South-eastern Europe region energy analysis
The countries of South-eastern Europe -- including Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova -- occupy a strategic location on
the west side of the Black Sea, exporting electricity through much of the Balkan Peninsula and transporting Russian
natural gas to Western Europe and Turkey.
South-eastern Europe also is a potentially significant transit region for Caspian oil exports to Europe.
Information contained in this report is the best available as of December 2002 and is subject to change.
The countries of south-eastern Europe -- here including Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova -- share a troubled history in
addition to their geographical location. Since the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the three countries have been independent democracies, but each has had significant problems in
transitioning from a centrally-planned economic system to a market-based economy.
While Bulgaria and Romania avoided the warfare and bloodshed that devastated the Balkansregion in the 1990s, they were both significantly affected by the economic embargo placed on Yugoslavia, suffering several billion dollars ' worth of losses due to disrupted trade, transport, and investment.
Moldova, although relatively less affected economically by the wars in the former Yugoslavia, suffered through a
civil war of its own in the 1990s. Fighting broke out shortly after the country received its independence, paralysing
the country's already stagnant economy. Russian settlers and Moldovans on the industrialized left bank of the Dnistr
River set up the secessionist Trans-Dnistrian Republic as the conflict stalemated.
Moldova's economy has crept along as fighting has subsided, but there is no formal resolution to the conflict in sight and Western investment, which is desperately needed, is nearly nonexistent. Unlike in central Europe and in the Baltic countries, the process of shedding the totalitarian past has proceeded slowly in south-eastern Europe.
Political reform did not match thesweeping changes elsewhere in the former Eastern block, and as a result, former
Communist leaders were able to hold on to the administrative controls of government. As a result, economic and
structural reform in south-eastern Europe was delayed.
Although the pace of reform has picked up, the transition to democracy and a market-based economy in Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova has lagged behind other parts of Europe. Each of the three countries held elections within 8 months during 2000-2001, with very different results.
In December 2000, Romanian voters elected former Communist Party official Ion Iliescu to the presidency in a runoff over nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, elevating Iliescu to the post that he held from 1990 to 1996, as well as returning his Party of Social Democracy in Romania to power.
In Moldova, the Communist Party, already the largest political party in the country, swept to a resounding victory in
February 2001 elections, winning an absolute majority in the parliament and installing Vladimir Voronin as president.
In Bulgaria, former King Simeon II, returning to his homeland for the first time since the monarchy was abolished by
the Communists in 1946, led his National Movement for Simeon II to a victory in June 2001 parliamentary elections,
swore allegiance to a republican constitution and accepted the post of prime minister. Georgi Parvanov then ousted
incumbent President Petar Stoyanov in Bulgaria's presidential elections.
Since the elections, Romania, Moldova, and Bulgaria have achieved significant economic growth, with a regional average of 5.0 % growth in nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001. Although the slowdown in the global economy has negatively affected South-eastern Europe as well, the region still is projected to post an average of 4.7 % growth in nominal GDP in 2002.
At an historic summit in Prague in November 2002, Bulgaria and Romania, along with Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia, were invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Membership in NATO has been a goal of the Romanian and Bulgarian governments since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. The two countries are expected to accede to the military alliance in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are also in negotiations to join the European Union, although neither country is expected to become a full member of the organization before 2006.
Regional energy issues
Although none of the three countries is a major energy producer, Romania is an important regional oil and natural gas producer, and both Romania and Bulgaria hold substantial coal deposits. In addition, Bulgaria, with its coal-fired and nuclear power generators, is a major regional exporter of electricity, both to Turkey and to the Balkans.
Nevertheless, it is the geographic location of Romania, Moldova, and Bulgaria -- between major producers of energy in Russia and the Caspian Sea region and major consumers of energy in Turkey and Europe -- that gives south-eastern Europe its importance as a transit point for Russian natural gas supplies to Turkey in world energy markets. With Caspian Sea region oil production expected to increase, Romania and Bulgaria, in particular, may become important transit centres for oil destined for consumers in western Europe.
Romania has proven oil reserves of 955 mm barrels, but despite a steady decline in its crude oil production over the past 25 years, the country remains the largest oil producer in central and eastern Europe. From 294,000 bpd in 1976, Romania's oil production has plummeted 58 %, sliding to 124,500 bpd in 2002.
In a bid to increase the country's petroleum production, Romania is liberalizing its oil sector by privatising the state-owned oil company SNP Petrom and luring foreign investment for exploration. Although Romania's oil consumption fell to just 180,000 bpd in 2001, the country remains a net oil importer.
