KING GEORGE V-Class battleship ordered
on 29th July 1936 under 1936 Build Programme from Vickers Armstrong shipyard
at Newcastle and laid down on 1st January 1937. She was launched on 21st
February 1939 as the second major RN
ship to carry this name, previously carried by a 1911 battleship sold
in 1926. Six minor warships had been named
KING GEORGE, one being a trawler hired during WW1. Build was completed on
11th December 1941. Following a successful WARSHIP WEEK National
Savings campaign in November 1941 this ship was adopted by the civil
community of the city of Birmingham.
B a t t l
e H o n o u r s
1916 - ATLANTIC 1941 - BISMARCK Action 1941 - ARCTIC 1942-43 - SICILY 1943
- OKINAWA 1945 - JAPAN 1945
H e r a l d
i c D a t a
Badge: On a
Field Blue, the Royal Cypher of HM King George V
the Imperial Crown proper.
D e t a
i l s o f W a r S e r v i c e
(for more ship
to Naval History Homepage
and type name in Site Search
1 9 4 0
1st - Commissioned for trials at
Armstrong, Newcastle on Tyne. Commanding officer Captain W. R. Patterson CVO RN.
the time of commissioning she was incomplete and was to be taken to Rosyth
17th - At 0745 hours KING GEORGE V cast off from
Armstrong and proceeded down the Tyne.
of the importance of KING GEORGE V special measures were taken to
ensure her safety on the passage from the Tyne to Rosyth. Anti-aircraft cruisers NAIAD (Rear
Admiral CS 15) and BONAVENTURE and destroyers FAME, ASHANTI, MAORI, SIKH,
ELECTRA, BRILLIANT were ordered to escort her.
The orders for the operation were that the NAIAD and
BONAVENTURE were to wait near 20C Buoy off the Tyne, and that destroyers were to proceed at twenty-three knots towards the Tyne pierheads,
there to meet KING GEORGE V. The object of proceeding at speed was to
explode any acoustic Mines that might be in the channel. 20C Buoy in the war
channel was not sighted [it was out of position and the situation was made
more difficult by heavy drizzle and poor visibility] and the
next one to the southward, 20Q was mistaken for it by the FAME [senior
officer of destroyers]. The FAME then turned out of the war channel to
make the entrance to the Tyne at high speed. The result was that in
1-21W, FAME and ASHANTI grounded at the
top of high water spring tides causing serious damage, MAORI was slightly
damaged and the other three destroyers narrowly escaped the same fate)
At 0900 hours off the entrance to the Tyne she was met by
cruisers NAIAD and BONAVENTURE and destroyers MAORI, SIKH, BRILLIANT and
ELECTRA, course was then set for the Firth of Forth.
At 1000 hours
destroyers BEAGLE, WESTMINSTER and WALLACE joined the screen.
At 1030 hours
destroyer FEARLESS joined the screen
At 1440, the force
reached the Oxcars Boom off Rosyth and KING GEORGE V entered Rosyth for the
fitting of her outer propellers,
strengthening her rudder and to complete installation of armament and radar fit.
14/10/40 the SS PERTH 2208grt was requisitioned by the Admiralty for service
as an accommodation ship at Rosyth for the shipyard workers who were to
carry out the finishing work on KING
GEORGE V. On completion of the battleship, PERTH was taken over
by the Ministry of War Transport and allocated for service as a Convoy
Rescue Ship. After conversion she made her first voyage in Convoy OG 61)
23rd - KING
GEORGE V was visited by the Prime Minster Winston Churchill.
undergoing completion works.
30th - KING
GEORGE V was visited by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the CinC
2nd - At 1445
hours KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers SOMALI (D6), MASHONA,
BEAGLE and BULLDOG departed Rosyth for Scapa Flow to carry out 'First
of Class' and builders acceptance trials, to test her aircraft
warning radar Type 279 and fire control radar Type 284 for main armament, and
to commence working up exercises.
4th - At 1500
hours KING GEORGE V with destroyers ESCAPADE, BRILLIANT, BEAGLE and
BULLDOG arrived at Scapa Flow after gun trials west of the Orkneys. The gun
firing trails exposed various defects with operation of the loading
5th to 9th -
Carried out steaming and gunnery trials off the west Orkney's.
10th - Carried
out full power trial in the Minches.
11th - KING
GEORGE V officially joined the Home Fleet.
At Scapa where
working up continued along with trials and remedial work on her main
(Nominated for special duty to take Lord Halifax, British
Ambassador Designate to take up his appointment in USA)
1 9 4 1
At Scapa where
working up continued along with trials and remedial work on her main
8th - The CinC
Home Fleet sent the results of KING GEORGE V's first main armament
shoot to the Admiralty.
15th - At 1240 hours destroyer NAPIER
(D7) with Prime Minster Winston Churchill and Lord Halifax embarked came
alongside KING GEORGE V. Winston Churchill and Lord Halifax boarded KING
GEORGE V. The minesweepers SHARPSHOOTER and SPEEDY followed with Halifax's
staff and luggage. The visitors then had lunch aboard.
After lunch Winston Churchill disembarked and visited the
canteen and buildings at Flotta.
At 1630 hours KING GEORGE V with Lord Halifax and staff embarked
and escorted by destroyers SOMALI (D6), MATABELE, BEDOUIN and TARTAR
sailed from Scapa on Operation PARCEL.
(Operation PARCEL was the transport of Lord Halifax to the USA
to take up his appointment as British Ambassador)
17th - At 1000 hours in approximate position 56- 30N, 26W
destroyers SOMALI (D6), MATABELE, BEDOUIN and TARTAR detached to carry out
an anti-submarine search along the latitude of 58 N, north of Rockall.
KING GEORGE V arrived in Chesapeake Bay escorted by
US destroyer USS LANSDALE. The US President Franklin Roosevelt came out
in his yacht POTOMAC to welcome the new British ambassador. Lord Halifax
disembarked at Annapolis to take up his duties.
Whilst at Annapolis KING GEORGE V was visited by a number
of US naval officers and naval cadets from Annapolis Naval Academy.
25th - In the morning KING GEORGE V sailed from Annapolis
to return to the UK. Embarked was a US army and naval delegation of Cypher
specialists and a copy of a Japanese Cypher machine (PURPLE) for Bletchley
November 1940 a top-secret agreement was concluded between Britain and the
US to provide for 'a full exchange of cryptographic systems and
cryptanalytical techniques, direction finding, radio interception, and
other technical communication matters pertaining to the diplomatic,
military, naval, and air services of Germany, Japan, and Italy'. The US
Army SIS had cracked the Japanese PURPLE cipher machine and produced PURPLE
analogue machines to read it and the despatch of the delegation with the
PURPLE cipher machine was the start of the US
on code breaking)
- In the morning in approximate position 43-30N, 52-30 W KING GEORGE V
joined the armed merchant cruiser ALAUNIA
escorting convoy BHX 104. This was an important convoy consisting of
36 mercantiles of which 25 were tankers that had sailed from Bermuda on
(BHX 104 was
the only BHX convoy that did not join up with the corresponding HX convoy,
but proceeded directly to the U.K. as a separate convoy)
the eastward passage several days of severe weather were experienced. This
provided a good test of KING GEORGE V's ability to deal with heavy weather
and she stood up well.
- At 1600 hours in position 62N, 25W the convoy was met by destroyers
SOMALI, ECLIPSE, ESKIMO and NAPIER. KING GEORGE V then detached from
the convoy escorted by SOMALI, ECLIPSE, ESKIMO and NAPIER and steered for
- At 0715 hours north of the Minches, destroyer NAPIER was detached to
1300 hours KING GEORGE V and destroyers SOMALI, ECLIPSE and ESKIMO
arrived at Scapa. On arrival the US delegation
disembarked and proceeded to Bletchley Park.
KING GEORGE V rejoined Home Fleet and resumed work-up.
hours the German battlecruiser SCHARNHORST, who was in company with the
GNEISENAU, made radar contact at 17200 metres with convoy HX 106. On
closing the convoy SCHARNHORST, at 0947 hours, sighted a battleship, which
was the RAMILLIES. On sighting her the Germans broke off.
At 1150Z/8/2/41, the Admiralty received a report
from RAMILLIES, in position 52- 55N,
34-00W, some 900 miles west of Slyne Head, that she had had a brief
glimpse of the mast and top of a ship which was possibly a German Hipper
class cruiser estimated to be steering a course of 030 degrees.
Following the encounter, SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU headed for refuelling point
Blue in approximate position 53-55N, 57W, arriving on 14/2/41 and refuelled
from German tankers SCHLETTSTADT (8028grt) and ESSO HAMBURG (9847grt).
The Admiralty appreciation was that the Hipper class cruiser seen in dock
at Brest between 2nd January
and 1st February had not
been located there on 4th February,
and if she was the ship seen by the RAMILLIES she might well have been
attempting to return to Germany by the northern passages. At twenty-five
knots she could have reached a position by dusk on 9th February to the
westward of the Iceland-Faeroes channel appropriate for a night passage through
the gap which would have taken her well clear to the eastward by dawn the
following day. At twenty knots she would have been too far to the westward
before dusk to give a reasonable chance of interception if she attempted a
night passage, but she might conveniently be caught to the eastward at
daylight. Ships at Scapa were accordingly sailed and disposed to meet
either of these contingencies.
At 1947/8/2/41 the Admiralty ordered the cruiser
EDINBURGH (CS 18), who was in the Clyde ready to sail with convoy WS 6A,
and destroyers KELLY (D5), KIPLING, KASHMIR and JACKAL from Plymouth,
to proceed to Scapa for orders. At 2331/8/2/41 the CinC HF requested that
EDINBURGH and destroyers RV with RODNEY at 1100/10/2/41 in position 64-15N, 9W)
9th – During the forenoon battleships
RODNEY and KING GEORGE V and destroyers INGLEFIELD (D3), BEDOUIN, MAORI,
ZULU, BRILLIANT and BOREAS sailed from Scapa Flow for position 65N, 8-30W.
10th – At 1100 hours in position 64-15N,
9W, light cruiser EDINBURGH (CS18) RVed with the RODNEY force.
At 1640 hours, there having been no further
developments, EDINBURGH and the RODNEY force were ordered to return to
11th – At 2045 hours RODNEY, KING GEORGE V
with destroyers INGLEFIELD, BEDOUIN, ZULU, MAORI and BRILLIANT arrived at
During her time at Scapa KING GEORGE V
embarked two Walrus amphibians equipped with ASV 11N radar.
These were the first naval front line aircraft to be fitted with radar.
morning of 1/2/41 German cruiser ADMIRAL HIPPER sailed from Brest on her
second raiding mission with orders to join up with
GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST. At 0440/9/2/41 in position 35-53N, 13-13W the 21
ship convoy HG53, with only the sloop DARTFORD as escort, was attacked by U
37,; following the attack U 37 made a sighting report. On receipt of the
report Doenitz sensed an opportunity to mount a combined U boat, air and
surface attack on the convoy. Doenitz ordered U 37 to shadow the convoy and
transmit beacon signals. At 1600/9/2/41 in 35-54N, 14-41W five FW 200's
made a low level bombing attack on HG 53 sinking 5 ships. At first the
Oberkommando der Marine
[OKM] was reluctant to release ADMIRAL HIPPER, but at 1140/10/2/41 when
in approximate position 45N, 30W, ADMIRAL HIPPER was ordered to attack HG 53.
ADMIRAL HIPPER missed HG 53 but found the 19 unescorted ships of convoy SLS 64. At 0925/12/2/41 in position
37-10N, 21 20W, ADMIRAL HIPPER opened fire and in 80 minutes, sank 7 and damaged 3. [250
seamen from convoy SLS 64 were lost. Their deaths have not been
acknowledged in convoy loss statistics as the Admiralty regarded these
ships as independents]. In the
engagement ADMIRAL HIPPER expended a large amount of ammunition and set course to return to Brest, arriving on 15/2/41. The Admiralty were
aware of HIPPER's arrival at 1115/15/2/41.
RRR raider report from the SS WARLABY
in SLS 64 was picked up at 0930/12/2/41 by SS EGYPTIAN PRINCE in convoy HG 53 .
When the Admiralty received the
raider report, part of their response was the decision to provide close
escort for all ocean convoys as far as possible. This would require
detachments from the Home Fleet)
- At 1425 hours battleships NELSON (Flag CinC Home Fleet) and KING
GEORGE V, light cruisers EDINBURGH and NIGERIA and destroyers
INGLEFIELD (D3), ECHO, ECLIPSE, MAORI and PUNJABI sailed from Scapa for
position 65-40N, 05-00E, approx 200 south west of the entrance to Vestfjord
to provide cover for ships carrying out Operation CLAYMORE.
CLAYMORE was a Commando Raid on the Lofoten Islands. The objectives were the
destruction of fish oil factories that produced glycerine the Germans used
in the manufacture of explosives, and a morale boost for the home front.
There was also a top secret mission to be carried out by the RN, called a 'pinch' by Bletchley Park; this was to attempt to seize an ENIGMA
landing force comprised LSI (M)'s QUEEN EMMA [with No 4 Commando
embarked] and PRINCESS BEATRIX [with No 3 Commando]; they also
carried 52 Norwegians of the Norwegian Independent Company and demolition
teams from 55th Field Squadron Royal Engineers. The escort was destroyers SOMALI (D6 Captain Caslon), BEDOUIN, TARTAR, ESKIMO and LEGION.
Submarine SUNFISH was positioned in approximate position 67-37N, 12-45E
as a beacon at the entrance to
- At 0900 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 62-59N, 3-15W
1045 hours the Battle Fleet was sighted by German reconnaissance aircraft
and reported as two heavy cruisers and five destroyers, course north.
1200 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 63-38N, 3-00W.
1700 hours, EDINBURGH and NIGERIA were detached to stand off the
entrance to Vestfjord, RV with the returning Landing Force, and provide
close cover for the return passage.
1900 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 64-00N, 3-00W and sailing northerly
for position 65-40N, 5-00E.
- At 0001 hours the Battle Fleet was south westerly of Vestfjord.
0001 hours, under ideal weather conditions, the Landing Force entered Vestfjord.
At 0445 hours the Force split in two groups, for the attack on the two most
important targets. QUEEN EMMA, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and TARTAR made for Svolvaer; PRINCESS BEATRIX, ESKIMO and LEGION made for Stamsund. At 0500
hours the first attacks took place; in total 4 targets were attacked,
Stamsund, Svolvaer, Henningsvaer and Brettesnes)
1200 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 66-24N, 7-16E and steering
1230 hours EDINBURGH and NIGERIA were sighted ahead.
hours the Commandoes re-embarked, the Landing Force sailed down Vestfjord and course was set to RV with EDINBURGH and NIGERIA. The
raiding force had destroyed 11 factories, 800,000 gallons of oil and five
ships had been sunk (including fish factory ship SS HAMBURG 5470grt). A
party from SOMALI boarded the German trawler KREBS and seized Enigma
paraphernalia. The Force returned with 314 volunteers (including 8 women)
for the Norwegian forces, 60 Quislings, 225 German prisoners and the
English manager of Messrs Allen & Hanbury, chemists, who had been
caught there in the war; all for the cost of one accidental self-inflicted
wound to an officer's thigh)
1356 hours in position 66-45N, 8-18E the Battle Fleet altered course to
1414 hours KING GEORGE V, DFed a radio station bearing 162¼ that
appeared to be vectoring aircraft.
1620 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 67-22N, 12-38E steering 225¼, speed
20 knots, when it was located by enemy aircraft.
- At 0900 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 65-28N, 2-08W steering
0913 hours course was altered to 140¼ to return to Scapa.
1047 hours enemy aircraft in sight.
1050 hours AA fire was opened on the enemy aircraft. This was first use of her AA armament in anger.
1301 hours the CinC Home Fleet ordered KING GEORGE V to attempt to bluff
the enemy aircraft by calling up 'non existent fighter' to attack the enemy
1450 and 1541 hours AA fire was opened on the enemy aircraft.
1800 hours Battle Fleet was in position 63-35N, 4-51W.
hours the Landing Force was in position 64-25N, 3-04W, course 190¼, speed
- At 0800 hours the Battle Fleet was in position 59-57N, 4-29W.
1015 hours a RAF Hudson was sighted on the port beam.
1400 hours battleships NELSON and KING GEORGE V, light cruisers
EDINBURGH and NIGERIA, LSI (M) QUEEN EMMA and PRINCESS BEATRIX and destroyers
INGLEFIELD, ECHO, ECLIPSE, MAORI, PUNJABI, SOMALI, BEDOUIN, TARTAR, ESKIMO
and LEGION arrived at Scapa.
– At 0058 hours the Admiralty signalled the CinC Home Fleet, 'Request
you sail two battleships in company to Halifax. These ships should be
routed so as to afford NORFOLK with HX 112 as much support as possible'.
followed the receipt of a signal from the MALAYA stating,' two German
ships, probably the battlecruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, sighted at
1600Z/8/3/41 in position 21-37N, 20-21W'. Following their sighting the
German ships moved off in a north westerly direction)
0740 hours battleships RODNEY and KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers
SOMALI, BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, TARTAR, MATABELE and ESKIMO departed Scapa Flow.
They were routed through 59N, 07-30W, 62N, 11W, 62N, 25W, 58N, 30W, and
thence to Halifax. RODNEY and KING GEORGE V to provide ocean escort for
convoys HX 115 and 116.
- At 1400 hours in position 58N, 30W destroyers SOMALI (D6), BEDOUIN,
PUNJABI, TARTAR, MATABELE and ESKIMO detached and returned to Scapa.
- At 1000 hours KING GEORGE V arrived at Halifax.
in position 42N, 43-25W, tanker MV ATHELFOAM 6554grt, in ballast en
route from Liverpool to Pastelillo, Columbia, from the dispersed convoy OB
294, was shelled and sunk by the SCHARNHORST. Before gooing down, ATHELFOAM sent off a raider RRR
report. Further raider reports were received from vessels being attacked by GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST)
- At 1130Q hours KING GEORGE V sailed from Halifax, ordered to proceed
with all despatch to position 41-12N, 49-00W and/or with all convenient
despatch to 42-40N, 45-20W, subsequently sweeping to south westward unless
further information on raiders was received.
At 1729Q hours the Admiralty signalled the KING GEORG V; 'We are inclined to
think that ships which have been raiding in Newfoundland area are returning
to North Sea. If this is so there is a danger that they may come across a
wave of ships originally belonging to OB 295 but now proceeding
independently. These ships were probably within 100 miles of 56N, 35W at
1200Z/16/3/41, mean course 210¼. Failing any further information regarding
raider you are to proceed at best speed to cover these ships assuming you
will ultimately proceed to Scapa'
- At 1400Z hours the Admiralty signalled KING GEORGE V; 'Subject to no
enemy information being received you are required to proceed to Scapa but
may refuel at Hvalfjord if necessary. On above basis it is desired you
first join HX 115 and escort the convoy to UK. If you cannot join HX 115 you
should report accordingly and join CinC HF as directed by him'.
- At 0828Q hours in position 42-30N, 51-45W, KING GEORGE V joined AMC CALIFORNIA escorting convoy HX 115. The convoy consisted of 30
mercantiles, including 9 tankers. The convoy proceeded on base course 033¼ at a
speed of 8½ knots.
much of note occurred whilst KING GEORGE V was with the convoy.
- At 1741 hours the CinC Home Fleet signalled KING GEORGE V, 'Intend to
transfer my flag to KING GEORGE V after your arrival at Scapa'.
- At 1115 hours KING GEORGE V received the signal, repeated to D4, 'COSSACK
(D4), MAORI and ZULU are to RV with KING GEORGE V in position (X), 61N, 25W
at 0730Z/29 and then to provide A/S screen to Scapa'.
- At 1250 hours in position 60-49N, 26-00W, tanker MV COWRIE 8198grt
with a cargo of Admiralty bunker oil, detached from HX 115 for Reykjavik.
1930 hours in position 60-56N, 24W KING GEORGE V detached from convoy
HX 115 for Scapa.
detaching, KING GEORGE V sailed north towards Iceland and launched her
Walrus aircraft. The aircraft were to wait at Iceland to be embarked by NORFOLK.
the afternoon of 28/4/41 the Admiralty had confirmation that German
battlecruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were at Brest. The evidence came from
photographs taken by a RAF Spitfire PR 1 aircraft of No 1 PRU that had
flown from RAF Thorney Island)
- At 0730 hours in position 61N, 25W, KING GEORGE V RVed with destroyers COSSACK (D4), MAORI and ZULU;
following which course was set
1852 hours in position 60-15N, 19-53W, KING GEORGE V signalled, 'One
submarine bearing 066¼, ten miles, identity unknown'.
2332 hours KING GEORGE V received a signal from the CinC Home Fleet,
reference Admiralty message 2106/29, which stated that D/F indicated a
possible surface ship in vicinity of convoys HX 115 and OB 302; 'Reliable
report. Possible the ADMIRAL SCHEER homeward bound. Endeavour to intercept
if fuel permits'.
- At 0929 hours the CinC Home Fleet signalled KING GEORGE V, 'My
2332/29, if no further information is received by 1200 hours today, proceed
- At 1416 hours KING GEORGE V and destroyers COSSACK, MAORI and
ZULU arrived at Scapa.
- At Scapa, where at 0900 hours the CinC Home Fleet transferred his flag to
KING GEORGE V from the QUEEN ELIZABETH.
2115/1/4/41 the CinC Home Fleet received Admiralty message 1930/1;
'Situation at Brest necessitates our maximum effort being disposed in best
manner to engage the two German battle cruisers should they leave harbour.
HOOD, NIGERIA and FIJI leave Bay of Biscay area on 4/4/41 to refuel in
United Kingdom. REPULSE and FURIOUS leave Gibraltar on about 4/4/41 for
United Kingdom. Submarines on Bay of Biscay patrol will require to be
withdrawn on 5/4/41. It is requested you will sail KING GEORGE V with such
cruisers as you think fit in company to the area in which HOOD has recently
- At 1145 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), heavy cruiser
LONDON and destroyers SOMALI (D6), BEDOUIN, MATABELE and MASHONA
departed Scapa for the Bay of Biscay.
1800 hours position was 58-42½N, 6-37W, course 267¼, speed 19 knots.
1831 hours clocks put back one hour to GMT (Zulu time)
- At 0800 hours position 56-30N, 13-04W, course 250¼, speed 18 knots.
1600 hours position 55-42N, 17W.
- At 0715 hours, HOOD passed by seven miles on the starboard beam,
0800 hours position 52-28N, 21-57W, course 190¼, speed 19 knots.
1900 hours in approximate position 50N, 21W; destroyers SOMALI (D6),
BEDOUIN, MATABELE and MASHONA detached to Londonderry to refuel, where they
arrived at 0600/6/4/41.
2359 hours estimated position was 49N, 20-10W.
- At 0800 hours position was 47-16N, 18-33W.
1600 hours position 45-32N, 17-02W, course 180¼, speed 16½ knots.
2125 hours the CinC HF received Admiralty message 2154/5; 'There are
indications that probably six German destroyers passed through Straits of
Dover at about 1900/5. It is possible they may be proceeding to Brest'.
6th - At 0140 hours the CinC HF received Admiralty message 0041/6;
'Movements of German destroyers down Channel indicate that battle cruisers
may sail shortly, earliest probable time being night of 6/4/41'
0900 hours position 45-30N, 18-24W, course 045¼, speed 16½ knots.
1800 hours position 45-26N, 16-06W, and course 200 ¼.
1900 hours LONDON detached to RV with REPULSE.
2330 hours clocks advance by one hour to BST (Z+1)
(At 0420/6 a
22 Squadron RAF Beaufort 1, OA-X [N1016],
flown by Flying Officer Kenneth
Campbell took off from RAF St Eval. The aircraft was one of six tasked to
attack the German battleships in Brest harbour; in the event only four
aircraft actually took off. They were to RV off Brest but poor weather
prevented this. Aircraft X/22 was the only aircraft to reach the target and
attack. At approximately 0530 hours FO Campbell flew through a wall of flak
at mast head height and torpedoed the GNEISENAU, almost immediately X//22
was shot down and all four crew killed. The attack, together with a further
successful one by RAF bombers on the night of 10/11 April, put the
GNEISENAU out of action for six months. When the details of FO Kenneth
Campbell's attack became known he was awarded the VC)
- At 0800 hours position 45-31N, 16-06W, course 330¼, speed 16½
1800 hours position 45-31N, 16-06W, course 330¼, speed 16½ knots.
2300 hours position 48-28N, 18-44W, course 315¼, speed 16½ knots.
- At 0500 hours light cruiser KENYA joined from Scapa.
0945 hours destroyers SOMALI (D6), BEDOUIN, MATABELE and MASHONA
rejoined from Londonderry
1200 hours position 50-01N, 20-03W, course 120¼, speed 16½ knots.
1800 hours position 49-15N, 18-35W.
2000 hours KENYA detached to RV with HOOD.
- At 0800 hours position 52-34N, 16-41W, course 031¼, speed 20 knots.
hours the Admiralty issued an aircraft report of a very large ship escorted
by three destroyers leaving Goulet de Brest at 0830/9. It is not confirmed
this is a man of war. This turned out to be a merchant ship of about 3000grt with and escort of three vessels which were definitely not destroyers.
At 1804/9 the group was attacked by RAF torpedo bombers in position 49-25N,
- At 0600 hours in position 56-35N, 7-49W destroyer MATABELE detached
for Barrow to refit.
0730 hours position 56-48N, 7-09W, course 014¼, speed 20 knots.
1519 hours in position 58-42N, 4-35W destroyer BEDOUIN was detached to
proceed to the assistance of a merchant vessel reported on fire in position
58-42N, 09-41W with survivors in the water.
1811 hours KING GEORGE V with destroyers SOMALI and MASHONA arrived at
- At 0107 hours KING GEORGE V, light cruiser NIGERIA, and destroyers
MASHONA, ELECTRA and ESCAPADE departed Scapa Flow for position 46-30N,
18-10W to mount patrol off the Bay of Biscay.
1800 hours position 57-48N, 9-35W.
- At 0515 hours unidentified aircraft sighted passing from port to
0611 hours sighted a large group of unidentified aircraft passing from
starboard to port.
0618 sighted destroyers HMCS SAGUENAY and RESTIGOUCHE bearing 110¼.
1039 hours radar reported single aircraft bearing 282¼, 14 miles.
1130 hours position 54-44N, 12-39W.
- At 0800 hours position 50-30N, 19-14W, course 227¼, speed 19 knots.
1045 hours destroyers MASHONA, ELECTRA and ESCAPADE were detached to
refuel at Londonderry.
- At 0900 hours position 46-28N, 18-01W, course 220¼, speed 18 knots.
0925 hours speed reduced to 17 knots due to heavy weather.
1900 hours position 46-56N, 18-40W, and course 090¼.
- At 0800 hours position 44-05N, 17-07W and course 320¼.
- At 0800 hours position 44-37N, 17-48W, course 270¼, speed 18 knots.
(Late on the
18/4/41 the Admiralty received a report that German battleship
BISMARCK, two cruisers, cruiser Leipzig class and three destroyers passed
the Skaw early morning of 18/4/41 steering north west. This report was
false, as at the time the BISMARCK was in the Baltic)
- At 0001 hours position 45-31N, 17-21W and speed 21 knots.
0150 hours altered course to 000¼ and increased speed to 20 knots to return
0900 hours position 46-39N, 18-12W.
- At 0900 hours position 49-46N, 20-53W, course 060¼, speed 17 knots. KING
GEORGE V and NIGERIA was joined by destroyers ESCAPADE, ELECTRA
and MASHONA from Londonderry.
1342 hours position 49-24N, 20-49W, course 043¼, speed 17½ knots.
- At 0350 hours received a report from CinC Western Approaches 0303/21;
'One Catalina aircraft missing. Following received at 0210/21 from
Sunderland aircraft, begins: Distress flares seen in position 53-42N,
13-24W. No further news, searching, ends'. (This was
Catalina AH 532
of 210 Squadron that was on an Atlantic Patrol from Loch Erne, N.I.)
0628 hours altered course to 051¼ to search for missing Catalina.
0900 hours altered course to 090¼.
hours received Admiralty message 0909/21; 'Blue air raid message'.
1213 hours KING GEORGE V opened fire with her 5.25in at aircraft
identified as German.
- At 0700 hours position 58-37N, 7-37W, course 085¼, speed 17½
1552 hours KING GEORGE V, light cruiser NIGERIA and destroyers
ESCAPADE, ELECTRA and MASHONA arrived at Scapa.
- At Scapa where the Home Fleet including KING GEORGE V was visited by
HRH The Duke of Kent. The Duke of Kent slept on board KING GEORGE V.
- HRH The Duke of Kent slept on board KING GEORGE V.
the 14/5/41 the CinC Home Fleet and the Admiralty became aware that the
Luftwaffe had increased its reconnaissance of Scapa Flow. Also Luftwaffe
Enigma decrypts revealed that FW 200's were carrying out reconnaissance
flights between Jan Mayen island and Greenland checking out the ice
conditions. This intelligence led to the possibility that German ships were
intending to break out into the Atlantic)
1200/19/5/41 off Ruegen Island in the Baltic, battleship BISMARCK [Flag
and heavy cruiser PRINZ EUGEN joined forces and with destroyers Z 16 and Z 23,
west on Operation RHEINUBUNG. [This was an Operation to break
into the North Atlantic to attack British shipping
for a period of several months]. At
2230 hours destroyer Z 10 joined the Force.
At 1300/20, the German ships were sighted by the
Swedish cruiser GOTLAND which reported the sighting to Stockholm. Luetjens
assumed this ship would report his position, and at 1737 radioed this
incident to Group North, the German Naval command station based in
Wilhelmshaven. GOTLAND had reported the sighting and then it was leaked
to the British Naval Attache, Captain Henry W. Denham RN. Later in the day,
from the British embassy in Stockholm, Denham transmitted the following
message to the Admiralty in London:
'Kattegat, today 20 May. At 1500/20, two large warships, escorted by three
destroyers, five ships and ten or twelve planes passed Marstrand to the
On receipt of this information the Admiralty
requested photographic reconnaissance of likely harbours in southern
At 1100/21 two Spitfire PR 1 aircraft
of No 1 PRU, took off from Wick,
one flown by Flight Lieutenant Michael Suckling sighted and photographed
the two German ships in Korsfjord, near Bergen. BISMARCK was in Grimstad Fjord, near Haakonsvern and
PRINZ EUGEN in Kalvanes Bay,
near Agotnes, 9¼ miles north west of the BISMARCK. At 1420/21 Flight
Lieutenant Suckling landed back at Wick and the photographs were rushed to
available Home Fleet warships came to two hours' notice for sailing.
On 22/5/41, the weather worsened and RAF attacks failed due to
the weather or because the enemy had sailed.
The Admiralty were desperate to know if BISMARCK
had sailed but as the weather was now 10/10 cloud at 100 feet, the RAF were unable
to provide a reconnaissance flight.
Captain Henry St John Fancourt,
HMS SPARROWHAWK, RNAS Hatson near Kirkwall
thought it might be possible for a single aircraft to
get through to Bergen to ascertain the situation. Lieutenant Noel Goddard RNVR
volunteered to fly one of 771 squadron's Martin Marylands, which were used
for training and target towing. Three other crew members volunteered - these
were Commander G A Rotherham RN [executive officer of HMS SPARROWHAWK] observer, Leading Airmen J W
Armstrong, radio operator and J D Milne air gunner.
the Maryland [serial number AR720] took off from Hatson and was flown
as close to the surface of the sea as possible in the
poor visibility and strong winds. However due to Rotherham's superb
navigation, the plane arrived directly over the location where the German
ships had last been photographed. After several low runs over the fiord in
the face of heavy AA fire, Rotherham decided that the ships were gone. They
flew on to Bergen, again in the face of heavy AA fire, to find the
roadstead there also devoid of the battleship and cruiser. Armstrong then signalled
on an emergency frequency 'Battleship and Cruiser have left'. Goddard was
awarded a DSC, Rotherham a DSO and Armstrong a DSM.
