were wiped out by satchel charges.
Usually, the Finns attacked without preliminary bombardment, but
of course, in some cases short preliminary bombardments were made
in order to avoid routine. The biggest problem that the Finns had
in this field, was the lack of heavy artillery. As the snow was 50
cm thick by the time the motti battles begun (compare to Soviet sources
claiming several meters of snow) , the 76 mm artillery was ineffective,
unless used in direct fire. But in late January, the IV Corps had
only one battery 3. / Rask.Psto 4 (3rd battery of the 4th Separate
Heavy Artillery Battalion) of 152 mm H/10 howitzers. Near the Ladoga
coast, some fire missions could be called from the coastal forts (although
the lack of shrapnel shells restricted it) , and few of the obsolete
152 K/04-200p guns, a part of the Ladoga coast defense, were used
to bombard the motti of Kitilä.
The importance of reconnaissance was emphasized. Enough time was
to be reserved to scout thoroughly the enemy positions. The more powerful
the motti was, the more time this took. In order to get the enemy
to reveal it's heavy weaponry, several phony positions and guns were
constructed (and this required again, a lot of time and cunning) .
The defensive strength of the motti's often led to a somewhat strange
tactic on the Finnish side. Sometimes, when a group tried to break
out of a motti, the surrounding Finns often let them go, preferring
to destroy the stragglers in the forest . Of course this wasn't always
allowed, but e.g. The Motti of East Lemetti proved out to be so strong,
that on Feb 14th, the HQ of 13.D issued an order to prevent any movement
into the motti, but allow any group to leave (of course hunting them
down in the woods, afterwards) .
Back to Top !
The final moments
of East Lemetti
At the end of February, some 3800 Soviet soldiers
left in the Motti of East Lemetti. On Feb 28th at 0045
hrs, the Soviet High Command gave the permission to break
out of the Motti, after which the troops were divided into
The final and decisive Finnish attack began
in the evening of Feb 28th. During the battles that night,
the still healthy defenders broke out, to east and south.
The breakout was a partial success. The Southern
group, which consisted of 1 237 men (mostly wounded and sick)
when the breakout began, made it to friendly lines, losing
249 men. The Northern Group, consisting of some 1 500 men,
was searched by planes until March 6th. The it became clear,
that the whole Northern Group was annihilated.
The break out was very bloody. In many places,
the retreat routes were lined with bodies. One party, part
of the northern group, was virtually annihilated near one
of Finnish the camping areas. Among the dead was, the HQ staff
of the 34th Tank Brigade and the HQ of the 18th division.
412 bodies were counted, from which 310 were officers. The
tired Soviet stragglers moving on foot, were easy prey
to the pursuing Finnish units equipped with skis. The
bulk of the "Motti of East Lemetti" was finally
overrun at 0400 hrs on Feb 29th, while some suicidal individuals,
left behind, fought on, until neutralized after fierce fighting.
Some 3 100 Soviet dead were counted inside and around the
motti, while a few dozen prisoners were captured. The Soviet
High Command was unaware of the situation, and as late as
afternoon on March 3rd, a Soviet plane, flying over the motti,
asked by signals if "...General Kondratjev and his staff
are wholly or partly present..." the Finns of the HRR
replied;"wholly" and the plane started to drop supplies.
The Finns mistakenly identified a Soviet
high ranking officer as the Commander of the 34th Tank
Brigade, Brigade Commander Stepan Ivanovits Kondratjev,
burying him besides the Brigade Commander P.Borisov
(died on Feb 5th, on the road to Pitkäranta) , commander of
the 11th Division, and Brigade Commander G.Kondrasov
(died on Feb 29th) , commander of the 18th Division. Borisov
and Kondrasov were placed to rest near the Lemetti crossroad,
and the presumed body of Kondratjev was also buried next the
previous two, giving the place it's name "kolmen kenraalin
hauta", ("the grave of three Generals",in English).
But according to Soviet sources, Kondratjev made it back to
friendly lines to Pitkäranta, having lost both his troops
and his reputation.
to an article in "Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940"
(Minsk, Harvest Publishers, 1999, ISBN 985-433-692-1):
commander of the 34th Tank Brigade Brigade Commander
S.I. Kondratyev, his Chief of the Staff and the Commissar
of the 34th Tank Brigade have committed suicide when
attempting to break out of the motti. So did the Commissar
of the 18th Rifle Division. The commander of the 18th
Rifle Division Brigade Commander G.F. Kondrashov has
been wounded in the motti but has successfully reached
the friendly lines. He has been arrested in the hospital
and his further fate is unknown. Probably he was court-martialed
and executed, as it happened, for instance, to the
commanding officers of the surrounded 44th Rifle Division
at Raate Road. "
Data was provided Andrey Sysa,
St. Petersburg, Russia
Back to Top !
