Following the 2nd Battle of Ypres, the battered Canadian Division was withdrawn and hastily rebuilt, having lost 6,000 of its 10,000 men. In the first week of May 1915, the 10th Battalion received a draft of two officers and 250 men, making it larger (with 1133 all ranks) than it had been before its first action, but many were of average physique and none had military musketry training, and some had never handled a firearm of any kind at all.1
The British continued the fight to defend Ypres with their 2nd Army and the 1st British Army began a co-operative venture with the French in Artois, including an inconclusive assault on Vimy Ridge.2 About 100,000 French troops were lost in the fighting there, sixteen kilometres of "tactical importance" being gained on the lower slopes of the ridge, the heights themselves remaining in German hands until the famous Canadian assault in April 1917.3
The British Army contributed to the offensive by attempts to breach the German line north and south of Neuve Chapelle, at Aubers Ridge. The assaults were ineffective, no ground being gained and 11,000 casualties being suffered.4
The French demanded that the British meet their commitments, however, and the British 1st Army recognized a need to continue operations, especially with German divisions thinning the line to leave for the Eastern Front. The failure at Aubers Ridge convinced the 1st Army's General Haig that two attacks could not be maintained simultaneously and therefore resources were concentrated on the three-mile front between Neuve Chapelle and Festubert, a small village one and a half miles north of the La Bassée Canal. The commander of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir John French, agreed at this time to the 1st Army extending its front south of the Canal in order that a French division might be freed for the action at Vimy Ridge. Therefore, the 1st Canadian Division, reorganizing after 2nd Ypres, was selected to relieve the French 58th Division. However, their artillery was still fighting at Ypres and Ploegsteert, and so the 1st British Division made the relief instead.
The disaster at Aubers Ridge had demonstrated the strength of German defences and the ability of machine-guns to mutually support each other. The British opted now for longer, methodical bombardments by heavy guns and howitzers, with the intention of observing fall of shot.
The war of attrition on the Western Front had begun, though few of the British and French leaders yet recognized it, still firmly believing that there was still a way to achieve some form of breakthrough, if they could only find the correct method of bombarding the enemy first.6
The Battle of Festubert
The 60-hour bombardment preceding the Battle of Festubert began on the morning of 13 May 1915, as 433 howitzers and guns began to systematically work over German defences on a frontage of 5,000 yards extending north from the village. The fire was slow and deliberate (just 50 rounds per gun every 24 hours) so effects could be observed. Targets included the German parapet, support and communication trenches, wire entanglements and harassing fire in the form of shrapnel shells into communication trenches. The fire was originally to last just 36 hours but extended another 24 at the request of one of the British assault divisions. The 1st Corps used just over 100,000 rounds of ammunition in total.
Two divisions of British infantry launched the initial attack (in fact, the first British night assault of the war) on 15-16 May 1915. On the left, the 2nd Division attacked at midnight on a frontage of 1,300 yards with the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps covering their left flank. The right-most brigade achieved the German breastwork soundlessly, but on the northern flank, the planned demonstration by Indian troops only managed to alert the enemy that an operation was underway, and both of the two assault brigades on the left were driven back by heavy fire.
At daybreak, the 7th Division, new to the sector and unfamiliar with the ground (and thus required to advance in daylight) was scheduled to join in on the right, attacking on a front of half a mile during which time the 2nd Division would again advance to the second objective, the line of la Quinque Rue, a road running northeast out of Festubert. They division was held up by heavy fire, tried twice to tie in its flanks, and was stopped both times during 16 May.
The German 14th Infantry Division was manning the line south of the La Bassée Canal to the Ferme du Bois, a wood two miles northeast of Festubert. The division comprised three infantry regiments (the 16th, 56th and 57th), while opposite the Indian Corps was the 13th Division. The commander of the 14th Division felt compelled to withdraw on a 3,000 yard frontage and formed a new line behind Quinque Rue. The British were unable to identify the new line for several days where it swung west, winding north from Festubert. However, the British staff were once again optimistic, and saw the withdrawal as reason to pursue a continued advance where possible. The 3rd Canadian Brigade was put under command of the British 1st Corps, who put it into the divisional reserve of the 7th Division.