2200/22 Admiral Tovey had this signal in his hand and was then able to put
in motion his forces to
counter the threat from the BISMARCK )
- At 2307 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, light cruisers GALATEA (Flag CS2), AURORA,
KENYA, and HERMIONE, and destroyers ACTIVE, PUNJABI, NESTOR, LANCE,
WINDSOR, INGLEFIELD (D3) and INTREPID sailed from Scapa and set course
- At 0100 hours destroyer LANCE detached due to boiler problems and
returned to Scapa.
0710 hours in approximate position 60N, 7W the Home Fleet was joined by battlecruiser
REPULSE and destroyers LEGION, SAGUENAY and ASSINIBOINE.
Course was then set north westerly towards Iceland.
(At 1922/23/5/41 AB Alfred Newell the
starboard lookout of heavy cruiser SUFFOLK sighted the BISMARCK at a
distance of 7 miles to the NNE, and shortly afterwards, astern of
BISMARCK, the PRINZ EUGEN. SUFFOLK's approximate position was 66-44N,
26-45W, BISMARCK's 66-51N, 26-38W.
At 1923 hours SUFFOLK made a sighting report, but because
her aerials were iced-up this was only picked up by
NORFOLK. At 2032 hours NORFOLK, who was in
company with the SUFFOLK, sent a sighting report, 'one Battleship, one
cruiser in sight'
which was picked up by the CinC Home Fleet, Admiral Holland and
2032 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 60-20N, 13W when the
CinC Home Fleet received NORFOLK's sighting report.
2045 hours the battlefleet altered course to 280¼ and increased speed to 27
- At 0410 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 61N, 18-30W.
hours battleship PRINCE OF WALES who was in company with battlecruiser HOOD signalled,
'Emergency to Admiralty and C in C Home Fleet. One battleship and one heavy
cruiser, bearing 335, distance 17 miles. My position 63-20 North, 31-50
West. My course 240. Speed 28 knots')
(At 0601/24/5/41 in approximate position
63-22N, 32-17W HOOD was sunk by the
BISMARCK. Just before the HOOD blew up and sank,
BISMARCK was hit on her port side by three 14in
shells from PRINCE OF WALES. One was amidships under the armoured belt, a
second in her bows [this hit caused her to take on water forward and caused
a 9-degree port list and a trim down by the bow of 2 meters. Also since
the manifolds for the fuel
distribution system were located in one of the flooded compartments, BISMARCK was immediately deprived
of the use of more than 1,000 tons of fuel oil
that was in the
forward oil tank] and the third which passed through a boat. Because
of the list BISMARCK's starboard propeller was coming out of the water Her CO, Captain Lindemann ordered counter flooding aft to restore
the trim, causing maximum speed to be reduced to 28 knots. After the action, SUFFOLK reported that
BISMARCK had been hit by three shells, but of course this could not be
hours a RAF Sunderland
L5798/Z of 201
Squadron, pilot Flight Lieutenant Vaughan, happened upon the scene. The
Sunderland had taken off from Reykjavik and had been searching for the BISMARCK
for 6 hours 15 minutes in extremely poor weather conditions. When the Sunderland
arrived on the scene she was fired on by PRINZ EUGEN with her 105mm AA battery. After HOOD was sunk, BISMARCK was observed emitting a lot of smoke, which
subsequently ceased and losing a large quantity of oil. The aircraft
approached within 5 miles of the enemy ships on the starboard beam at an
altitude of 2500 feet and identified them as BISMARCK and SCHEER.
Sunderland aircraft Z remained on the scene shadowing the enemy force for
about 3 hours, signalling its course and speed to the British warships,
before setting course for Reykjavik where the aircraft landed at 12.03 hrs,
having been airborne for 13 hours and 38 minutes.
At 0801/24/5/41 BISMARCK reported to Group North:
1. Loss of Electric plant No. 4.
2. Port Boiler Room No. 2 is taking water, but can be held. Water in
forecastle [BISMARCK shipped 2000 tons of water]
3. Maximum speed 28 knots.
4. Denmark Strait 50 miles of floating mines. Enemy has radar instruments.
5. Intention is to put into St. Nazaire. No losses of personnel.
because Bletchley Park at this time was not able to read the naval Enigma,
none of the above signal was read)
At 0600 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 60N, 22W. This was
about 350 NM south easterly of the position of HOOD's sinking.
0800 hours the Home Fleet altered course to 260¼ and later to 240¼.
1509 hours, VICTORIOUS, GALATEA, AURORA, KENYA and HERMIONE were
detached to steer the best course to get within 100 miles of the enemy and
carry out an air strike on BISMARCK.
(At 1840/24/5/41 the BISMARCK emerged from
mist on SUFFOLK's starboard beam at a range of 10 miles and heading
straight for SUFFOLK. BISMARCK immediately opened fire on SUFFOLK, firing 7 salvoes. This manoeuvre was to allow the PRINZ
EUGEN to detach to
the south, which she did at 1814 hours. SUFFOLK replied with 9 broadsides,
most of which fell short. PRINCE OF WALES came up from astern and fired 12
salvos from 15 miles, following which two of her guns were put out of
At 1856 hours, BISMARCK broke off the action and
turned west then south.
At 1914 hours,
reported to Seekriegsleitung: brief fight with King George without
results. PRINZ EUGEN released for oiling. Opponent keeps up surveillance.
At 2056 hours BISMARCK
reported to Group West and Seekriegsleitung: shaking off contacts
impossible due to enemy radar. Due to fuel shortage will proceed direct to
At 2400/24/5/41 BISMARCK
was attacked by nine Swordfish of 825
Squadron from the VICTORIOUS armed with 18in torpedoes. Three Fulmars
of 800Z Flight followed the Swordfish with orders to observe the attack and
then maintain contact at all costs. One torpedo hit was achieved on the
starboard side; no significant structural damage was caused, but
the shock of the impact
caused one casualty. Also the increase in speed and manoeuvring had
dislodged the collision mats that had
been put over the two shell holes in the bows and
she again started to take
in water again. BISMARCK had to slow down to 16 knots to reposition the
(Following BISMARCK's 2056
signal, to Group West. Bletchley Park reported to Admiralty OIC that the
operational control of BISMARCK had been transferred from Wilhelmshaven to
Paris and this was a good sign that she was moving south. OIC did not pass
on this information until late on the 25th)
2400 hours all the Home Fleet escorting destroyers had detached to refuel
– At 0013 hours the CinC Home Fleet in KING GEORGE V signalled to RA CS1 in
NORFOLK that he hoped to engage the BISMARCK, with KING GEORGE V and REPULSE at about 0900/25/5/41, which was about Sunrise,
and from the eastward.
CinC then signalled REPULSE, whose armour was inferior to HOOD's, that
in the engagement she was to keep 5000 yards outside of him and not to
engage until KING GEORGE V had opened fire.
CO, Captain Lindemann having decided there was a chance that BISMARCK's shadowers could be shaken off, turned to starboard and described
a huge arc, passing astern of SUFFOLK.
hours BISMARCK settled on a course of 130¼.
0500 hours SUFFOLK, now to the south of BISMARCK, signalled that she had
lost radar contact)
period that SUFFOLK had been in contact, BISMARCK had made 22 signals to
Germany. Although GC and CS were unable to read any of BISMARCK's signals
until 28/5/41, the Admiralty OIC plotted the bearings of her DFed signals
against the positions reported by SUFFOLK. This enabled any DF errors to be
analysed which assisted in verifying the accuracy of bearings DFed after
SUFFOLK lost contact)
0401 hours SUFFOLK reported the loss of contact.
0600 hours, the CinC Home Fleet working on the assumption that BISMARCK was
still steering southerly, continued steering south westerly in KING GEORGE
V with REPULSE, and crossed about 100
miles ahead of the new track of
BISMARCK who was now steering south easterly.
1000 hours in approximate position 54N, 36W, REPULSE, who was short of fuel,
detached for Conception Bay, Newfoundland.
(Between 0852 and 0928 hours, BISMARCK reported to Group West and
'Possession of radar equipment by opponent, effective
range at least 35,000 meters, adversely affects to the highest degree the
operations in the Atlantic. Ships were located in the Strait of Denmark in
dense fog and were continuously tracked. Disengagement failed even in
favourable weather conditions. Oil replenishment is generally no longer
possible, if disengagement of opponent cannot be accomplished with higher
speed. Running battle between 20,800 and 18,000 meters. Opponent HOOD
concentrates fire on BISMARCK. After five minutes, HOOD is destroyed by an
explosion; thereafter, change of target to King George who then turns away
in black smoke caused by definitively observed hits. He remains out of
sight for several hours. Own munitions expenditure: 93 rounds. Later, King
George took on the fight only at extreme distances. BISMARCK received two
hits from King George; of those one hit below the side armour belt at
sections XIII-XIV. Hit in compartment XX-XXI impaired speed and caused a 1¼
bow burying forward and destruction of oil cells. Release of PRINZ EUGEN
possible by engagement of cruisers and battleship by BISMARCK. Own EM-2
[radar] instrument prone to failures, especially during firing.
This signal was DFed by various Y stations who feed
their bearings to the Admiralty OIC, who were then able to plot a fairly
accurate fix at 55-30N, 30 to 32W.
On the specific orders of the CinC Home Fleet the
Admiralty only supplied the bearings and not the fix calculated by the OIC.
The staff of the CinC Home Fleet then calculated BISMARCK's position
incorrectly at 57N, 30W)
1047 hours KING GEORGE V reversed course and at the same time, CinC
Home Fleet advised all ships, including battleship RODNEY, to search
northwards of BISMARCK's last known position. The bearings plotted on a
gnomonic chart in OIC showed the BISMARCK to be in a position that would
suggest she was heading south east for Brest. However, Admiral Tovey had
specifically requested that the OIC send the bearings only. When the
bearings were plotted on a Mercator projection chart onboard KING GEORGE V,
it appeared that BISMARCK was heading northerly home to Germany. So Tovey turned to the North and
for a while was actually steaming away from the enemy.
Dalrymple-Hamilton, RODNEY's CO, realised the error and did not conform with
the CinC Home Fleet's wishes believing that the error would be quickly
corrected by the Admiralty.
hours the Admiralty signalled RODNEY to act on the assumption that BISMARCK
was heading to a Bay of Biscay port and also supplied the latest DFed
bearing fixes. From these fixes Dalrymple-Hamilton decided that RODNEY was
now to the south of BISMARCK's track, so he turned north east and worked up
to 21 knots.
hours the Admiralty ordered RODNEY to act on the assumption that BISMARCK
was proceeding to Norway via the Iceland-Faeroes passage and to conform to
the movements of the CinC HF. Why the Admiralty sent this signal remains a
mystery since at the time the opinion of the OIC and the Directors of the
Plans and Operations Divisions at the Admiralty was that BISMARCK was
heading for France. Dalrymple-Hamilton ignored the order.
hours Dalrymple-Hamilton decided that BISMARCK was making for Brest.
hours the Admiralty signalled RODNEY stating that BISMARCK was making for
the west coast of France)
hours the Admiralty signalled all ships of the Home Fleet to confirm their
1805 that BISMARCK was definitely heading for the west coast of France. This
signal was based on information from the GAF Enigma that GC and CS had been
reading for some time).
1815 hours KING GEORGE V turned on to a south easterly course and was
now sailing in the same direction as the BISMARCK but about 170 miles
about the same time the CinC Home Fleet signalled the Admiralty requesting
the provision of a destroyer escort for KING GEORGE V and RODNEY.
Admiralty had also become concerned about the lack of anti-submarine
escorts, particularly as they were aware that Doenitz had ordered several
U-Boats to go to BISMARCK's aid. So after due consideration the Admiralty
ordered Destroyer escort of convoy WS 8B
- KING GEORGE V continued on a south easterly course.
hours in approximate position 49N, 21W destroyers COSSACK (D4), SIKH,
ZULU, MAORI and PIORUN detached from convoy WS 8B and headed north to join
the CinC Home Fleet)
hours a RAF Coastal Command Catalina Mk. 1 [US PBY-5] of 209 squadron took
off from Castle Archdale on Lough
Erne and flew through the Donegal corridor to commence a search for BISMARCK. Catalina WQ Z209 was piloted by Flying Officer Dennis Briggs and
his co-pilot was Ensign
Smith USN. The search pattern they were to fly had been selected, with
Admiralty approval, by the CinC Coastal Command Air Marshal Sir Frederick
Bowhill, who believed the BISMARCK would be steering a more southerly
course than that predicted by the Admiralty.
At about 1010 hours Smith who was piloting Z209 at
the time sighted BISMARCK at a bearing of 345¼, definite recognition
was not immediately possible due to poor visibility. Whilst closing the
BISMARCK at 2000 feet to confirm contact, Z209 came under fire. Biggs sent off the following signal,
'one battleship bearing 240¼
5 miles, course 150¼, my position 49-33N, 21-47W. Time of origin 1030/26.'
The position given for Z209 was 25 miles out)
(At 1051 hours the CinC HF signaled the
Admiralty; 'Request a check that contact was not RODNEY'. The Admiralty
confirmed that the sighting was not RODNEY)
1115 hours Swordfish 2H of 810 Sqd,
flown by Sub Lieut. Hartley, from ARK ROYAL sighted BISMARCK, but reported
her as a cruiser.
hours Swordfish 2F of 810 Sqd, flown by Lieut. Callander, from ARK ROYAL
sighted the BISMARCK and reported her as battleship and sent an accurate
approximately 1515 hours the CinC HF in KING GEORGE V caught up with the RODNEY,
TARTAR and MASHONA. The CinC signalled Dalrymple-Hamilton, what is your
maximum speed; Dalrymple-Hamilton replied, 22 knots. This suited Tovey as
he wanted to reduce speed to conserve KING GEORGE V's fuel which was
causing concern. So KING GEORGE V and destroyers TARTAR and MASHONA set off
at 22 knots. However despite the best endeavours' of her engine room staff,
RODNEY started to fall behind.
1815 hours Dalrymple-Hamilton was forced to signal the CinC; 'I am afraid
that your 22 knots is a bit faster than ours'.
hours the CinC signalled the Admiralty and the CinC Force H; unless
BISMARCK's speed had been reduced by midnight he would have to return to
harbour for lack of fuel; RODNEY could continue until 0800/27)
hours a strike force of 15 torpedo armed Swordfish from ARK ROYAL commenced
their attack on the BISMARCK.
hours the attack was over. Two, possibly three hits were achieved, the
significant one being the hit on the stern that jammed
both rudders at 12¼ to port, following which she
carried on turning to port.
hours SHEFFIELD, who was in contact with BISMARCK, reported BISMARCK's change
of course. When Tovey received the signal, he uttered the deadly insult, 'SHEFFIELD has joined the reciprocal club' – meaning of ships that
have steered a course 180 degrees off true. But SHEFFIELD had not.
At 2105 hours
reported to Group West; 'Square BE 6192. Have
sustained torpedo hit aft.' [BE 6192 indicated approximate position 47-40N,
At 2115 hours
Luetjens reported to Group West; 'Torpedo hit amidships.'
At 2140 hours Luetjens
to Supreme Command of the Navy (O.K.M.) and Group West; 'Ship unable to
manoeuvre. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Fuehrer'.)
When BISMARCK's change of
course was confirmed, KING GEORGE V, RODNEY, TARTAR and MASHONA changed course to the south to close
her. With a closing speed of 30 knots, there was a chance of action before
the light was lost.
2205 hours Captain Patterson addressed the crew of KING GEORGE V and
ordered, hands will go to action stations in five minutes.
2235 hours ARK ROYAL reported that a second hit had most probably been
this report Tovey went to his sea cabin for a few minutes and when he
returned to the bridge he walked the bridge wing and looked thoughtfully
astern and appreciated that while the BISMARCK was almost invisible in the
murk, our ships would be clearly silhouetted against the streak of light
running across the western horizon. He therefore took the decision to postpone
an attack until the morning. It was an astonishing decision, made without
any consultation even with his Chief of Staff, Commodore Brind, who was
amazed by it. But he had complete faith that Vian's destroyers would shadow
throughout the night.
Tovey having made his decision KING GEORGE V, RODNEY, TARTAR and MASHONA
turned on to a NNE course.
- At 0005 hours Captain Patterson again addressed the crew of KING GEORGE V
and told them that action was now expected at 0700/27, meantime hands were
to remain at action stations.
(Prior to the engagement the CinC
Home Fleet issued orders for RODNEY and KING GEORGE V to manoeuvre
independently. Thus he would give the BISMARCK two different targets to
think about; also he avoided
Admiral Holland's error of
maintaining too close formation between the HOOD and PRINCE of WALES)
At 0715 hours Captain
Patterson again addressed the crew of KING GEORGE V and told them that they
would soon be engaging the enemy, take it steady and treat it as a battle
At 0730 hours KING GEORGE
V, RODNEY, TARTAR and MASHONA commenced a long slow turn eastwards
so as to be in position to open the engagement from the west of BISMARCK.
This manoeuvre would place BISMARCK to their east where she would
silhouetted against the rising Sun.
(Sunrise was at 0722 hours and when it
came the wind was blowing force 8 to 9 from the north west with a rising
sea and swell, visibility was 12 to 13 miles with rain squalls and the
cloud base about 2000 feet)
At 0800 hours destroyers TARTAR and MASHONA detached due to lack of fuel and set course
At 0805 hours Wake-Walker
in the NORFOLK, who had just sighted KING GEORGE V, signalled Tovey; 'Enemy
bears 130¼ 16 miles'.
(At 0700 hours the NORFOLK had closed to
within 16500 yards of BISMARCK and signalled her believing she was
KING GEORGE V)
At 0848 hours, with the
BISMARCK sailing directly towards the flagship, KING GEORGE V opened fire
at a range of about 25,500 yards. The gunnery department at first had a
difficult task in obtaining the range because of BISMARCK's head-on approach
and the squally weather.
At 0853 hours the
operator of the Type 284 radar finally obtained an accurate range of 20,500
yards and KING GEORGE V obtained her first straddle.
At 0859 hours, when the
range had reduced to 16,000 yards, KING GEORGE V turned to starboard on to
a course of 175¼ and opened her 'A' arcs.
At 0905 hours, when the
range had reduced to 14,000 yards, KING GEORGE V opened fire with her port 5.25in
At 0910 hours BISMARCK
scored her only near miss on KING GEORGE V when a salvo fell 400 yards
At 0913 hours, when the
range had reduced to 12,400 yards, her Type 284 radar was put out of action
through blast damage.
At 0914 hours KING GEORGE
V commenced a turn to port.
At 0920 hours, when the
range had reduced to 12,000 yards, KING GEORGE V settled on a course of
At 0921 hours KING GEORGE
V opened fire with her starboard 5.25in guns.
At 0922 hours her
14in guns, which since first opening fire had operated faultlessly
started to give problems. The loading mechanism of A-turret jammed putting
all four guns out of action and a similar fault occurred in Y-turret. A-turret was out of action for ten minutes and Y for seven minutes.
At 0951 hours with the
range down to 6,000 yards, KING GEORGE V had an almost stationary BISMARCK
on her starboard beam. The flagship then commenced a 360¼ turn.
At 1005 hours the CinC
ordered Captain Patterson to close the BISMARCK and attempt to finish her
At 1015 hours the CinC
Home Fleet signalled the Admiralty, 'The BISMARCK is a wreck, without a gun firing, on fire fore and aft
and wallowing more heavily every moment. Men can be seen jumping overboard,
preferring death by drowning in the stormy sea to the appalling effects of
our fire. I am confident that the BISMARCK, will never get back to harbour
and that it was only a matter of hours before she sinks'.
At 1021 hours KING GEORGE
V fired her last salvoes from Y-turret; these salvoes not only caused
damage to the enemy but also blast damage to the flagship. KING
GEORGE V in company with the RODNEY now set course north easterly; both
battleships were dangerously low on fuel. During the action the Admiralty
had signalled all ships, warning that U-Boats were en route to the area, so
this was a further reason for the ships to withdraw. In the action KING
GEORGE V had fired 339 x 14in shells and 660 x 5.25in shells. Gunnery
performance was below the expected standard because of design deficiencies
in the interlock system to protect against explosions during loading of the
14in guns. For 7 minutes she was firing at only 80% efficiency and at 40%
for 23 minutes. Only B-Turret, the twin, was 100% trouble free. In addition
the low freeboard forward caused significant flooding of shell rooms in the
At 1023 hours a Swordfish
approached KING GEORGE V to request her to cease fire so that the Swordfish
could make another torpedo attack on BISMARCK, but the Swordfish was fired
at by the flagship's AA battery.
(As he withdrew the CinC made a signal to
ships in company; 'Any ship with torpedoes to close the BISMARCK and
torpedo her'. The only ship in contact with torpedoes was the
DORSETSHIRE, whose CO, Captain Martin had already anticipated the order. Closing to 2600
yards on BISMARCK's
starboard beam, she fired two torpedoes, both of which hit. She then went
round the other side, and from 2000 yards fired another, which also hit)
At 1035 hours the
BISMARCK sank in approximate position 48-10N, 16-12W.
.At 1039 hours Tovey
signalled the Admiralty, 'BISMARCK has sunk'.
KING GEORGE V and
RODNEY now retired northerly at an economical speed of 17 knots to conserve
fuel (a contingency plan was for them to refuel in Eire) escorted by
COSSACK, SIKH, ZULU and JUPITER.
At 1137 hours the
Admiralty signalled the CinC Home Fleet; 'We cannot visualise the situation
from your signals, BISMARCK must be sunk at all costs and if to do this it
is necessary for KING GEORGE V to remain on the scene, then she must do so,
even if it subsequently means towing KING GEORGE V'. This extraordinary
signal had been sent at the behest of Churchill. Tovey considered it the
stupidest and most ill-considered signal ever made.
At 1230 hours the Force
was joined by DORSETSHIRE and MAORI.
At 2359 hours destroyers VANQUISHER, COLUMBIA, RIPLEY, SHERWOOD and ST CLAIR had joined
28th - At 0800 hours
destroyers SHERWOOD and ST CLAIR were detached to go to the aid of destroyers TARTAR and MASHONA who were under air attack.
(Destroyers TARTAR and MASHONA were
slowly, at a speed of 12 knots, sailing north, both being low on fuel. At
0730 hours they came under sustained air attack from Ju 88A bombers of KG
77. These aircraft had been sent out to attack the battlefleet but having
failed to find them, 'gave their all' to TARTAR and MASHONA. After
a long fight , MASHONA was hit port side, the bomb
exploded in No 1boiler room and eventually she had to be abandoned. At this
time, SHERWOOD and ST CLAIR hove on the scene and were able to assist
with the rescuing of MASHONA's crew. Seven officers and one hundred and
twenty ratings were picked up by TARTAR. The SHERWOOD picked up two
officers and fifty four ratings and ST CLAIR picked up four officers
and eight ratings. TARTAR attempted to sink the hulk by torpedo but
failed. MASHONA was
finally sunk at 1200 hours by gunfire from SHERWOOD and ST CLAIR in
position 52-58N, 11-36W)
By 1600 hours when the
Force was in approximate position 55-30N, 9W, NORFOLK and a further six
destroyers had joined - SOMALI, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, NESTOR, INGLEFIELD and LANCE.
At 1630 hours, RODNEY
with NORFOLK and destroyers MAORI, SIKH, LEGION and COLUMBIA detached for Greenock.
RIPLEY detached for Londonderry.
29th - At 0300 hours in
The Minches off Loch Ewe, DORSETSHIRE detached to proceed to Newcastle
At 0400 hours KING GEORGE
V with destroyers SOMALI, COSSACK, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, NESTOR, LANCE
and JUPITER arrived at Loch Ewe.
At 1100 hours destroyer INGLEFIELD arrived at Loch Ewe.
30th - At 0300 hours KING
GEORGE V with destroyers SOMALI, ZULU, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, NESTOR, LANCE,
COSSACK, JUPITER and INGLEFIELD departed Loch Ewe for Scapa Flow.
At 1100 hours KING GEORGE
V with destroyers SOMALI, ZULU, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, NESTOR, LANCE,
COSSACK, JUPITER and INGLEFIELD arrived at Scapa Flow.
1st - At Scapa Flow.
6th - At Scapa where a
meeting was held on board to discuss the minelaying policy in Northern
waters. Present were CinC Home Fleet, RA Minelaying and RA CS1.
(On 6/6/41 the Operationsabteilung [1/Skl]
ordered heavy cruiser LUTZOW to commence Operation SOMMEREISE. On
the afternoon of 10/6/41, LUTZOW sailed from Gotenhafen for Norwegian
waters. From very early on 11/6/41, from decrypts of Enigma signals to the
Luftwaffe and LUTZOW's escorts, Bletchley Park was aware of this movement.
This information led to the OIC to determine that the LUTZOW was going to
attempt a breakout into the North Atlantic. At 0430/11/6/41the Home Fleet
at Scapa Flow came to one hour's notice)
12th - At 0127 hours KING
GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), light cruisers AURORA (Flag RA CS2) and
ARETHUSA and destroyers BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, ESKIMO and NESTOR departed
Scapa Flow for position 64N, 28-30W, to cover the Northern Patrol vessels.
(Just before midnight on 12/6/41, acting
on information from the Admiralty OIC, the RAF launched a strike force of
five Beaufort 1's of 22 Sqd. from Wick and nine Beaufort 1's of 42 Sqd.
from Leuchars. At 0015/13/6/41 a patrolling RAF Blenheim of 114 Sqd.
sighted and reported LUTZOW in position 57-48N, 6-50E, and course 270
¼. At 0225/13/6/41 one of the Beauforts torpedoed LUTZOW on her port side in
No 2 motor room. By 0445/13/6/41 she had abandoned her
mission and was making for Kiel. At 0525/13/6/41 the OIC was aware that the
LUTZOW had been hit and crippled)
13th - At 0200 hours in
position 61-08N, 16W, AURORA detached to investigate Finnish
merchant ship the SS ROLFSBORG 1831 grt, en route from Norfolk, USA to
Petsamo. The ROLFSBORG was sent into Kirkwall under armed guard, and taken into British service.
detached to investigate Finnish merchant ship the SS KRONSBERG 6537grt,
en route from New York to Petsamo. The KRONSBERG was also sent into
Kirkwall under armed guard.
At 0745 hours when the
Force was in approximate position 61-40N, 19-08W, the CinC Home Fleet was made
aware that the LUTZOW was damaged and returning to Germany.
At 0942 hours the CinC aborted
the mission and the Force turned for Scapa.
14th - At 1230 hours KING
GEORGE V, AURORA, ARETHUSA and destroyers BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, ESKIMO and
NESTOR arrived back at Scapa.
15th to 30th - Deployed at Scapa Flow, during which time she was
fitted with the new centimetric surface warning radar Type 271.
1st to 31st -
Deployed at Scapa Flow.
(On the 22/6/41 Germany
commenced Operation Barbarossa, the
invasion of Russia. On the same day Winston Churchill condemned the
invasion in a broadcast on BBC radio, in his broadcast he stated; 'Any man
or State who fights against Nazism will have our aid'. The only way aid
could immediately be given to Russia was by sea.
On 12/7/41 the CinC Home Fleet was instructed by the Admiralty to
prepare a squadron to operate in North Russia. The squadron was to consist
of two light cruisers, four destroyers, three minesweepers and four
trawlers, supported by two oilers and two small armament supply issuing
ships and would be under the command of Rear Admiral P. L. Vian. On the
same day, in order to ascertain the situation in North Russia, Vian flew to
Whilst awaiting Vian's return the CinC Home Fleet and his staff
aboard KING GEORGE V were kept busy organising the preparation and
assembly of the vessels that would be required for the enterprise.
The departure of the force would reduce the Home Fleet cruisers to
one and leave no destroyers. Therefore after the 14/7/41 it would be
impossible to maintain any cruisers at Iceland or to operate the Northern
Patrol. In order to provide a screen for KING GEORGE V should she need
to leave Scapa, three destroyers were to be transferred to the Home Fleet,
two from the 1st Minelaying Squadron and one from Western Approaches.
19/7/41 Vian returned from Russia, in his report he stated that the
air defence of Murmansk was wholly inadequate to ensure the security of any
force that might be stationed there.
The CinC Home Fleet therefore recommended to the Admiralty that the
Naval Force should not be sent unless RAF fighter support could be
arranged. The Admiralty therefore included in the ships to go to Russia the
SS LANCASTRIAN PRINCE 1914grt with a battery of 40mm Bofors [sailed in the DERVISH convoy]
and HMS AGAMEMNON 7593 grt, ex Blue
Funnel ship now converted to a minelayer, which was to carry 350 soldiers
to man the guns. In the event the troops were carried in SS LLANSTEPHAN
29th - The RFA NASPRITE was damaged when going alongside KING GEORGE V at Scapa Flow.
1st to 31st -
Deployed at Scapa Flow.
2nd - Mr
Harry Hopkins, one of President Roosevelt's closest advisers, stayed on
board KING GEORGE V for two nights on his return from Russia. The
American Ambassador Mr J C Winant visited Harry Hopkins on board.
(Hopkins had been on a
fact-finding visit to discover if the Russians could hold out against the
German invasion and what help the US could give to Russia. During
his visit he had spent three days in Moscow and had several days of face-to-face meetings with Stalin and Molotov. Stalin's main request had been for
AA guns, machine guns, aluminium, high octane fuel and a million rifles.
Hopkins discussed his visit with Churchill, before they both sailed on the
4/8/41 on board the PRINCE OF WALES to meet Roosevelt in Placentia Bay)
9th - Destroyer INGLEFIELD escorted by the TARTAR conveyed His Majesty the King
on a visit to the Home Fleet. His Majesty disembarked from INGLEFIELD and
boarded KING GEORGE V where he was welcomed by the CinC Home Fleet.
three day stay with the Home Fleet the King visited aircraft carriers
VICTORIOUS and FURIOUS, heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and SUFFOLK, light
cruisers AURORA and NIGERIA, destroyer depot ship TYNE and destroyers
ECLIPSE and CHARLESTOWN berthed alongside.
11th - In the
morning His Majesty held an investiture on board KING GEORGE V,
presenting decorations to officers and ratings. Many of the decorations
were connected with the pursuit and sinking of the BISMARCK.
The King then
inspected the Lyness Base and embarked in destroyer INGLEFIELD at 1230
hours for transport to Scrabster, escorted by destroyers TARTAR and
20th - At
2100 hours KING GEORGE V, escorted by destroyers
INGLEFIELD, LIGHTNING and PUNJABI departed Scapa Flow for Rosyth.
21st - At
0600 hours off the Isle of May destroyers INGLEFIELD and LIGHTNING detached
and returned to Scapa Flow.
At 0830 hours
KING GEORGE V and PUNJABI arrived off Rosyth.
GEORGE V was at Rosyth she was visited by Sir William Beverage and his
(At the time Beverage and
his committee were working on the
Social Insurance and Allied Services report that was published in 1942.
When published it proposed that all people of working age should pay a
weekly National Insurance contribution. In return, benefits would be paid
to people who were sick, unemployed, retired or widowed. The report argued
that the system would provide a minimum standard of living 'below which no
one should be allowed to fall'. It recommended that the government should
find ways of fighting the five 'Giant Evils' of Want, Disease, Ignorance,
Squalor and Idleness. The report included as one of three fundamental
assumptions the fact that there would be a National Health Service of some
sort, a policy already being worked on in the Ministry of Health)
1st to 4th - At Rosyth.
5th - At 0930 hours KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers
BEDOUIN, VIVACIOUS and VERDUN departed Rosyth for Scapa Flow.
At 1700 hours off Kinnaird Head destroyer LAFOREY joined and VERDUN detached and returned to Rosyth.
At 2012 hours KING GEORGE V escorted by BEDOUIN,
VIVACIOUS and LAFOREY arrived at Scapa Flow.
9th - At Scapa Flow, where early in the morning KING GEORGE V was
one hour's notice on the report that German heavy cruiser ADMIRAL SCHEER
had departed Oslo.
the torpedoing of the LUTZOW the SKL decided to send heavy cruiser
ADMIRAL SCHEER in her place. On 4/9/41, SCHEER sailed from the Bay of Mecklenburger for Oslo. At 0300/5/9/40 she was sighted and reported
by a returning RAF bomber aircraft. At 1000/5/9/41, SCHEER arrived at
Oslo. Her arrival was known and the RAF mounted several unsuccessful
bombing attacks. Although SCHEER remained unharmed, SKL thought it only
a matter of time before she was hit so she was ordered back to Germany. On
the afternoon of 8/9/41 she sailed from Oslo and returned to the
Baltic. However because the Admiralty thought a breakout attempt likely, the
Home Fleet was alerted)
23rd - At 1800 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), aircraft
carrier VICTORIOUS, light cruiser AURORA, and destroyers SOMALI (D6),
MATABELE, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, ASHANTI and PUNJABI departed Scapa Flow for
25th - At 1400 hours KING GEORGE V, aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS,
light cruiser AURORA, and destroyers SOMALI, MATABELE, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO,
ASHANTI, and PUNJABI arrived at Hvalfjord.
