OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND WORSHIP
The right to religious freedom and worship is established in the American
Declaration which provides:
The general kind of provision set forth in the Declaration has been
specified in the American Convention on Human Rights.
Although the latter instrument is not applicable to Cuba, as it is not a
party thereof, the Commission considers it worthwhile to take into account some
of its pertinent provisions in order to better define the specific scope of the
right under consideration, as well as the limits within which it may be
In addition to the free profession and practice—public and private—of
a religious faith, the American Convention includes other rights which are
necessarily associated with the exercise of these freedoms (Article 12).
It establishes the right to disseminate one’s religion and the right of
parents or guardians “to provide for the religious and moral education of
their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions”
(paragraph 4). Furthermore, the
American Convention stipulates the State’s obligation to respect these
freedoms and to refrain from adopting restrictive measures that might indirectly
impair them. On the other hand,
limitations on the exercise of the right to religious freedom and worship should
be those prescribed by law, and such as are necessary “to protect public
safety, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others” (paragraph 3).
The basic rules that govern the exercise of the right of religious
freedom and worship in Cuba are set forth in article 54 of the Cuban
Constitution, which provides:
law regulates the activities of religious institutions.
is illegal and punishable by law to oppose one’s faith or religious belief to
the Revolution, to education or to the fulfillment of the duty
to work, defend the country with arms, show reverence for its symbols and
fulfill other duties established by the Constitution.
In the first place, it should be pointed out that this article employs
the term “recognizes” in reference to the right under consideration.
This is positive, in that it reveals a concept of the right under
consideration as something inherent in a human being and which belongs to him as
such. Nevertheless, ambiguous terms
are also used in this article which prevent it from functioning as an adequate
guarantee of the right to religious freedom and worship.
Thus, to consider it “illegal and punishable by law to oppose one’s
faith or religious belief to the Revolution”, is to give a free hand to the
political bodies to interpret the legal scope of faiths or actions that may be
considered in opposition “to the Revolution”.
Furthermore, the paragraph under consideration introduces another of the
frequent professions of doctrinal faith, in establishing that “The socialist
State bases its activity and educates the people in the scientific materialist
concept of the universe¼”. This text establishes the bases for indirect discrimination
against believers with respect to the performance of state functions, due to the
materialism which is the basis of State activities.
Likewise, it prevents parents from deciding on the education they wish
their children to have in moral or religious terms.
Article 54 thus reinforces the dogmatic content of education, which is
one of its basic features, as described in Chapter XI of this Report.
To evaluate the practice of the Government of Cuba with respect to the
exercise of freedom of religion and worship, it is necessary to analyze, on the
one hand, the forms taken by relations between the Government and the existing
religious institutions in the country, with respect both to activities directly
linked to worship, and to actions indirectly linked to it and which
traditionally had been performed by the churches until 1959.
In addition, such an evaluation should also consider the ideological and
practical conditioning that affects believers in the performance of social and
political activities generally. This
will be the subject of the following presentation.
Government Relations with Religious Institutions
Until the rise to power of the present government, the Catholic and
Protestant churches had carried out activities similar to those performed in
most of the countries of Latin America. Thus,
in addition to activities related to religious worship—including those of
public dissemination of beliefs—were joined those activities indirectly
related to religious worship, among which special mention should be made of
education and social assistance to disadvantaged sectors.
Furthermore, religious denominations, in particular the Catholic Church,
possessed a status that provided them a relative degree of political influence.
It should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned activities were not
clearly separated; on the contrary, they overlapped in a way that made and
continues to make it difficult, to specify the effective social and political
impact of one or several of these activities.
With respect to this distinction among the various categories of
activities and their potential political and social impact, an assessment of the
observance of the right to religious freedom entails assuming a position with
respect to the framework within which concrete actions are taken.
It is undeniable that there is a social dimension to religious
activities; the ethical content of religious concepts can be translated into
general principles that serve both to evaluate concrete phenomena in the
economic, social and political arena, as well as to guide the daily conduct of
believers at certain times in the political life of a country.
Furthermore, when applied to the concrete activities of society, these
general principles can become the ideological foundation to support political
action. In this capacity, they are, on the one hand, legitimate
elements of a democratic political system and, on the other, they become
relatively independent of the original concepts from which they derive, thus
becoming subject to the same status as other political principles; they are,
therefore, subject to criticism in theory and practice, as well as to possible
change. It is the latter aspect
that distinguishes them from the denominational base which supports them, and in
this sense, they become guidelines for desirable but not obligatory conduct.