A map of the
Motti of East Lemetti
||1) Finnish 1st company
2) Finnish patrol lines
3) Motti perimeter
5) rise or hill
1) The "Lemetti" house (the field
was marked for Soviet aerial supply drops)
2) The "Pauni" house (probably the last name of
3) a cottage
4) the hill / Soviet strongpoint "Flatfoot" ("Lättäjalka"
5) the hill / Soviet strongpoint "Egg" ("Muna"
6) the hill / Soviet strongpoint "Sausage" ("Makkara"
The probable Soviet deployment inside the
Motti, according to Finnish intelligence
| 1) Elements of
the howitzer regiment
2) Political officers, and troops
3) HQ of 18th division
4) positions in where the attack
of the Finnish "HRR"
Cavalry Regiment was repulsed in late February
| 5) artillery
pieces and positions
6) troops of the Signals Bn
7) Flame-thrower tanks
8) HQ of the 34th Tank Bgd
9) HQ of the AT-Bn
10) shelters, tanks protected
The arrow points to the north, E is South and P is North
(some of the Soviet trenches and positions are barely visible
SW of the road)
During the motti battles, it was noticed, that the best results were
achieved if one commander (usually a battalion commander) was in charge
of the destruction of "his" motti from start to finish (the
Finnish IV Corps fought nearly through the whole war using Task Forces,
which made this arrangement easy) . This arrangement had good results,
as these commanders turned out to be masters of "motti warfare",
and the tactics and ideas they invented spread out throughout the
To improve communications, cable lines were drawn around the motti's,
making it easier to coordinate operations. It was also discovered,
that it was fruitful to draw cable lines also along the assault teams,
giving the local HQ, and other levels, immediate reports of
Back to Top !
War booty from the
motti's in the southern area of the Finnish IV Corps
(date of fall)
| "Lemetti West"
| "Lemetti West"
| "Lemetti crossroad"
| "Regimental" motti
| "Lemetti East"
source: "Talvisodan Historia 3", p.92
The "Total" figure above, is the number
reported back to General HQ. The figures don't reflect the whole
truth. Especially the numbers of small arms captured lack hundreds,
probably thousands, of rifles, lmg's and mg's taken into use immediately
by the Finnish troops and thus never included into the lists of
(E.g. eyewitnesses told that huge piles of weapons were gathered
in the motti of East Lemetti.) Also according to some Finnish
sources, some 2000 rifles were captured from the motti of East
* = from these 71 tanks, only 22 were damaged. The total number
of tanks inside the motti was 105.
From the Motti's, listed above, the Finns captured
also a total of 2 radio stations, 82 field kitchens, 35 cars and
36 tractors. Other material included a field bakery, a truckload
of musical instruments, flags, artillery shells, rifle caliber
Picture source: "Talvisodan Historia 3",
Back to Top !
Life in a Motti
In order to give some idea how the life in the Motti's
(on the Soviet side) was, I decided to include some sections of a
diary, found after the battles around East Lemetti. The unknown writer
was a company leader's assistant in the 83rd Separate Tank Battalion,
which was a part of the 34th Tank Brigade. I
have shortened the text considerably from the text I found
in a Finnish source "Suomi Taisteli osa 2, p.146-151". Note
also that this text is my "own" translation,
which is most likely quite different, if compared to any possible
more "official" translation. The diary was written on a
notebook, so the actions after Feb 8th are unknown.
Back to Top !
of this text
February 1st, 1940
I spent the whole night from 2200 - 0800 hrs, on duty in the communications
trench. Only little action by the Finns. It was very cold, and the
shelter is so cramped, that you can rest only while sitting or standing,
but that's nothing new especially after the some 40 days we've been
I got the following for breakfast, some tea and
the regulated piece of meat, that weighed 30 grams. I made also some
meat soup and drank it. To tell the truth, it was water, having only
the scent of canned meat.