Whilst at Hvalfjord KING GEORGE V was visited by the CinC Western
Approaches Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who stayed aboard the flagship for
three days. Noble was present when the flagship was visited by Mr Bjornson
the Regent of Iceland and Mr Jonasson the Prime Minister of Iceland.
4th - At 1300 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, light cruisers AURORA and PENELOPE, and destroyers
SOMALI (D6), BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, MATABELE, ASHANTI and PUNJABI sailed from
5th - At 1400 hours KING GEORGE V, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and
ESKIMO arrived at Akureyri for a short visit.
At 2000 hours KING GEORGE V, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and ESKIMO
sailed from Akureyri for Seydisfjordour.
6th - At 0800 hours KING GEORGE V, SOMALI, BEDOUIN
and ESKIMO arrived off Seydisfjordour, where the three destroyers detached and joined VICTORIOUS.
At 0900 hours KING GEORGE V and destroyers MATABELE, ASHANTI
and PUNJABI arrived at Seydisfjordour where they joined AURORA and
At Seydisfjordour the CinC Home Fleet transferred his flag to the
At 1715 hours KING GEORGE V, PENELOPE, SOMALI,
BEDOUIN and ESKIMO sailed from Seydisfjordour; off Seydisfjordour they
joined VICTORIOUS, MATABELE, ASHANTI and PUNJABI, the
Force then set course westward for a flying off position off the Lofoten Islands,
to carry out Operation EJ.
EJ was a FAA strike against enemy shipping in the port of Bodo and
Norwegian coastal waters between Glomfjord and the head of Vestfjord)
8th - At 0730 hours off the Norwegian coast VICTORIOUS launched
an air strike of eight Albacores from 817, 820 and 832 Sqds, 5 were armed
with bombs and 3 with torpedoes, against the port of Bodo and shipping in
Vestfjord. The strike force should have been 13 but five aircraft were
damaged immediately prior to take off by a squall.
At 1100 hours a strike force of eight Albacores armed with bombs was
flown off to search Vestfjord.
At 1400 hours after all the second strike aircraft were recovered the
Force set course for Scapa.
A sweep in Vestfjord by destroyers SOMALI and MATABELE was
cancelled due to the lack of available destroyers and poor weather.
An inshore patrol north and south of Alesund by destroyers
SOMALI, MATABELE, ASHANTI and ESKIMO was also cancelled.
10th - At 1000 hours KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, PENELOPE, SOMALI, ESKIMO, MATABELE, ASHANTI and BEDOUIN arrived back at
Scapa. PUNJABI arrived later in the day.
Back at Scapa the CinC Home Fleet moved his flag to KING GEORGE V.
11th to 31st - Deployed
at Scapa Flow.
1st - Deployed at
3rd - At 1730 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruisers KENT, BERWICK and SUFFOLK and
destroyers SOMALI (D6), ASHANTI, MATABELE, PUNJABI, OFFA and ORIBI departed
Scapa Flow for Hvalfjord.
on passage the CinC Home Fleet received intelligence from the Admiralty
which indicated that a heavy German unit had passed through the Belts late
on 2/11/41. The indications were that this was the SCHEER. But it was
possible that it could be the TIRPITZ or both. If the intelligence was
correct they could attempt a breakout into the Atlantic on 5/11/41. In fact
both German ships were in German waters, the TIRPITZ at Gotenhafen and the
SCHEER en route to Hamburg)
5th - Early in the morning off southern Iceland, VICTORIOUS, ASHANTI, OFFA and ORIBI
detached for exercise
At 0730 hours KING GEORGE V, BERWICK, KENT, SUFFOLK, SOMALI, MATABELE and PUNJABI arrived at Hvalfjord.
arrival at Hvalfjord Admiral R C Giffen USN CinC US naval forces in Iceland
came on board KING GEORGE V to confer with the CinC Home Fleet
regarding co-operation against the possible breakout of German heavy units.
A joint plan of action was agreed between the two Admirals that was put
into action later that day)
At 1200 hours, VICTORIOUS
and destroyers ASHANTI, OFFA and ORIBI arrived at Hvalfjord.
At 1730 hours cruisers USS WICHITA (Flag CinC USN Iceland) and TUSCALOOSA sailed from
Hvalfjord to patrol north east of the British minefield in the Denmark
At 1800 hours, light
cruisers EDINBURGH (Flag 18CS), SHEFFIELD and heavy cruiser SUFFOLK sailed
from Hvalfjord to carry out a line abreast patrol, 15 miles apart, leaving
the datum line, which ran 145¼ from position 65-15N, 32-13W, at first light
each morning and making good 055¼ at 18 knots, till last light when they
were to turn back to reach the datum line again next morning.
At 1800 hours KING GEORGE
V, VICTORIOUS, KENT, BERWICK, SOMALI, PUNJABI,
ASHANTI, MATABELE, ORIBI and OFFA sailed from Hvalfjord for position
63-40N, 35W to cover the British cruiser patrol.
At 1830 hours the
US battleships USS MISSISSIPPI and IDAHO and destroyers GWIN, MEREDITH and
MONSSEN of Destroyer Division 22 departed Hvalfjord on patrol to pass
through position 62-30N, 30W each morning.
(At 2200 hours the CinC Home Fleet
received a signal from the Admiralty informing him that further
intelligence had been received indicating SCHEER was still in the
Baltic on 4/11/41. The CinC Home Fleet then ordered all units to return to
Hvalfjord and suggested that the US forces do the same)
At 2230 hours, BERWICK
detached to patrol the ice edge north east of the minefield in the Denmark
6th - At 0300 hours KING
GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, KENT and destroyers SOMALI, PUNJABI, ASHANTI,
MATABELE, ORIBI and OFFA arrived back at Hvalfjord.
28th - At 1400 hours KING
GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser
NORFOLK and destroyers ASHANTI, TARTAR, ESKIMO, SOMALI, MATABELE, ECHO
and ESCAPADE departed Hvalfjord for Scapa Flow.
30th - At 1200 hours KING
GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, NORFOLK, ASHANTI, TARTAR, ESKIMO,
SOMALI, MATABELE, ECHO and ESCAPADE arrived at Scapa Flow.
1st - Under refit. Type
271 surface warning radar was replaced by four Type 273 (modified Type 271
for large warships)
Resumed Home Fleet Flagship
duties at Scapa Flow on completion.
- At Scapa Flow on standby to provide cover for
Operations ANKLET and ARCHERY. Commando raids on Vaagso Island and the
1 9 4 2
1st - Deployed at
consequence of Operations ANKLET and ARCHERY, Hitler who was already
concerned about a British invasion of Norway, became even more anxious. As
a deterrent to an invasion and more landings Raeder proposed that battleship TIRPITZ should be sent to Norway; further she would be ideally
positioned to interdict the Russian convoys. After some hesitation Hitler
agreed to TIRPITZ's deployment to Norway.
14/1/42, TIRPITZ escorted by destroyers Richard Beitzen, Paul
Jacobi, Bruno Heinemann
and Z-29 sailed from Wilhelmshaven
Late on 16/1/42, TIRPITZ arrived in Fottenfjord)
(At 0730/17/1/42 the
CinC Home Fleet received information TIRPITZ might be at sea. From
intelligence which was not conclusive, the indications pointed to some
operation or movement other than a breakout into the Atlantic. However the
CinC HF had to make the necessary dispositions to prevent this possibility)
17th - At 0800 hours all Home Fleet units at
Scapa were ordered to raise steam
1600 hours battleships KING GEORGE V (C-in-C Home Fleet), RODNEY,
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser SUFFOLK, light cruisers NIGERIA
(10th CS), KENYA, SHEFFIELD (18th CS), and destroyers INGLEFIELD (D.3),
FAULKNOR (D.8), MARNE, PANTHER, BEDOUIN, ASHANTI, ESKIMO, INTREPID, ECHO,
and ESCAPADE departed Scapa Flow for Hvalfjord.
– Home Fleet arrived at Hvalfjord.
– At 1600 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), RODNEY,
VICTORIOUS, SUFFOLK, NIGERIA, KENYA, SHEFFIELD, INGLEFIELD,
FAULKNOR, MARNE, PANTHER, BEDOUIN, ASHANTI, ESKIMO, INTREPID, ECHO and
ESCAPADE sailed from Hvalfjord for position 61N, 25W.
1428/22/1/42 the CinC Home Fleet signalled the Admiralty that every
endeavour should be made to damage TIRPITZ in harbour by bombing or
sabotage. At the same time he suggested that the Russian convoys should
continue, only one at a time between 10¼W and 15¼E)
(On 23/1/42, TIRPITZ was located and photographed by a RAF Spitfire of No1 PRU flying
from Wick. She was at anchor at the head of Aasfjord, 15 miles east of
Trondheim. Fottenfjord is three quarters of a mile wide with steep cliffs
on three sides and TIRPITZ was berthed on the north shore of the fjord
below a steep cliff. The ship was well camouflaged and protected from
attack by anti-submarine nets and protective booms in the water as well as
anti-aircraft and searchlight positions on the surrounding cliffs and
– The Home Fleet returned to Hvalfjord, and stayed there for the remainder of the month to
cover the Denmark Strait and Faeroes-Iceland Gap.
Winston Churchill wrote; "The destruction or even crippling of the
TIRPITZ is the greatest event at sea at the present time. No other target
is comparable to it")
the first attempt on TIRPITZ in Norway, Operation OILED. At 0030 hours
seven Short Stirlings of 15 and 149 squadrons took off from Lossiemouth and
at 0205 hours eight Halifaxes four from 10 Sqd and five from 76 Sqd took off
from Lossiemouth to bomb TIRPITZ in Fottenfjord. Weather conditions
were not good with cloud from sea level to 20,000 feet. One of the Stirlings reported having seen the mast tops of TIRPITZ but was unable to
gain sufficient height in order to drop its bomb load. All the Stirlings
returned safely to base. All four of the 10 Sqd Halifaxes had to return to base
before reaching the target due to lack of fuel. The five 76 Squadron
Halifaxes reached the target area, but weather conditions prevented them
from locating the target. All aircraft returned to base with the exception
of one 76 Squadron Halifax which ditched in the North Sea just off the
coast from Aberdeen. The crew were all uninjured and rescued by the
to 18th - The Home Fleet remained at Hvalfjord to
cover the Denmark Strait and Faeroes-Iceland Gap.
19th - At 0800 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser BERWICK and destroyers
ONSLOW, BEDOUIN, TARTAR, ESKIMO, ASHANTI, PUNJABI and ICARUS departed
Hvalfjord for Seydisfjordour.
20th - At 0830 hours KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, BERWICK, ONSLOW, BEDOUIN,
TARTAR, ESKIMO, ASHANTI, PUNJABI and ICARUS arrived off Seydisfjordour, following which destroyers detached and completed with fuel in Seydisfjordour.
At 1600 hours the Force reassembled off Seydisfjordour and set
course for Tromso to carry out Operation EO.
EO was to be an air strike against shipping at Tromso)
2200/20/2/42, German heavy cruisers PRINZ EUGEN (Flag Vice Admiral Ciliax) and ADMIRAL SCHEER sailed from
Brunsbuettel on Operation SPORTPLAST. From Ultra the OIC was aware of the
movement and requested RAF Coastal Command to carry out extra
reconnaissance patrols. At 1210/21/2/42 a RAF Hudson V, H/53 from North
Coates, sighted and reported ADMIRAL SCHEER and
PRINZ EUGEN, escorted by destroyers RICHARD BEITZEN, FRIEDRICH IHN, PAUL
JACOBI, HERMANN SCHOEMANN and Z 25 and torpedo boats SEEADLER and ILTIS,
off Jutland heading north. This Force was assumed to be heading for
Trondheim. On receipt of the information the CinC HF immediately abandoned
the attack on Tromso and altered course to the south)
21st - At 1400 hours KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, BERWICK, ONSLOW, BEDOUIN,
TARTAR, ESKIMO, ASHANTI, PUNJABI and ICARUS altered course to the south.
1300/21/2/42 the B Dienst detachment on the PRINZ EUGEN had decoded the
Hudson's sighting report. Ciliax immediately reversed course to return to
Germany. At 1730 hours Ciliax was ordered to reverse course by Gruppe Nord,
this he finally did at 1940 hours and at the same time detached the two
torpedo boats. At 0815/22/2/42 the Force was off Karmsund, and at 1200
hours the Force anchored in GrimstadtFjord, south of Bergen. At
2000/21/2/42 Ciliax sailed from GrimstadtFjord for Trondheim. At
approximately 0330/23/2/42 Ciliax's Force was off Stadtlandet. At 0700
hours in position 63-12N, 7E submarine TRIDENT torpedoed PRINZ
EUGEN in the stern)
22nd - The VICTORIOUS, BERWICK and destroyers ASHANTI,
BEDOUIN, ESKIMO and ICARUS were detached to proceed ahead to reach a point
100 miles off Stadtlandet at 0100/23rd. KING GEORGE V and destroyers
ONSLOW, TARTAR and PUNJABI followed at a slower speed to give cover.
23rd - At 0100 hours, VICTORIOUS, BERWICK, ASHANTI, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO and ICARUS arrived in approximate position 62-12N,
At 0130 hours in atrocious weather conditions, VICTORIOUS
launched a strike force of ten Albacore's of 832 Squadron, only one of
which was equipped with ASV radar.
At 0200 hours a second strike force of seven Albacore's of 817
Squadron were launched, two of which were fitted with ASV radar.
Immediately after launching the last aircraft, VICTORIOUS
and her escort set course to rejoin the CinC HF and then return to Scapa
to the weather conditions the strike force achieved nothing, although at
0300 hours one of the ASV equipped aircraft obtained a contact that was
probably Ciliax's Force; three aircraft were lost. The strike
force was ordered to return to RAF Sumburgh on completion of their mission.
At 1900/22/2/42 destroyers GROVE and CHIDDINGFOLD departed Scapa Flow
to patrol to the east of the Shetlands and act as rescue ships for the
At 2230 hours KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, BERWICK, ONSLOW, BEDOUIN, TARTAR, ESKIMO, ASHANTI, PUNJABI and ICARUS arrived back
at Scapa Flow.
Kriegsmarine now had at Trondheim a ship, the SCHEER, whose preservation
was not as important as the TIRPITZ and which could
therefore be employed on offensive operations. Basing the German ships at this
port was most disturbing, for no disposition of the Home Fleet could
adequately protect both the Russian convoys and the Northern Passages from
In the course of a prolonged discussion with the Admiralty,
the CinC Home Fleet forwarded his appreciation of the new situation. In
this, he detailed the many reasons for his opinion that, while it was
possible that the enemy would attack the Russian convoys with the SCHEER,
it was improbable that the TIRPITZ would take part or, if she did take
part, that she would accept action with any capital ships covering the
convoy. In a few months time, on the other hand, when the whole German
Fleet could again be assembled, they could seek to engage in their own waters, with superior
force and with the co-operation of shore-based aircraft and U-boats. It was
essential that the men and material
of the Home Fleet should be prepared for this situation; the
watertight subdivision of several of the capital ships was deficient and
refits, dockings, training and leave were widely necessary if the
efficiency of the fleet was to be
CinC Home Fleet, stated
his intention to cover the next homeward and outward convoys, which were
both unusually large, with DUKE OF YORK and RENOWN, sailing KING GEORGE
V and VICTORIOUS in support only if late intelligence should
indicate movement at Trondheim or if the PRU reconnaissance failed; he was
averse to the use of the whole fleet to cover these convoys, for this would
steadily sap its efficiency, would leave the Atlantic wholly uncovered and,
as soon as the enemy became aware of our policy, would present him with
attractive opportunities for the use of his U-boats against our capital
ships. At the same
time, the CinC repeated the request he had made five weeks earlier for offensive
action against the ships at Trondheim and against their sea communications,
in an endeavour to stop their use of this base; the crux of the whole
The Admiralty, in reply, pressed for an increase in the size
of the convoy covering force, stating that their Lordships accepted full
responsibility for any break out into the Atlantic which might occur while
the Fleet was thus employed. They were concerned at the danger to the
covering force of air attack from North Norway, though the enemy air forces
there were small in number and without torpedo aircraft, and though the
CinC had earlier instructed the covering force not to approach within 250 miles of that coast
except to sink or damage enemy warships; their Lordships instructed the
CinC to provide fighter protection to the capital ships when within range
of enemy aircraft. They hoped that the NELSON and RODNEY would have
completed refits by the time the enemy battlecruisers could be repaired;
and stated that the possibility of offensive action against the ships at
Trondheim was still under consideration)
order to comply with the Admiralty requirement that the Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 12
and QP 8, CinC Home Fleet believed that the most dangerous area would
be between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Therefore on 26/2/42 Tovey asked
that the next outward and homeward Arctic convoys be sailed simultaneously
so that they would pass through the danger area at the same time. For the
first eight days of the operation the weather conditions were extreme with
storms up to force 10, snow showers, icing and poor visibility. Convoy PQ
12 and QP 8 sailed on 1/3/42 from Reykjavik and Murmansk respectively)
1st - At
4th - At 0730
hours KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet Admiral Tovey), aircraft
carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser BERWICK and destroyers ASHANTI,
BEDOUIN, ICARUS, INTREPID, LOOKOUT and ONSLOW sailed from Scapa Flow and
set course northerly.
At 1600 hours
BERWICK detached to return to Scapa with engine trouble escorted by
5th – At 1200
hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 65-27N, 5W, about 100
miles bearing 206¼ from the 2nd Battle Squadron and steering northerly.
1200 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron was in position 66-45N, 06-30W about 100
miles south of PQ 12 and steering northerly.
(At 1300 hours a Fw 200
reconnaissance aircraft of Gruppe 1, KG40 from Trondheim-Vaernes airfield,
sighted and reported PQ 12 in position 69-22N, 08-27W, 100 miles south of
Jan Mayen Island. The sighting
was made after the KENYA had joined PQ 12 and was reported as 15
merchantmen, one cruiser and two destroyers. The signal was picked up by
the Y service and passed to Bletchley Park who, because they had broken the GAF Enigma,
decoded it almost immediately. The information was then passed to CinC Home
in this account of the encounter between the Home Fleet and the TIRPITZ,
German times are one hour ahead of British times. Also the weather was
generally poor with low visibility and snow showers)
2000 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron altered course easterly to affect a RV
with the Home Fleet.
– At 1030 hours in position 71-00N, 4-30E the Home Fleet and the 2nd
battle squadron RVed and the two forces joined together, continuing to
Home Fleet now comprised KING GEORGE V, RENOWN, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS
and destroyers ASHANTI, ICARUS, INTREPID, LOOKOUT, ONSLOW, FURY, ECHO,
PUNJABI and ECLIPSE
hours the TIRPITZ (Flag Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax) sailed from Fottenfjorden on Operation SPORTPLAST.
hours TIRPITZ was joined by destroyers HERMANN SCHOEMANN, PAUL JACOBI
1430 hours the TIRPITZ squadron was joined by destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN
and torpedo boats T5 and T12.
hours the TIRPITZ squadron entered the Frohavet Channel and turned NNE into
the Norwegian Sea on an intercept course for the convoy reported by the Fw
200 reconnaissance aircraft at 1300/5/3/42.
hours the submarine SEAWOLF sighted TIRPITZ in approximate position 64-15N,
9-44E, but was forced to dive and therefore unable to report until she
hours SEAWOLF surfaced and signalled the Admiralty reporting 'a large
warship, either a battleship or a heavy cruiser'.
hours the TIRPITZ squadron was in position 64-44N, 10-17E)
1400 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the south.
– At 0010 hours the CinC Home Fleet received a signal from the
Admiralty giving him SEAWOLF's sighting report. Tovey now knew that TIRPITZ
was out but was unsure if she was intending to attack the convoy or
break out into the Atlantic.
Home Fleet altered course to the north.
the morning the CinC HF planned that VICTORIOUS would launch reconnaissance
aircraft to search out to 120 miles in the sector 065¼ to 115¼. However due
to the severe icing conditions no flying was possible.
hours TIRPITZ released destroyers
IHN, Z 25 and HERMANN SCHOEMANN to carry out a sweep to the north.
hours TIRPITZ was in position 70-45N, 10-21E, approximately
90 miles from Tovey, and had planned to launch two Ar 196 aircraft , but had to abandon the reconnaissance for the same reason
0800 hours the Home Fleet increased to full speed.
1122 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the south, this put Tovey on a
reciprocal course to TIRPITZ.
hours convoys PQ 12 and QP 8 passed each other 200 miles SW of Bear Island.
time TIRPITZ was crossing the mean course of the convoy's, astern of PQ 12
and ahead of QP 8.
hours in approximate position 72-35N, 10-30E, the German destroyers found a
straggler from QP 8, the Russian freighter MV IJORA 2815grt; she was
approximately 100 miles astern of QP 8.
HERMANN SCHOEMANN fired a
torpedo, which missed then FRIEDRICH IHN attempted to sink her by gunfire
but failed. HERMANN SCHOEMANN and
FRIEDRICH IHN then teamed up to sink her with their main armament. The
Russian merchantman's distress signal was intercepted by Tovey, but the sender's
position was not clear to him)
1750 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the east. At the same time
destroyers ICARUS and INTREPID detached to Iceland to refuel.
hours in approximate position 72-33N, 8-23E, the three destroyers rejoined
hours TIRPITZ released destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN to refuel at Harstad)
2000 hours the Home Fleet was about 150 miles SW of the TIRPITZ and altered
course to the north. Tovey was now on an interception course.
At the same time, destroyers ONSLOW (D17), ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY
and PUNJABI were detached to sweep north between the Home Fleet and the
Lofoten Islands along what Tovey considered to be the enemy's most likely
return route, before returning to Iceland to refuel.
hour course change was based on signal traffic analysis from TIRPITZ that
was analysed almost simultaneously by the AID and the results passed to
hours TIRPITZ was in position 72- 10N, 12-22E and steering east)
2400 hours, in approximate position 71-30N, 7-30E, the Home Fleet altered
course to the south so that Tovey could be in position off the Lofoten
Islands to launch an air strike at dawn. Tovey had been approximately 120
miles from TIRPITZ and was now steering away from her.
– At 0400 hours Tovey, who's Fleet now comprised KING GEORGE V,
VICTORIOUS, DUKE OF YORK, RENOWN and destroyer LOOKOUT, decided that he
had missed TIRPITZ and since he was without destroyers in dangerous waters,
turned SW towards Iceland to collect some destroyers.
hours TIRPITZ released destroyers
to refuel at Tromso, which was approximately 125
0800 hours destroyers ONSLOW (D17), ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY and
PUNJABI, who were to the north east of Tovey, having sighted nothing set
course for Seidisfjord to refuel.
1800 hours the Home Fleet was steering south westerly when Tovey received a
signal from the Admiralty suggesting that TIRPITZ might be south of Bear
Island and still searching for the convoys.
1820 hours the Home Fleet in approximate position 68 -20N, 01W, acting on
Admiralty intelligence, altered course to the north east. The Home Fleet
was again steaming towards the TIRPITZ.
(At 1730 hours
TIRPITZ was in approximate position 72-54N, 13-24E and steering 255¼)
1830 hours Tovey broke radio silence with a signal to the Admiralty
requesting destroyers and refuelling facilities for his destroyers.
of this signal the Admiralty ordered 4 cruisers [heavy cruisers KENT and LONDON and light cruisers LIVERPOOL and
TRINIDAD] to positions between
Jan Mayer and Bear Islands to refuel destroyers and assembled all available
destroyers which were then sailed to the aid of the Home Fleet)
hours TIRPITZ turned on to a southerly course and was now moving away from
Ciliax took the decision to abort his mission to find and destroy the
convoys, and return to Trondheim)
– At 0240 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 70-20N,
02-30E and steering north easterly, when Tovey received a signal from the
Admiralty that TIRPITZ was steaming south and not searching the waters off
0245 hours the Home Fleet altered course to 120¼, steering for Vestfjord,
and increased speed to 26 knots.
0640 hours VICTORIOUS flew off a reconnaissance force of 6 Albacores on a
diverging search between 105 degrees: and 155 degrees to a depth of 150 miles.
hours TIRPITZ was in position 68-15N, 10-44E, steaming south when she was
joined by destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN who took up position off TIRPITZ's
0730 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 68-10N, 6-40E, a
strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores, 5 from 817 Sqd and 7 from
832 Sqd, was flown off VICTORIOUS. At the time of launch TIRPITZ was
approximately 115 miles to their south east.
hours TIRPITZ was in approximate position 68N, 10-45E, steering southerly
at 25 knots)
0802 hours Albacore F of 832 Sqd sighted TIRPITZ and FRIEDRICH IHN sailing south, and made a sighting report.
hours TIRPITZ sighted two Albacores dead aft.
hours TIRPITZ increased speed to 27 knots and turned on to course 130¼.
hours TIRPITZ launched her Arado 196 aircraft for anti-submarine detection
and makeshift fighter protection.
hours TIRPITZ and FRIEDRICH IHN increased speed to 29 knots and turned on
to course 82¼ heading for Vestfjord and Narvik)
0917 hours, TIRPITZ was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying
Albacores. The attack failed although one torpedo only missed TIRPITZ's
stern by 30 feet, 2 Albacores were shot down.
reported the torpedo attack by 24 Swordfish type aircraft taking place
between 1015 and 1024 hours. Three downings were claimed two on starboard
and one on port side. Several aircraft claimed leaving the scene with smoke
0940 hours the Home Fleet turned west then SW
1545 hours the Home Fleet was attacked by 3 Ju 88 bombers, one bomb landed
close astern of VICTORIOUS but no damaged was caused.
1840 hours FAULKNOR, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO and TARTAR joined the Home Fleet.
hours TIRPITZ anchored in Bogen Bay, off Ofotfjord)
various times during the Home Fleets return to Scapa the Fleet was joined
by destroyers that the Admiralty had assembled at Tovey's request.
These were destroyers JAVELIN, INCONSTANT, VERDUN, LANCASTER, LEDBURY,
GROVE, WOOLSTON and WELLS joined the fleet.
– At 2300 hours, KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS, RENOWN,
LOOKOUT, FAULKNOR, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, TARTAR, JAVELIN, INCONSTANT, VERDUN,
LANCASTER, LEDBURY, GROVE, WOOLSTON and WELLS arrived at Scapa.
what for both sides had been a frustrating operation. The appalling weather
affected both sides. The
poorly served by the Luftwaffe who only sighted PQ 12 once and completely
missed QP 8. Also B-Dienst were completely unaware of the Home Fleets
presence until Tovey broke radio silence. Even so TIRPITZ failed by a very
narrow margin in finding the convoys. In contrast Tovey was well served by
good intelligence from the Admiralty which was based on appreciations by
OIC and decoded intercepts from BP. This intelligence led to air strike
against TIRPITZ which almost succeeded and was the only time that the FAA
were to attack TIRPITZ in the open sea)
operation for the Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 13 and
QP 9. The TIRPITZ was in Trondheim Fjord with
heavy cruisers ADMIRAL SCHEER and ADMIRAL HIPPER [arrived 21/3/42]. The Admiralty considered that another sortie by the
surface units was a possibility. So Tovey again had to provide heavy
distant cover for the two convoys. What was not known by the Admiralty was
units were limited by lack of destroyers and low fuel stocks. This operation
again took place in exceptionally bad weather)
- At Scapa a RAF type of 12in Plan Radar Display Indicator (PPI) unit was
installed in the Admirals Plot for use with the Type 273 surface warning
radar. First operational use of a PPI at sea.
– At 1400 hours the Home Fleet comprising KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice
Admiral Curteis 2iC Home Fleet), DUKE of YORK, RENOWN, VICTORIOUS, cruisers
KENT and EDINBURGH and destroyers ASHANTI, BEDOUIN, ECHO, ESCAPADE, ESKIMO,
FORESIGHT, ICARUS, INGLEFIELD, LEDBURY, MARNE, MIDDLETON, ONSLOW, PUNJABI,
TARTAR and WHEATLAND sailed from Scapa to provide distant cover for convoys
PQ 13 and QP 9. Course was set for the north east of Iceland.
0720/20/3/42 convoy PQ 13 comprising 21merchants sailed from Reykjavik
heading north through the Denmark Strait. When the Home Fleet sailed PQ 13
was north of Iceland in approximate position 67-35N, 16-40W. Convoy QP 9
sailed from Kola Inlet on 21/3/42)
23rd – Late in the
evening the Fleet arrived off
destroyers were detached turn to refuel.
24th – In the
afternoon, all destroyers having refuelled, the Fleet set course for
25th – Early in the
morning the Fleet arrived in position 68N, 10W, where, for two days, in
temperatures of -35 degrees, they cruised for two days.
(Against convoys PQ 13 and QP 9 the
Kriegsmarine deployed ten U-Boats and three destroyers. Using intelligence
gained from Enigma the Admiralty was able to provide details of the U-Boat
dispositions and to warn of the GAF and destroyer attacks. Most importantly
the Enigma provided the Admiralty with evidence that none of the larger
enemy units had moved north with destroyers. The Admiralty was
therefore able to assure Curteis that TIRPITZ was not going to sortie
against the convoys)
27th – Aware from
TRINIDAD's signal, received late on 25/3/42, informing the CinC Home Fleet
that convoy PQ 13 had been scattered by a full gale and with the Home Fleet
itself experiencing gale force conditions that had caused damage to
VICTORIOUS and TARTAR, Curteis decided that he would be unable to provide
assistance to the convoy in its scattered state so therefore turned for
At 0600 hours the Home
Fleet left its patrol area to return to Scapa.
28th – At 1400
hours the Home Fleet arrived back at Scapa.
3rd - At Scapa where the
Flag of the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet was transferred to KING GEORGE V
from light cruiser LIVERPOOL.
At 0700 hours KING GEORGE
V (Flag CinC Home Fleet) then sailed from Scapa for Rosyth to have
two additional eight barrelled Pom-Poms fitted atop B and Y turrets.
In the afternoon arrived
(At 0905/3/4/42 the USN Task Force TF 99
comprising battleship WASHINGTON, heavy cruiser TUSCALOOSA (Flag Rear Admiral Giffen CinC Task Force
99), and destroyers WAINWRIGHT,
MADISON, WILSON and PLUNKETT arrived at Scapa)
5th - KING GEORGE V
(Flag CinC Home Fleet), light cruiser NIGERIA and destroyers FAULKNOR
(D8), ICARUS and ESCAPADE left Rosyth for Scapa.
6th - KING GEORGE V,
NIGERIA, FAULKNOR (D8), ICARUS and ESCAPADE arrived at Scapa.
operation for the Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 14 and
QP 10. Their cover was required as the Kriegsmarine heavy units were still
in Trondheim Fjord)
– At 0600 hours the Home Fleet, comprising KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral, 2iC Home Fleet), VICTORIOUS,
heavy cruiser KENT, light cruiser NIGERIA and destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8),
ONSLOW (D 17), OFFA, ESCAPADE, MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, WHEATLAND and BELVOIR
departed Scapa to cover convoys PQ 14 and QP 10. Course was set north
westerly for the Faroe Islands.
1430/8/4/42 convoy PQ 14 comprising 26 merchant ships sailed from Reykjavik heading north
through the Denmark Strait. When the Home Fleet sailed, PQ 14 was south west
of Jan Mayen Island and having encountered fog, snow and ice, only 8 ships
were in company with the commodore. Convoy QP 10 of 16 merchant ships
sailed from Kola Inlet on 10/4/42)
At 1930 hours when the
Home Fleet was south of the Faroe Islands destroyers FAULKNOR, ONSLOW,
ESCAPADE and OFFA were detached to refuel in Skaalefjord.
13th – At 0430
hours destroyers SOMALI (D 6), BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, and MATCHLESS joined
the Battlefleet from refuelling in Skaalefjord.