Proof of this is that persons who do not belong to the religion from
which they are derived may adhere to these social principles, and conversely,
members of the religious belief in question may legitimately hold different
What has been stated thus far allows one to consider that there is a
nucleus of religious beliefs that manifest themselves in concrete activities,
including religious worship; this
is the fundamental content of the right to religious freedom.
From these basic beliefs, doctrinal postulates may be derived that serve
to support models of economic, social and political organization; in that
capacity, they and the actions they inspire spill over from the sphere of
religion to the political arena; protection of them is therefore a matter
derived from the observance of political rights.
In Cuba, the combined effect of a number of factors rendered the tenuous
distinction between these two kinds of actions more imprecise and almost
nonexistent, a situation that was especially acute in the early years of the
present Cuban government, due to the hyperpolitization provoked by the process.
The antagonism that marked relations of the Government with religious
institutions was exacerbated by the different social bases on which the former
and the latter grounded their activity; by the international context in which
the Cuban process took place; and by the rigidity of the ideological positions
of both the Government and the churches, especially the Catholic Church, whose
social doctrine was made more flexible only following the Second Vatican Council
In considering the sectors of society on which religious institutions had
greater influence, it may generally be stated that on the eve of 1959, there was
a high level of secularity in Cuban society, with the result that the churches
lacked the marked influence that characterizes their presence in other societies
in Latin American. This influence,
already limited, was basically restricted to the middle and upper classes, and
was very slight among the lowest ranks of society.
For example, the Agrupacion Catolica performed a study in 1957 of
4,000 heads of rural families, which revealed that 53.51% had never seen a
priest; 36.74% indicated that they knew him only by sight, and only 7.81%
affirmed having had personal contact with one.
The weakness of the church in rural areas is also confirmed by the fact
that 41.41% of those surveyed stated they had no religious faith, whereas 52.10%
claimed to be Catholic, 3.26% protestant, and 1.09% as believers in Spiritism. Of the Catholics, 88.84% had never attended mass, and only
4.25% had done so three or more times per year.
Moreover, when asked what institution would most help them to improve the
situation of all rural workers, only 3.43% mentioned the church.
The majority mentioned the government (68.73%) or their employer
Protestant churches were affected by a similar phenomenon, to which
should be added their close identification with protestant churches in the
United States. Thus, in 1940, it
was indicated that:
evangelical church is not yet adjusted in program, upkeep and leadership to the
economic and social conditions of Cuba. The
church is a middle class and expensive institution in a largely lower class and
poverty-stricken constituency. It
is an Anglo-Saxon and democratic institution in a Latin and feudal society.
It is an urbanized institution seeking to expand in a rural
Two additional elements further sharpened confrontations between the
government and the churches in the area of politics.
On the one hand, the “cold war” environment that permeated the
international scene and that led the superpowers to strongly exert their
influence on the internal polarization of positions, a process undertaken and
developed by the leaderships for the political factions in conflict.
The second element, in reference to the Catholic Church, was the
above-cited organizational and doctrinal rigidity characteristic of the period
preceding the Second Vatican Council.
In this context, in 1959 the Catholic Church expressed its concern over
the education law that would prohibit religious instruction in public schools.
The church hierarchy held that the problem would be resolved if chaplains
were allowed to provide such instruction in the schools.
The issue became moot with the revolution’s expansion of the number of
elementary and secondary schools, for which there were not enough chaplains.
A proposal to suspend degrees and credits earned at private universities
to compensate for the losses suffered by students at the University of Havana
which had been closed from 1956 to 1958 by former President Batista, generated
strong protests by the Catholic University of Villanueva and the Protestant
Candler University. The dispute was
eventually resolved by suspending the validity of such degrees and credits for
The first major conflict with church members came with the circulation of
the draft agrarian reform law adopted in May, 1959.
Welcomed by Bishop Evelio Diaz of Havana on behalf of the hierarchy, it
was condemned by Agrupacion Catolica.
The issue of agrarian reform helped prompt a meeting of 62 priests at
Castro’s Jesuit alma mater, Belen, in June 1959, to review the
political situation in general. While
unanimity of opinion proved elusive, the meeting served to reinforce the
preoccupations of those clergymen fearful of the Marxist direction of the
regime, and thereafter more priests used their pulpits to criticize the
direction of the Revolution. Protestants shared some of the same concerns and in general
felt that the new government was more radical than expected.
Overall, there was an increasing preoccupation on the part of the
Catholic Church with the sanctity of private property, a cornerstone of its
The divisions within both the Catholic and Protestant Churches greatly
limited their capacity to influence the course of the Revolution.