Festubert, 18 May 1915
For the Canadian battalions, the battle promised new challenges:
Haig's orders were not issued until mid-afternoon and received by the infantry brigade as Zero Hour approached. The two-hour preliminary bombardment was an hour late in starting, originally scheduled for 2:30 p.m. The Canadian attack did not go forward until 5:25 p.m. by which time the Guards Brigade had already been halted by German machine-guns - scarcely touched by the British artillery due to their positions still not having been precisely located.9
The 14th Battalion attacked with two companies, flanked by the Guards Brigade and 16th Battalion, setting off from the former German front line and told not to expect serious opposition. They met heavy shell and M.G. fire. Guided by a British officer, they attempted to reach a position known as "The Orchard", but were forced to stop short and dig in. They handed their positions to the Guards on the night of 18-19 May and pulled back to their start line. "Both the attack and the withdrawal were made under trying conditions - in darkness, under constant fire, and across water-logged country seamed with deep ditches and old tranches." Some 65 other ranks were casualties, most of them fatal, including 18 NCOs. The 14th Battalion remained in support trenches until 22 May under constant shellfire, losing 75 other ranks killed and wounded, as well as one officer killed and another wounded while attached to the 13th Battalion.10
The 14th Battalion had met fire from the same M.G.s that had harried the Guards and were diverted south, halted about 400 yards from their jumping-off trenches. The 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) had an adventure just assembling for the attack, deploying in assembly trenches early on 17 May and then setting off cross-country through steady rain to new billets, the last troops arriving at 1:00 a.m. on 18 May. New orders sent them to Indian Village at 4:00 a.m., "dead tired", and the renewed cross-country trip lasted from 6:45 a.m. until 4:00 p.m., with one company detailed to make a circuitous 5,000 yard long end-around through Festubert and up la Quinque Rue to make a flanking attack on The Orchard.
In addition to inaccurate maps, printed upside down and with poor iconography, the frontal attack was ordered over ground laced with deep drainage ditches and abandoned breastworks - entrenchments built up above ground because of the shallow water table. The flanking company was to meet a British staff officer somewhere in Festubert, the only one who knew where the start line would be.
The flanking company was shelled in Festubert, then split up to run the gauntlet, their staff officer escort never arriving, and their maps useless in finding the objective or a covered route forward. The company commander ordered packs dropped, the communications trench was found by luck or God's grace, and they moved forward to meet the survivors of the battalion's frontal assault, to be informed of its failure.12
Situation 19 May - "Alderson's Force"
Neither the 1st Corps nor the Indian Corps had managed to reach their objectives on 18 May (the Germans credited their heavy artillery fire for this lack of progress), but the 3rd Canadian Brigade did manage to reduce a gap between the positions of the 2nd and 7th British Divisions. The 16th Battalion worked through the night in driving rain to consolidate gains and create a continuous line. On the night of 18-19 May, the 2nd Canadian Brigade deployed to the right of the 3rd as the 2nd and 7th Divisions were replaced in the line by the 51st (Highland) and 1st Canadian Divisions. "Alderson's Force", which included the divisional artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, became an unusual command arrangement for a tactical grouping of the two divisions in the line (in essence, a corps without a corps staff). Meanwhile, the Germans were rushing all available reserves to the scene.
The 10th Battalion completed their move by 11:00 p.m. on 19 May, and Major Percy Guthrie - given temporary command of the battalion following the mortal wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel Boyle at Kitcheners' Wood on 21-22 April - remained as C.O. Captain Geoff Arthur, recommended for promotion to major, was designated the second-in-command, with a major, two captains, and a lieutenant now commanding the four rifle companies. Battalion H.Q. was established in a small house in the southern outskirts of Festubert, the village mostly lying in ruins. The three companies occupying front line trenches found them in poor condition, with unburied corpses and also wounded men lying untended, some for as long as a week.13
20 May 1915 - Renewed Assaults
On the morning of 20 May, General Alderson gave orders to renew the advance, hoping to gain 600 to 1,000 yards against objectives sited 3,000 yards apart. The 51st (Highland) Division's relief of the 2nd Division was delayed, however, and the 1st Army changed the requirements. At 3:00 p.m. the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Brigades were ordered to make a fresh assault at 7:45 p.m., the 2nd Brigade towards a point on the map labelled K5, which was a junction between the former and the newly established German front lines. The 3rd Brigade was to simultaneously secure half a mile of that new enemy front line and capture The Orchard, now christened "Canadian Orchard" as well as the adjoining building marked M.10.14
3rd Brigade Attack - 20 May
The attack by the two designated assault battalions on the 20th began in broad daylight at 7:45 p.m. after a barrage starting at 4:00 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Leckie of the 16th Battalion had protested the order to attack over open ground with a single company. Brigadier-General Turner replied that the British felt, after the experiences at Aubers Ridge, that night operations restricted the ability of commanders to control troop movements and despite the disadvantages of exposure to accurate enemy fire, there was an advantage to be gained by attacking in daylight. The plan was for No. 3 Company to attack Canadian Orchard and No. 1 Company to support it; if the orchard was gained, a communication trench leading to the orchard would be used as a covered route to approach M.10.15 In the event, No. 3 Company managed to reach the orchard, and despite the enemy being well dug-in, the defenders were surprised and evicted, putting the Canadian Scottish within 100 yards of the main German trenches. The attempts to attack M.10 were turned back by heavy fire and belts of barbed wire.16 The Canadian Scottish had made the deepest penetration of any unit of the British 1st Army during the Battle of Festubert, and Canadian Orchard remained in Allied hands until the German offensives in the spring of 1918.17
The 15th Battalion (48th Highlanders) had as fruitless an attack as No. 1 Company of the Canadian Scottish, and the Highlanders suffered heavy casualties attacking over open ground into the teeth of machine-guns and watchful German artillery observers. Despite using short 20-yard dashes, many men were hit, and though they gained the relative safety of the North Breastwork, they were stopped 100 yards beyond it. Supporting companies came up to consolidate the gains after dark.18
2nd Brigade Attack - 20 May
Brigadier-General Arthur Currie also protested his attack orders, received from 1st Army with less than five hours notice on 20 May. Currie's request, also denied, was for 24 hours to better prepare. Currie's his first major difference of opinion with a superior left him "angry and bitter" about taking an action he knew to be wrong.