At 0500 hours, north of
the Faroe Islands FAULKNOR, ONSLOW, ESCAPADE and OFFA rejoined the
At 0500 hours destroyers MIDDLETON,
LEDBURY and BELVOIR detached to return to Scapa.
The Home Fleet then set
course for north east Iceland.
At 1900 hours the Home
Fleet arrived off Seydisfjordour where destroyer WHEATLAND detached to escort oiler RFA ALDERSDALE from
The Home Fleet then set course for a patrol position 135 miles south
west of Jan Mayen Island.
14th – At 1000 hours the Home Fleet arrived in position 62-50N,
6-15W where they patrolled for the next two days to be available should the
Kriegsmarine heavy units sortie from
(Twice during the period that the Home
Fleet were in the patrol area the Admiralty, from the lack of Enigma
traffic, was able to assure Tovey that no German heavy units were at sea)
16th – In the morning
the Home Fleet was about to leave the patrol area when Tovey received a
report from the LIVERPOOL (with QP 10) that the convoy was being shadowed
by four aircraft and one U-Boat, and that heavy air attack was expected.
Tovey decided to remain in the area, to provide support should it be
At 0800 hours, KENT
detached from the Home Fleet to proceed north to reinforce the escort of
convoy QP 10.
At 1500 hours the Home
Fleet set course for Scapa via north east Iceland.
17th – At 0400
hours off Seydisfjordour FAULKNOR, SOMALI,
BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS were detached to refuel.
The Home Fleet then set
course for the north Faroes.
At 1500 hours in position
62-50N, 6-15W the Fleet was joined by destroyers MIDDLETON, LEDBURY,
LAMERTON, and HURSLEY from Skaalefjord, following which ESKIMO, OFFA
and ESCAPADE detached to refuel at Skaalefjord.
At 1630 hours the Fleet
was joined by FAULKNOR, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS from
18th – At 0500
hours the Home Fleet comprising KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS,
NIGERIA, escorted by the SOMALI, FAULKNOR, ONSLOW (D 17), MIDDLETON,
LEDBURY, LAMERTON, HURSLEY, BEDOUIN, and MATCHLESS arrived back at Scapa.
28th - KING GEORGE V
(Flag CinC Home Fleet), battleship USS WASHINGTON (Flag CinC Task Force
99), aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruisers USS WICHITA and TUSCALOOSA, and light cruiser KENYA escorted by destroyers INGLEFIELD
(D3), MIDDLETON, LAMERTON, HURSLEY, BELVOIR and USS WAINWRIGHT, MADISON,
WILSON and PLUNKETT, sailed from Scapa and set course
northerly to provide distant cover for convoys PQ 15 and QP 11.
(Convoy PQ 15 sailed from Reykjavik on
26/4/42 and QP 11 sailed from Kola Inlet on 28/4/42)
30th - North of the Faroe
Islands the Battlefleet was joined by destroyers MARTIN, PUNJABI, ORIBI
and MARNE from Seydisfjordour following which destroyers MIDDLETON,
LAMERTON, HURSLEY and BELVOIR detached and returned to Scapa.
1st - At 1545 hours north
east of Iceland in thick fog the Battlefleet was zigzagging when they ran
into a thick bank of fog; immediately KING GEORGE V made a signal to
cease zigzagging. Destroyer PUNJABI failed to receive the signal and
carried on zigzagging and crossed under the flagship's bows. KING GEORGE V
travelling at 25 knots cut PUNJABI clean in half; PUNJABI's stern sank
almost immediately. The collision caused a 40 foot gash in the bow of KING
GEORGE V and also under water damage. As the stern of PUNJABI sank her ready
use depth charges exploded directly under the keel of the WASHINGTON the
vessel immediately astern of KING GEORGE V, causing slight damage to
The fore section of
PUNJABI sank slowly which enabled many of her crew to abandon ship. Destroyers
MARNE and MARTIN were able to pick up 201 survivors. 49 were lost mainly
from the stern section.
(Immediately following the assessment of
the damage to the flagship, Tovey signalled the 2iC Home Fleet in battleship
DUKE OF YORK at Hvalfjord, to sail as soon as possible to relieve the CinC
Home Fleet and KING GEORGE V. As well as the structural damage,
most of her radar and
radar equipment suffered some degree of damage)
At 2359 hours in position
67-32N, 10-25W, DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral Curteis, 2iC Home
Fleet), and destroyers FAULKNOR and ESCAPADE RVed with the Home Fleet.
3rd - At 0030 hours KING
GEORGE V escorted by destroyers MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI detached
from the Battlefleet for
At 1330 hours KING GEORGE V, MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI arrived at
The PUNJABI survivors were transferred to KING GEORGE V for passage to Scapa.
At 1630 hours KING GEORGE
V escorted by destroyers MIDDLETON, LAMERTON, BLANKNEY and
WHEATLAND sailed from Seydisfjordour for Scapa.
4th - At 2330 hours KING GEORGE V, MIDDLETON, LAMERTON, BLANKNEY and WHEATLAND
arrived at Scapa.
7th - At Scapa Captain P.J. Mack,
DSO, RN, assumed command of KING GEORGE V.
8th - The flag of CinC Home
Fleet, was transferred from KING GEORGE V to the DUKE OF YORK.
KING GEORGE V,
escorted by destroyers MIDDLETON and BLANKNEY left Scapa for Liverpool
for repairs and refit.
9th - KING GEORGE V
and destroyers MIDDLETON and BLANKNEY arrived at Liverpool.
On arrival at Liverpool
KING GEORGE V entered Gladstone dock and was taken in hand for repairs
The damage sustained by
KING GEORGE V in the collision extended from the stem to number 16
station below the main deck, both sides of the ship were open to the sea.
The starboard outer wing compartments 119 to 140 were flooded as a result
of the depth charge explosions.
to 30th - At Liverpool under repair and refit.
her refit radar Type 285 installed for
fire-control of 5.25in mountings and the newly developed surface warning
radar Type 273Q was also fitted.
(In September 1942 a CW candidate from
KING GEORGE V, a Petty Officer Deacon, who had a roving commission around
the Fleet attending to radar problems, was in London for a CW selection
board. Sitting on the board was the chief scientist to Winston Churchill,
James Brundrett who appeared only to be interested in quizzing the candidate
about the performance of the new 3000 MHz Type 273Q surface warning radar
recently fitted to KING GEORGE V)
1st to 9th - At Liverpool under
repair and refit.
- KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers MARNE, MARTIN and ESCAPADE
left Liverpool on completion of refit for Scapa to work up.
- Off Cape Wrath KING GEORGE V, MARNE, MARTIN and ESCAPADE were joined
by the heavy cruiser CUMBERLAND to carry out trials of KING GEORGE V's new
in the day KING GEORGE V, CUMBERLAND, MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE,
arrived Scapa to commence working up exercises.
- The flag of CinC Home Fleet, transferred from DUKE OF YORK to KING GEORGE
to 31st - At Scapa Flow.
Russian convoys were suspended following the debacle of convoy PQ 17 and
also because of the transfer of Home Fleet units to the Mediterranean for
- His Excellency The Turkish Ambassador made a two day visit to the Home
Fleet, accompanied by the Turkish Naval Attache, between 12th and 14th
August. He arrived from Scrabster in destroyer MONTROSE on the 12th and
stayed onboard KING GEORGE V, going to sea in the escort carrier AVENGER
on the afternoon of that day to watch flying exercises. He returned by air
to London on 14th August
- His Majesty The King of the Hellenes arrived at Scapa to pay a short
visit to the Home Fleet. During his stay His Majesty was accommodated
onboard KING GEORGE V which he inspected. He also inspected the Greek
destroyers ADRIAS and KANARIS which were working up at Scapa at the time.
His Majesty returned to London by train on the 26th.
to 30th - At Scapa Flow.
- His Grace The Archbishop of Canterbury paid a short visit to the Home
Fleet arriving in destroyer ECLIPSE from Scrabster on 5th and leaving
again two days later. During his stay, His Grace was accommodated onboard
KING GEORGE V.
Tovey found the visit of the Archbishop immensely stimulating,
to 31st - At Scapa Flow.
- His Majesty King Peter of Yugoslavia, paid a visit to the Home Fleet from
7th to 9th October. The Royal Party arrived from Scrabster in destroyer
ROTHERHAM on 7th and were accommodated onboard KING GEORGE V. During
his stay, King Peter visited several units of the Home Fleet, leaving Scapa
on the 9th in destroyer FAULKNOR for Scrabster.
- The Prime Minister accompanied by Sir Stafford Cripps visited the Home
Fleet from the 9th to 11th. During his stay the Prime Minister was
accommodated on board KING GEORGE V, but visited several other units of
the Fleet, notably those who had taken part in the last North Russian
convoys, and address the ships' companies. The Prime Minister left Scapa on
Sunday 11th in destroyer MILNE for Thurso and Edinburgh
1st to 30th - At Scapa
1st to 18th - At Scapa
19th - KING GEORGE V
(Flag CinC Home Fleet), heavy cruiser BERWICK escorted by destroyers
MUSKETEER, QUADRANT and RAIDER sailed from Scapa Flow to provide distant
cover for convoy JW 51A. Cover was to be provided to the westward of 15¼
(Convoy JW 51A [this was the first convoy with the new title; the titles had been
changed from PQ to JW, and QP to RA for return, for security reasons].
JW 51A sailed from Loch Ewe on 15/12/42.
Loch Ewe was chosen as the new starting point because the Luftwaffe had
been increasing its reconnaissance flights over Iceland)
21st - The Battlefleet reached approximate position 72-30N, 2E, in
which area it cruised for two days before returning to Scapa.
25th - KING GEORGE V, BERWICK, MUSKETEER, QUADRANT and RAIDER arrived back at Scapa.
(Convoy JW 51B, comprising 15 merchant
ships, sailed from Loch Ewe on 22/12/42.
U 354 reported a lightly guarded convoy of six to ten ships 50 miles south
of Bear Island. On receipt of this sighting report
Admiral Raeder personally
ordered heavy cruisers LUTZOW and HIPPER to sail from
their base in Altenfjord with an escort of six destroyers and carry out
an attack on convoy JW 51B.
At 0820/31/12/42 the corvette HYDERABAD,
one of the close escort on the starboard quarter, sighted two strange
destroyers. She took them to be the expected Russian reinforcements, and
therefore made no report. Ten minutes later destroyer OBDURATE, who was
on the starboard beam of the convoy, sighted and reported the same ships
crossing astern of the convoy.
At 0930 hours the German destroyers
open fire on OBDURATE, and so commenced the Battle of the Barents Sea.
The return convoy RA 51, of fourteen
ships, sailed from Murmansk on the 30th of December. Although the CinC Home
Fleet did not have full details of the progress of the action until much
later, it was evident that the cruiser force, Force R, was unlikely to have
enough fuel remaining to cover RA 51 throughout the dangerous part of its
passage. Therefore the CinC HF put to sea to give additional cover)
31st - Battleships
KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet) and HOWE, heavy cruisers KENT (Flag
CS1) and BERWICK, light cruiser BERMUDA, escorted by destroyers RAIDER,
QUEENBOROUGH, MUSKETEER, MONTROSE, WORCESTER and ORP PIORUN sailed from
Scapa and steered north to cover the passage of convoy RA 51 between
latitudes 70 and 71-30N and longitude 1 to 5E.
1 9 4 3
1st - As the battlefleet
steered northerly they ran into heavy weather and had to slow down to
enable Destroyers to keep up.
KENT and BERWICK were
detached to proceed ahead to reach the covering position as soon as
2nd - The battlefleet
arrived in position 72-50N, 11-40E where they cruised until the convoy had
cleared the area.
detached and proceeded to Seydisfjordour to refuel.
3rd - The battlefleet
left the covering position to return to Scapa.
detached and proceeded to Seydisfjordour to refuel.
5th - KING GEORGE V, HOWE,
BERMUDA and destroyers RAIDER, QUEENBOROUGH, MUSKETEER and ORP PIORUN
arrived back at Scapa.
6th to 31st - At Scapa.
1st to 17th - At Scapa.
15th - Her new CO,
Captain Thomas Edgar Halsey took command.
18th - KING GEORGE V
(Flag CinC Home Fleet), heavy cruiser NORFOLK, screened by destroyers
METEOR, FORESTER and ICARUS sailed from Scapa for Akureyri.
20th - KING GEORGE V,
NORFOLK, METEOR, FORESTER and ICARUS arrived at Akureyri.
22nd - Battleships
KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet) and HOWE, heavy cruiser BERWICK,
screened by destroyers ONSLAUGHT, OFFA, MUSKETEER, ICARUS, METEOR and
ORP PIORUN sailed from Akureyri and set course for Bear Island to cover convoy
(Convoy JW 53, comprising 25 merchant
ships, sailed from Loch Ewe on 15/2/43; this was four days later than
planned due to loading difficulties. A further three merchant ships and escort
designated JW 53B sailed from Loch Ewe on 16/3/43 to catch up with JW 53. On
the afternoon of 17/2/43 the weather had deteriorated to a Force 10
westerly with a huge 80ft swell, the deck cargos of the ships of JW 53B
started to shift so they turned back to Loch Ewe. The convoy was delayed
and scattered by the severe weather, which also caused damage to light
cruiser SHEFFIELD and escort carrier DASHER)
23rd - During the
northerly passage several groups of scattered merchant ships were
encountered and reported to the convoy escorts to be rounded up.
24th - The battlefleet arrived
in their covering position 150 miles S.W. of Bear Island.
25th - The battlefleet
left their covering position to return to Akureyri.
26th - BERWICK
detached for Hvalfjord.
KING GEORGE V, HOWE
and destroyers ONSLAUGHT, OFFA, MUSKETEER, ICARUS, METEOR and ORP
PIORUN arrived at Akureyri.
1st - At Akureyri.
2nd - Battleships
KING GEORGE V
(Flag of CinC Home Fleet) and HOWE, light cruiser GLASGOW screened by
destroyers ONSLAUGHT, OFFA, ICARUS, MUSKETEER, FORESTER and ORP PIORUN
sailed from Akureyri and set course
for Bear Island to cover convoy RA 53.
(Convoy RA 53, comprising 30 merchant ships, sailed from Kola Inlet
on 1/3/43. En route this convoy also experienced severe weather with most
of the passage taking place in a full gale. The weather caused the convoy
to drop behind schedule and ships to straggle. The convoy finally arrived
at Loch Ewe on 14/3/43)
4th - The battlefleet arrived in its covering position, where it
cruised for a few hours then turned for Scapa.
5th - GLASGOW and FORESTER detached for Skaalefjord where FORESTER
fuelled from GLASGOW.
6th - KING GEORGE V, HOWE, ONSLAUGHT, OFFA,
ICARUS, MUSKETEER and ORP PIORUN arrived at Scapa Flow.
7th to 31st - At Scapa.
18th - HM The King came
on his second visit to the Fleet at Scapa Flow; he arrived in
destroyer MILNE escorted by destroyers INTREPID, FURY and ORP ORKAN. He
was hosted by the CinC Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John TOVEY KCB
KBE CB DSO in the flagship KING GEORGE V.
During his four day visit
the King visited the DUKE OF YORK, HOWE, INDOMITABLE, ARCHER, TYNE, BELFAST,
CUMBERLAND, GLASGOW, JAMAICA and SCYLLA. He also embarked in ONSLAUGHT to
go ashore to visit Hatston RN Air Station and later attend an ENSA
show in the RN Cinema on Flotta.
21st - HM The King
departed from KING GEORGE V on board light cruiser SCYLLA to return
to Scrabster escorted by destroyers OBDURATE, OPPORTUNE and ORIBI. As
was the custom the King ordered 'Splice the Mainbrace' giving every
rating an extra tot of rum, gaining the hearty approval of the
(With the hours of daylight now
lengthening and with a powerful Kriegsmarine squadron in Altenfjord, Admiral
Tovey considered the risks involved in sailing further convoys to Russia
unjustified. Further the CinC Home Fleet was well aware of the difficulties,
shortage of surface escorts and long range aircraft, being faced by the
North Atlantic convoys. So he proposed to the Admiralty that the
postponement of the Russian convoys would temporarily release 19 destroyers,
8 other escorts, one escort carrier and six submarines to reinforce our
forces in the vital trans-Atlantic theatre. This solution was adopted and
all destroyers, except a bare minimum to screen the battlefleet, were
temporarily transferred to Western Approaches command)
1st to 13th - At Scapa.
14th - Flag of the
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, transferred from KING GEORGE V to DUKE OF
KING GEORGE V
escorted by destroyers ECHO, BRISSENDEN and HMCS IROQUOIS sailed from
Scapa for Rosyth.
15th - KING GEORGE V, ECHO, BRISSENDEN and HMCS IROQUOIS arrived at Rosyth where
KING GEORGE V had a short docking for the installation of additional 20
x 20mm Oerlikon guns for close range AA defence and to give leave.
30th - KING GEORGE V
escorted by destroyers MAHRATTA, STEVENSTONE and ST MARYS sailed from
Rosyth for Scapa.
1st - KING GEORGE V, MAHRATTA, STEVENSTONE and ST MARYS arrived at Scapa.
In the PM KING GEORGE V and
destroyers TROUBRIDGE, TUSCAN and METEOR sailed from Scapa for
Gibraltar for temporary duty with Force H.
6th - KING GEORGE V, TROUBRIDGE, TUSCAN and METEOR arrived at Gibraltar.
KING GEORGE V joined
(This deployment was to reinforce Force H
in preparation for Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily)
1st - At Gibraltar.
12th - At Algiers where
she was visited by King George V1.
5th - At 0500 hours battleships KING GEORGE V (Flag, Vice Admiral Arthur John Power) and HOWE escorted by destroyers ARROW, JERVIS,
PALADIN, PANTHER, PATHFINDER, PENN, PETARD and TYRIAN sailed from Gibraltar
6th - At 0800 hours off
Oran the force was joined by battleships NELSON and RODNEY, aircraft
carrier INDOMITABLE and their screen of 7 destroyers.
8th - KING GEORGE V,
HOWE, JERVIS, PANTHER, PATHFINDER, PENN, PALADIN and
PETARD arrived at Algiers.
9th - At 0300 hours KING
GEORGE V, HOWE, light cruisers DIDO and SIRIUS and destroyers
JERVIS, PANTHER, PATHFINDER, PENN, PALADIN and PETARD sailed from Algiers
as Force Z (also known as Division 3 of Force H) for their operational
position between Sardinia and Sicily.
(The task of Force Z was to provide
distant cover for the HUSKY assault convoys, to provide a show of force to
suggest an American attack on Sardinia and Corsica and to reinforce the
Eastern Task Force should it suffer casualties)
(During the afternoon of D-1 an
unseasonable force 7 north-westerly gale blew up and the smaller craft were
tossed about like corks. On D Day itself the Canadians and Americans landed
in very rough conditions suffering the double discomfort of seasickness and
a drenching through to the skin. The British conditions on the leeward side
of the island were better as the landing craft moved inshore. However these
unfavourable conditions had a beneficial side effect, the enemy relaxed
their guard in the mistaken belief that a landing in such conditions was
most unlikely and initial resistance was consequently less than expected.
H Hour had been set at 0245/10/7/43, two hours before first light. This time had been fixed by the fact
that it required the paratroops about three hours from dropping time to
assemble and carry out their mission of softening the beach defences. This
despite the fact that the assault forces needed to approach the
coastline under cover of darkness. But an examination of the Astronomical
Data revealed no such darkness. On the contrary the assault forces were
required to make the approach under a brilliant waxing moon which would not
set until the vessels had hove-to in the Initial Transport Areas
immediately under the coast defence guns of the enemy. These facts were
well known to the naval planners who pointed out the fact that the moon
phase selected was most unfavourable from naval considerations. The date,
however, was not changed because it was reiterated that this phase was most
favourable to dropping of the paratroops that were the only means available
to "neutralize the beach defences opposing the seaborne assaults, the
most vital part of the whole plan'. In the event the American paratroopers
objective became the seizure of high ground around Gela and the capture of
the airfield at Ponte Olivo)
10th - At approximately
0200 hours Force Z arrived in their operational position, approximately
11th - Cruising in
At 1800 hours Force Z
moved eastwards towards the western coast of Sicily.
At 2330 hours the force
was approximate position 38N, 12-15E at which time KING GEORGE V and
HOWE commenced a 14in shoot against the port of Trapani and the islands
of Favignana and Levanzo as a diversion to suggest landings on west coast
of Sicily (Operation FRACTURE). DIDO and SIRIUS carried out a
bombardment of the port of Marsala at the same time.
12th - Force Z off the
western coast of Sicily with KING GEORGE V and HOWE continuing their
At 0030 the bombardment
was checked and Force Z regrouped and set course westerly to return to
their operational area.
(Just before Force Z completed their
bombardment the area was bombed by RAF Wellingtons of the
Northwest African Strategic Air Force, flying from
During the operation destroyer PATHFINDER hit a submerged rock and sustained damage to her
port propeller. She detached from Force Z and went to Alexandria for
replacement of the propeller.
13th - Cruising in
14th - Force Z returned
(Under the original plan KING GEORGE V and HOWE would now returned to the Home Fleet. However Admiral Cunningham
CinC Mediterranean requested and was granted permission to retain the two
battleships in the Mediterranean for Operation AVALANCHE, the assault on
the Italian mainland at Salerno)
15th to 31st - At
the Italian Head of State, King Victor Emmanuel
III, had Benito
Mussolini arrested and replaced him with Marshal
Pietro Badoglio, the Army Chief of Staff. Badoglio immediately started
secret negotiations with the Allies to take Italy out of the war)
1st to 31st - At Algiers
or Mers el Kebir.
1st - At Algiers.
(On 3/9/43 a representative of Marshal
Pietro Badoglio, Italy's prime minister since the downfall of Benito
Mussolini signed the document in which Italy surrendered to the Allies. The
surrender was not officially announced until 1730/8/9/43. Also at
British troops of XIII Corps,
[British 5th and Canadian 1st Divisions], Eighth Army crossed the Straits
of Messina and landed in force on the European mainland north of Reggio di
Calabria in Operation BAYTOWN.
BAYTOWN had been planned to draw German forces away from Salerno, where
Operation AVALANCHE was to take place. But the Germans had left by the time
the men of XIII Corps came ashore. There was little resistance; some
Italian soldiers even volunteered to unload the landing craft.
of opposition in the heel and along the east coast had resulted from an
independent decision made by the commander of the 1st Parachute Division, General Major Richard Heidrich. It
was the only German unit in Apulia and its troops were dispersed over a
wide area. Since there were several points of entry vulnerable to Allied
invasion he concluded he would be unable to offer effective resistance
anywhere against what would obviously be superior invading forces. Heidrich
assembled his troops and insured their security by withdrawing north,
though he maintained light contact with the British troops to delay them
where he could.
One consequence of the German
withdrawal was that the naval port of Taranto was open and heavy units of
the Italian navy in that port needed to be secured. On 5/9/43 The CinC
Malta Vice Admiral A J Power was ordered to seize the port and neutralise the
Italian naval units. An operation was quickly cobbled together and code
named Operation SLAPSTICK [as General Alexander later remarked, the
code name well illustrated the ex
tempore nature of the planning] and was to involve KING GEORGE V and HOWE and 3600 men of the
1st British Airborne Division under the command of Maj. Gen. G. F.
Hopkinson, who were in reserve at Bizerte.
Cruisers AURORA PENELOPE, DIDO,
SIRIUS and the USS BOISE and the minelaying cruiser ABDIEL were ordered to
Bizerte to embark the airborne division and KING GEORGE V and HOWE were
ordered to Malta)
7th - At 1700 hours KING
GEORGE V and HOWE escorted by destroyers JERVIS (D14), PALADIN,
PANTHER, PATHFINDER and PENN sailed from Algiers for Malta.
8th - At 2230 hours KING
GEORGE V and HOWE arrived off Malta and destroyers detached to
refuel in Valetta.
Vice Admiral A J Power
came out from Valetta and embarked on the HOWE.
9th - At 0300 hours KING
GEORGE V and HOWE (Flag Vice Admiral A J Power) escorted by destroyers
JERVIS (D14), PALADIN, PANTHER, PATHFINDER and PENN sailed for Taranto as
Force Z to carry out Operation SLAPSTICK.
At approximately 1100
hours, cruisers AURORA PENELOPE, DIDO, SIRIUS, USS BOISE and minelaying cruiser ABDIEL, with the 1st British Airborne Division embarked,
joined Force Z.
At approximately 1400
hours, Italian battleships CAIO DUILIO (Flag
Vice Admiral Alberto Da Zara) and
ANDREA DORIA, light cruisers LUIGI CADORNA and POMPEO MAGNO and
destroyer NICOLOSO Da RECCO hove into sight, they were steaming towards
Malta to surrender.
KING GEORGE V
detached from Force Z and escorted the Italian ships to Malta.
(At approximately 1800/9/9/43 Force Z
arrived at Taranto and received a friendly welcome from the Italians. Because
of the possibility of mines in the inner and outer [Mar Grande] harbours of
Taranto, disembarkation of the airborne troops proceeded slowly. ABDIEL
who had embarked 435 men of the British 1st Airborne Division [6th Royal Welsh battalion and the 2nd Oban,
Air Landing Anti Tank Battery]
moored to a buoy in the Mar Grande. At 0015/10/9/43 a violent explosion
took place under ABDIEL which broke her back and caused her to sink in two
minutes. It is believed that she had swung at her moorings and
triggered a German GS type magnetic mine.
48 crew plus 120 soldiers
were killed, together with the loss of a large
amount of stores, eight Jeeps and seven 6 pounder A/T guns)
10th - At 1800 hours KING
GEORGE V and her Italian charges arrived at Malta.
11th - At Malta
During the morning, surrendered Italian Fleet units from northern Italy arrived at Malta.
(On 11/9/43 Admiral Cunningham signalled
the Admiralty sending the message,
pleased to inform their Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now lies at
anchor beneath the guns of the fortress of Malta)
14th - At 2000 hours KING GEORGE V, HOWE and destroyers
FAULKNOR, FURY, ECHO, ECLIPSE, INTREPID and the
from Valletta escorting the Italian battleships VITTORIO VENETO,
ITALIA (ex LITTORIO), CAIO DUILIO, ANDREA DORIA and GIULIO CESARE and
light cruisers EUGENIO di SAVOIA, EMANUELE FILIBERTO DUCA d'AOSTA, RAIMONDO
MONTECUCCOLI and LUIGI CADORNA to Alexandria to be interned to await a
17th - At 0700 hours the
surrendered ships and escort arrived at Alexandria.
acting on behalf of the Allied Commander in Chief, and
De Courten, the Italian Minister of
Marine, signed an agreement for naval cooperation.
Battleships and some cruisers were placed in care and maintenance, under
Italian control. Some cruisers were to remained active and serve in the
Atlantic on blockade control. All destroyers, torpedo boats and coastal
craft were kept in commission, under Italian control. all Italian ships continued to fly their flags)
KING GEORGE V and HOWE with destroyer escort sailed from Alexandria for Algiers.
29th - KING GEORGE V and HOWE with destroyer escort arrived at
13th - At 1200 hours battleships
KING GEORGE V
and HOWE aircraft carriers ILLUSTRIOUS (Flag Rear Admiral Aircraft
Carriers) and FORMIDABLE screened by destroyers INGLEFIELD, OBEDIENT, SAVAGE,
VENUS, HNorMS STORD, and USS FORREST, CAPPS and HOBSON sailed from Gibraltar
for the UK.
17th - At approximately 1200 hours in position 55-05N, 11-15W, ILLUSTRIOUS, FORMIDABLE and destroyers INGLEFIELD, VENUS detached
for the Clyde and destroyer USS HOBSON detached for Londonderry.
18th - At 1300 hours in the Pentland Firth, HOWE and
OBEDIENT, SAVAGE and HNorMS STORD detached for
19th - At 0700
hours KING GEORGE V and destroyers FORREST and CAPPS arrived at
KING GEORGE V gave leave and was taken in hand for a docking.
20th to 31st -
1st to 13th -
14th - At 0030
hours KING GEORGE V screened by destroyers VIGILANT and HARDY
sailed from Rosyth for Scapa.
At 1800 hours
KING GEORGE V, VIGILANT and HARDY arrived at Scapa.
15th to 30th -
1st to 6th -
7th - At 0700 hours
KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers OBDURATE, TERMAGANT and KEMPENFELT sailed
from Scapa for Gibraltar, where KING GEORGE V was to embark Prime
Minster Winston Churchill and convey him back to the UK following his
conferences at Cairo and Teheran.
10th - At 0900
hours in approximate position 43N, 20W the force was joined by three
destroyers form Gibraltar, following which OBDURATE,
TERMAGANT and KEMPENFELT detached to refuel at Horta, Faial Island, the
12th - At 0200
hours KING GEORGE V arrived at Gibraltar; however the
Prime Minster had contracted pneumonia and was unable to travel.
17th - At 0100
hours KING GEORGE V and heavy cruiser LONDON sailed from Gibraltar for
the UK escorted by local destroyers.
19th At 1200
hours in approximate position 40N, 21W the Force was joined by destroyers OBDURATE, TERMAGANT and KEMPENFELT from Horta, following which
the local escort detached and returned to Gibraltar.
22nd - At 0900
hours in position 55-32N, 7W, destroyer OBDURATE detached to refuel at
At 1800 hours
KING GEORGE V, LONDON and destroyers TERMAGANT and KEMPENFELT arrived
in the Clyde.
23rd - At 1200
hours KING GEORGE V escorted by OBDURATE left Greenock
24th - At 0900
hours KING GEORGE V and OBDURATE arrived at Scapa.
25th to 31st -
1 9 4 4
1st to 7th -
8th - At 1700
hours KING GEORGE V
escorted by destroyers METEOR and HMCS ATHABASKAN sailed from Scapa
where she was to embark the Prime
Minster Winston Churchill and convey him back to the UK.
9th - At 1400
hours in position 56-30N, 11-15W, destroyer ASHANTI joined the screen.
13th - At 1000
hours in approximate position 40N, 20W the force was joined by three
destroyers form Gibraltar, following which ASHANTI, METEOR
detached to refuel at Horta, Faial Island, the Azores.
14th - At 1200
hours KING GEORGE V arrived at Gibraltar, refueled and embarked the
Prime Minster and his party.
At 2330 hours sailed
from Gibraltar for the UK escorted by local destroyers.
ATHABASKAN and METEOR joined
from Horta and the local destroyers detached and returned to
18th - At 2300
hours KING GEORGE V, ASHANTI, ATHABASKAN and METEOR arrived Plymouth
and disembarked Winston Churchill and his party.
19th - At 1500 hours
KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyer METEOR sailed from Plymouth for Scapa.
21st - At 0500 hours
KING GEORGE V and METEOR
arrived at Scapa.
22nd to 31st - At Scapa.
1st to 8th - At Scapa.
9th - KING GEORGE V and escort sailed from Scapa for
10th - KING GEORGE V arrived at Liverpool for refit.
Paid-off and taken in hand for refit
by Cammell Laird at Gladstone Dock, Liverpool
preparation for re-deployment with the Eastern Fleet
11th to 31st - At Liverpool under refit.
March to June
At Liverpool under refit.
During the refit the
aircraft and catapult equipment were landed. The space that had been
occupied by the catapult was replaced with new superstructure on which the
ship's boats were relocated.
AA armament was amended by the
removal of 1 x 4 barrelled 2pdr pom-pom and 12 x single barrelled 20mm Oerlikons;
and augmented by the addition of 3 x 8 barrelled 2pdr pom-poms, 6 x 2
barrelled 20mm Oerlikons and 2 x 4 barrelled 40mm Bofors.
Aircraft warning radar
Type 279 was replaced by Type 279B using only one mast.
Main armament fire
control radar for forward mountings Type 284 replaced by a Type 274.
After main armament fire
control radar Type 284 replaced by a Type 274 augmented by a new Type
277/P/Q to measure approximate elevation.
Surface warning radar Type
273Q replaced by a Type 293/M.
Additionally for control
of the pom-poms 7 x Type 282Q beam switching radars.
to 30th - At Liverpool under refit.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Liverpool for Scapa.
