Written by Christy Beall
Theme: Logistics and the army train
b_145_145_16777215_00_images_issues_aw_AW7-4_aw_VII-4.jpgIntroduction: O. Shawn Cupp, 'Logistics and the army train - Historical introduction'.
Looking at ancient warfare through the lens of a logistician and discussing the army train provides a unique way of understanding combat operations. It is often said that amateurs discuss tactics and professionals discuss logistics. No combat operation would happen without the support of supplies, equipment, men, animals, and materiel to sustain those operations.
The Source: Lukasz Rózycki, 'The Strategikon as source - Late Roman baggage trains'.
The Roman army of the sixth century AD was significantly different from the infantry legions of the Republic or the Principate. Already at the beginning of the Dominate period, during the reign of Diocletian and Constantine the Great, the Roman war machine underwent the first serious reforms, which were to finally transform it into the themata-based army. The defining feature of this new force was mobility resulting from a simple distribution of responsibility. The fortified Roman border, the limes, was guarded by limitanei (garrison forces). In the event of a bigger threat, the Romans dispatched their mobile army consisting of comitatenses. Although in the course of many wars and difficult situations this system saw significant changes, its traces could still be seen in the Eastern Roman Empire at the end of the sixth century.
b_145_145_16777215_00_images_issues_aw_AW7-4_freize.jpgTheme: Timmy De Cabooter, 'True masters of logistics - The Assyrian army'. Illustrated by Angel García Pinto.
For the Assyrian kings, there was only one thing that really mattered: waging war. With support of the mighty god Ashur, the Assyrian kings commanded the cruellest and best equipped army of the ancient world. This was the Assyrian way of life: war fed them, clothed them, supplied them with endless streams of cattle and slaves, and brought them unseen wealth. For more than 300 years, they successfully pillaged their unfortunate neighbours.
The Reenactor: Kevin Giles, 'The Scythian guerrilla - Mobility and firepower'.
War cries on the wind, the thunder of hooves, a hail of arrows, and in charge the Scythians. The appearance of a Scythian war party on the field, brought panic, confusion and frustration amongst their enemy. Lightning attacks of what was the fastest weapon system of the day, could not be combatted due to the very nature of the rapid fluid engagements.
Theme: Barry Webb, 'The Babylonian conquest of Arabia - Adventures of Nabu-na?id'. Illustrated by Carlos García.
Throughout all recorded history ? and during countless aeons before history ? migration and/or invasion has been mostly one-way from Arabia to Mesopotamia. However, for a brief ten-year period during the mid-sixth century BC, the reverse was true: migration/invasion from Mesopotamia to Arabia. To back up a century or so, during the seventh century BC, the Assyrians staged military incursions into northern Arabia as far south as Tayma and took prisoners and booty, but they did not colonize it or maintain any sort of semi-permanent military presence there. That was left to the Babylonians.
b_145_145_16777215_00_images_issues_aw_AW7-4_caesar.jpgTheme: Erich B. Anderson, 'Logistical failure in North Africa - A setback for Julius Caesar'.
Although he was one of the greatest Roman generals, Gaius Julius Caesar was not perfect. Following his epic victory against Pompey the Great at the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC, Pompeian forces decisively defeated Caesar two years later on the plains outside of the town of Ruspina in North Africa. Usually one of Caesar?s strongest attributes was his initiative in battle, however, his impatience leading up to the Battle of Ruspina nearly cost him his army, as well as his life. He was so eager to destroy the remaining opposition against him that he failed to properly plan for the provisioning of his forces. In an attempt to forage for food, he led his troops out into the fields and was caught completely off guard, barely managing to retreat back to his camp. In the end, Caesar was able to overcome his logistical failure in North Africa and went on to crush the Pompeian forces at the Battle of Thapsus a few months later. But at Ruspina, Caesar came as close as ever to losing everything to the Pompeians, which would have drastically changed history as we know it.
Theme: Filippo Donvito, 'Mark Antony?s Parthian campaign - Parthia strikes back'. Illustrated by José Antonio Gutierrez Lopez and Johnny Shumate.
Seventeen years after the massacre of Crassus and his legionaries in the disastrous Battle of Carrhae, the Romans attempted another massive invasion of the Parthian kingdom. Under the command of Mark Antony, Julius Caesar?s former lieutenant, one hundred thousand men ? sixteen legions and thousands of auxiliaries ? marched from Syria to Azerbaijan across the rough mountains of Armenia to besiege the capital of Media Atropatene, Praaspa. Many of them would never return.
Theme: Jesse Obert, 'Xerxes? invasion of Greece and its logistical complications - Feeding an invasion'. Illustrated by Sebastian Schulz.
?Xerxes now decided to hold a review of his army. On a rise of ground nearby, a throne of white marble had already been specially prepared for his use by the people of Abydos; so the King took his seat upon it and, looking down over the shore, was able to see the whole of his army and navy in a single view. (?) And when he saw the whole Hellespont hidden by ships, and all the beaches and plains of Abydos filled with men, he called himself happy.? (Herodotus 7.44, trans. Aubrey De Selincourt)
Theme: Robert Wimmers, 'Blacksmithing on the move - Forging ahead'.
What did a mobile smithy look like and what was its hypothetical function in an army baggage train? What could have been its added value? Which objects could have been produced given the limited size of the smithy? What logistical advantages could have been gained by having a mobile smithy on hand? The author uses his own experiences as a blacksmith and reenactor to find answers for these questions.
b_145_145_16777215_00_images_issues_aw_AW7-4_greeks.jpgSpecial: Murray Dahm, 'Waxing lyrical on the ideal warrior - Warfare and Greek poetry'. Illustrated by Juhani Jokinen.
Greek lyric poetry from the seventh to the fifth centuries BC provides remarkable insights into a variety of aspects of ancient Greek life. One aspect of life which occurs throughout this poetry (although one which is not usually emphasised) is the conduct of warfare and the ideal of the warrior. This ideal has been adopted by innumerable subsequent cultures. Whether it is a direct exhortation to a warrior, an army or a city, or as allegory and metaphor in the poetry of love or politics, the imagery of ancient Greek warfare resounds throughout its culture?s verses. Taken together, this imagery adds substantially to our understanding of ancient Greek attitudes to warfare and attitudes to warfare and warriors in subsequent ages.
The Debate: Duncan B. Campbell, 'Was Mithraism a Roman military cult? - The mysterious ?Mysteries of Mithras?.
The Roman cult of Mithras has been studied for over a century, but it stubbornly refuses to reveal its mysteries to researchers. Although the mass of archaeological evidence continues to grow, there are no Mithraic texts to assist in its interpretation, and debate continues across a range of topics, including the cult?s origins. One perennial theory states that it was nurtured and spread by the Roman army, but the evidence is rarely examined. So, is it really safe to say that Mithraism was primarily a military cult.