The 10th was left with little time to prepare for their mission: an assault on K.5. Two companies were to attack from a former German communications trench. Major Guthrie described K.5 as a "fort in the German line constructed of concrete and sandbags and in which numerous machine guns were mounted so as to sweep the ground in every direction."19
As with the 15th Battalion's attack, the attack of the 10th did not go well - "doomed to failure before it started" in the words of the Army's official historian.
There was no record of the number of casualties in the 10th Battalion attack, but a renewed attack was immediately called for dawn on 21 May, then postponed until after dark to allow for a proper bombardment.21
Festubert, 21 May 1915
10th Battalion Attack - 21 May 1915
The 1st Army's orders for the renewed attack required "Alderson's Force" to secure both K.5 and M.10, as well as the intervening stretch of 1,500 yards of front-line trench which was barring access to the Rue d'Ouvert which led southeast towards La Bassée. The new front formed a salient with the old front line, and the Germans intended for K.5 to be occupied as long as possible until the new front line could be completed, with reinforcements and counter-attacks allocated to K.5. Since K5 was at the boundary of the 1st Canadian and 47th (London) Divisions, its left forward battalion also came under command of Brigadier-General Currie. The units on the left were given no orders to expand the gains earned at Canadian Orchard, the strength of the positions at M.10 being known, complicated further by a lack of unexposed assembly areas in which troops could prepare for new attacks.22
The 10th Battalion's Major Guthrie made three trips through shell-swept terrain to Brigade Headquarters finalizing details for the renewed attack on K.5. The communication trench would again be utilized as a jump-off point, and he planned to use the same two companies from the night before, splitting them in two, with his left-hand company assaulting the objective and the right-hand company clearing trenches adjacent. Guthrie realized that success would depend on the ability of the artillery to reduce the German position before the assault.23
To that end, a bombardment of three and a half hours was laid on, beginning at 5:00 p.m. Once again, the attack went in while it was still light, and once again, in the words of the Army historian, the bombardment was "woefully ineffective." The field guns had been dispersed across the front, and ammunition shortages required them to fire shrapnel shells, comparatively ineffective against the German strongpoints as opposed to the heavier guns of the siege batteries. Counter-battery artillery fire was still in its infancy and German guns, heavier and with ample supplies of shells, were able to respond by shelling the Canadian infantry heavily.
22-24 May - Continued Attacks
The original history of the C.E.F. described the battle at Festubert as "the most unsatisfactory engagement" involving Canadians of the entire war. Half the infantry who fought there had been fresh from reinforcement camps in the U.K. and barely arrived from Canada, thrown into action just three weeks after the horrifying losses of 2nd Ypres. The 1st Division lost 93 officers, 1 in 5 belonging to the 10th Battalion, though that battalion lost less than a tenth of the 2,230 other ranks. Over establishment early in May, the 10th Battalion was at half strength on 30 May.26 The 16th Battalion had lost 277 men, including 6 officers, 3 of them dead. No. 3 Company had been reduced to just 56 effectives.27
On 24 June 1915, the 1st Canadian Division moved yet again, this time to the Ploegsteert sector, returning to the 2nd Army and the beginning of three months of relative inactivity along the entire British front. German units continued to stream out of the trenches to reinforce the Eastern Front, and with the unlikelihood of a German offensive in the west growing, there was time to improve defences.
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