- KING GEORGE V arrived at Scapa.
to 31st - At Scapa working up.
to 30th - At Scapa working up.
to 4th At Scapa.
- At 1100 hours KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers OPPORTUNE and
ORIBI sailed from Scapa for Plymouth.
- At 0600 hours in the North Channel, OPPORTUNE and ORIBI
detached for the Clyde and the escort was taken over by two Western
- At 0400 hours KING GEORGE V arrived at Plymouth.
- At 0100 hours KING GEORGE V escorted by destroyers NUBIAN and
UNDAUNTED sailed from Plymouth for Scapa.
- At 1800 hours KING GEORGE V, NUBIAN and UNDAUNTED
arrived at Scapa.
Scapa the Flag of the CinC Home Fleet was transferred from the RODNEY.
- At Scapa where the Flag of the CinC Home fleet was transferred to aircraft
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Scapa for the Clyde arriving the same day.
off Greenock KING GEORGE V was visited by the King and Queen and their
daughters Princesses Elizabeth and Margret.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from the Clyde escorted by Western Approaches
Command destroyers for Gibraltar on the first leg of her journey to join
the Eastern Fleet.
- KING GEORGE V arrived at Gibraltar.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Gibraltar for Malta.
- KING GEORGE V arrived at Malta.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Malta for Alexandria.
- KING GEORGE V arrived at Alexandria.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Alexandria the carry out a bombardment of Milos Island.
- KING GEORGE V arrived off the Island of Milos and carried out a
bombardment of the Lakida battery in support of
the attacking British troops.
bombardments of Milos had been
carried out on 25/26 October 1944 by cruiser AURORA, destroyers
TETCOTT and TYRIAN and Seafires of 899 Sqd. from the escort carrier KHEDIVE)
15th - KING GEORGE V
arrived back at Alexandria.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Alexandria to join the Eastern Fleet at
- KING GEORGE V arrived at Colombo.
- KING GEORGE V sailed from Colombo for Trincomalee arriving later in
the day and joining the Eastern Fleet.
1 9 4 5
- KING GEORGE V became a unit of the British Pacific Fleet.
(The formation of the British
Pacific Fleet was resultant of
Quebec Conference, held in September 1944 and code-named OCTAGON. Two
months after OCTAGON, US agreement in principle was reached that a British
carrier task force would fight in the Pacific despite continued opposition
from Churchill and the USN Chief of Operations, Admiral Ernest J King. The
man chosen to be CinC of the BPF was Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser GCB KBE. He
was responsible to the Admiralty in London for the general direction the
forces under his command; to the Australian Government for the dockyards,
air stations, depots and barracks that formed his main base and to the
individual Navy Boards of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa
for the men and ships they provided him. Operationally he took his orders
from Admiral Chester Nimitz the Allied Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean
Areas. But because of his own seniority, he delegated sea command to Vice
Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings his second-in-command. The Admiralty intended
the BPF to reach its full strength in October 1945 in time for Operation
OLYMPIC, the planned invasion of Japan.
Before his fleet was ready to move into the
Pacific, Admiral Fraser called on Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbour with key
members of his staff. Admiral Nimitz asked for the BPF to strike at the
important oil refineries in the Palembang complex in Sumatra as the fleet
deployed from Ceylon to Australia. He had several reasons for doing so.
Between them, the Sumatran refineries provided Japan with about 75% of the
aviation fuel it needed and any reduction would have strategic
significance. USAAF B-29 bombers had attacked the plants recently using
high-level bombing techniques and had failed to score hits; tactical
aircraft from carriers were expected to be more accurate. It must also be
said that Nimitz wanted a demonstration of the RN capability to carry out
sustained strikes at long range so that he could judge the value of the BPF
to his command. Fraser accepted immediately and 1st Aricraft Squadron (1 ACS) relished the chance
to show what it could achieve. Models of the refineries were made in the
carriers which helped operations staff brief aircrew on individual,
specific targets and an 'air co-ordinator', Major Hay RM from the
VICTORIOUS, was used for
the first time in line with USN procedures)
to 15th at Trincomalee.
- At 1430 hours KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Sir Henry Bernard
Rawlings 2iC British Pacific Fleet) the aircraft carriers INDOMITABLE
(Flag Rear Admiral Sir Philip
Louis Vian Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers, British Pacific Fleet),
INDEFATIGABLE, VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS, light cruisers BLACK PRINCE,
ARGONAUT and EURYALUS and
GRENVILLE (D25), UNDAUNTED, UNDINE, URSA
, KEMPENFELT (D27), WAGER, WAKEFUL, WHELP and WHIRLWIND sailed from
Trincomalee as TF 63, to carry out Operation MERIDIAN 1.
At 1700 hours, light
cruiser CEYLON, having collected mail for the ships of TF 63, sailed from
Trincomalee to join TF 63.
(Operation MERIDIAN 1 was an air strike
carried out of the aircraft of TF 63 on oil refineries at Pladjoe, Palembang on the
Island of Sumatra.
The targets in the Palembang area
were at Songei Gerong, which had been the East Indies oil refinery for the
Standard Oil Company. The other was at Pladjoe, the former Royal Dutch
Shell refinery. Both were quite large and between them produced and
supplied 50% of the oil used by Japan, including 75% of the vital aviation
The targets were situated about 50
miles inland up a network of rivers and creeks and surrounded by jungle and
swamp on the south east of the island.
American long-range reconnaissance
aircraft had reported that there was a strong anti-aircraft gun defence and
the presence of fighter aircraft based at the airfields of Lembak,
Palembang, Talangbetoetoe and Mana; also from a fighter training base
nearby. Unfortunately no reports had been made of a defensive balloon
barrage around the refineries.
The objective was too put refineries
at Palembang out of action)
17th & 18th - During their
passage south easterly TF 63 carried out intensive exercises.
19th - The exercises continued.
At 1930 hours destroyer WESSEX, who had been delayed at
Trincomalee waiting parts for her faulty radar, joined TF 63.
20th - At 0700 hours on arrival at the refueling RV, in approximate
position 5S, 97-30E, the refueling force TF 69 was not in sight.
At 0822 hours TF 69 was located by aircraft and refueling commenced
at 0900 hours. The weather conditions at the time were not good, there being
frequent rain squalls, with a moderate southerly swell and wind force 3-5,
the oilers reported much gear damaged by destroyers.
By 1850 hours KING GEORGE V, the cruisers and destroyers had all
This was the first under way refueling by KING GEORGE V and she
took 10 hours to complete.
consisting of destroyer URCHIN (Senior Officer) and the RFA oilers
ECHODALE, WAVE KING and EMPIRE
SALVAGE sailed from Trincomalee and proceeded to the first oiling
At 1900 hours, cruiser CEYLON
detached from TF 63 and joined TF 69. TF 63 then set course for the flying
During the passage Vice Admiral
Rawlings became ill and was confined to his bed so operational control of
TF 63 was exercised by Rear Admiral Vian.
21st - 22nd - During the night, Force
63 approached the flying off position, but owing to bad weather and
unfavourable weather forecasts, it was decided to turn back to the westward.
22nd - 23rd -
night, Force 63 approached the flying off position, and again, owing to bad weather and
unfavourable weather forecasts, it was decided to turn back to the
(The weather problem was caused by an inter-tropical
front [now known as an
Intertropical Convergence Zone]
which lay against the Sumatran coast
until the 23rd January. Whilst it provided a convenient screen in which to
operate, it detracted on the
whole from success because spray and the torrential rains affected the serviceability
of the large number of aircraft necessarily parked on deck)
24th - At 0400 hours TF 63 arrived
at the approximate position 5-41S, 103-32E, between the Island of Pulau
Enggano and the coast of Sumatra, coded as 'Position TA'; and approximately
200 miles from the target, Pladjoe refinery.
At 0615 hours the first aircraft
began taking off and during the next 45 minutes the strike force of 52
Avengers each armed with 4 x 500 lb bombs, 12 Fireflies armed with 60lb rockets,
56 Corsairs and 20 Hellcats were assembled.
At 0704 hours, nine minutes late,
the strike force headed for the objective, Pladjoe refinery.
At 0850 hours the attack commenced,
after dropping their bombs the Avengers headed for the RV 30 miles away.
At 0940 hours the strike started to
land on. This was completed by 1025 hours.
Six Corsairs, one Hellcat and two
Avengers failed to return.
At 1030 hours TF 63 commenced retiring
to the south-west at 22 knots towards the refuelling area.
25th - En route to the refuelling
area KING GEORGE V topped up destroyer URSA with oil following
which URSA was detached in the evening to proceed to the Cocos Island with
signals for despatch.
On arrival at the refuelling area TF
63 commenced refuelling in two groups. ILLUSTRIOUS and VICTORIOUS also
topped up with aviation spirit. Oiling was slow owing to buoyant hoses
parting at the joints.
(The refuelling force TF 69 now included
the RFA oiler ARNDALE who had sailed from Freemantle on 15/1/45)
26th - TF 63 continued refuelling. At
this stage it had become clear that the fuel situation would allow no more
than one further strike at Palembang.
Destroyer URSA rejoined.
27th - TF 63 continued refuelling.
28th - TF 63 continued refuelling.
On completion of refuelling TF 63
headed back to flying off position TA.
29th - At 0600 hours TF 63 arrived
In position TA, the weather was poor with heavy rainstorms in a belt 30
miles off the coast. So H Hour was postponed from 0615 until 0640. By which
time the carriers were in a clear patch between two rainstorms, but others
At 0640 hours the first aircraft
began taking off and during the next 54 minutes the strike force of 48
Avengers each armed with 4 x 500 lb bombs, 12 Fireflies armed with 60lb
rockets, 48 Corsairs and 16 Hellcats were assembled.
At 0734 hours the strike force, four
minutes late, headed for the objective, Songei Gerong refinery.
At 0850 hours the attack commenced;
after dropping their bombs the Avengers headed for the RV.
At 0900 hours TF 63 gained a radar indication
of an enemy aircraft in the vicinity of the fleet.
At 0917 hours the bogey was sighted
by Seafires of the CAP, it was a fast single engined aircraft which escaped
by diving into clouds.
At 0939 a few enemy aircraft
approached TF 63 from the north. They probably did not sight the fleet,
which was then under low cloud. Seafires were sent to intercept and shot
down one Dinah [Mitsubishi Ki-46] 28 miles west of the fleet
At 1010 hours the strike started to
land on. This was completed by 1100 hours.
Seven aircraft failed to return.
At 1026 hours a group of twelve plus
enemy aircraft were reported approaching from the north. Corsairs and
Seafires of the fighter patrols were vectored out. The Corsairs reported
sighting two single engined enemy aircraft carrying bombs which were chased
far to the eastward. One Corsair from VICTORIOUS failed to return.
At 1028 hours a few enemy planes
were detected passing the fleet on a southerly track some 40 miles to
seaward. No fighters were sent to intercept as the enemy seemed to have no
knowledge of the fleet's position.
At 1100 hours the last of the strike
force was landed on. TF 63 then commenced its withdrawal north westward
towards the refuelling area.
(The two strikes on the
severely disrupted production. According to post war analysis the strikes crippled
production and reduced the Japanese fuel reserves)
At 1152 a raid was detected
approaching low from the southward and seven Seafires of the low patrol
were sent to intercept. This Seafire patrol was flying wide of the fleet to
the northward when given their first vector. They intercepted the raid as
it was sighted from the fleet. The enemy formation, which was originally
reported by radar as 'one large', consisted of one Helen [Nakajima Ki-49] and
six Sallies [Mitsubishi Ki-21]. The enemy formation attacked from the port
quarter of the fleet upwind, height about 50 feet. They broke up when the
Seafires intercepted and appeared to try to carry out low-level bombing
attacks on ILLUSTRIOUS and INDEFATIGABLE. From the form of the attack when
it first developed it was thought that the enemy aircraft were carrying
torpedoes and the fleet was accordingly manoeuvred so as to present a
difficult torpedo target.
Most of the attackers succeeded in
reaching the main body and were shot down close to the ships. Of the seven
aircraft which attacked, certainly six and probably all seven were
Gunfire from the fleet accounted for
one aircraft. But the standard of fire discipline and fire control in the
fleet was low.
At 1203 hours during the air attack the
ILLUSTRIOUS was struck by two 5.25in shells fired by our own forces and
suffered 12 fatal casualties and 21 wounded (see following).
(The attacking Japanese aircraft were
described as above in the official British report. However some reports
state that the attacking aircraft were seven Kawasaki Ki-48, Lilies, of the
Japanese Army's Shichisi Mitate Tokubetsu Kōgeki Tai)
(A Walrus amphibian, with recovered
aircrew, had just landed on ILLUSTRIOUS, when two Sallies attacked the ILLUSTRIOUS.
One dropped a bomb astern of the ILLUSTRIOUS that failed to explode and
they then flew down the length of the deck. The cruiser EURYALUS was
shooting at the attacking aircraft and failed to check her fire as the
enemy flew over the ILLUSTRIOUS. Two of EURYALUS's 5.25in shells struck
the ILLUSTRIOUS hitting the superstructure and destroying the Walrus and
killing some of the rescued aircrew)
From 1212 to 1430 hours the fleet
was shadowed by an aircraft which remained 45 to 60 miles to the eastward.
It is possible that this aircraft may have been keeping track of us by
receiving either our radar or our beacon transmissions.
At 1818 hours, a quarter of an hour
before sunset, a single enemy aircraft approached from the north-eastward
at 15,000 feet. The enemy aircraft remained in the vicinity until about
1910 hours, during which time TF 63 was steering a course towards Ceylon.
As soon as night fell course was
altered to the westward at 23 knots to arrive at the re-fueling area on
30th - At 1315 hours TF 63 commenced
re-fueling from TF 69, all ships with the exception of VICTORIOUS and
ILLUSTRIOUS either filling up or topping up for the passage to Fremantle.
After refuelling destroyer, URSA was
detached to take messages to the Cocos Island for transmission and then to
proceed independently to Fremantle.
At 2200 hours re-fuelling was
completed and TF 63 set course for Fremantle.
1st to 3rd - TF 63 on passage to
4th - At 0600 hours TF 63 arrived at
fleet arrived in Fremantle the public welcome stunned the arriving crews.
Every vantage point was packed with people, all cheering and waving)
a Board of
Inquiry was convened on board ILLUSTRIOUS to investigate the circumstances
attending the unfortunate incident which occurred when the Fleet was
attacked by Japanese bombers off Western Sumatra and ILLUSTRIOUS sustained
damage and casualties from 'friendly' gunfire)
Orders of the CinC, British Pacific Fleet, the Fleet was split into two
groups, ABLE and BAKER, before leaving Fremantle. Group ABLE comprising
INDOMITABLE, ILLUSTRIOUS, INDEFATIGABLE, ARGONAUT, BLACK PRINCE, GRENVILLE,
UNDINE, UNDAUNTED, WAGER and WESSEX. Group ABLE sailed late on the 4/2/45
5th - Group BAKER comprising KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Sir Henry Bernard Rawlings 2iC
British Pacific Fleet),
VICTORIOUS, EURYALUS, KEMPENFELT, WHIRLWIND, WHELP, WAKEFUL and URSA sailed
6th to 10th - On passage to Sydney the Fleet carried out an intensive
program of exercises. These included:
Fleet manoeuvers with ships conning from emergency positions.
(i). 14 inch throw short firing by KING GEORGE V.
(ii). AA throw off firings by KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, and
(iii). Dive bombing exercise
(iv). Fire direction exercise
(v). Range and
(i). No difficulties were experienced in the use of American Signal
publications and procedure, except in the case of the United States Radar
reporting and fighter direction methods, which must be practiced further to
become efficient. Manoeuvers were carried out daily by V/S, W/T
11th - Group BAKER arrived at Sydney
(As the fleet steamed into Sydney harbour,
thousands of people were gathered at various points waving and cheering the
return of the Royal Navy and, according to one historian, 'the city went
mad'. In port, members of the fleet received an extremely warm welcome. 'The
hospitality of the Australian families, with their own sons still overseas
or POWs and with a far higher percentage of their population in the forces
than ourselves, had to be seen to be believed')
At 1130 hours
the CinC, British
Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sir Guy Royle the First Naval Member of the Commonwealth
Naval Board and Rear Admiral G.D. Moore, Flag Officer in Charge, Sydney; arrived
on board KING GEORGE V where the Flag Officers met the Commanding Officers of the ships of the British
British Pacific Fleet had established a
Barracks, Accounting Base and Manning Depot in the
docklands area at Woolloomooloo at the head of Woolloomooloo Bay. It
was commissioned on 20/11/44 as HMS GOLDEN HIND)
(Most Royal Navy ships were designed to
operate in climates that had brief and temperate summers. Therefore they
did not have air-conditioning, or evaporation plant that could produce
sufficient fresh water for the boilers and the crew when operating in the
The result was that in the tropical
areas of the Pacific the heat below decks became unbearable; 127¼ F [53¼C]
was recorded in one instant. This made physical labour exhausting and it
was difficult to avoid becoming drowsy while doing paperwork. Crews took
lots of showers and drank as much water as possible, quickly overwhelming
the evaporators and forcing water rationing.
There was also a lack of
standardisation in Royal Navy equipment. This was particularly so with the
aircraft which constituted the British Pacific Fleet's main offensive
weapon. Admiral Fraser informed the Admiralty that, 'The Royal Navy had too
many different types of aircraft, which made logistics difficult, and
recommended standardisation of the machines and designing a plane
specifically for carrier warfare'. The Royal Navy was using the Seafire, which
was a modified Spitfire. Although a good plane in the air, the Seafire had
problems withstanding the stress of the sudden stops of carrier landings.
Many of the planes in the fleet were of US design, which the RN had then
modified, and this made it impossible to obtain some spare parts from the
Americans. The RN was also using bombs that would not fit aboard their
aircraft carriers and had to be stored on other ships. This process added
to the time and energy required for resupply at sea.
The RN therefore had a number of
design, equipment and logistical problems to overcome for Pacific
operations. Most of which they muddled through rather than resolved.
Keeping the fleet equipped with fuel, food, water and ammunition was an
ever present concern for Fraser, his staff, subordinate commanders and the
the generous help of USN bases, fuelling facilities and spare parts, the
British Pacific Fleet would have been hard put to keep going. Eventually
even Admiral King backed away from the requirement of self-sufficiency. In a
letter to Admiral Fraser from Washington, Admiral Somerville recounted that
'recently King has admitted that pooling of resources to some extent must
obviously be necessary if we are to keep the maximum number of ships, both
US and British, ready for operations')
12th to 26th - The Fleet remained at Sydney where the ships made good
minor defects which had developed during nearly four weeks at sea, and the
ships' companies were given 48 hours local leave.
Sydney, the British Pacific Fleet was allocated Task Force Numbers so as to
conform to American procedure. Battleships, carriers, cruisers,
and destroyers were designated Task Force 113 and the Fleet Train was
designated Task Force 112. Task Force 113 remained as such until it
was allocated to the Commander 4th Fleet when it became Task
27th - At Sydney.
afternoon the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, comprising aircraft carriers
INDOMITABLE [Flag of AC1 Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian], VICTORIOUS and
INDEFATIGABLE screened by destroyers HMAS QUICKMATCH (D4), HMAS
QUIBERON, HMS QUEENBOROUGH and HMS QUALITY sailed from Sydney and headed east)
28th - At 0830 hours battleships KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Sir Henry Bernard Rawlings 1st
Battle Squadron and 2iC British Pacific Fleet) and HOWE, maintenance carrier UNICORN, light cruisers SWIFTSURE (Flag Rear Admiral E.J.P. Brind CS 4), ARGONAUT, BLACK PRINCE, EURYALUS (Flag Rear Admiral
J.H. Edelsten , Rear Admiral (D) temporarily) and HMNZS GAMBIA, destroyers
GRENVILLE (D25), ULSTER, UNDINE, URSA, and URANIA, KEMPENFELT (D27), WAGER,
WAKEFUL, WHIRLWIND, WHELP and WESSEX sailed from Sydney as TF 113, into the
teeth of an easterly gale.
At 1200 hours the 1st Battle
Squadron was in position
During the afternoon the 1st Battle Squadron RVed with the 1st Aircraft
Carrier Squadron. TF 113 then set course northerly.
was due to be shadowed and attacked by RAAF aircraft. A few blue
aircraft were tracked, but no attack developed. Weather prevented our
carriers from flying off fighter opposition. Altogether this was a
disappointing exercise which provided little value)
After dark, SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA carried out shadowing exercise with
1st - TF 113 continued on a northerly course. The weather was still
In the morning TF 113
Carried out Visual Radar Control Air Defence
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position 29-18S, 155-04E.
In the afternoon TF 113 exercised tactical maneuvering.
EURYALUS and all destroyers carried out Radar Interrogation
TF 113 carried out Range and Inclination exercises on EURYALUS.
After dark the 4th Cruiser Squadron carried out a Night
2nd - Early in the morning destroyer URANIA was detached and
returned to Sydney.
At 1000K hours the refueling force of four tankers escorted by minesweeper (known as a corvette in the RAN) HMAS WHYALLA was located.
For refueling TF 113 divided into two groups, the Main Body requiring
no fuel, and the fuelling force of all cruisers and destroyers.
refueling force was placed under the Command of Rear Admiral Commanding
CS4. Screens for both forces were relieved as necessary, and fuelling
was completed by 1700 hours by which time all destroyers and 5.25in
cruisers had been topped right up and 6in cruisers had fuelled for
exercise. The detailed fuelling program made by CS 4 seemed to be
expeditiously and smoothly carried out. Unnecessary high steaming by fuelled
ships from the Fuelling Force joining the screen of the non fuelling Force
would be saved if they were ordered to proceed to the nearest position in
the screen, other screening vessels adjusting position as if rotating.)
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position
After dark 4th Destroyer Flotilla exercised flotilla night attacks
on the Fleet in cruising disposition 5A. From this, and similar
attacks on subsequent nights, the weakness of a circular screen to prevent
a determined or suicide minded enemy flotilla fighting their way into
decisive torpedo range of the Main Body was shown.
3rd - In the morning TF 113 Carried out aircraft Direction and Radar
Reporting Exercise No 1. Attacking planes flew 90 miles ahead of the
Fleet before commencing their approach. EURYALUS and ARGONAUT were
stationed 15 miles 30 degrees on either bow of the Fleet as Radar
Pickets. Full fighter protection was flown off by the carriers.
Some very interesting Torpedo Bomber and Dive Bomber raids developed, and the
Fleet was maneuvered evasively and as necessary for flying off standby
fighters to meet raids as they developed. On such occasions
unnecessary and unrealistic confusion was caused to plots by aircraft which
hovered over the Fleet after completing their attacks; they should have formed up
and remained well clear, but in sight of the Fleet.
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position
In the afternoon the carriers exercised A.A. throw off firings.
SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA carried out independent exercises. The 1st Battle
Squadron exercised H.A. Drills with single aircraft and then with EURYALUS,
SWIFTSURE, and BLACK PRINCE, exercised emergency conning and
communications. It was found that when in a single line ahead; ships
had to haul out of line for their secondary control position personnel to
read the Flagship's Signals.
After dark the 27th Destroyer Flotilla carried out
divisional night attacks on the Fleet representing a damaged force
returning to base. One cruiser with destroyers in any threatened
sector moved out to counter attack, and the exercise finished in true
Saturday night style with a blaze of starshell searchlight and smoke.
The 27th Destroyer Flotilla continued to shadow during the
4th - TF 113 continued on a
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position
UNICORN escorted by two destroyers detached
TF 113 continued on a northerly course.
In the morning QUICKMATCH was detached to investigate radar
surface contacts to eastward. The contacts were identified as the
troop transport USAT SEABARB 7909grt and Australian coastal transport ALAGNE. No warnings of these ships had been received.
SEABARB was en route to Cairns, Queensland where she was to embark the
advanced party of the 2/9 Australian armoured Regiment and transport them
to Morotai Island in preparation for the invasion of Borneo. Morotai Island
had only been secured on 14/1/45)
FAA planes Exercised Dummy Suicide attacks on the Fleet. Enemy
aircraft occasionally strafing with bursts short, attacked every ship in
the Fleet in most realistic manner for two hours, and providing very useful
training. Carried out Height Find Exercise.
Several groups of apparently large aircraft flying from East to West
detected ahead of the Fleet and displaying I.F.F. Total number of
aircraft estimated at 50. They were eventually identified as friendly
transports by carrier aircraft.
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position
08- 29S, 153-27E.
In the afternoon HOWE carried out 14in Long Range Throw Shoot
Firing on KING GEORGE V.
A.A. Throw off Firings by all ships of the Fleet.
More aircraft detached ahead, flying from west to east and not
displaying I.F.F. No warning had been received of these or the
After dark TF 113 altered course 30 minutes, to avoid a Radar
Contact. The KEMPENFELT detached to investigate the contact, which
was identified as the eastbound troop transport USS STRATFORD 2286grt.
No warning of this ship had been received.
TF 113 continued on a northerly course.
In the morning UNICORN and her two destroyer escorts rejoined TF
Following which TF 113 carried out Visual and Radar controlled
fighter direction exercise for the battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers;
9 detected, with Fireflies representing hostile snoopers, and with 24 fighters
acting as a CAP and 2 Avengers as friendly A/S patrol.
At 1200 hours TF 113 was in position
At 1315 hours TF 113 formed into groups disposed astern for passage into
the Bismarck Sea.
In the afternoon SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA carried out 6in throw off
firings. Groups exercised emergency conning and communication.
The airborne A/S patrol and CAP was maintained at readiness to deal
with possible snoopers from the enemy base at Rabaul.
KING GEORGE V, HOWE, EURYALUS and 4th D.F. carried out
Radar Interrogation exercise.
As night fell it had been hoped to operate night fighters from
INDOMITABLE, but weather conditions were not suitable.
7th - At 1000 hours TF 113 were off the north east coast off the
Island of Manus, in approximate position 1-53S, 147-30E.
At 1000 hours UNICORN and a destroyer screen detached for Ponam
UNICORN was carrying MSR 4 [MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT & REPAIR 4]
were an advanced party of MONAB IV. MSR 4 were to take over the airbase on
Ponam Island that had been built by the Americans and completed in August 1944
and had been used by USN aircraft up to its handover to the Royal Navy. On
2/4/45 the airbase was commissioned as HMS NABARON, Royal Naval Air Station
PONAM. The stores and equipment of MONAB 4 arrived on the 11/3/45 on board
SS Clan MacAULLY 10492grt. The advanced party of MONAB 1V and the
second echelon of MSR 4 arrived on 13/4/45 on board escort carrier SPEAKER.
The main body of MONAB IV arrived on the 25/4/45 on board SS EMPIRE ARQUEBUS 6440grt, direct from the UK. [EMPIRE ARQUEBUS was a standard US C1 cargo ship, ex USS CAPE ST
VINCENT, but was now a commissioned RN LSI(L) HMS CICERO, although she does
not appear to have operated in her latter guise] )
Following the departure of UNICORN, TF 113 commenced an
Exercise with 6 shore based Corsairs as Blue aircraft simulating torpedo,
dive, suicide, and level bombers. TF 113 operated a CAP of eight Hellcats
and eight Seafires.
After the exercise, TF 113 divided into groups and entered Seeadler
Harbour, Manus between 1300 and 1600 hours.
Battleships and aircraft carriers anchored on the western side of
Harbour is at the eastern end of Manus and a superb natural anchorage, 15 miles
long by 4 miles wide and 120ft deep)
8th to 11th - TF 113 was anchored in
period the fuelling of the Fleet was carried out, with destroyers and
cruisers proceeding alongside the oilers at their berths in the Eastern
Anchorage, it being intended that capital ships and carriers should be
fuelled at their own berths in the Western Anchorage.
It was soon
found that the swell was too heavy for fuelling the carriers in these
berths, VICTORIOUS, the first to fuel, smashing both her own catamarans; a
tug had then to be provided to tow the oiler clear of her.
In view of
the above, a signal was made to the Senior British Naval Officer asking for
berths to be allocated in the Eastern anchorage to complete the fuelling of
the carriers. This was arranged accordingly and U.S. Navy steel
catamarans were provided by the Commander Naval Base Manus for the
VICTORIOUS. Fuelling was successfully completed but not before the
INDOMITABLE had smashed one of her own catamarans in the process.
catamarans carried by our carriers are for use in calm water and are in no
way suitable for the open anchorages of the Pacific. The U.S. Navy
has developed steel 'fenders' from the pontoon structures used widely by
them for lighters and sea bridges. We shall be dependent on the U.S.
Navy for the loan of theirs until we can get our own. They cannot be
carried in a ship and once erected would have to be towed from place to
place as required.
Even in the
Eastern anchorage the swell caused damage when ammunition ships, oilers,
etc were alongside the cruisers and it is apparent that in an exposed
anchorage such as Manus a large supply of hard fenders is most necessary.
cocoanut trees were obtained locally and all ships were instructed to make
It was later
arranged that on all future occasions of fuelling our carriers, U.S. Navy
steel catamarans should be provided, and that the carriers should be
allocated the best available berths in the Eastern Anchorage')
12th - TF 113 commenced a series of exercises; however these did not
involve KING GEORGE V or HOWE.
13th - Aircraft carrier ILLUSTRIOUS and destroyers URANIA and
UNDAUNTED arrived from Sydney and proceeded to fuel in the Eastern
14th - Exercises continued.
15th - The 1st Battle Squadron proceeded to sea for
exercises, but the receipt of messages from the CinC British Pacific Fleet,
DTG 141205Z and DTG 141208Z instructing TF 113 and TF 112 to report to CINC
PAC forthwith for duty in operations connected with Operation ICEBERG,
changed the situation. All exercises were immediately cancelled and HOWE was ordered back to harbour whilst KING GEORGE V proceeded to get
in V/S touch with AC 1 to arrange for re-embarkation of aircraft and air
Arrangements were made to top up the fleet with fuel, ammunition, and
stores as quickly as possible and it was decided the Fleet could be
ready to sail at noon on the 17th March. CinC PAC was
informed accordingly in CTF 113's signal DTG 150611Z.
(The final US decision to accept the BPF
for operations alongside the US Fifth Fleet was not taken until 15/3/45.
Despite late opposition from Admiral King, Admiral Nimitz insisted that the
BPF form part of his Central Pacific Command. Admiral Nimitz's decision was
justified within days when on 19/3/45 the US aircraft carriers INTREPID,
WASP II, and FRANKLIN were all damaged and put out of action, reducing the
number of carriers available for Operation ICEBERG, the Okinawa landings)
staff's of the BPF Flag Officers were now tasked with planning and
implementing the necessary operations to ensure the Fleets timely
departure, these were:
embarkation of aircraft, stores, etc. The time table for these was in
some measure the sport of the swell and the lack of boats.
preparation of operation orders and arrangements for fuelling in the
forward area for a period of up to three weeks continuous operations.
speed [9 knots] at which the tankers of the Fleet Train
could be moved to the first re-fuelling area.
of aircraft between the maintenance/escort carriers UNICORN, SPEAKER and
SLINGER so that the Fleet might leave as fully equipped as could be
American naval officers did their best to ignore Admiral King's requirement
on supply matters. In fact, a good number of admirals in the Pacific had
problems with this stipulation. The requirement had to be heeded, though,
at least on paper. The Americans were more than willing to provide the
British with any surplus items they had available. Commanders and supply
officers, however, had to turn down requests that had to go through
Washington, at least officially. The doctrine of self-sufficiency was
always the rationale for this response)
16th - Preparations continued.
17th - Preparations continued.
Train oiling force, designated TU 112.2.1, comprising oilers RFA
CEDARDALE 8132grt, 12.5 knots, MV SAN AMBROSIO 7410grt, 12 knots and
MV SAN ADOLPHO 7365grt, 12 knots, escorted by escort carrier
STRIKER with replacement aircraft embarked, escorted by destroyer WHIRLWIND, sloop CRANE and frigate FINDHORN
sailed from Seeadler Harbour. This was in order to be in position at the appointed
time for the BPF to top with fuel, as near to what was to be their
operational area as possible.