With 10 refineries and an overall refining capacity of approximately 504,000 bpd, Romania has the largest refining industry in the region. Romania's refining capacity far exceeds domestic demand for refined petroleum products, allowing the country to export a wide range of oil products and petrochemicals, -- such as lubricants, bitumen, and fertilizers -- throughout the region.
However, nearly all Romanian refineries are under-utilised because of a lack of crude oil supplies, and the majority remain in the government's hands, running at 50 % of capacity or less and needing repair. Years of low investment have left the country's refining industry in poor health, requiring massive amounts of capital to modernize and improve efficiency.
Bulgaria and Moldova both have minimal reserves of oil and thus each has only a very small oil industry. Bulgaria,
which has one refinery with a 115,000-bpd capacity, consumed approximately 121,000 bpd in 2001, while Moldova
consumed 21,000 bpd in the same year. Bulgaria currently is producing just 1,000 bpd, while Moldova does not produce
any oil, making both countries nearly entirely dependent on imports to satisfy their domestic petroleum needs.
Moldova, without any refineries of its own, must import all refined products. Oil Transit Increasing oil and natural gas production in and around the Caspian Sea, along with forecast increases of oil consumption in the European Union, means that Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova may play a strategic role in the European transport corridor to bring Caspian oil exports to European markets.
The March 2001 launch of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia
means that additional oil will be transported via the Black Sea through the Bosporus Straits, which is already a
major chokepoint for oil tankers. The difficulty in navigating the narrow straits, exemplified by a number of
accidents, has led Turkey to raise environmental concerns over the increase in tanker traffic through the
The projected increase in oil exports from the Caspian Sea region in general, and Kazakhstan in particular, has led to the proposal of a number of Bosporus bypass options. Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova all have made proposals to allow Caspian oil exports to bypass the Bosporus, although Moldova, lacking a Black Sea port, is highly unlikely to transport any Caspian oil exports coming via the Black Sea. Ukraine has an advantage over the countries of south-eastern Europe in capturing Caspian oil export transit, since its Odessa-Brody pipeline already has been completed.
Nevertheless, several Bosporus bypass pipeline options running through Bulgaria or Romania are being seriously considered.
In January 1997, Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia agreed on a plan to build an oil pipeline linking the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas with Alexandropoulis on the Mediterranean coast of Greece.
The proposed 178-mile, underground pipeline would allow Russia to export oil through the Black Sea while bypassing the Bosporus. However, the $ 700 mm project has been stalled by a wide range of technical and economic disputes.
In November 2002, Greece and Bulgaria ended a long-standing dispute over plans to build the so-called Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline, agreeing to a three-way division of stakes in the pipeline company, along with third-party crude producer Russia. Earlier, in June 2002, Kazakh officials, worried about the possibility that Kazakh oil exports would be limited if Turkey reduced tanker traffic through the Bosporus Straits, expressed their interest in being included in the pipeline company if it were as an equal partner.
Russia has ensured that the pipeline, which has a proposed initial capacity of 300,000 bpd and a maximum capacity of
700,000 bpd, will have sufficient supplies to be economical. Russian oil major LUKoil also has proposed to extend the
pipe to Thessaloniki, an additional 93 miles that would increase the cost of the project by an estimated 25 % to 30
No time frame for the start of pipeline's construction has been set, as financing is conditional on the conclusion of commercial agreements, including commitments of oil deliveries to the Burgas terminal for transit through the pipeline. Previous estimates on the timetable for construction suggested it would start in 2003 and would be completed in four years.
A 750,000-bpd pipeline connecting Burgas with the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlore via Macedonia also has been proposed. This pipeline proposal has received letters of acceptance from the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and a $ 980,000 feasibility study, partially $ 588,000 of which was funded by the US Trade and Development Agency, concluded that the 560-mile pipeline project was feasible.
The Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) Pipeline Corporation has been established with exclusive rights to construct the pipeline, which is estimated to cost approximately $ 1.1 bn. A joint venture to carry out the project was to be set up between AMBO and potential investors. Fundraising for the project already has begun, and once financing is secured, the pipeline could be constructed in four years.
Romanian government officials have advocated that a pipeline to transport crude oil from the Caspian Sea to European markets pass through its territory, claiming that Romania, which has sought to develop its infrastructure to increase its chances of sharing in the Caspian oil bonanza, offers the shortest route, best refining technology, and links via waterways to major ports in the West.