We were given biscuits yesterday, 50 grams each
and I ate nearly all of them, leaving only some for dinner. We have
dinner only after 1800 hrs, and for a reason. The Finns disturb even
our meals during daylight, so we have to do almost everything after
During the evening, I heard some frantic artillery, rifle and mg
fire from the HQ's direction. I went to bed at 2400 hrs.
Back to Top !
of this text
7.00 am, southern sector. It's particularly cold this morning, nearly
-35 °C. It will be a clear sky today. I woke and got up at 0500 hrs,
being unable to sleep due to the cold.
Our artillery has fired through the night. After
I woke up, I went shit, but at that moment the Finns opened fire,
one bullet striking the ground between my legs.
Burjak got me some soup of horse meat this morning,
probably the last portion, as we're out of horses. Lots of planes
this day. We got a lot of supply packs, some 70, also the Finns got
bombed quite heavily. No special Finnish actions on our sector today,
only some sporadic automatic fire.
There's no knowledge of the whereabouts of the
relief forces sent to help us, but it's assumed their doing fine.
I ate dinner at 1830 hrs, and I traded a cigarette with the chef's
assistant, who filled my mess kit with the soup, giving me some extra
making my dinner quite satisfactory.
At the evening I sent the arrested and death sentenced
Moltskov to ...(the word was too smeared to be read).
I haven't shit since Jan 25th. I'm going to bed and it's 2300 hrs.
No troubles from the Finns.
Back to Top !
of this text
The night was cold. I was on duty between 2400 - 0300 hrs and checked
Orlov's and politruk Anufrijev's positions. At Orlov's, I warmed up
the can of soup I had and drank it. After I woke up in the morning,
I was assigned to distribute the rations of horse meat, 15-20 grams
I attended the reading of the sentence number 8,
given by the 55th Court Martial, sentencing Timoshenko to be executed
by a firing squad.
Our artillery opened up and fired the enemy, the
temperature is nearly - 35°C. The weather is excellent for planes,
and our Air Forces should operate successfully.
We had thin buckwheat soup for dinner, I got three
portions. We got an extra ration of 60 grams of biscuit and 60 grams
of sugar rations, that should last for three days.
In the evening, I had duty in a trench near the
front-line. I was there for 5 hours. The night was relatively peaceful.
The whole night, I heard mg-fire from the HQ sector. This night, soldiers
from the 1st battalion arrived. They had crept through the Finnish
Back to Top !
of this text
I arrived from the sentry position at 0800 hrs. I'm going to try
and get some sleep. An announcement has been given, that the relief
forces are about to launch their attacks.
I have to admit, that I was sorry to hear that
the 1st battalion was destroyed, and only some lucky fellows, who
heroically managed to get to us.
My family is occupies a lot of my thoughts today.
It's so painful to be apart from them.
I ate some thin soup, which had a scent of beans. I drank it mixed
with tea. It's the food like this, what is responsible to the fact
that I haven't been able to shit for days.
After dinner I had duty until 0400 hrs the next
morning. I had to receive ammo resupply for the tanks. I discovered
Kuptsov's rude nature. He simple hasn't any comradeship in him.
I'm about to leave for Orlov's and Anufrijev's
posts. The enemy shelled us with few stray shots during the day.
Back to Top !
of this text
I woke up at 0800 hrs. I had tea and 10 grams of horse meat for
breakfast. I distributed the same rations to all the others. At 1100
hrs, I made a mixed soup from all the leftovers that I had. Beans,
onions, buckwheat porridge, biscuit crumbs and some macaroni. After
that all has boiled, the result is a soup, in which I mix some tea
and drink the stuff.
After the breakfast, I rested. I can hear artillery
and mg fire from the back, which raises hopes of relief forces reaching
us. The sky is cloudy and gray, not a weather for planes. It is sleeting.
After dinner came an order to start up Shapokov's
tank by 2100 hrs, but that requires strength which we lack, so we
got it started only at midnight. This was, because at 1800 hrs came
a message reporting that friendly troops are closing. That's true,
recon patrols are less than a kilometer away, even some signal rockets
I had duty from midnight until 0400 hrs, I went
directly to sleep. The knowledge that help is on it's way gives us
some joy, but I'm afraid that I won't see it as I have barely the
energy to move around.
Back to Top !
of this text
1200 hrs, it's a good weather for planes, our Air Forces can operate.
Maybe they'll drop us some supplies.