Train force designated TU 112.2. 2 comprising escort carrier SPEAKER,
with Hellcats of 1840 Sqd embarked, to provide a CAP for the Fleet Train,
escorted by destroyer KEMPENFELT and sloop PHEASANT sailed at the
18th - At 0630 hours the 1st Battle Squadron, comprising, KING GEORGE
V, HOWE, SWIFTSURE, ARGONAUT, HMNZS GAMBIA screened by destroyers GRENVILLE,
ULSTER, UNDINE, URANIA and UNDAUNTED sailed from Seeadler Harbour and set
course north easterly for Ulithi Atoll.
aircraft carriers were delayed to complete the embarkation and adjustment
of aircraft which had been hampered by adverse weather
conditions. They sailed at 1100/18/3/45 with a screen of six destroyers
and completed the passage to Ulithi Atoll as a separate force.
BLACK PRINCE remained at Manus to complete the fitting of American SG Radar. [SG
Radar was a centimetric Radar,
equivalent of the RN Type 271. However the SG had become the holy grail for navigating officers for new and
unexpected reasons. The charts of the Pacific islands were dangerously
inaccurate, but close approaches to shore were now the rule not the
exception, which made the map-like PPI display of SG a comforting sight for
a captain closing an unknown and poorly charted coast].
EURYALUS was delayed by a foul cable and jammed cable holder, but rejoined the Fleet shortly. The URSA also
remained behind to dock for hull repairs)
At 0815 hours the battleships and cruisers carried out AA sleeve
firings. Four sleeves were shot down. Seven U.S.N. aircraft
took part in this and the practices went off in an unusually prompt and
At 1720 hours, EURYALUS dropped depth charges for practice.
At 1800 hours, KING GEORGE V carried out Type 253 Radar Interrogation
tests of ships in company.
At 2130 hours, radar contact was obtained with TU 112.2.1 and TU
19th - The 1st Battle Squadron continued on course for Ulithi Atoll.
At 0830 hours, KING GEORGE V and ARGONAUT carried out Range and
At 1100 hours, KING GEORGE V carried out a 5.25in long range
throw off firing at ARGONAUT.
The SWIFTSURE carried out a damage control exercise.
At 12.00 hours EURYALUS carried out a VT fuse test shoot,
throwing off at the ARGONAUT. Owing to a number of early bursts,
EURYALUS had to be ordered to cease fire and move further from the screen
At 1400 hours HOWE carried out a 5.25in long range throw off
firing at the SWIFTSURE.
At 1600 hours KING GEORGE V carried out a blind main armament
control long range throw shoot firing at the SWIFTSURE.
At 1730 hours KING GEORGE V and HOWE carried out VT fuse test
The 1st Battle Squadron continued on course for Ulithi Atoll.
At 0730 hours the cruisers were ordered to proceed 4 miles ahead for
At 0915 hours the cruisers entered Ulithi harbour
At 0930 hours the battleships and destroyers entered Ulithi harbour.
At 1300 hours the aircraft carriers, screened by destroyers QUICKMATCH,
QUALITY, QUIBERON, QUEENBOROUGH, WHELP and WAGER arrived at Ulithi.
At 1800 hours re-fuelling of the Fleet commenced.
atoll is at the
western end of the Caroline Islands, 360 miles southwest of Guam, 850 miles
east of the Philippines and 1300 miles south of Tokyo. It is a typical
volcanic atoll, with a coral reef, white sand beaches and palm trees.
Ulithi Atoll consists of forty small islands that barely rise above sea
level, the largest being only half a square mile in area. However the reef
runs roughly twenty miles north and south by ten miles across, enclosing a
vast anchorage with an average depth of 80 to 100 feet. The anchorage was
well situated for the concentration of naval vessels that were to take part
in Operation ICEBERG.
The main body
of the USN invasion covering Force, TF 58 had sailed from Ulithi on 14/3/45
and headed north. Its
objective was the Inland Sea, bounded by Kyushu, western Honshu, and
Shikoku; the task of TF 58 was to prepare for the invasion of the Ryukyus
Islands by attacking airfields and naval bases in the Japanese homeland.
The formidable task force was composed of 10 large aircraft carriers, 6
smaller carriers, 8 fast battleships, 16 cruisers, and dozens of destroyers
Although Ulithi Atoll was some
distance from the nearest Japanese air base it was necessary for the forces
at Ulithi to be alert for air attack; on 11/3/45 the anchorage was
attacked by two kamikaze Yokosuka P1Y
bombers, Frances, one
of which hit and damaged aircraft carrier USS RANDOLPH.
between the Fleet and the American anchorage at the northern end of the
harbour [about 10 miles] was too
great for ships' boats. Realising this, the US authorities placed an
L.C.I. at the disposal of the Vice Admiral Rawlings; this proved of the
greatest value, not least so as a 'staff boat' for Staff Officers in their
many lengthy trips in bad weather)
21st - The British force continued re-fuelling and ammunitioning before sailing for
Operation ICEBERG. The fuelling was done from USN tankers, destroyers
and cruisers proceeding alongside the tankers as detailed. The
tankers serviced the battleships and carriers at their anchorages.
5000 fuses Mark 40 were supplied by ComSerRon 10 to KING GEORGE V, HOWE, ARGONAUT and EURYALUS to replace fuses Mark 32. The supply
was very promptly executed and U.S. Navy personnel advised and assisted
ships' staffs when carrying out the un-fusing and re-fusing of ammunition.
22nd - In the morning Vice Admiral C.H. McMorris, U.S.N., Chief of
Staff to CinC PAC, accompanied by Captain H.S. Hopkins, R.N., British
Pacific Fleet Liaison Officer, arrived by seaplane from Guam to discuss
general matters with Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2iC British Pacific
Fleet. Admiral Nimitz had intended to come to Ulithi himself but he
had been laid up the previous day with a cold. The Flag Officers of
the British Pacific Fleet came on board KING GEORGE V for lunch and to
meet Vice Admiral McMorris.
At 1600 hours BLACK PRINCE arrived at Ulithi.
considerable activity which had prevailed during the last days at Manus
increased in intensity at Ulithi, but transferred itself mainly to Flag
Officers meetings and their staff officers. There was a continuous stream
of intelligence and other material [flown
by special plane from Guam],
arrival of which required hurried modification and re-modification of such
plans as had already near-crystallised. Typing the distribution to
the Fleet of both plans and intelligence matter went on throughout the
night of the 22/3/45, the boat shortage and the swell in the anchorage no
way assisting. In spite of everything, the British Pacific Fleet, now
designated Task Force 57 was ready to sail on 23/3/45)
23rd - At 0630 hours TF 57 (now under the overall command of
Raymond Spruance USN, CinC US Fifth Fleet) comprising TU 1, battleships KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Sir Henry Bernard Rawlings, CinC
TF 57 and 1st Battle Squadron and 2iC British Pacific Fleet) and HOWE; TU 2, aircraft carriers
Rear Admiral Sir Philip Louis Vian Rear
Admiral Aircraft Carriers, British Pacific Fleet and 2iC TF 57),
INDEFATIGABLE, VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS; TU 5,
light cruisers SWIFTSURE, BLACK PRINCE, ARGONAUT, EURYALUS (Flag RA [D] temporarily)
and GAMBIA; and TU 8, destroyers GRENVILLE, ULSTER, UNDINE, URANIA,
UNDAUNTED, QUICKMATCH, QUALITY, QUIBERON, QUEENBOROUGH, WHELP and WAGER
sailed from Ulithi heading north easterly for the re-fuelling area, 18-30N,
129-08E, and then their operational position for Operation ICEBERG.
overall objective of Operation ICEBERG
was to capture Okinawa Gunto and, gaining control of the Nansei Shoto
area, use them to attack the main islands of Japan with their
sea and air approaches. Within ICEBERG the objective of the BPF [TF 57]
was to neutralise the six airfields in the Sakishima Gunto as
continuously, and for as long as possible. H Hour for the US landing on
Okinawa had been set for
En route to the re-fuelling area bombardment exercises were carried
out by KING GEORGE V, HOWE and SWIFTSURE.
At 0310 hours with EURYALUS, BLACK PRINCE and ARGONAUT spread 8
miles apart, 8 miles ahead of the Fleet, radar contact was made with TU 12.2.5
and TU 112.2.1.
At 0600 hours an RV was made with
the re-fuelling group and destroyers commenced re-fuelling. It had been
hoped to complete the re-fuelling in five hours from the tankers, but
the north easterly wind, swell and hose problems were causing the operation
to exceed the projected time frame. Some of destroyers were therefore ordered
to refuel from KING GEORGE V, HOWE and STRIKER.
Destroyers QUALITY and WHELP,
both with defects, were detached to operate with TU 12.2.5 and TU 112.2.1
and WHIRLWIND joined TF 57.
At 1530 hours re-fuelling was
terminated and TF 57 set course for the operation area at 23½ knots.
26th - At 0635 hours when TF 57 was
in approximate position 23-15N, 125-21E, 100 miles south of the island of
Miyako-Jima, fighter sweeps were flown off to attack the airfields of
Ishigaki on the island of Ishigaki-Shima and Miyako on the island of Miyako-Jima.
(At 0800 hours the US 77th division made
the first landings of Operation ICEBERG, when they landed on the Kerama
Islands. These are a group of islands 15 miles west of Okinawa and the
landings were designed to secure a seaplane base and a fleet anchorage to support
the main invasion)
In the evening after the last
aircraft had been recovered at dusk, TF 57 moved off to the south eastward.
27th - At sunrise, which was at approximately
0600 hours, TF 57 had returned to yesterdays flying off position and flew
off a strike force to attack Ishigaki airfield.
It had been intended that the
capital ships would carry out a bombardment of Ishigaki airfield; but Guam
reported a typhoon to the southward whose track would threaten the fuelling
area and dislocate the re-fuelling. Therefore the CinC TF 57 decided to
withdraw early to the re-fuelling area.
In the evening after the last
aircraft had been recovered at dusk, TF 57 moved off south eastward toward
re-fuelling area MIDGE.
28th - At 0730 hours TF 57 made
contact with Task Units 112.2.5 and 112.2.1 in area MIDGE, a rectangle
extending 50 miles to the south and 100 miles to the west of 19-55N,
129-40E; fuelling and transfer of aircraft continued throughout the day.
The Fleet was divided into two
groups for this operation, the non-fuelling group proceeding so as to
remain within touch of the fuelling group. The Fleet disengaged from the
Tanker Group for the night.
29th - In the morning TF 57
re-engaged with the Tanker Group.
In the afternoon the RA Commanding.
Destroyers transferred his flag from EURYALUS to WHIRLWIND; the WHIRLWIND with
STRIKER and CRANE then detached for Leyte.
EURYALUS then rejoined the remainder
of the cruisers in TU 5.
During the day, mails and
correspondence brought out by the Tanker Group were distributed by
destroyers around TF 57.
Destroyers QUALITY and WHELP
rejoined TF 57.
Destroyers KEMPENFELT and
WHIRLWIND rejoined the Tanker Groups.
For the night TF 57 formed up into
Cruising Disposition 5A.
30th - In the morning TF 57
re-engaged with the Tanker Group.
At 1430 hours fuelling was completed
and TF 57 formed up in Cruising Disposition 5B. Departure was taken at 22
knots for the operating area and AC 1 assumed tactical command.
31st - At 0530 hours, ARGONAUT
and WAGER were detached to a position 3000, 30 miles from the
Fleet centre to act as pickets to prevent enemy aircraft returning
with our own strikes. ARGONAUT was chosen for this purpose as having the
most suitable radar.
At 0630 hours a fighter sweep was
sent in from a flying-off position 23-10N, 125-23E and thereafter
fighter patrols were maintained over the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako.
There appeared to be little activity in either island. Two bomber strikes
were sent against Ishigaki airfield, installations and barracks.
At dusk TF 57 disengaged to the
south westward and CTF 57 assumed tactical command.
1st - As TF 57 approached the
operational area, AC 1 assumed tactical command.
ARGONAUT and WAGER opened out to
their picket positions before the fighter sweep was launched.
At 0640 hours from the flying-off
position 23-26N, 125-25E, the first fighter sweep was launched.
At 0650 hours bogeys were detected
by radar to the westward, height 8,000 feet, closing at 210 knots. The fighter sweep was recalled to
intercept and additional fighters were flown off.
The raid split up more than 40 miles
from the Fleet.
One enemy ZEKE aircraft
machine-gunned INDOMITABLE in a low attack killing one rating and
wounding two officers and four ratings. Still flying very low it made a
similar attack on KING GEORGE V but without causing casualties.
Considerable difficulty was
experienced in identifying enemy planes from the FAA planes that were hard
on the enemy heels.
At 0727 hours an enemy Kamikaze plane
dived into the base of the INDEFATIGABLE's island. Four officers and ten
ratings were killed, and sixteen of her complement wounded. The flight deck
was put temporarily out of action.
At about 0755 hours the ULSTER was
near missed by what appeared to be a 500 lb. bomb from an aircraft then
being chased by one of our fighters. ULSTER reported that the bulkhead
between the engine-room and the after boiler-room had blown, flooding both
compartments, but that the ship was floating well. Casualties were two
killed and one seriously wounded. She was unable to steam but her armament
remained effective. The QUIBERON was ordered to stand by her and as soon as
the raid was over the GAMBIA was ordered to tow ULSTER to Leyte.
(At 0830 hours the first landings by US
forces took place on the island of Okinawa)
(At 1200 hours,
the ULSTER in tow, left TF 57. Two days later destroyer reported that
she was short of drinking water and supplies were passed to her from the
GAMBIA, sixteen casks being veered astern one at a time on the end of a
light wire line. On 4/4/45, minesweepers HMAS BALLARAT and LISMORE RVed
with the GAMBIA and provided an anti-submarine escort for the rest of the
passage. Two hours after the meeting, the tow-line carried away when two
badly worn links in the ULSTER's cable parted. It took GAMBIA five
hours to recover her wire and pass a 61/2-inch wire hawser which was
secured to the destroyer's two remaining shackles of cable. The ships
arrived off the entrance to Leyte Gulf in the evening of the 5/4/45 and the
tow was transferred to a naval tug. GAMBIA had towed the ULSTER 760
miles at an average speed of eight knots)
At 1215 hours a bombing strike was
sent in against Ishigaki to bomb airfields and runways. No activity was
At 1430 hours reports were received
from combat patrols over the islands that more aircraft had been sighted at
Hirara and Ishigaki airfields. These were attacked by the fighter patrols
and were followed by a fighter sweep. It was estimated that about 14 enemy
aircraft were destroyed on the ground during this attack and others
At 1730 hours a low flying bogey was
detected by radar to the north westward. Hellcats were sent to intercept
this raid which developed into 2 plus but the enemy avoided them in cloud.
Soon afterwards the Fleet sighted the enemy and opened fire, sometimes it
is regretted, at friendly fighters.
One enemy aircraft dived on the VICTORIOUS;
her swing under full helm was successful and the plane touched its wing
only on the flight deck edge spinning harmlessly into the sea where its
bomb exploded clear of the ship. The manuscript instructions to the pilot
were blown on board the VICTORIOUS, an interesting document,
denoting priority of targets for suicide planes.
(The matter of differentiating between friendly
and enemy aircraft became daily more important. With the Kamikaze's
being chased by friendly fighters right on to the Fleet's guns, there was only
a matter of seconds in which to act. Presented at certain angles there is
very little difference between the Kamikaze Japanese single-engined
aircraft and some of the FAA fighters. On the other hand the means of
controlling, particularly of, stopping, the fire of the innumerable small
guns that are now scattered about ships, often with poor communications, made
the problem difficult)
At dusk TF 57 disengaged to the
south eastward and CinC TF 57 assumed tactical command.
2nd - At 0510 hours, in moonlight,
two fighters were flown off INDOMITABLE and sent to Ishigaki airfield. Two
other aircraft were flown off at the same time and destined for Miyako airfield,
but theses were unable to proceed owing to radio failures. No activity was
reported from Ishigaki.
(It was evident from experience the day
before that the Japanese had started staging into the Sakishima airfields
and it was therefore decided to cancel the planned bombardment in favour of
air operations. Also the absence of enemy activity noticed by the first
fighter sweep the previous day made it appear likely that the enemy might
be leaving the airfields at first light)
At 0630 hours from a flying off
position 230-12N, 126-02E a fighter Ramrod was flown off to attack all
airfields before TF 57 withdrew. Little activity was noticed, but one
airborne Zeke was shot down over Ishigaki by Hellcats.
At 1045 hours the fighter Ramrod was
recovered, following which TF 57 withdrew to fuelling area MIDGE,
maintaining a CAP of 12 aircraft until dark
The CinC TF 57 was very disappointed
to have to cancel the bombardment again, for although bombing was far more
successful in cratering the runways etc. Rawlings particularly wished
to bombard for the sake of the personnel manning the battleships and
cruisers, many of whom were very young and untried.
As TF 57 left the operational area
CinC TF 57 resumed tactical command.
(During the period 23rd March to 2nd
April inclusive, losses of aircraft were 25, compared to 47 enemy
destroyed or probably destroyed and .38 damaged, on the ground. Enemy
vessels sunk and damaged
were one lugger sunk, 13 other small vessels probably sunk, and over 40
small craft damaged)
3rd - 0630. There was no sign of the
Tanker Group in rendezvous position MIDGE ONE, 19-12N, 128-00E. Weather: heavy N.E. swell, wind
north, force 5. SWIFTSURE, ARGONAUT and EURYALUS were ordered ahead to
carry out a search for the Fleet train.
At 0900 hours TF 57 made W/T contact
with Tanker Group.
At 1320 hours TF 57 RVed with TU 112.2.5
The weather and cross swell were too
heavy to attempt re-fuelling. TF 57 remained in the area throughout the
day, but towards the evening meteorological information
suggesting more suitable weather to the westward; TF 57 and the Fleet Train
turned west to area MOSQUITO.
A US Task Group, TF 58, was ordered
to cover Sakishima Gunto during the absence of TF 57.
4th - En route to area MOSQUITO.
(At 0630 hours TU 112.2.3 arrived in
replenishment position MOSQUITO from San Pedro Bay, Leyte. TU 112.2.3
included escort carrier SLINGER with replacement aircraft embarked and
two further oilers, RFA's ARNDALE 8296grt, 12 knots and DINGLEDALE
8145grt, 11.5 knots. This brought the number of oilers available for
refuelling to five)
At 0730 hours TF 57 commenced
refuelling and transferring stores and aircraft in a heavy N.N.E. swell in
position, MOSQUITO ONE, 19-37N, 124-42E.
At 1920 hours TF 57 disengaged from
the Tanker Group for the night.
5th - TF 57 returned to position
At 0630 hours recommenced refuelling
TF 57, the weather conditions for fuelling having considerably improved.
During replenishment, Captain E. C.
Ewen, USN, the senior USN Liaison Officer, was transferred from the
INDOMITABLE to KING GEORGE V.
At 1930 hours TF 57 having
disengaged from the Tanker Group; TF 57 set course at 20 knots for the
operational area. Owing to the numerous delays in fuelling, KING GEORGE V and the HOWE had to proceed, nearly 50% short of their full fuel stowage
and the aircraft carriers had been able to embark only sufficient Avgas for
the forthcoming two days' operation.
(Rawlings took the decision to stop
replenishment even though refuelling was incomplete as he judged it
essential to leave with these shortages in order to be back at the
time promised. He did not like battleships steaming about short of fuel for
although they should have enough oil for the operation as planned, it left
little in hand to meet any change of programme, and if a ship short of
fuel received underwater damage her position might become embarrassing)
6th - At 0450 hours four fighters
were flown the INDOMITABLE, two each to Miyako and Ishigaki airfields to
attack any enemy aircraft taking off at dawn, but early reports from these
planes indicated little or no activity in the islands. Heavy low cloud over
the islands impeded operations. However eight aircraft not previously
noticed at Ishigaki were attacked with apparent satisfactory results.
At 0530 hours, ARGONAUT and
URANIA with a CAP were detached to act as Radar pickets to the north
At 0625 hours CAP (Combat Air Patrol) and ASP (Anti-Submarine Patrol) for the Fleet flown off.
0635 hours TF 57 was in position 23-16N, 125-36E and CAPS were flown off to
cover both islands. The craters in the runway at Miyako airfield were
observed to be filled in.
At 0650, ARGONAUT and
URANIA not being required to operate as pickets, were ordered to
rejoin TF 57.
At 0850 hours TF 57 was
detected by an enemy aircraft who escaped in cloud.
In the forenoon Hellcats
returning from Miyako, shot down a Frances, after a 30 mile chase.
At about 1700 hours bogeys
were detected by Radar. Fighters intercepted them and splashed one Judy. One
Kamikaze out of an estimated raid of four broke through in cloud and dived
on the ILLUSTRIOUS, who took radical avoiding action. The aircraft's wingtip
hit the island, spinning the aircraft into the sea where the bomb exploded.
Only slight damage and no casualties were caused.
After the dusk the CAP
had been flown on and TF 57 disengaged to the south eastward and CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
(During the day the following signal was
received by the CinC TF 57:
To:—COM 5th Fleet (R) CTF 58
CTF 57 CTF 51 CTF 56 CTF 17
From C IN C PAC
I share your hope we can bring enemy
to decisive battle. Expect all out enemy reactions in prospect.
Good luck.— Nimitz)
7th - At 0530 hours AC 1
assumed tactical control.
At 0530 hours ARGONAUT
and URANIA were detached to the north westward to act as Radar pickets,
with orders to rejoin TF 57 at 0810 hours.
(In view of Admiral Nimitz's appreciation
that an all out enemy air reaction against the land and sea forces in and
around Okinawa was imminent, the bombardment of Ishigaki planned to take
place p.m. was cancelled in favour of air operations only, clouds over the
island also influencing the decision.
A report was
received that an enemy surface force had 'been sighted in the early hours
leaving the Inland Sea and steering to the southward')
At 0610 hours CAPS for the Fleet and
islands, and ASP were flown off from position 23-16N, 125-36E. The island
CAPS reported little activity on the islands, but noticed that bomb craters
on Ishigaki had been filled in, and that Hirara and Nobara airfields appeared
serviceable. It was therefore decided to send in three bomber strikes
during the day to re-crater these fields. These strikes were successfully
carried out without loss.
(In the afternoon a USN Privateer
aircraft [a navalised Liberator
bomber] sighted and reported a
Corsair pilot who had lost, his way and landed in
the sea about 70 miles from TF 57. The Privateer having reported him,
dropped dinghies and remained in the vicinity until relieved by FAA
URANIA escorted by two
fighters was despatched to the rescue of the Corsair pilot. URANIA
recovered him, but unfortunately he was found to be dead.
At 1930 hours CTF 57 assumed
tactical command and the Fleet set course to refuel in area COOTIE, an
American area closer to TF 57's operating area than areas MIDGE or MOSQUITO
and which C IN C PAC had approved TF 57 using.
USN TG 52 was
instructed to cover Sakishima Gunto during the day in the absence of TF 57
(In the evening CTF 57 learned that
aircraft from TF 58 had dealt severely with a Japanese surface force which
had sallied forth from the Inland Sea. Reports, which indicated that the
enemy lost 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers sunk, with 2 destroyers
burning. This news filled crews of the ships of TF 57 with admiration and
at the same time, envy. This was a suicide attack on the US forces off
Okinawa by the world's largest battleship the YAMATO the
light cruiser YAHAGI and 8 destroyers. The USN attacked the Japanese Force
with 386 aircraft from TF 58)
8th - At 0600 hours TF 57
RVed with TU 112.2.5 in position COOTIE ONE, 21-12N, 128-44E and commenced
to refuel the Fleet in excellent weather conditions.
Light cruiser HMCS
UGANDA and destroyers URCHIN and URSA joined TF 57 as reinforcements
and GAMBIA rejoined from Leyte after towing the ULSTER.
By dusk all ships except
one battleship and one aircraft carrier had fuelled from the 5 tankers. At
this point TF 57 disengaged for the night.
9th - At 0630 hours TF 57
UNDAUNTED rejoined TU
112.2.5 from Leyte, WHIRLWIND joined TF 57 from TU 112.2.5, and WHELP
detached from TF 57 with A/S defects to Leyte.
At 1500 hours refuelling
At 1530 hours TF 57
proceeded, setting course to carry out final strikes on Sakishima on 10th and
11th April; the programme then envisaged TF 57 returning to Leyte
(At 1650 hours the following signal was
C IN C PAC (R) CTF 57
From COM 5th Fleet.
On 11-12 April propose Task Force 57
and Matsuyama, airfields Formosa. Request you
arrange SOWESPAC AIR hit Southern Formosa fields same days. COMSUBPAC
assign lifeguards to stations 9, 10 and, if possible, 11 on these days. TG
52.1 will maintain neutralisation Sakishima Gunto.
Shortly after, the following signal
was also received:
CTF 57 and 51.
From COM 5th Fleet
CTF 57 cancel 10th April Sakishima
operations. TG 52.1 continues
neutralisation that day. CTF
57 advise if following not within capabilities. If approved by C IN C PAC, CTF 57 to strike Shinchiku
and Matsuyama airfields Formosa 11-12 April.
These were the first intimation that a change of plan was
contemplated for TF 57; Rawlings thought it looked an attractive change.
Rawlings discussed the situation with AC 1, following which they decided
that the attacks on the Formosan airfields could be undertaken.
At 1817 hours CTF 57 made a signal
to inform COM 5th Fleet that TF 57 were ready to attack Formosa)
10th - TF 57 continued
patrolling in the southern area during most of the day.
At 0845 hours AC 1's Chief
'Staff Officer was transferred to KING GEORGE V by destroyer and the
various details of the strike plans were discussed with Rawlings and his
(Following the discussion, Rawlings made a
signal to inform all concerned of his intentions:
To COM 5th Fleet (R) CINC POA both
HQs. CTG 50.5. CINC BPF, CTG 51, CTF 112, COMAAFSWPA, CINCSWPA.
From CTF 57
From approximate position SAMSON
196½¼ from western tip Yonakumi Jima will strike Matsuyama and Shinchiku airfields 11-12 April forenoons. Will replenish COOTIE area 13th
April. On 16th will arrive Leyte)
At 1203 hours TF 57 was
in position 20-35N, 125-55E when the final signals were transmitted to Guam.
At 1700 hours TF 57 was steering
for the flying-off position and CTF 57 handed over tactical command to AC 1.
The operation was named ICEBERG OOLONG.
11th - At 0600 hours TF
57 arrived at the flying-off position, 30 miles 202¼ from Yonakumi Shima. There
was a fresh N.N.E. wind, moderate sea and short swell. Cloud base was about
1,000 feet with intermittent rain and drizzle.
Course was reversed and
in daylight it was soon apparent that conditions were unlikely to improve
in the flying area during the day while weather reports showed that
conditions over Matsuyama precluded any hope of attack. It was considered
that a small fighter sweep coasting round North Formosa might find
Shinchiku, but that their return journey would be a considerable gamble and
surprise lost. Conditions were most unsuitable also for air-sea rescue.
Operations were accordingly postponed 24 hours, and the Fleet
continued to the south eastward.
At 1813 hours CTF 57 received
CinC US 5th Fleet's order to all Task Group Commanders to prepare for
heavy enemy air attacks on 12th April.
At 2000 hours CTF.57
assumed tactical command.
Course was reversed
during the night to bring the Fleet to the flying-off position at dawn.
12th - Overnight the
weather improved considerably.
At 0530 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0555 hours
enemy reconnaissance aircraft
possibly detected TF 57 and soon afterwards enemy air activity was detected
to the northward.
At 0615 hours CAP flown off.
At 0704 hours Seafires had an encounter with four
eastbound Zekes, one of which was shot down.
At 0715 hours in position 23-58N, 122-46E the main strike force of 24
bombers and 20 fighters was flown off.
At 1135 a shadowing Dinah was chased
by Corsairs, which, after releasing their drop tanks, caught and destroyed
At 1410 hours a Dinah escorted by
two Oscar's escaped our fighters in cloud
At 1530 hours Hellcats to the north
westward of the Fleet shot down a Zeke.
In the evening the enemy made a
sortie from Ishigaki, which was intercepted by fighters.
At dusk all aircraft were recovered
and TF 57 moved away from the operational area.
At 2100 hours CTF 57 assumed tactical
(From signals received CTF 57 became
aware that during the day US forces off Okinawa were being heavily attacked
by Kamikaze's and that Formosa-based planes were taking part. Rawlings came
to the conclusion during the evening that TF 57 must contrive to remain for
a further period; even it could do little more than occasionally strike at
the Sakishima Gunto. TF 57 should anyhow provide an alternative target
to take some of the weight. AC 1 had evidently come to the same conclusion,
for at 2113 hours he informed Rawlings that, in view of the very heavy air
attacks being launched against US forces on and around Okinawa, he felt
that our remaining aircraft and aircrews could manage a fifth operating
period provided that our losses tomorrow should remain small. In the
event, the Formosa attack days acted as tonic. I therefore made the
COM 5th Fleet (R) CTG 52.1 CINC BPF, CINC PACCTF
From CTF 57.
In view of current situation expect
to be ready further operations 16th-17th April. If Formosa weather bad
tomorrow intend deal with Ishigaki and significant intercepted traffic
between Sakishima and Formosa both ways)
13th - At 0530 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
At 0550 hours four
fighters were flown off. A bogey originally detected at 0540 hours developed
into an ineffective raid by four Vals accompanied by a radar fitted search
plane. One Val dive bombed, but missed INDOMITABLE.
At 0615 hours in position 23-58N,
122-46E the CAP proper was flown off.
At 0640 hours a small group of
bogeys was intercepted 25 miles to the north west, two Zekes were
splashed by Corsairs and the remainder retired to the northward.
At 0645 Avenger strikes were flown
to attack Matsuyama and Shinchiku airfields.
At 1300 hours Hellcats intercepted
three Zekes about 40 miles north of .the Fleet, and Corsairs intercepted
a Dinah escorted by Tojos. All the enemy aircraft escaped in cloud.
(At 1840 hours the following signal was
received, and plans for a fifth operating period were made
From COM 5th Fleet
Cover Sakishima 16th and 17th unless
other orders received in interim. Affirmative your message of 12th. Appreciate
your co-operation and initiative)
At 1945 hours after all aircraft had
been flown on, CTF 57 assumed tactical command and TF 57 moved out of the
operational area to RV with Fleet Train.
(When Rawlings became aware of the death
of President Roosevelt [Roosevelt
died at 1535/12/4/45 at
Warm Springs, Georgia]
he sent the
From CTF 57
It was with profound grief that TF
57 learned of the death of the President of the United States)
14th - At 0630 hours TF 57 RVed with
TU 112.2.5 and Tanker-Group consisting of 5 tankers in position COOTIE ONE,
Fuelling was commenced in fine
weather and proceeded with fewer delays than usual.
Aircraft carrier FORMIDABLE and
destroyers KEMPENFELT and WESSEX joined TF 57.
At 1755 hours, ILLUSTRIOUS screened
by destroyers URANIA and QUALITY detached for Leyte.
(Following receipt of the order to the US
Fleet to half mast colours, Rawlings gave orders that British ships in
harbour or near thereto, should conform. 'Since US ships do not, I
understand, fly their colours in the operation areas and the half masting
of our colours at sea in war is I believe only done when convoying or
burying the deceased, the position
was not clear as regards TF 57. However Rawlings felt it fitting and in
keeping with what I knew to be the feeling of the British Fleet for this
great leader and sincere friend of the British Empire, to mark the occasion
irrespective of precedent'; therefore Rawlings ordered colours to be half masted for
the last hour before sunset)
(During the refuelling operation, oiler
RFA WAVE KING established a record at the time for the number of ships
refuelled in one day and pumped 5050 tons of oil in 9 hours)
At dusk TF 57 disengaged from the
Tanker Force for the night.
15th - At 0730 hours TF 57 rejoined the
Tanker Group, now consisting of three tankers.
By 1400 hours fuelling and general
replenishing was completed at TF 57 set course to cover the Sakishima area
16th - At 0530 hours AC 1 assumed
No picket cruiser was stationed owing to the shortage of
fighter aircraft. (No supply of new aircraft had been available during the
At 0600 hours, 17 minutes before
sunrise, in position 23-28N, 125-18E the CAP was flown off in excellent
At 0622 hours an enemy snooper at
20,000 feet escaped before the CAP had time to gain height.
At 0630 hours the first strike took off to attack Ishigaki
0930 hours the second strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.
1230 hours a further strike took off to attack Ishigaki airfields.
1530 hours a further strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.