The proposed 660,000-bpd Constanta-Trieste pipeline would allow crude oil from Kazakhstan to be shipped via the Novorossiisk port on the Black Sea to the Romanian port of Constanta, where it would then be piped to Italy across the Balkan Peninsula.
The pipeline, estimated to cost $ 900 mm to construct, would be used mostly to provide oil to the countries along the route, and would incorporate existing pipelines connecting Constanta with 10 refineries. Several alternatives exist for the route, with a proposed northern route transiting southern Hungary and central Slovenia before terminating at Italy's oil terminal of Trieste.
From there, the oil the Constanta-Trieste pipeline would be linked with the Trans Alpine Pipeline (TAP), which would carry the oil further to customers in Austria, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The southern route for the pipeline, sometimes known as the South-East European Line (SEEL), would transport Caspian oil from Constanta via a similar route as the northern route, but instead would pass through Yugoslavia and an intermediate transit point at Croatia's Adriatic port of Omisalj before crossing Slovenia and ending at Trieste.
The SEEL pipeline also would link to the TAP to deliver oil to Central Europe. Feasibility studies have shown that
both proposed Constanta routes are viable, but neither pipeline has moved to the construction stage yet. In September
2002, officials from Romania, Serbia, and Croatia signed an agreement on the SEEL pipeline, but financing for the
southern route remains a problem, as construction is expected to cost around $ 1 bn despite the fact that nearly
two-thirds of the pipeline will be made up of existing pipelines.
The Serbian section is expected to account for nearly 80 % of the budget, and Romanian officials have said that attracting financing for the 248-mile section in their country will be easier since the route will traverse easily accessible terrain. In addition to serving as a transit point for Caspian oil, Romania is hoping to offload some Caspian crude at Constanta and deliver it to its own refineries in order to offset the country's declining domestic production.
Romania and Kazakh officials already have an agreement to refine Kazakh crude oil at Romanian refineries, and Romania hopes to supply its own domestic market as well as transport refined products to Europe via barges on the Danube-Main-Rhine link. Romania also could use its own distribution network to transport refined products into other European lines.
Since 1983, when Romania's production peaked at 1.4 tcf, the country's natural gas output has declined nearly 65 %, dropping to 501.5 bn cf in 2000. In its difficult transition to a market economy, Romania's natural gas demand has decreased precipitously as well, with consumption decreasing 55 % from 1989 to 2000, from 1.4 tcf to 621.5 bn cf.
Romania has proven natural gas reserves of 3.56 tcf, but additional exploration has been discouraged by the country's economic woes and the poor investment climate. Also, the slow pace of reform has prevented potential investors from entering the Romanian natural gas market to help boost current levels of production. As a result, Romania is reliant on imports to meet its natural gas consumption needs.
In 2000, Romania began to reorganize Romgaz, the state-run natural gas utility, and in July 2001 Germany's Ruhrgas became the first foreign company to invest in Romania's s natural gas distribution network. Bulgaria has minimal natural gas reserves of 210 bn cf, forcing it to rely on imports for almost all of its natural gas consumption.
From 0.4 bn cf in 1989, Bulgaria's natural gas production inched up to a peak of just 2.5 bn cf in 1993. In 2000, the
country produced 2.1 bn cf of natural gas, far short of Bulgaria's rate of natural gas consumption, which reached
192.8 bn cf in 2000. State-owned Bulgargaz owns the country's 1,380-mile pipeline network and functions as the
country's main importer of natural gas.
Bulgaria is hoping that a concession to British Petreco will boost the country's natural gas production, and the Bulgarian government, in line with a European Union directive, is beginning to implement measures to liberalize the country's natural gas market.
Moldova is thought to contain small reserves of natural gas, but currently produces none, leaving it entirely
dependent on Russia. Since Moldova became independent in 1992, the country's natural gas consumption has been wildly
inconsistent, with consumption falling to just 49.4 bn cf in 1994 and jumping to 84.8 bn cf in 1997 before dropping
to 75.2 bn cf in 2000.
This pattern reflects the economic contraction and rise in fighting between Moldova and the breakaway Trans-Dnistrian Republic during the mid-1990s, followed by the relative stability later in the decade as the fighting stalemated and gave way to negotiations.