This caused them to be slow to react to revolutionary initiatives and
hampered them in formulating alternatives.
Divisions within the Catholic hierarchy were exacerbated by conflicting
pressures emanating from the laity.
As a result of the collapse of the traditional political parties in the
face of the positions and measures of the Government, the churches, and in
particular the Catholic Church, became a base for the opposition to the regime.
Thus, the National Catholic Congress in November 1959 was attended by
over 1 million people, when previously no more than 10,000 had attended this
meeting. It was in this atmosphere
that religious processions began to turn into anti-government rallies and that
revolutionaries interrupted church services and raided parish houses.
In the fall of 1960, Cuban bishops issued a series of pastoral letters
which stated that in any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union
over Cuba, they would support the former. Coming
as they did after the beginning of nationalization of US property in June, 1960,
these documents placed the Catholic Church in clear opposition to the
Revolution. This situation
illustrates the impact of the cold war climate that was felt at a global level,
typified by polarization and confrontation between the two superpowers that
struggled to win followers inside Cuba, thus impeding the adoption of positions
that would respond appropriately to the true social and national nature of the
political conflicts that had erupted.
The Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961 was commanded by Manuel Artime, of
the Agrupación Católica and accompanied by four priests of Spanish
origin as well as other members of that institution.
This gave the Government grounds for closing the headquarters of the Agrupación
Católilca in Havana. The
Government also claimed that several private schools had been used to prepare
uprising that was to follow the Bay of Pigs invasion.
On May 1, 1961, the Government nationalized private schools, thus
provoking further confrontation with the churches.
In September of that year it prohibited religious processions when a
person in attendance at one of them was killed.
Both the Bay of Pigs invasion and nationalization of educational
institutions, as well as prohibition of religious processions brought
Church/State relations to their lowest point; the Government proceeded to expel
priests and religious members, it being estimated that 8% were expelled for
alleged “counter-revolutionary activities”.
These acts and the increasingly radical measures adopted by the
Government in other areas prompted an exodus of members of religious orders and
citizens who did not support the direction adopted by the revolution, among whom
was a large number of church members. The
Jewish community also participated in this exodus, with the effect of reducing,
over time, the Jewish population to one-tenth of its numbers prior to 1959.
The shortage of pastors caused by the exodus and the expulsions, combined
with the prevailing hostile environment, led some churches to cease functioning.
To avoid this, some Protestant churches responded by placing lay
people—including women—in charge of pastorates, which was not the case of
the Catholic Church. Nevertheless,
the number of Catholic parishes increased from 210 in 1959 to 226 in 1965.
In the course of these initial stages, the Government adopted other
measures such as the elimination of religious holidays and the organization of
athletic activities and indoctrination classes on Sundays, in order to hamper
attendance at religious services. It
also denied access to the mass communications media to church people to
disseminate their beliefs. Various
other forms of discrimination were brought to bear against those professing a
religion, in keeping with the strong, officially-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist
In the mid-sixties, another Church/State conflict erupted over adoption
of obligatory military training in Cuba, which led several churches to request
that their followers, including those who made religion a way of life be
assigned to alternative service. The
Government’s response was to draft priests, pastors, seminarians and other
clergy into the Unidades Militares para Ayuda a la Producción (UMAP)
(Military units to Assist Production), in which government employees who were
guilty of punishable administrative errors, homosexuals, informants and
ex-convicts were conscripted into force labor for the Government.
Treatment of church people was unjust from any standpoint, and revealed
the abuses to which they could be subjected by government authorities.
It should be pointed out that the UMAPs were discontinued in 1976 as a
result of strong public criticism against them.
Some religious groups had—and continue to have—serious conflicts with
the government. This is the case of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Evangelical Gideon’s Band, and Seventh-Day Adventists.
Their activities are regarded as counter-revolutionary, in particular,
the continued links of Jehovah’s Witnesses to the United States, their method
of proselytizing, and opposition to military service and public schooling.
The Evangelical Gideon’s Band is considered blatantly
Seventh-Day Adventists are singled out for refusing to work or sent their
children to school on Saturdays. In
a national campaign, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists were
targeted as counterrevolutionary, anti-social, and unpatriotic.
Some Jehovah’s Witnesses have been imprisoned for refusing military
service. In 1974 the Jehovah’s
Witnesses lost their legal status as a private entity, entitles to engage in
commercial transactions, and became simply a religious association as the other
The conflict that arose over the drafting of church people into the UMAPs
was the last significant confrontation between church authorities and the
government. As the regime
consolidated its political power and constrained church activities to a
framework that provided them scant opportunity to influence the population,
relations tended to stabilize in the environment of tolerance.