At 1536 hours fighters
failed to find a 320 knot bogey closing from the westward, the bogey fading
at 25 miles. A possible explanation for these mysterious bogeys is that
they were piloted flying bombs launched too far away and which failed to
reach TF 57 before exhausting their fuel.
At 1722 hours Hellcats
shot down a Myrt which was apparently stalking a USN Privateer search
(In spite of
having received no replenishment aircraft since 9/4/45 and the lack of
fighters consequently felt, AC 1 informed CTF 57 that he considered a sixth
operation period, if confined to one day, would be possible.
therefore, in view of the sustained heavy enemy air attacks on our Fleet
mates at and around Okinawa, informed Commander 5th Fleet as follows:
Continuing operations Sakishima
tomorrow. Own losses light. Little enemy activity except anti-aircraft
fire. If light losses continue, can strike final blow 19th April. Same Dumbo and submarine services needed)
At dusk TF 57 disengaged
to the south eastward and CTF 57 assumed tactical command at 2110
- At 0520 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
At 0600 hours TF 57 was in position 23-34N, 125-38E. CAP was flown off.
At 0609 a few bogeys were detected to the north west of the Fleet.
Fighters sent to investigate splashed one Zeke.
0630 hours the first strike took off to attack Miyako airfields.
At 1627 hours bogeys were
detected 110 miles west of the Fleet. Fighters intercepted at 55 miles and
two out of 6 Zekes were shot down, the others escaping in cloud.
At 1750 hours the close
range weapons on KING GEORGE V suddenly opened fire on what appeared to
be a blazing aircraft diving vertically on the ship. It turned out to be a falling
dropped tank from a Corsair overhead, both parties missed.
(Rawlings signal informing COM 5th Fleet
that TF 57 would be available to strike again on 20th April was approved by
A further signal was also received:
To CTF 57 (R) 5th Fleet, CINC BPC.
It was gratifying to note, your
message of 16th to COM 5th Fleet. Your Force is always ready to make still
greater efforts whenever there is an opportunity to hit the enemy.
Appreciate your offer which is traditional of British Navy)
At 1945 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command of TF 57, which then withdrew to fuel in area MOSQUITO
18th - At 0630 hours TF 57 commenced fuelling from Tanker Group of 5 tankers
in area MOSQUITO ONE. Mails, stores, and correspondence were transferred
but no replenishment aircraft were available.
Destroyers HMAS NAPIER (7), NORMAN and NEPAL joined TF 57 and HMS UNDAUNTED
Three of the five tankers
of the tanker group, with Captain of Escort Forces in sloop PHEASANT,
detached and sailed for Leyte.
By dusk TF 57 had
completed fuelling and disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.
19th - At 0730 hours TF
57 rejoined the remaining two tankers of the tanker group, and destroyers
The second day in
replenishing area was necessary in order to rest aircrews, and for
maintenance work on aircraft.
At 1300 hours TF 57 disengaged
and set course for the Sakishima area, leaving KEMPENFELT (D27) in the fuelling
area with 2 tankers, SPEAKER and the sloops WOODCOCK and FINDHORN, with
orders to proceed to Leyte at dawn on 21st April.
20th - At 0520 hours AC 1assumed
At 0555 hours in position
23-33N, 125-02E the CAP was flown off.
The plan for the day
followed generally the pattern of previous strikes, namely to crater the
runways on all Miyako and Ishigaki airfields and to maintain a CAP over
them to prevent repair work, destroying any enemy airborne, and to strafe
any grounded planes. In addition, 2 strikes by rocket-firing Fireflies were
ordered to attack coastal shipping and ground installations.
There was no enemy
airborne opposition over the islands and none came near the Fleet. The
several bogeys detected during the day were all found to be friendly search
planes when intercepted.
At 1910 hours TF 57 set
course for Leyte, having completed 12 strike days out of 26 days between
first and last strikes.
At 1930 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
22nd - During the day,
and taking advantage of the presence of Chief Staff Officer to CinC BPF on
board KING GEORGE V, Rear Admiral E. J. P. Brind, C.B., C.B.E. (Flag
Officer Commanding, 4th Cruiser Squadron), and Captain J. P. Wright, D.S.O.
(C.S.O. to AC 1), were transferred by destroyer to KING GEORGE V for
At 1700 hours paravanes
At 2000 hours,
SWIFTSURE (Flag 4CS), GAMBIA, UGANDA and EURYALUS to proceed ahead to
23rd - At 1030 hours TF
57 entered the swept channel.
At 1115 hours paravanes
At 1245 hours TF 57
anchored in San Pedro Bay, Leyte. TF 57 anchored close to the ships of the
TF 57 had been at sea for
32 days since sailing from Ulithi. On arrival in San Pedro Bay the ships of
TF 57 commenced making good defects and replenishing from ships of the
R and R for the crews of
TF 57 was taken on board ship.
KING GEORGE V's new commanding officer,
Captain Brian Bethem Schofield, RN, took command.
arrival at Leyte, Rawlings waited upon Admiral Kincaid USN, Commander US 7th
Fleet, and he met Vice Admiral J. L. Kauffman USN, Commander Philippine Sea
Frontier and Rear Admiral R. O. Davis USN, Commander Amphibious Group 13.
Following his meetings with these
officers Rawlings hosted a lunch for them on board his Flagship, KING
Commodore E. M. Evans-Lombe RN,
Captain (S) J. R. Allfrey RN, Chief of Staff and Secretary to CinC BPF,
after most useful discussions, with Flag Officers of TF 57, left Leyte by
air for Guam: Captain E. C. Ewen, USN, liaison Officer with TF 57,
travelled with them.
Uppermost in Rawlings mind during
the first few days at Leyte was the question of the future employment of
Task Force 57. Rawlings had been informed by the CinC BPF, that alternative
employment for the Fleet in the immediate future was under consideration as
of Operation ICEBERG as already planned.
Withdrawal from ICEBERG and
engagement on an operation in Borneo with target date for leaving Leyte of approximately
The CinC's signals made the latter
appear the most probable.
On 27/4/45 a signal was received
from CinC BPF making it clear that the Fleet would not participate in the
Borneo operation and CinC, Pacific in a signal informed Rawlings that TF 57
should continue with Operation ICEBERG. This was very satisfactory.
In Rawlings's signal to COM 5th
Fleet he stated his intention and ability, unless otherwise ordered,
to proceed from Leyte with TF 57 on 1st May to
continue the neutralisation of Sakishima Gunto for a period of from three
to four weeks before requiring to withdraw for major replenishment.
Operations were planned for a cycle of two days of strikes. followed by two
for replenishment, the first strikes to be carried out on 4th and 5th May
24th to 30th - At San Pedro Bay where repairs
and replenishment of TF 57 continued.
1st - At 0630 hours TF57 sailed from Leyte
in the following groups:
1st Battle Squadron comprising battleships KING GEORGE V (Flag CTF 57 and 1stBS) and HOWE.
1st Carrier Squadron comprising aircraft carriers
INDOMITABLE (Flag of 2iC TF57
and AC 1), VICTORIOUS, FORMIDABLE and INDEFATIGABLE.
4th Cruiser Squadron
comprising light cruisers SWIFTSURE (Flag of CS.4), EURYALUS, BLACK
PRINCE, HMCS UGANDA and HMNZS GAMBIA.
4th Destroyer Flotilla
comprising destroyers QUILLIAM (D4), QUEENBOROUGH,
QUALITY , HMAS QUIBERON,
and HMAS QUICKMATCH.
Flotilla comprising destroyers GRENVILLE (D5), UNDINE, URCHIN,
URANIA, UNDAUNTED and URSA.
was set to RV with the Logistic Support
Group in area MOSQUITO ONE.
2nd - TF 57 continued steaming for replenishment area MOSQUITO ONE.
3rd - At 0600 hours TF 57 RVed with
the Logistic Support Group TF 112 comprising oilers RFA CEDARDALE, MV SAN AMBROSIO and MV SAN ADOLPHO escorted by destroyers
HMAS NAPIER (D7), HMAS NEPAL, HMAS NIZAM and HMAS NORMAN, sloops HMS CRANE
and WHIMBREL and frigate AVON.
TF 57 cruisers and destroyers
topped up with fuel.
By 1530 hours fuelling was completed.
transferred fuel at sea using hoses
trailed astern of the tankers since they lacked catamarans to keep
ships apart and the appropriate derricks and block and tackles to sail side by side while fuelling.
Admiral Vian called this method 'an awkward, un-seaman like business. This
approach was dangerous and resulted in incidents like the one on 3/5/45
when the UGANDA fouled one of her propellers on a hose. Because of the
method used it took the RN twice as long as the USN to replenish their
ships. When the RN mastered the techniques that the US Pacific Fleet had
mastered, such as having ships refuel abeam of their tanker, the time
required was reduced)
TF 112 set course for area COOTIE.
TF 57 set course for their
operational area to commence Operation ICEBERG TWO.
4th - At
0500 hours AC 1 assumed
(The plan for the opening of operations of
ICEBERG TWO was:
(a) To make airfields of the
Sakishima Gunto unserviceable by bombing runways and air installations.
(b) To conduct an offensive against
flak positions and to assist in cratering runways by ship bombardment.
(c) To maintain an offensive CAP
over the islands.
The particular plan for the first
day was for the bombarding force to bombard Miyako airfields and flak
positions at about noon, from medium range, with the Carrier Force about 30
miles to the southward)
At 0540 hours in position
23-44N, 125-11E the CAP was flown off
At 0600 hours enemy air activity in
the vicinity of Sakishima was detected, the general trend of traffic being
to the eastward. One small group approached the Fleet and Hellcats
shot down one Zeke before the others escaped in cloud.
At 0605 hours bomber strikes were
flown off against Miyako.
At 0815 hours bomber strikes were
flown off against Ishigaki.
At 1000 hours in position 23-54N,
125-10E the bombarding force comprising KING GEORGE V, HOWE, SWIFTSURE,
GAMBIA and UGANDA escorted by destroyers
UNDINE, URCHIN, URANIA, UNDAUNTED and URSA, and EURYALUS and BLACK PRINCE, detached from the
carrier force and closed Miyako at 24 knots. The carriers provided an
additional CAP for this force as well as aircraft for spotting.
At 1155 hours the bombarding force
passed through position 24- 33.5N, 125-10E on the bombarding course of
070 degrees at 15 knots. KING GEORGE V and HOWE were in open order line ahead
and screened by 25th DF and EURYALUS and BLACK PRINCE, who occupied the
two port, i.e. inshore, positions on the screen. SWIFTSURE, GAMBIA and UGANDA
in open order line ahead were stationed 270¼, 3 miles, i.e. fire off port
quarter of the Fleet Flagship. Conditions were ideal.
At 1205 hours fire was opened. KING
GEORGE V and HOWE bombarded Hirara airfield and the A.A. defence area to
the north of the airfield, respectively.
EURYALUS and BLACK PRINCE
carried out a simultaneous air burst shoot on the A.A. defence
area of Nobara airfield.
On completion of the air
burst shoot, SWIFTSURE and GAMBIA bombarded Nobara airfield,
and UGANDA bombarded Sukama air strip.
In spite of comparatively close
ranges, no form of opposition from the shore was encountered.
At 1247 hours fire was checked
after firing 77 rounds of 14in and 188 rounds of 5.25in.
(The shots fired by UGANDA were the
first shots fired in anger at sea by a Canadian warship against the
Photographs showed that the runways
at Nobara and Sukama were-well hit and that all rounds from the HOWE fell
in the target area, but no photographs were obtained to show results of the
bombardment by KING GEORGE V.
(A few minutes after the bombardment was
commenced CTF 57 received a signal from AC 1 to say that the FORMIDABLE had
been hit; at 1131 hours she was struck by a Zeke Kamikaze, and was reduced
to a speed of 18 knots. CTF 57 accordingly informed the Bombarding Force
and instructed ships to speed up the bombardment. As signals were corrupt
and the situation not quite clear, CTF 57 ordered the cease fire a little
earlier- than planned and at 1247 hours turned the force to the southward
and closed the carriers at 25 knots)
At 1500 hours the
bombarding force rejoined the carriers.
At 1945 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command and TF 57 withdrew from the area for the night.
(Because the operational condition of the
FORMIDABLE was not clear, the programme for the day was arranged on the
basis that FORMIDABLE would keep 8 fighters at readiness to reinforce the
CAP if required.
At 0420 hours FORMIDABLE reported
that repairs to her centre boiler room were complete and that full speed
At 0500 hours AC 1
assumed tactical control.
At 0545 hours in position
23-10N, 125-29E the CAP was flown off.
Bombing missions were
carried out against runways on Miyako and Ishigaki.
At 1905 the Fleet
withdrew and set course for area COOTIE.
At 1945 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
In the absence of TF 57, US
Task Group 52.1 covered Sakishima.
- At 0630 hours in area COOTIE ONE, position 21-12N, 128-44E, TF 57 RVed
with the Logistic
Support Group TF 112 comprising oilers RFA's CEDARDALE, WAVE
KING, WAVE MONARCH and MV SAN AMBROSIO and MV SAN ADOLPHO, escort carriers RULER and STRIKER escorted by destroyers
HMAS NAPIER (D7), HMAS NEPAL, HMAS NIZAM and HMAS NORMAN, sloops
CRANE, PHEASANT and WHIMBREL and frigate AVON.
At 0700 hours re-fuelling commenced and exchange of aircraft with STRIKER continued throughout the day.
(The RULER, who had embarked 885 Sqd a
composite squadron of 18 Hellcats and four Avenger, provided a CAP and ASP over TF 112)
Casualties from FORMIDABLE were
transferred to the STRIKER.
At 1915 hours STRIKER and destroyer KEMPENFELT detached for
HMAS NAPIER joined TF 57.
At 1845 the Fleet
detached from the Tanker Group for the night.
7th - At 0615 hours TF 57
RVed with TF 112 and re-commenced fuelling and
exchange of stores, mail and correspondence.
At 1400 hours fuelling was
completed and TF 57 set course to return to the operational area. By this
time the FORMIDABLE had made good her damage and was fully operational.
(NORMAN was ordered to escort
oilers WAVE KING and WAVE MONARCH to Leyte; and WHIMBREL and AVON
escorted oilers SAN AMBROSIO, SAN ADOLPHO and CEDARDALE to
9th - At 0510 hours AC 1
command. The weather although showery was much improved and continued
to do so during the day.
hours in position 23-06N, 126-00E, CAPS were flown off. Weather over the
targets was reported as satisfactory. All runways at Hirara were
reported as serviceable.
At 0830 hours in position 23-40N, 125- 34E. the first bomber strike was
Three further bomber
strikes were flown off during the day.
1145 hours TF 57 was sighted by a bogey which approached within 30 miles.
Fighters drove it off but were unable to catch it.
1645 hours bogeys were detected very low 22 miles to the westward coming
in fast. Four Seafires intercepted at 15 miles, but allowed themselves to
be decoyed away by one aircraft which they shot down. Meanwhile
four other enemy planes evaded another division of Seafires, and after
climbing to about 3,000 feet penetrated to the Fleet.
1650 hours onwards the Fleet was radically manoeuvred by emergency turns at
22 knots. One minute after such a turn of 6o degrees to starboard was executed, a Kamikaze
made a 10 degrees angle dive onto the VICTORIOUS from her starboard quarter. The
enemy was well hit by close range weapons but crashed onto the flight deck
near the forward lift.
1656 hours another Kamikaze made a shallow power glide from astern on VICTORIOUS.
Though hit hard by gunfire, and well on fire, it hit the flight deck aft a
glancing blow, and burning furiously, passed over the side. Damage to the
ship was limited.
At 1657 hours a third
Kamikaze made a pass at VICTORIOUS but then shifted target to the HOWE
further ahead, and approached from the starboard quarter in a long shallow
dive. This time the attacker was hit at a more reasonable range, and
continued to be so until it crashed in flames 100 yards from the HOWE after
passing over the quarterdeck.
At 1705 hours a fourth
Kamikaze approached FORMIDABLE and then INDOMITABLE, being engaged
by both ships, without apparent result. It then turned and dived into the
after deck park of the FORMIDABLE. There
was a large explosion and fire and a great deal of smoke. Speed was reduced
to 15 knots to aid control of the fire which was extinguished at
At 1755 hours the FORMIDABLE
reported being fit to land on aircraft.
(The state of the Carrier Squadron was
now as follows. The FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS could operate, but the former
had only four bombers and 11 fighters serviceable, and also had two
pom-pom mountings out of action. The VICTORIOUS could operate a few
aircraft at a time, but the damage to her lift seriously reduced her speed
of handling. In the circumstances CTF 57 concurred with a recommendation
from AC 1 that the Fleet should withdraw to fuel, sort out and make good
the damage, etc; and return to strike on 12th/13th May. Rawlings informed Commander 5th
Fleet of this intention. As TG 52.1 had been ordered to cover Sakishima on
days when TF 57 was not striking, these two alterations to the
programme, dictated first by weather and then by damage consideration, must
have caused inconvenience to QJG 52.1)
At 1950 hours TF 57 left
the operational area and course was set for area COOTIE.
At 2000 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
USN Task Unit 52.1.3
covered Sakishima during 10th and 11th May.
- At 0610 hours in area COOTIE ONE, TF 57 RVed with the
Logistic Support Group TF 112 comprising oilers
RFA ARNDALE and DINGLEDALE, MV AASE
10.5knots [Danish, taken over by MOWT in 1940]
and MV SAN
AMADO 7316grt, 12 knots, tug WEASEL, and escort carriers RULER and STRIKER escorted by destroyer NEPAL, sloops
CRANE, PHEASANT and WOODCOCK and minesweepers [known as corvettes in
Australian Navy] HMAS WHYALLA and BALLARAT.
At 0630 hours re-fuelling
and the exchange of mail correspondence and stores, and the
replenishment of aircraft commenced and continued throughout the day.
AC 1 visited VICTORIOUS and
FORMIDABLE to inspect damage, and found that temporary repairs being
carried out showed that both ships would be sufficiently repaired to be operational
to continue the programme of strikes.
(AC.1 and CS.4 then boarded KING GEORGE V to discuss with CTF 57 measures to give better protection to the
carriers, and in the light of the enemy's apparent change of tactics in
attacks on TF 57. The enemy appeared to have abandoned his previous
practice of a high approach in favour of a low one, thereby greatly reducing
the length of warning and making interception by fighters much more
difficult. To combat this, it was decided:
'(a) To station two radar pickets,
each consisting of a 6in cruiser and a destroyer, 12 miles to the
north west, and south westward of the Fleet so as to increase the range of
detection. Two fighters would be allocated to each picket and at first
contact with the enemy, other fighters would be sent to the .threatened
(b) To bring in the 5.25in.
cruisers from the screen and station them with the main body of the
Fleet to increase AA protection for the carriers whenever in the operation
(c) To station a destroyer astern of
each carrier to afford more gun protection in what appears to be the
enemy's favourite position for attacking carriers.
(d) To increase mutual gun support
when attack threatened by bringing in the carriers to the 2,000 yards
circle, and the battleships and cruisers of the main body until their
distance from adjacent carriers is 2,000 yards.
This new disposition was to be given a trial during the next-strike period.
The question of reducing the
distance between ships had been under review for some time: there are many
factors to take into consideration, not least of these being the
interference caused to flying in and off and forming up. Its adoption
for trial now is a measure of the improvement of the pilots' skill, etc.,
during the present operations.
The Fleet was also instructed that
in future attacks enemy aircraft must be brought under fire much earlier
than has been the case recently. Commanding Officers of ships were ordered
to give this matter their personal attention')
At 1915 hours the Fleet
disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.
- At 0630 hours, KEMPENFELT, having
made good defects at Leyte rejoined TF 57.
At 0640 hours TF 57 again
formed on the Tanker Group, and all fuelling and transfer of stores,
aircraft, correspondence, and personnel was completed in time for the Fleet
to disengage at 1640 hours and take departure for the operations area.
NEPAL joined TF 57.
QUEENBOROUGH, who had
developed shaft vibration, was sent back to Leyte, with SPEAKER.
oilers AASE MAERSK
and SAN AMADO escorted by the
WHYALLA and BALLARAT also returned to Leyte.
12th - At 0510 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
At 0520 hours the four
counter-Kamikaze destroyers took station, one close astern of each carrier.
SWIFTSURE with KEMPENFELT, and UGANDA with WESSEX, were stationed 12 miles
315 degrees and 225 degrees respectively from the Fleet centre.
At 0540 hours in position
23-40N, 126-51E, in overcast weather, the TF 57 and island CAPS and the
first bomber strike were flown off.
Four bomber strikes were
flown off during the day.
At 1915 hours the radar
At 1930 the dusk CAP was
landed on and the Fleet withdrew to the southward for the night.
At 2010 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
13th - At 0510 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
Radar pickets and counter-Kamikaze
destroyers were stationed.
At 0540 hours in position
24-20N, 126-55E, in fine weather, the TF 57 and island CAPS were flown off.
Four bomber strikes were
flown during the day, three to Miyako and one to Ishigaki.
At 0948 hours a possible
submarine contact was obtained close to TF 57 in position 24-20N, 126-48E.
Three destroyers were detached to hunt for it with a CAP of 4 Corsairs
At 1203 hours a possible
contact was attacked with depth charges, and 2 Avengers were flown off for
ASP, and another armed with depth charges was sent to assist the hunt. The
possible contact was later reported as stationary, and although the
hunt was continued throughout the afternoon no S/M contact was found.
It now considered that a S/M
was ever present.
At 1920 hours the dusk
CAP was landed on and the Fleet withdrew to fuel in area COOTIE.
At 1950 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
14th - At 0630 hours in
area COOTIE, TF 57 RVed with oilers RFA's ARNDALE and DINGLEDALE escorted
by RULER, CRANE, WOODCOCK, PHEASANT and WEASEL.
At 0650 hours re-fuelling
The other incoming Tanker
Group was late at the rendezvous. They were found by search
aircraft from the CAP and directed to TF 57. This group consisted of RFAs WAVE KING and WAVE MONARCH escorted by NIZAM and STRIKER.
At 1100 hours re-fuelling
and replacement of aircraft commenced from the second group.
Forty tons of bombs were
transferred by BLACK PRINCE from FORMIDABLE to the INDEFATIGABLE.
This was necessary because the dimensions of the American bombs supplied to
ships at Leyte had prevented the full number required being stowed in INDEFATIGABLE.
During the forenoon,
search aircraft were sent to find and direct hospital ship TJITJALENGKA
to TF 57.
(MV TJITJALENGKA 10972grt, 15knots,
was a Dutch passenger ship that had been requisitioned by the MOWT in 1940
and used as troopship. On 8/7/42 she was chartered to the Admiralty after having been
fitted out as a hospital ship with beds for 504 patients)
TJITJALENGKA had been requested
by CTF 57 to remain at call within 30 miles of a position 85 miles to the
eastward of the normal dawn position of TF 57 in the fuelling area.
Casualties by now fit to
be moved were transferred to TJITJALENGKA by destroyer in the afternoon.
At 1910 the Fleet
disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.
During the absence of TF
57 Sakishima was covered by USN TU 52.1.3.
(At this stage it became necessary to consider
the date on which TF 57 would leave the operations area for major storing
in the rear bases. The oilers and repair ships of the Fleet Train, based at
Leyte, require early notice of a firm date for re-disposition in order that
with their slow speed they might reach their new stations in time to meet
TF 57 and fulfil their functions.
As TF 57 was due at the storing
ports early in June, and as it was evident that a considerable amount of
work would be required to make good the battle damage to carriers, it
appeared desirable to conclude operations with the twelfth strike day on
25th May, and so ensure the Fleet being ready to resume operations
when required in July.
After consultation with AC 1, CTF 57
accordingly sent the following signal:
Action COM 5th Fleet C IN C PAC
Info C-in-C, B.P.F. VA(Q) FONAS(A) CTF 113
From CTF 57
Propose with your concurrence TF57
continues present strikes until 24 and 25 May then CTF 57 in KING GEORGE V,
3 destroyers proceed Guam arriving 1000 hours 28th leave 0600 hours
30th for Manus. If you concur request authority these four ships fuel with
US supplies Guam. Remainder TF 57 to Manus after fuelling COOTIE on 26th
arriving in forenoon 30th. Could carry out further strikes if losses remain
light on 28th and 29th May which would delay above programme for four
days. CTF112 will divert slow tankers to Manus or COOTIE which necessitates
early decision on your needs)
15th - At 0630 hours TF
57 reformed on the tanker group, and fuelling and exchange of stores, aircraft
and correspondence was continued
and TENACIOUS joined TF 57.
from TF 57 and joined TU 112.2.5, to be left in the servicing area.
At 1705 hours with
replenishment completed TF 57 disengaged from the Tanker Group and
departure was taken for the operations area.
day the following signals were received:
CTF 57. From COM
Not necessary, keep up coverage of
Sakishima after 25th.
CTF 57. From
Arrival KING GEORGE V and 3 destroyers
Guam 28th May approved. Will be pleased welcome you. Guam has available
fuel for topping off)
16th - At 0510 hours
AC 1 assumed tactical command.
Radar pickets were
sent out and counter Kamikaze destroyers closed their carriers.
0540 hours in position 23-40N, 126-51E, the TF 57 and island CAPS and the
first bomber strike for Miyako were flown off.
bomber strikes were sent to the islands, during the day, three to Miyako
and two to Ishigaki.
1935 hours the dusk CAP landed on and the Fleet withdrew to the southward
for the night.
1950 hours CTF 57 assumed tactical command.
- At 0510 hours
AC 1 assumed tactical command.
Radar pickets were
sent out and counter Kamikaze destroyers closed their carriers.
broke with very light winds of only one or two knots, a state of affairs
which persisted and proved a handicap throughout the day. The state of
boiler brickwork in several ships, and the defective centre stern tube bush
in INDOMITABLE, made high speeds most undesirable; but without high
speeds, little safety margin was left for operating aircraft)
At 0540 hours from a
position 85 miles 110 degrees from Miyako the
TF 57 and island CAPS were flown off.
strikes were sent to the islands during the day.
1915 hours the dusk CAP was landed on
and the radar pickets were recalled and TF 57 withdrew to area COOTIE to
At 1940 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
During the absence of TF
57 Sakishima was covered by USN TG 52.1.
18th - At 0545 hours in
area COOTIE, TF 57 RVed with the Tanker Group, comprising oilers RFA
CEDARDALE, MV SAN AMBROSIO and MV SAN ADOLPHO, escorted by RULER,
CHASER, [with replacement aircraft embarked] GRENVILLE, NORMAN, WHIMBREL,
PARRETT, BENDIGO and WEASEL
At 0600 hours refuelling
BLACK PRINCE transferred bombs from FORMIDABLE to INDEFATIGABLE.
At 1745 hours the Fleet
disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.
At 1800 hours the Tanker
Group reversed course to enable them to RV with ammunition carrier
ROBERT MAERSK expected in position COOTIE ONE at 0600/18/5/45. Meanwhile
the transfer of bombs by BLACK
PRINCE continued until dark.
19th - At 0645 hours TF
57 reformed on the Tanker Group which now included MV ROBERT MAERSK 2294grt,
14 knots, [Danish ship requisitioned 6/40 by MOWT] with supplies of
bombs, who had been escorted to the area by minesweeper HMAS CAIRNS
The transfer of bombs,
fuel and stores was continued.
VICTORIOUS and later
INDOMITABLE went alongside ROBERT MAERSK and embarked bombs by
whip and inhaul method, the rate of transfer being about 75 bombs per
Continuous rain and low
visibility in the afternoon prevented flying and seriously upset the
numbers of replenishment aircraft to be flown onto FORMIDABLE and the
flyable duds which were to be flown from her to CHASER.
TJITJALENGKA was contacted by
aircraft and directed to the Fleet. TJITJALENGKA then embarked sick and
NORMAN joined TF 57
replacing the NEPAL.
At 1800 hours oilers CEDARDALE,
SAN AMBROSIO and SAN ADOLPHO escorted by BENDIGO and CAIRNS detached for
Manus. PARRETT acted as additional escort until 21/5/45 when she
detached to Leyte.
At 1930 hours NEPAL was
detached to Leyte to augment the escorts available to CTF. 112 for the
forthcoming, move south by the Fleet Train.
At 1930 hours TF 57 departed
for the operations area.
20th - The flying-off
position for the day was to be 23-39N, 126-40E.
At 0458 hours, first
light, the clouds were low, about 8/10 and the horizon clear.
At 0500 hours the four anti–Kamikaze
destroyers who included QUILLIAM, left the screen as previously
arranged, and started to close their carriers to form astern of them. The
Fleet was proceeding at 16 knots.
At 0510 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0515 hours the Fleet
ran into dense fog.
At 0524 hours QUILLIAM,
endeavouring to form astern of the INDOMITABLE, collided with her.
Fortunately no casualties were sustained, but superficial above water damage
was caused to the INDOMITABLE, and serious damage to the bow of the QUILLIAM.
As soon as the damaged destroyer was clear of the screen, NORMAN was
ordered to take her in tow.
At 0615 hours BLACK
PRINCE was sent to stand by both ships and escort them to area COOTIE.
At 0745 hours by which
time the weather had improved slightly, CAPS and the first
strike was flown off. Because of
weather conditions this proved to be the only one.
(During the forenoon CTG 99.2's signal
was received, indicating the intention of that group to strike Miyako with
shore based aircraft at 1700 hours. It was therefore decided to withdraw
CAPS from that island by 1600 hours. The strike planned for Ishigaki at
1630 hours was not altered. These intentions were communicated to CTF 51
and CTG 99.2. In the event, however, and presumably because of weather, CTG
99.2 cancelled his strike)
At 1210 hours two bogeys
were detected 50 miles to the westward tracking 040 degrees. Fighters sent to
intercept found both aircraft were friendly bombers. No information of their
presence nor mission was known to CTF 57.
At 1900 hours all CAPS
were recovered and TF 57 withdrew to the southward for the night.
At 1930 hours CTF 57 assumed
At 2100 hours TF 57
passed close to BLACK PRINCE who reported that the QUILLIAM was
satisfactorily in tow.
(On 21/5/45 BLACK PRINCE transferred
the tow to tug WEASEL)
21st - At 0510 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
Flying off had been
planned for 0540 hours from a position 85 miles 110¼ from Miyako. The
weather at dawn was similar to the previous day except that the Fleet was
clear of fog patches. Flying-off was therefore postponed.
At 0600 hours four
Hellcats were flown off to investigate the weather within a 30 mile
radius. They reported clear weather to east and west, and improving weather
to the northward. Acting on this information the first strike was flown off
at 0655 hours.
Five bomber strikes were flown
off during the day, three to Miyako and two to Ishigaki.
At 1423 hours a high
snooper was detected approaching TF 57 from the westward. Fighters were
ordered to 30,000 feet and at 1442 hours intercepted 36 miles to the south
westward at 26,000 feet. The enemy, a Myrt, was shot down 4 minutes later
by Hellcats from the INDOMITABLE.
(During the day Commander Third Fleet's
signal was received. This indicated the nature of future operations for the
British Pacific Fleet. In the light of this, and after consulting with
AC 1, CTF 57 decided to release FORMIDABLE early for repair of battle
damage. It was felt that this was necessary to ensure that 4 carriers would
be available for operations on completion of the forthcoming storing
period. This decision was communicated to Commander Fifth Fleet)
At 1930 hours the dusk
CAP were landed on, radar pickets were recalled, and TF 57 then withdrew to
At 1930 hours CTF 57 assumed
During the absence of TF
57 the USN Task Unit 52.1.3 covered Sakishima.
22nd - At 0700 hours in
position COOTIE ONE, TF 57
(a) The tug WEASEL towing
QUILLIAM and escorted by the BLACK PRINCE, GRENVILLE, NORMAN and RULER.
(b) The ships of the
Fleet Train consisting of oilers RFA's WAVE KING and WAVE MONARCH, MV AASE MAERSK and MV SAN AMADO,
ammunition carrier MV ROBERT MAERSK, CHASER and SPEAKER [with
replacement aircraft] escorted by NAPIER, CRANE, AVON and FINDHORN.
Fuelling, and exchange of
aircraft and stores and bombs, was carried out throughout the day.
GRENVILLE (D25) rejoined TF 57 as Senior Officer Destroyers, and WESSEX took her place as escort
to TU 112.2.5.