Nevertheless, the Moldovan government's inability to reach a settlement with the Trans-Dnistrians, along with a below-market pricing policy that has failed to discourage natural gas consumption, has led to a mounting debt to Russia for natural gas already supplied. As of November 1, 2002, Moldova owed Russia approximately $ 913 mm for natural gas supplies, with approximately $ 690 mm of this debt accumulated by the Trans-Dnistria region.
Natural gas transit
In addition to oil, south-eastern Europe also represents an important transit site for Russian natural gas exports, mainly to Turkey. Russia's Gazexport, the export arm of Gazprom, transports natural gas from Russia via Ukraine and Moldova to Romania and on to Bulgaria. From Bulgaria, Russian natural gas is delivered via to Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia.
During the past few years, the countries of south-eastern Europe have sought to upgrade their pipeline links and increase their natural gas transit capacity in order to ensure that Russian natural gas continues to flow their way. Although Russia is looking to deliver natural gas directly to Turkey via the Blue Stream pipeline below the Black Sea, the Blue Stream will be in addition to -- rather than replacing -- natural gas flowing to Turkey via south-eastern Europe. With Russia seeking to increase its natural gas exports, the countries of south-eastern Europe will remain important transit centres.
In March 2002, Romania opened a 124-mile pipeline linking the country's borders with Ukraine and Bulgaria, completing
a project begun with Russia in 1996 to develop the natural gas transit corridor in south-eastern Europe. A shortage
of funds in Romania delayed the construction until 1999, when Russia's Gazprom offered credit (in the form of natural
gas) to Romania to finance the pipeline's construction. With the Isaccea-Negru Voda pipeline now operational, Romania
now has the ability to transit up to 988 bn cf of natural gas per year, up from 353 bn cf per year previously.
In addition, by 2004, Romania will increase its underground capacity for storage of natural gas from 53 bn cf to approximately 159 bn cf. Bulgaria also is increasing its natural gas transit capacity, but mainly by widening its existing network and building new compressor stations rather than by building new pipelines.
In the last three years, Bulgargaz, which owns and operates Bulgaria's pipeline network (which includes over 400
miles of transit pipelines), has enlarged the country's natural gas transiting network to pump more Russian natural
gas to its Balkan neighbours.
From a transit capacity of 283 bn cf of natural gas per year before the enlargement program began, in 2000 Bulgaria transported to Greece, Macedonia, and Turkey some 423 bn cf of Russian natural gas, up 14 % from 1999 and up 57 % from 1999, according to Bulgargaz CEO director Kiril Gegov. Nearly 388 bn cf of that natural gas went to Turkey, the region's biggest energy consumer.
Under a 1998 agreement with Gazprom, Bulgaria's only natural gas supplier, transit volumes to Greece, Macedonia, and
Turkey should increase to 494 bn cf after 2002 and to 670 bn cf by 2010. COAL Romania is rich in coal deposits, with
an estimated 4 bn short tons, much of which is lignite and sub-bituminous coal.
However, the country's ailing coal industry -- which suffers from obsolete equipment, inefficient mines, labour strikes, safety issues, and mounting wage arrears to miners -- is in dire need of major restructuring. Since the revolution of 1989, when Romanian coal production peaked at 66.4 mm short tons, the country'sproduction has dropped over 50 %.
Romania's severe economic problems, combined with a parallel drop in coal demand and a lack of reform, have crippled
the country's coal mining industry. After levelling off in the mid-1990s, the decline in Romania's coal production
accelerated in the late 1990s as pits began to be shut down and miners periodically went on strike to protest poor
working conditions and to demand payment of wage arrears owed to them by the government.
The coal-rich Jiu Valley region has been hit particularly hard by problems in the coal sector, with 18,000 miners losing their jobs in 1997 alone. Over 70,000 jobs in Romania's coal sector have been cut in the last five years, and the World Bank has stated that Romania must shut additional loss-making pits in the Jiu Valley.
Starvation caused by the 1997-1998 job severance program led to bloody clashes, suicides and mass hunger strikes by
Romanian miners, and in 1999, miners protesting the shutdowns and unhappy about wage arrears clashed with government
forces as they marched to Bucharest to voice their concerns.
Former Prime Minister Radu Vasile was forced to bargain with striking miners to negotiate a settlement to the confrontation before further violence erupted. In 2000, Romania's coal production rose to 32.2 mmst from 25.2 mmst the year before as the country attempted to revive its coal mining industry by squeezing out as much coal as possible from existing mines.