I had for breakfast some soup with sugar! I filled
myself with tea, and had to run out to "relieve" myself.
At 1100 hrs, Shapolov's tank was sent to perform a combat mission.
I hear artillery and mg-fire, from a long distance though.
We were told that our relief forces have left Uomaa
and are closing our positions, and that they're some 3 - 4 km away.
We've heard that kind of reports before so there's no reason to trust
I've decided to wash myself today, for the first
time in ten days. Everyone seems to be busy gathering anything that
could be used to help in this hunger. We are all getting weak. It's
1600 hrs and I'm sitting in the shelter having nothing to do. My stomach
is completely empty. Some soldiers around me are frying some horse
meat. Some have gone out to gather horse bones, that they're going
to dry up and eat. Some are washing themselves ignoring the hunger.
My health is deteriorating.
Dinner is still 2 hours away, so I'm going to get
some sleep. I managed to shit today
It's very late, when I get to bed, as I was on duty. 3 green signal
rockets were fired during dinner. The Finns aren't currently shooting
At midnight, mortar fire began in our sector. I
will continue on duty until 0200 hrs, and only after that I'll get
Back to Top !
of this text
0130 hrs, southern sector. Some sparse mortar fire. We counted nine
explosions in the vicinity of our shelter. Some lone rifle shots towards
out kitchen, they're aiming at the lights. I can hear artillery fire
from the direction of Pitkäranta, from a long distance though.
The driver Zvjazintsev is boiling intestinals and
offal's and is eating the soup. It's sickens me, but I'm nearly willing
to try it, and perhaps I'll be forced to it as I'm steadily running
out of food, no matter how good I regulate my personal stocks. I can
maybe manage to make them last to the 10th day, but after that I'll
be on water only. I think that we can maybe make it to Feb 15th -
20th, but after that unless you get shot, you will be facing death
by starvation. I get to bed at 0200 hrs, I'm having troubles sleeping,
as it is so cold.
I got up at 0700 hrs. The breakfast is even lousier
than yesterday. Some "horse soup", which didn't even have
the scent of meat, and even that was given too little. I also drank
some tea with some sugar. We got a 20 gram biscuit instead of the
ordered 35 gram for lunch. After eating it, it felt like I hadn't
eaten anything. I'm feeling dizzy in the mornings.
I'm even running out of cigarettes. What have I
to do if I run out of cigarettes?
The Finns aren't disturbing us. Feels like a calm before the storm.
We haven't got any info of our main forces moving towards us, but
they'll probably getting some progress, fighting of course strong
Finnish forces on the way.
I'm scared to think of my family, as each time I get this huge pain
in my heart while thinking of their, and my, fate.
I tried to sleep, but I couldn't. I'm just too
hungry. After three hours, we were busy again with the tank. We got
very thin bean soup and 40 grams of biscuit for dinner. I'll try to
save the biscuits to the evening.
Our artillery has been busy today, during the night
some firefights were fought with the Finns. I had tea for supper with
little sugar, 0.5 grams for the entire mess kit. The Finns sent patrols
which threw satchel charges at us, but no casualties were reported.
Back to Top !
of this text
I got up at 0600 hrs and it's now 10 am. I slept lousy for two reasons,
cold and hunger. I plan to sleep around noon if I get the chance.
I had just tea for breakfast, not even soup. All horses have been
eaten. I got also 35 grams of biscuit. I'm slowly losing my will to
live, as there seems to be no hope.
Again, three persons were rewarded today - Petrov,
Makov and xxxx (the name was too smeared to be readable).
I'm passed again, even while I work very hard. That's why I'm losing
my motivation to work.
Some planes have dropped some supplies, but the
weather isn't so good. The Finns fire at us by rifles and mg's.
We're expecting a Finnish attack in our sector tonight. I have to
go for the 3rd time to go guard duty in the trenches today. It's terrible,
I barely have the energy to move my feet. After relieved, I was ordered
to duty at the tank, which is definitely worse as I have to be 2 days
in here. But what can you do, that's our fate.
It's 2000 hrs and we're changing the shift once every hour as it's
- 30°C. The night went good. I had a full mess kit of tea with sugar
for supper, but afterwards I had to run every now and then to urinate.
At 2400 hrs, I went to duty and was relieved at 0100 hrs. I'm stopping
this here and continue this diary in the next notebook. End.
To start of this text