This was illustrated by the positions taken by the churches, in
particular by the bishops of the Catholic Church. Two pastoral letters of April and September 1969 condemned
the US economic blockade and assured Catholics that cooperation with the
Government for the betterment of Cuban society was legitimate. Nevertheless, church officials have not ceased to urge the
Government to provide more facilities for the education of children in keeping
with the religious convictions of their parents and to meet their requests for
access to the media to disseminate their beliefs among a wider section of the
populace. It should be noted that
two Catholic and five Protestant seminaries operate in Cuba.
Ideological and Practical Problems
As has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this report, the official
ideology of the Cuban Regime is Marxist-Leninist.
The hostility of this ideology toward religious beliefs, in general, is
well known, as is its requirement that it be professed in order to become a
member of the Communist party, which is an indispensable prerequisite to holding
any political office in Cuba. Therefore,
there is necessarily de facto discrimination on the basis of religious
belief in access to higher positions in the state apparatus, including the armed
31. The above-cited hostility has led, on the one
hand, to the active promotion of Marxism-Leninism in every facet of Cuban
society, and on the other, it has dictated a number of restrictions on religious
activities. Indeed, religion has
been systematically considered by Marxism as one of various instruments used by
a social class to maintain And strengthen its domination over another; likewise,
that ideology has postulated that religion is a fanciful divergence from reality
which is destined to disappear with the spread of a materialist concept of the
There is, therefore, an inherent competition in the relations between
Marxist-Leninist ideology and religious beliefs, which initially was expressed
in hostility. It is what led the
government to officially promote scientific materialism in every aspect of Cuban
society. It has also imposed
restrictions on the ability of churches to disseminate their beliefs through the
mass media, by denying them access to the communications media—instruments of
ideological education, as was seen in Chapter V of this report—and by
eliminating religious instruction from the educational system, which is also a
fundamental channel for the transmission of official doctrine.
With respect to the application of religious beliefs and materialist
philosophy to national life, the churches and the government and the Communist
Party have undergone change in Cuba. It
is essential to bear this process in mind to fully understand the forms taken by
the practical observance of the right to religious freedom and worship.
On the part of the churches, two elements have influenced the evolution
of their position over approximately the last fourteen years. One has been the political consolidation of the of the
present regime and the assumption that virtually all of the changes that have
taken place in Cuban society are irreversible; this has led the churches to
reconsider how they might integrate themselves into that society, which has
necessarily entailed a redefinition of their relations with the government.
This has included giving careful consideration to the results of
governmental action affecting the standard of living of the most disadvantaged
sectors of society in the period prior to 1959.
The other element that has influenced the evolution of the churches, in
particular the Catholic Church, has been the changes at the global level that
have led to emphasis on a commitment to social justice as a principle derived
from basic religious beliefs.
This has resulted in a more flexible position on socialism as a form of
social organization, in distinction from the broader concept of Marxism-Leninism
itself, which is still considered as definitively incompatible with religious
belief. This has removed one of the
obstacles that impeded smoother church action in Cuban society, in general, and
with the government in particular.
The Government of Cuba and the Communist Party of that country have also
undergone a change which has transformed the focus of their relations with the
churches from its initial political hostility to the current ideological
competition. Thus, at the first
Cuban Congress on Education and Culture, held in 1971, the conclusion was drawn
that the struggle against religious belief corresponded to the Party rather than
to the State, and it was affirmed that it did not constitute the center of its
task, but rather an aspect of the “ideological battle” that must be waged as
part of the building of a socialist society.
Complete separation of the State and education of the church was also
affirmed, with the stipulation that no encouragement, support or help would be
given to any religious group, or any favors asked of them.
The Congress stated that it shared no religious belief, but at the same
time it stated the respect of the regime for religious beliefs and worship “as
an individual right”, by virtue of which it emphasized that there was no
religious persecution. Viewing construction of socialist society as the center of
its tasks, it affirmed that all citizens, without distinction of religious
belief, should be included in that undertaking.
The First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in December 1975
emphasized that the struggle for a scientific view of the world was subordinate
to the task of constructing a new society.
It affirmed that in that task, believers, nonbelievers, members of
religious orders and atheists have participated, continue to participate and
must necessarily participate, since the construction of a new society required
the union of all Cubans and hence believers should not be isolated nor rejected,
but rather incorporated into the political process underway.
Furthermore, it was stated that the dissemination of historical
dialectical materialism should be done in such a fashion as not to offend
believers’ personal or religious feelings.