Coal is Bulgaria's most significant natural resource, with reserves estimated at 3 bn short tons, almost all of which is lignite or sub-bituminous coal. The country's biggest coal deposit, with estimated lignite reserves of 2 bn short tons, is the Maritsa Iztok coal basin, located in the southeast of the country. The Maritsa coal fields produce low-quality lignite coal with high ash and high sulphur content, but the adjacent Maritsa Iztok power plants are designed to work with this coal.
Of the 29.8 mmst of coal mined in Bulgaria in 2000, 23.82 mmst was mined at Maritsa Iztok, while Bobov Dol, the
second largest coalfield, produced approximately 3 mmst. Despite a continuing decline in coal consumption over the
last decade, Bulgaria's coal consumption still exceeds the country's domestic production, which has also decreased
Moldova has a small coal industry, with reserves estimated at approximately 10 mmst. Since 1992, when Moldova's coal production stood at 290,000 short tons, the country's output of coal has gradually been reduced, with zero production since 1998, as markets for Moldova's low-grade bituminous coal have disappeared. The country's coal consumption, like its production, has dropped significantly in the past decade, from 2.96 mmst in 1992 to just 263,400 short tons in 2000 -- a 91 % reduction.
With 22.2 GW of installed electric-generating capacity, Romania has the largest power sector in south-eastern Europe. However, approximately 60 % of Romania's existing power capacity is more than 20 years old, and about 8 GW will need to be rehabilitated or replaced by 2010.
As a result, in 2000, Romania produced just 49.8 bn kWh, down from 71.9 bn kWh in 1989 but a slight increase over the low of 48.5 bn kWh that the country generated in 1999. In addition, technical losses in Romania's inefficient power transmission and distribution system means that an estimated 13 % of all electricity dispatched is lost before it reaches any customers.
Of the 49.8 bn kWh produced in 2000, approximately 56 % came from thermal-fired (oil, natural gas, and coal) power plants and 34 % from the country's hydropower plants, with the remainder from Romania's sole nuclear power plant at Cernavoda.
Nevertheless, plummeting domestic electricity consumption, largely due to the collapse of industrial demand after the 1989 revolution and Romania's economic woes in the mid and late 1990s, has assured Romania's status as a net electricity exporter. In 2000, as Romania emerged from a prolonged recession, the country's electricity consumption increased for the first time in more than a decade, to 45.7 bn kWh -- still 39 % lower than Romania's electricity consumption of 74.7 bn kWh in 1989.
Romania is reforming its power market, having already split up Conel, the state-owned power-generating company, and
working to restructure its electricity distribution networks. According to the government's medium-term energy
strategy, Romania is planning to rehabilitate 10 thermal power stations, with a combined capacity of 1.36 GW, between
2000 and 2005.
Rehabilitation of these units will cost an estimated $ 460 mm, while power-generating units with a total capacity of 5.9 GW are planned to be shut down. A second unit at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) also is under construction, with completion scheduled for 2005.
Bulgaria's installed electric capacity in 2000 was 12.1 GW, made up of 5.6 GW of thermal power (all coal), 3.8 GW of
nuclear power, and 2.7 MW of hydropower. With domestic electricity consumption of 34.4 bn kWh in 2000, Bulgaria has
significant spare capacity, even with nearly 2.6 MW of installed capacity currently inoperable.
In 2000, Bulgaria produced 38.8 bn kWh of electricity, with coal-fired power plants generating 50 %, the Kozloduy NPP accounting for 40 %, and hydropower supplying the remaining power. The Maritsa Iztok complex, made up of three coal-fired power plants with combined capacity of 2,950 MW, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the power generated by coal-fired plants.
In 1998, the Bulgarian parliament began to liberalize the country's power sector by unbundling the generation,
transmission, and distribution activities of the national electricity company, NEK. In the summer of 2000, the
largest power plants and distribution networks, including the Kozloduy NPP, were separated from NEK, creating seven
generation and seven distribution companies.
Six of the seven independent power generators registered a profit in 2000, and some of them (but not Kozloduy) will be eligible for privatisation. Bulgaria has sealed investment deals with two US firms to rehabilitate the Maritsa Iztok complex, and Bulgaria and Turkey are looking to launch a rehabilitation project at the Gorna Arda hydropower station.
Bulgaria has agreed with the EU to shutdown two of six reactors at Kozloduy NPP by the end of 2002 out of safety
concerns, and the country may close two additional units by 2006, although opponents claim that upgrades could allow
the two reactors to remain safely operational until at least 2008.
The shutdown of reactors at Kozloduy NPP could affect Bulgaria's status as the regional power hub in the Balkan Peninsula. In 2000, Bulgaria more than doubled its electricity exports, sending 5.6 bn kWh of electricity to its neighbours and earning more than $ 105 mm in the process. Preliminary 2001 figures show that Bulgaria's exports increased to nearly 7 bn KWh.
Turkey, the region's largest power consumer, imported 3.4 bn KWh of power from Bulgaria in 2000, up from 2.2 bn KWh of Bulgarian electricity in 1999. In addition, Bulgaria exported power to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Macedonia in 2000, and in August 2001, Bulgaria began exporting power to Albania for the first time ever. Although the closure of the first two units at Kozloduy NPP will not affect the amount of electricity available for Bulgaria's domestic consumption, it could affect exports to neighbouring countries.
Since receiving its independence in 1992, Moldova has gone from being a net power exporter to a net importer as
power-generating capacity has been reduced due to under-investment, warfare, and the country's economic contraction
during the 1990s. Moldova's current 1-GW power-generating capacity is less than one-third of the country's 3.1-GW
capacity in 1992.
The country's power generation has been reduced from 10.6 bn KWh in 1992 to 3.3 bn KWh in 2000, while Moldova's domestic electricity consumption has dropped from 9.8 bn KWh in 1992 to 3.7 bn KWh in 2000. In August 1999, Union Fenosa purchased three of Moldova's regional energy distributionnetworks, including the network supplying Chisinau.
Under the $ 25-mm sale agreement, Union Fenosa is committed to making further investments of $ 60 mm over five years
to upgrade and modernize energy infrastructure. In August 2001, Union Fenosa signed a $ 267 mm, 10-Bn KWh, 5-year
power supply agreement with the Cuciurgan power station, which is controlled by the secessionist Trans-Dnistrian
The agreement is expected to cover 70 % to 80 % of the needs of the three power distribution grids. However, Moldova's power sector continues to suffer from consumer non-payment of bills, leaving the countries' power-generating facilities short of cash for investment and leading to an energy crisis in northern Moldova in 2001. In April 2001, Moldova passed several urgent measures to resolve the crisis, including finally allowing electricity suppliers to cut off indebted customers.
Economic and demographic indicators for South-eastern Europe
Gross Domestic Product (Nominal GDP), 2001E (billions of $, market exchange rate)
Real GDP growth rate, 2001 estimate
Real GDP growth rate, 2002 projection
Per capita GDP, 2001E (market exchange rate)
Population, 2002E (millions)
Bulgaria $ 13.7 4.0 % 3.8 % $ 1,727 7.9
Romania $ 39.6 5.3 % 5.0 % $ 1,768 22.4
Moldova $ 1.5* 6.1 % 5.9 % $ 408* 4.3
Total/weighted average $ 54.8 5.0 % 4.7 % $ 1,584 34.6
Source: Global Insight
* Figures do not include the unrecognised Trans-Dnistrian Republic.
Energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions in South-eastern Europe, 2000
Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu)
Petroleum Natural gas coal nuclear hydroelectric other
Electricity net electricity imports
Carbon dioxide emissions (million tons of carbon)
Bulgaria 0.94 20.2 % 20.2 % 37.2 % 16 % 3.2 %
0.4 % -4.4 15.0
Romania 1.59 25.8 % 39.0 % 19.5 % 3.8 % 11.9 %
0 % -4.1 24.7
Moldova 0.11 18.2 % 72.7 % 0.4 % 0 % 2.7 %
0 % 0.4 1.6
Total/weighted average 2.64 23.5 % 33.7 % 25.2 % 8.0 % 8.4 %
0.01 % -8.1 41.3
Note: percentages may not add up to 100 % due to rounding.
Energy supply indicators, South-eastern Europe
Proven crude oil reserves, 1/1/02E (mm barrels)
Natural gas reserves, 1/1/02E (bn cf)
Coal reserves, 1/1/01E (million short tons)
Petroleum production, 2001E (thousand bpd)
Natural gas production, 2000E (bn cf)
Coal production, 2000 (mm short tons)
Electric generating capacity, 2000E (GW)
Crude oil refining capacity, 1/1/02E (thousand bpd)
Bulgaria 15 210 2,988 12.12 9.81 2.11 1 5
Romania 955.6 3,560 1,606 124.550 1.53 2.22 2.250 4
Moldova minimal minimal minimal 0 0 0 1.0 0
Total 970.6 3,770 4,594 125.550 3.66 2.03 5.36 19