Nevertheless, it was emphasized that membership in the Communist Party
and the Union of Communist youth was to be limited to those who accepted their
programs and Marxism-Leninism.
The platform of the Communist Party in 1978 focused on two elements
regarding religion: relations with
members of the church, and religion as ideology.
With respect to the former, the Party reaffirmed the liberty of
conscience, freedom to worship within the law, and objected to the use of
religion to oppose the revolution and socialism.
The same rights and social responsibilities were established for
believers as well as nonbelievers. With
respect to religion as ideology, the platform reaffirmed the need for systematic
dissemination of scientific materialism, and opposition to anti-religious
campaigns, the use of coercive or administrative measures against religion and
the isolation of believers.
The Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held in 1980,
reaffirmed the positions stated at the previous Congress and expanded on them in
reference to political cooperation between Christians and Marxists, particularly
in the Western Hemisphere.
In several interviews and speeches, President Fidel Castro has upheld the
same positions: ideological competition between religious beliefs and
Marxism-Leninism; legitimacy of the use of all state resources for the promotion
of official ideology; repression of members of certain churches not on the basis
of religion but rather for political positions derived from it and which are
contrary to the fundamental policies of the government; observance of religious
freedom as an individual right; and the absence of any contradiction between the
social purposes pursued by socialism and those based on religious beliefs,
The trends sketched above have led to a relaxation of previously tense
Church/State relations in Cuba; although there remain vestiges of anti-religious
sentiment, they appear to arise from personal viewpoints and not from government
or party policies. Nevertheless,
there are several situations that, in practice, engender discrimination against
believers. Thus, in addition to the
above-mentioned restriction on membership in the Communist Party, with the
consequent exclusion from higher political office in government and in the armed
Forces, there are also employment obstacles, such as the prohibition of
believers teaching courses that might have any political or ideological
overtones—economics, philosophy, social sciences, etc.--; there are also
ideological prerequisites for promotions and certificates are required for the
purchase of durable consumer goods. In
education also, ideology is a decisive condition for admission to universities,
which places those who profess religious faiths at a disadvantage; the same is
true of access to scholarships, one of the requirements for which is that
candidates “be faithful to the Revolution”.
Although the Commission recognizes that it does not have the kind of
field study necessary to evaluate the scope of these mechanisms and practice, it
considers that their mere existence represents a potential threat to the
effective observance of religious freedom and worship.
The preceding presentation points out that there is currently freedom of
religion and worship in Cuba, but it is limited in terms of dissemination by two
fundamental restrictions: the use
of the mass communications media and education.
The early hostility in the Church/State relations has given way to
ideological competition, in which the Government has—and uses—the vast
resources at its command to actively promote the official Marxist-Leninist
philosophy. In addition, it should
be made clear that there has been an evolution in the positions of the churches
and the government, which has brought about a positive environment of mutual
tolerance. There is no religious
persecution; the restrictions to which certain religious groups have been
subjected—including imprisonment of some of their members—can be traced to
the impact of their actions on the political system and not to the fact of
professing a religious faith as such. Nevertheless,
indirect restrictions continue to constrain believers, leading to discrimination
against them in various central aspects of the life and politics of Cuban
Echevarria Salvar, oscar A., La Agricultura Cubana, 1934-1966: Regimen
social, productividat y nivel de vida del sector agricola
(Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1971), pp. 14-16 and 25.
J. Merle Davis, The Cuban Church in a
Sugar Economy (New York: International Missionary Council, 1942), p.
133. This study, commissioned
by the International Missionary Council, officially surveyed all the
protestant churches in Cuba in an effort to devise more effective missionary
strategies. Davis recommended
increased social welfare and evangelizing efforts in the rural areas,
together with decreased dependence on the “mother’ churches in the
United States. It was not until
the 1950s that the protestant churches intensified their efforts in the
rural areas and the late 1960s when most became self-supporting and legally
independent of US mission agencies.
 The five protestant seminaries are the Nazarene in Punta Brava, Western Baptist in havana, Eastern Baptista in Santiago, the Pinos Nuevos in Placetas, and the Evangelical Seminary in Matanzas. The Catholics have a minor seminary in Santiago and a major one in Havana (San Carlos).
See especially the statements of
President Fidel Castro at the meeting of Christians for Socialism, Chile,
1972; his speech to the Jamaican Council of Churches on October 11, 1977;
and “There are no contradictions between the aims of religion and the aims
of socialism”, Granma, XII, 47, November 20, 1977, p.4.