After receiving mails and
discharging excess complement the damaged QUILLIAM proceeded in tow of tug
WEASEL to Leyte. NORMAN acting as escort. CTF 112 was requested to
arrange for a larger tug to meet and relieve WEASEL.
(American tug USS TURKEY was sent out from Leyte, where
the tow arrived safely on 28/5/45)
At 1800 hours FORMIDABLE
was detached with orders to proceed to Manus and then Sydney to expedite
repair of battle damage. She was escorted by destroyers KEMPENFELT and
WHIRLWIND, both of whom were due for refit.
At 1915 the Fleet
disengaged from the Tanker Group for the night.
23rd - At 0745 hours TF
57 reformed on the Tanker Group, and fuelling and exchange of stores was continued.
Light cruiser HMNZS
ACHILLES joined TF 57.
Owing to the plummer
block on the centre shaft overheating and wiping in INDOMITABLE,
her speed had to be limited to 22 knots.
At 1800 hours CHASER,
SPEAKER and NAPIER were detached for Manus.
At 1815 hours TF 57 detached
from the Tanker Group taking departure for the operations area with only 3
carriers in company.
CTF 57 had hoped to
bombard Miyako on 24/5/45, but with the reduced number of aircraft
available it was judged wiser to forego this plan in favour of an entire
24th - At 0510 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command.
At dawn visibility was
low, sky overcast with rain and drizzle. Flying-off was postponed.
At 0900 four fighters
flown off reported weather improving slowly in the vicinity.
At 1045 hours in position
23-40N, 126-52E the first strike was flown off against Miyako.
At 1245 hours the first
strike was flown off against Ishigaki.
A further strike was
flown off against each target.
At 1907 hours the last
CAP was landed on and radar pickets were recalled. TF 57 then withdrew
to the southward for the night.
At 1940 hours CTF 57
assumed tactical command.
25th - At 0510 hours AC 1
assumed tactical command
At 0600 hours in position
23-40N, 126-52E the first strike was flown off against Miyako.
A further two strikes
against Miyako were flown off at 1115 hours and 1400 hours.
The returning strike from
Ishigaki made contact with the submarine USS BLUEFISH, who reported that
during the previous night lights had been observed on Ishigaki airfield. The
submarine commander had therefore bombarded the airfield.
At 1910 hours the last
CAP was landed on and radar pickets were recalled. TF 57 then withdrew
to the southward for the night.
At 2200 hours KING GEORGE
V (Flag Vice Admiral Rawlings CTF 57) with destroyers TROUBRIDGE,
TENACIOUS and TERMAGANT detached from TF 57 and set course for Guam.
(The remaining ships of TF 57 under
command of AC 1 set course for area COOTIE to top off ships, with fuel as
necessary for them to reach Manus)
(The following signals were subsequently
exchanged between C IN C PAC and CTF 57:
CTF 57. Info C-in-C, BPF. C IN C PAC ADV 5th Fleet
From COM 5th Fleet
I would express, to you, to your
officers and to your men, after two months operations as a Fifth Fleet
Task Force, my appreciation of your fine work and co-operative spirit.
Task Force 57 has mirrored the great traditions of the Royal Navy to the
American Task Forces.
Spruance. COM, 5th Fleet Info C IN C
PAC ADV C.-in-C, BPF.
We are proud to have been in a
position to lend a hand in this crucial operation and hope we may continue
so doing until Victory. Will pass your generous message with great personal
pleasure, to all of the British Pacific Fleet who have been honoured by
serving under you. Regret my Flagship and I were not able to greet you on
your return to Guam)
(The objective of the British Pacific
Fleet [TF 57] had been to:
(a) Render the six Japanese
airfields unusable to the enemy by constant bombing and cratering of the
runways, plus destruction of buildings.
(b) Destroy enemy aircraft on the
ground and in the air
(c) Prevent aircraft originating in
Formosa from using the islands as a staging area to attack the American
fleet at Okinawa or reinforce land based aircraft in Japan.
The objective had generally been achieved, but as Vice Admiral Rawlings [CTF
57] reported, 'however thoroughly the airfields were neutralised
by day, the enemy was determined and able to effect repairs by night'. One
of the reasons the Japanese could do this was because the strike Avengers
were dropping 1000lb semi-armour piercing bombs that were surplus to the FAA attacks on the TIRPITZ; these weapons were useless for cratering
During TF 57's period of operations
against the Sakishima Gunto, the Force was at sea for 62 days, broken by
eight days spent in Leyte Gulf. In the course of its operations TF 57 flew
4852 aircraft sorties and discharged 875 tons of bombs and rocket
projectiles. About one hundred Japanese aircraft were destroyed and more
than seventy damaged.
During the second part of the
operations, nine oilers supplied the fleet with 87,000 tons of fuel oil and
756 tons of aviation spirit, enabling it to remain at sea for a month
between 700 and 900 miles from its base.
TF 57 carried out almost 8,000
aircraft sorties with the loss in action of 85 aircraft. Half that number again
was lost to kamikaze strikes.
The TF 57
aircraft carriers suffered 70 deaths and 34 seriously
wounded from kamikaze attacks)
(Admiral King USN,
CinC US Navy, in his report to the Honourable James Forrestal, Secretary of
the Navy, wrote:
A fast British carrier task force, under the command of Vice Admiral
Rawlings, was assigned to Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet to assist in the
air support operations for the Okinawa assault. From 26 March to 20 April,
and again from 4 May to 25 May, planes from this force rendered valuable
service in neutralizing the enemy air installations on Sakishima Gunto,
southwest of Okinawa. Carriers of the force were subjected to frequent
attacks by suicide planes, but none of them was put out of action.
Battleships and cruisers of the force bombarded Miyako Jima on 4 May with
26th - En route to Guam.
Noon position 20-04N, 132-08E
At 1700 hours
At 1800 hours sighted one Coronado aircraft on patrol
En route to Guam.
At 0846 hours sighted one Coronado aircraft on patrol.
Noon position 16-01N, 138-49E
At 2000 hours reduced speed to 19 knots.
28th - At 0715 hours land in sight, reduced speed to 17 knots and
altered course to 100¼.
At 0905 hours stopped one mile off Orote Point, Guam, where all
ships embarked pilots and the British Naval Liaison Officer to the CinC Pacific
Fleet, Acting Captain H.S. Hopkins, R.N. boarded KING GEORGE V.
At 0920 hours entered Apra Harbour.
At 0940 hours KING GEORGE V secured to buoy whilst destroyers TROUBRIDGE and
TERMAGANT proceeded to a tanker to fuel. The
TENACIOUS anchored and fuelled from tanker after the TERMAGANT had finished
Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2inC British Pacific Fleet called on Admiral
Nimitz, the CinC US Pacific Fleet immediately after arrival in Guam, and in
the evening dined ashore at Admiral Nimitz' invitation.
29th - At 1030 hours
Admiral Nimitz wearing 'white undress', came
on board KING GEORGE V where he inspected the Marine Guard of Honour and
was afterwards introduced to the Senior Officers, Commanding Officers of
destroyers, and Senior Staff Officers. Nimitz then addressed the
assembled company, which included a representative team of offices and men
from the three destroyers.
At 1630 hours an 'at
home' was held on board KING GEORGE V, the invitation being extended by
the Vice Admiral Rawlings, 2iC British Pacific Fleet, Captain and Officers
of the ship to the United States Authorities at Guam. The number
attending had unfortunately to be limited but about 100 Officers and a few
military and naval nurses attended the party, which was held on the Quarter
In the evening, the Vice
Admiral Rawlings, entertained Admiral Nimitz and other senior United States
Officers to dinner on aboard KING GEORGE V.
(The welcome given to this small representative
portion of the British Pacific Fleet was most warm, and every facility,
both social and recreational, was extended to the Officers and men of the
Flagship and accompanying destroyers. An issue of beer was made to
the ship's companies in the canteen ashore, and motor transport was put at
the disposal of Officers and ratings for sightseeing tours of the
Island. Practically 50% of the ship's companies were landed each day)
At 0700 hours
KING GEORGE V sailed from Apra Harbour, preceded by destroyers TROUBRIDGE,
TERMAGANT, and TENACIOUS, who formed an A/S screen as soon as the harbour
At 0715 hours set course 270¼, 24 knots for Manus.
At 0835 hours altered course to 195¼ and commenced zigzag.
Between 0850 and 1015 hours, KING GEORGE V carried out long
range and close range firings at two sleeve targets provided by CTG.
94.10. Destroyers carried out similar practices between 1030 and
At 1200 hours TROUBRIDGE carried out firing at smoke burst target.
Noon position 12-10N 143-35E
At 1700 hours altered course to 190¼.
31st - At 0325 hours altered course to 145¼ and resumed zig zag
Noon position 03-43N, 144-07E.
The Captain of the Fleet, Captain E.W. Longley Cook RN, was
transferred to TENACIOUS for passage to Manus and thence to Sydney by air,
so as to arrive before the Fleet.
1st - At 0255 hours course was altered to 175¼, speed 22 knots.
At 0600 hours off Manus, in TBS touch with destroyer GRENVILLE.
At 0630, hours, TROUBRIDGE, TERMAGENT, and TENACIOUS were
detached to Manus. Screen was then taken over by destroyers GRENVILLE,
UNDINE, URCHIN, and WESSEX. Speed was increased to 23 knots, course
as requisite to pass through the off lying islands.
At 0720 hours, passed destroyer TEAZER northbound to Manus.
At 1030 hours contacted
oiler RFA DINGLEDALE and proceeded to fuel on course 185¼, speed 9
At 1100 hours, GRENVILLE went alongside KING GEORGE V and transferred mail and
Noon position 03-31S,
At 1440 hours sighted CRANE southbound
At 1445 hours completed fuelling and course set for Viking Strait at
At 2100 hours passed aircraft carrier IMPLACABLE, outbound from Sydney,
and escort to port, northbound to Manus.
2nd - At 0415 hours altered course to 125¼.
At 0730 hours altered course to 150¼.
Noon position 9-32S, 151-30E
At 1655 hours altered course 180¼, speed 22 knots.
At 2000 hours altered course to 170¼.
3rd - At 0700 hours altered course to 165¼
0900 hours passed
escort carrier BEGUM, northbound from Sydney carrying airframes to MONAB IV, HMS Nabaron, at Manus.
Noon position 18-13S, 153-17E.
At 2100 hours altered course to 175¼.
4th - At 2100 hours altered course to 175¼.
Noon position 26-49S, 154-43E.
At 1700 hours altered course to 195¼.
5th - At 0658 hours reduced speed to 17 knots.
At 0730 hours altered course to 255¼.
At 0920 hours reduced speed to 16 knots.
At 1115 hours altered course to 275¼.
Noon position 33-47.5S 152-04E
At 1200 hours manoeuvred as necessary to
close Sydney harbour entrance.
At 1420 hours destroyer took station astern
At 1440 hours embarked pilot and proceeded up Sydney harbour
At 1530 hours KING GEORGE V secured at No. 6 WOOLLOOMOOLOO.
(5/6/45 the main body of the British Pacific Fleet arrived at Sydney
on this day. The objective of the Fleet returning to
Sydney was to facilitate the storing of ships, repair the carriers' battle
damage, boiler cleaning, and generally store for the next operational
days' leave was granted to each watch whilst in Sydney, the resultant
invasion being quickly dispersed by the hospitable Australians who accommodated
in their own homes a large percentage of the
libertymen for the period of their leave)
18th - At Sydney where their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess
of Gloucester honoured Vice Admiral
Rawlings, 2iC British Pacific Fleet, with their presence on board KING
GEORGE V for luncheon.
Hutchinson RN, Staff Officer Operations to the Vice Admiral Rawlings 2iC
British Pacific Fleet, Commander
Smeeton RN, Staff Officer Air Plans, Commander Lewin RN,
Staff Fighter Direction Officer, both on staff of the Vice Admiral
Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, together with Captain Ewen,
USN LO, with the Pacific Fleet left Sydney by air for Leyte, to discuss
forthcoming operation with the Staff of Admiral Halsey, Commander US Third
Fleet. The party returned to Sydney on 25/6/45)
24th - At Sydney where
again their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester honoured
Vice Admiral Rawlings with their presence on board KING GEORGE V for
28th - At 0730 hours the
ships of the British Pacific Fleet, now designated TF 37, started to leave
Sydney Harbour, split into the following groups so as to facilitate individual
TG 37.1 KING GEORGE V (Flag CTF 37 and VA2iCBPF)
TG 37.2 FORMIDABLE (Flag AC 1) and attendant destroyers WESSEX and
WRANGLER. [IMPLACABLE and VICTORIOUS and attendant destroyers
TERPSICHORE, and TEAZER joining on passage]
TG 37.3 BLACK PRINCE, EURYALUS and HMCS UGANDA with NEWFOUNDLAND
joining on passage.
TG 37.4 BARFLEUR (Flag RA (D)), GRENVILLE, URANIA, UNDINE, URCHIN,
UNDAUNTED and ULYSSES.
(In the orders for passage, it was arranged that
each Task Unit, under its Flag Officer, should proceed independently,
making the most of all opportunities for carrying out individual practices,
keeping within 30 miles of KING GEORGE V during the day, and closing to radar
touch by nightfall. The aircraft carriers were ordered to follow a
track approximately 10 miles to the Eastward of the route of the main
force, otherwise acting independently for flying practices. Throughout
the passage economy of oil in destroyers was the determining factor)
At 1030 hours destroyers
carried out sleeve target firing.
At 1145 hours KING GEORGE V,
GAMBIA and BLACK PRINCE carried out long and close rang AA firing position
in 75 degrees South Head, 10 miles. The sleeve targets were towed by
Naval Aircraft from NAS NOWRA.
29th - At 1000 hours KING GEORGE V carried out range and inclination
exercises with GAMBIA and BLACK PRINCE and on completion, the cruisers
carried out radar calibration exercises with KING GEORGE V at 10,000 yards.
Noon Position 29-10S, 154-52E
At 1500 hours the EURYALUS joined CS 4 from Brisbane.
30th - At 0300 hours a Radar contact was obtained with a group of
ships bearing 280 degrees, 21 miles. These were identified as
destroyers QUICKMATCH, QUIBERON, QUALITY and QUADRANT who, to ease the
fuelling situation, had been sent previously to fuel at Brisbane before
proceeding independently from there to join AC 1 and relieve WESSEX and
Bombardment communication exercises between KING GEORGE V and
Dummy Air Reporting Exercises carried out by the cruisers.
Noon position 22-46S, 156-07E.
At 1200 hours IMPLACABLE, escorted by destroyers TEAZER and
TERPSICHORE, joined AC 1. NEWFOUNDLAND and GAMBIA (Flag CS4) joined the
other two cruisers of CS 4. These ships had sailed from Manus.
At 1800 hours
Rear Admiral CS, Rear Admiral E J P Brind,
flag from GAMBIA to NEWFOUNDLAND
At 1930 hours TF 37 commenced night encounter exercise. For this
exercise, KING GEORGE V was assumed to be a damaged battleship, with
three 6in cruisers in company, returning to base. The attacking force
under RA (D) consisting of TG. 37.4 with the BLACK PRINCE and EURYALUS
At 2040 hours the exercise was completed.
At 2050 hours WESSEX was detached by AC 1 to return to
At 2050 hours WRANGLER was detached by AC 1 to proceed to
Brisbane to fuel, and for onward passage to Manus.
1st - At 1015 hours EURYALUS who was suffering from leaking
boiler tubes which were estimated to require 48 hours to repair, detached
from TF 37 and proceeded to Manus.
Noon position 16-19S, 156-33E
AT 1450 hours TERPSICHORE and TEAZER joined TG 37.4
detached by AC 1 on account of their low percentage of fuel remaining.
2nd - At 0830 hours KING GEORGE V carried out bombardment
communication exercise with BLACK PRINCE.
At 1000 hours KING GEORGE V carried out 5.25in throw off
shoot, using BLACK PRINCE as a target.
Between 1030 and 1130 hours, destroyers carried out Rapid Open
Noon position 10-08S, 154-37E
manoeuvres during the afternoon and at 1500 hours, formed screening
diagram No. 36 on KING GEORGE V.
At 2000 hours the cruisers, having exercised independently during
the day, carried out Night Encounter exercises which were completed at 2300
3rd - Bad weather postponed until 1000 hours the AA throw off firing
which had been scheduled for 0800 hours. Fighters (from the 1st
Carrier Squadron) carried out a strafing attack on the Fleet which had been
disposed in a circular formation so as to exercise coordination of gun
Noon position 06S, 149-03E
At 1800 hours
destroyer BARFLEUR, who had suffered slight damage from prematures during the practice firing, was
instructed to proceed ahead of TF 37 to effect repairs at Manus.
4th - At 0945 hours TF 37 commenced close range firing at sleeve
targets towed by naval aircraft from Ponam Island, (MONAB IV, HMS Nabaron)
At 1100 hours KING GEORGE V entered Seeadler Harbour, Manus, followed
by the remainder of TF 37.
Waiting at Manus to join TF 37 was HMNZS ACHILLES who had just
completed a refit in one of the floating docks in Seeadler Harbour.
5th - TF 37 was at Manus where they stored, ammunitioned, and
fuelled in preparation for the forthcoming operation.
(TF 37's stay at Manus,
which was of 36 hours duration, was taken up more or less completely by
meetings to discuss the best way of utilizing the forces at our disposal
and of adapting these forces to American methods when the British and
American Task Forces were operating in company. A considerable amount
of American operation orders was received on board the Flagship on
arrival at Manus which, together with our own operational orders, had to be
distributed to the Task Force before sailing)
(Early in the morning CTF 37
signalled COM US 3rd Fleet:
I hereby report
Task Force 37 for duty with the 3rd Fleet. We are much
looking forward to this out first operation under your orders)
At 0600 hours TF 37,
consisting of KING GEORGE V (Flag of CTF 37
& VABPF), FORMIDABLE (Flag AC 1), VICTORIOUS, IMPLACABLE, NEWFOUNDLAND
(Flag of CS 4), BLACK PRINCE, EURYALUS, ACHILLES, UGANDA, GAMBIA, BARFLEUR
(Flag of RAD), GRENVILLE (Captain D4), UNDINE, URANIA, URCHIN, ULYSSES,
QUIBERON, QUICKMATCH, QUALITY, QUADRANT (Captain D 24), TENACIOUS,
TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE, TEAZER, WRANGLER and NORMAN sailed from Manus for
Operations under Commander Third Fleet.
UNDAUNTED was delayed owing to boiler defects and sailed at 1730
hours to join TF 37.
At 0730 hours sleeve target firing carried out with aircraft from
Noon position: 01-09S, 148-17E
At 1330 hours carrier aircraft carried out simulated Kamikaze
attacks on the Fleet.
At 1400 hours TF 37 carried out an Air Warning and engaging
At 1550 hours fighter direction exercises were carried out.
7th - At 0430 hours TF 37 carried out a night air interception
At 1010 hours KING GEORGE V, cruisers, and destroyers carried
out A.A. throw off firing at aircraft provided by the carriers.
At 1120 hours commenced fuelling destroyers from KING GEORGE V and
light cruisers UGANDA, NEWFOUNDLAND and ACHILLES.
Noon position: 03-12N, 153-04E
At 1545 hours whilst BARFLEUR was fuelling alongside KING GEORGE V, the Rear Admiral Destroyers took the opportunity of going on board KING
GEORGE V for discussions with the Vice Admiral, Rawlings, CTF 37.
At 1900 destroyers WRANGLER and NORMAN detached to return to
8th - At 0855 hours aircraft from FORMIDABLE were flown off for
gunnery, Kamikaze, height calibration and bombardment communication
At 1040 hours a fighter direction exercise with aircraft flown off
from the VICTORIOUS was carried out.
Noon position: 7-23N, 156-31E
At 2112 hours TF 37 commenced manoeuvring exercises by
9th - Between 0500 to 0830 hours course of speed of TF 37 was
adjusted as necessary to pass large convoys and a number of single ships
sailing in both directions and apparently en route for Eniwetok and Guam
and vice versa.
At 0515 hours A.A. throw off shoots.
At 1015 hours dive bombing exercise with strafing attacks by fighters using live
ammunition. A height calibration exercise was carried out
At 1050 hours jackstays were rigged fore and after for aircraft from
VICTORIOUS to practice message drops on to KING GEORGE V.
At 1100 hours one aircraft carried out 'window' dropping exercises
to practice radar operators in selection of target etc.
(Window was the British code
name for strips of
foil which were dropped from aircraft as a radar countermeasure. It is now
known as Chaff)
Noon position: 13-28N, 157-26E
At 1725 hours the Rear Admiral Destroyers, together with his
communication officer and that of the 4th CS came on board for
discussions with the CTF 37.
At 1830 hours air warning and engagement exercises were carried out.
10th - At 0830 hours aircraft practiced forming up and followed this
up with an attack on the Fleet. Before the aircraft were flown on,
another message drop exercise was carried out on KING GEORGE V.
Noon position: 19-10N, 158-54E
At 1240 hours UNDAUNTED joined TF
37 and required topping up after
a fast passage.
At 1345 hours KING GEORGE V, FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS commenced
fuelling BLACK PRINCE, UNDAUNTED and TENACIOUS.
At 1835 hours the carriers practiced night deck landing training and
two Avengers provided targets for a night air warning and engaging
11th - At 0900 hours TF 37 carried out A.A. throw off firing.
Noon position: 24-58N, 159-59E.
At 1210 hours a most realistic massed air attack on TF 37 was staged
by carrier aircraft.
At 1810 hours night air warning and engaging exercise. During
this exercise TF 37 took evasive action and the screen was ordered to make
smoke as necessary.
At 2100 hours TF 37, using an imaginary aircraft plot controlled by
KING GEORGE V, carried out dummy blind fire exercise.
12th - At
0900 hours TF
37 carried out sleeve target firings.
At 1030 hours fighter direction exercise carried out.
Noon position: 30-34N, 157-29E
At 1445 hours TF 37 passed second oiling group, comprising oilers RFA WAVE MONARCH, MV SAN ADOLPHO
and MV SAN AMBROSIO escorted by frigates FINDHORN and DERG and minesweeper HMAS GAWLER to the eastward,
en route to the fuelling area.
At 1600 hours damage control exercise with concurrent emergency
conning, steering, and communications exercises were carried out.
At 1900 hours a night air warning and engaging exercise was carried
13th - At 0137 hours TF 37 RVed with the first oiler group of
DINGLEDALE, SAN AMADO, WAVE EMPEROR, escorted by frigates USK and
At 0430 hours TF 37 commenced fuelling and D.S.B. routine around the
Noon position: 33-52N, 154-45E
At 1840 hours TF 37 disengaged from the oiling force for the night.
14th - At 0113 hours TF 37 detected by radar the US Logistic Group, TG
30.8 and course altered to pass to the Westward.
At 0400 hours TG 37 re-commenced oiling.
At 1155 hours the QUIBERON reported a sub contact. KING GEORGE V cast off from the oiler and the Fleet was turned 50degrees to starboard.
AT 1200 hours the contact was reported as non sub and TF 37 resumed
the oiling course.
Noon position: 35-08N, 152-31E
At 1210 hours because of trouble with fuel hoses, KING GEORGE V
was changed over from the SAN AMADO to the WAVE EMPEROR to continuing
At 1837 hours TF 37 disengaged from oiling force for night.
(WAVE EMPEROR being empty was sent back south to Eniwetok escorted by the BARLE as
it was evident, as it had been throughout the planning stage, that the
tanker capacity would be a most critical and anxious factor. In the
event this move was to prove invaluable and justified the risk of moving
one of our best oilers with a solitary escort. Fortunately, the submarine
threat developed near the Philippines and not on the Eniwetok run)
15th - At 0545
hours re-commenced oiling. KING GEORGE V fuelled from DINGLEDALE, and UGANDA from SAN AMADO thus
completing the fuelling of TF 37, with the exception of some of destroyers who, by this time, required topping up again.
Noon Position: 35-49N, 151-36E.
At 1400 hours TF 37 disengaged from oiling force and set course to
RV with COM 3rd US Fleet.
At 1635 hours the carriers carried out sleeve target firing.
16th - At 0430 hours TF 37 sighted the US Task Force TF 38 to the
westward and TF 37 manoeuvred so as to pass
to the eastward of the US Fleet which had by then commenced to oil.
(TF 38 was in fact the US Third Fleet. The CinC of
the US Third Fleet was Admiral Halsey who flew his flag in battleship USS MISSOURI. TF 38 consisted of three task forces TF 38.1, TF 38.3 and TF 38.4 and in
total contained 17 aircraft carriers, 8 battleships, 19 cruisers and 59
Tactical command of
TF 38 was exercised by Vice Admiral
McCain flying his flag in the aircraft carrier USS
At 0710 hours TF 37 altered course to close battleship USS
MISSOURI (Flag of Admiral Halsey, CinC the US Third Fleet)
At 0745 hours QUADRANT and TERMAGANT closed KING GEORGE V
and FORMIDABLE respectively to transfer CTF 37 and AC 1 and their staffs
to the MISSOURI for a conference with the Commander Third Fleet.
knew Rawlings and Vian only by their reputations, but he was reluctant to
meet with them. The source of Halsey's reservation was the issue of
full operational control of the British fleet. Without that control, he
realized that the inclusion of the British in his command would be a
difficult matter. He tried to rectify the issue with a message to Nimitz
proposing that he use the British Pacific Fleet on the flank of U.S. naval
forces. Nimitz rejected this proposal, as his agreement with Fraser and
King that the British be self-sufficient made it impossible to accept
Halsey's idea. Nimitz ordered Halsey to 'Operate TF 37 separately
from TF 38 in fact as well as in name.' Nimitz was being rather
legalistic in his view of his agreement with Admiral Fraser.
Halsey began a conference of naval
leaders aboard his flagship by explaining that the strikes against the home
islands were designed to weaken enemy resources before the invasion
started. Then he gave Rawlings three options:
1 - The British could operate as a
component element of the fleet; Halsey would provide them with the orders
he gave his US detachments, which the British were strongly recommended to
consider as 'suggestions.' That would allow the Allies to
concentrate their power against the Japanese and make the British ships for
all practical purposes a task force under U.S. command.
2 - Rawlings could operate as a
semi-independent force separated by 60 to 70 miles of ocean from U.S.
3 - The Royal Navy could operate
totally on its own.
Halsey recalls that Rawlings never
hesitated in his response: 'Of course, I'll accept number l.
The British admiral impressed
Halsey. A British liaison officer assigned to Halsey's ship observed,
'The days conversation in the Third Fleet flagship could not have been
more cordial and at their end the fleet commander sent for me to tell
me how confident he felt about the prospects of cooperating with the
British.' The Royal Navy officers he met with felt the same way. Vian
stated later that Halsey 'showed he was fully aware of our difficulties,
and from that moment onwards, by kindly word or deed, he availed himself of
every possible opportunity to offer encouragement and to smooth our path'.)
At 0815 hours C.S. 4 assumed tactical command of TF 37 during the
absence of CTF 37 and AC 1.
At 1040 hours destroyer USS FRANK KNOX closed KING GEORGE V
to transfer correspondence and operation orders.
At 1050 hours to familiarize the Americans with the type of planes
employed in the British Pacific Fleet, a 'recognition' flight of Seafires
and Fireflies was flown over the ships of TF 38.
Noon position: 38-33N, 146-57E
At 1500 hours a 'recognition' flight, this time by American type
planes, was flown over TF 37 by TF 38.
At 1515 hours CTF 37 and AC 1 returned on board Their respective flagships.
At 1600 hours TF 38 disengaged having completed oiling and with TF
37 in company set course for the flying off position (37-10N, 143-19E.).
(On 16/7/45 the Potsdam conference, code name TERMINAL, commenced,
in which amongst other subjects, the future prosecution of the war against
Japan was discussed. On this day also the USA carried out the first atomic
bomb test at
Alamogordo, New Mexico. On 17/7/45 President Truman receives a message from Los
Alamos, New Mexico, 'Babies born successfully,' code words
meaning the atomic bomb test was a complete success)
(The mission of the US third Fleet, of
which the British Pacific Fleet [TF
one battleship, four aircraft carriers, eight
light cruisers and 18 destroyers,]
was now an integral unit, was:
To reduce enemy tactical air forces.
2 - To attack
strategic targets on the mainland.
3 - To explore Japanese defences in northern Honshu and Hokkaido.
4 - To destroy Japanese shipping.
These operations were to soften up the Japanese defences and
undermine military and civilian moral in preparation for Operation
invasion of Southern Kyushu)
0330 hours AC 1 assumed tactical control of TF 37 and the cruiser radar
pickets were detached to their stations.
(The US third Fleet employed destroyers
equipped with ADR Radar, known as Tomcats, as radar pickets. The BPF only
had ADR [Aircraft Direction Radar which provided range, bearing and height
and incorporated a large vertical circular map that was transparent and
which was covered with grid references of 360¼]
in some of the cruisers; so these were used as radar pickets. Since the
radar pickets operated at least 50 miles from TF 37 it meant they were not
available for their main function of AA defence)
0350 hours, in low cloud and poor visibility, when TF 37 was approximately
250 miles north east of Tokyo the first Ramrod of Fireflies, armed with
60lb rockets from IMPLACABLE and Corsairs from VICTORIOUS took off
to attack the airfields in the Miyagi Prefecture including Sendai and
Matsushima. The Ramrod crossed into Japan at the mouth of the Abukuma
(A Ramrod was a combined fighter-bomber
mission whose primary goal was the destruction of a ground target)
0630 hours a Seafire CAP was launched from the IMPLACABLE.
0830 hours, although the weather over Japan was good, in the launch area it
had deteriorated such that all flying was cancelled.
In the afternoon KING
GEORGE V and destroyers QUALITY and QUIBERON detached from TF 37.
The remainder of TF 37
with TF 38 moved off south easterly.
AC 1 assumed tactical
At 1700 hours KING GEORGE
V, QUALITY and QUIBERON joined US Task Unit TU 34.8.2 comprising five
battleships, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers under the command of Rear
Admiral Oscar C. Badger USN, flying his flag in battleship USS IOWA, to
bombard the heavily industrialized Mito-Hitachi area of Honshu. The weather
was overcast with rain; visibility was three miles so the shoot was
conducted by Radar. The aircraft carrier USS BON HOMME RICHARD, who had
embarked AI radar-equipped Hellcats, provided a night CAP for TU 34.8.2.
At 2310 hours the
bombardment commenced. No enemy opposition was encountered during the
Battleships fired 1797
shells into the target area, of which KING GEORGE V contributed 267 x 14in shells and the five US battleships 1238 x 16" shells and 292
x 6" shells. Damage was caused to the Taga and Mito Works of Hitachi
Manufacturing Company and the Yamate Plant and the copper refining plants
of Hitachi Mine.
18th - At 0110 the
bombardment ceased and KING GEORGE V, QUALITY and QUIBERON detached at
high speed to rejoin TF 37.
The weather in the flying
off area was slightly better that the previous day.
At 0530 hours the first
aircraft from TF 37 flew off to carry out Ramrods against targets Northeast
of Tokyo; the strike included the first Seafire Ramrod by 801 and 880 Sqds.
At 0730 hours KING GEORGE
V, QUALITY and QUIBERON rejoined TF 37.
At the end of the days
flying TF 37 moved off south easterly towards the replenishment area.
CTF 37 assumed tactical
19th - TF 37 en route to
the replenishment area.
20th - Early in the morning, in approximate
position 31N, 150E, TF 37 RVed with Task Unit TU 112.2.6 which comprised oilers RFA WAVE MONARCH, MV SAN AMBROSIO and MV SAN ADOLPHO, victualling stores issue ship MV GLENARTNEY 9795grt, 18 knots, escort
carriers ARBITER and STRIKER with replacement aircraft and airframes,
escorted by NAPIER, NIZAM, PHEASANT, WHIMBREL, REDPOLE,
FINDHORN and GAWLER; following which replenishment of the vessels of TF 37
escorted by destroyers WRANGLER and WAKEFUL arrived with TU 112.2.6 to
join TF 37.
Replenishment continued throughout the
day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU
21st - Early in the morning TF 37 RVed with Task Unit TU 112.2.6 and
Replenishment continued throughout the
day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU
22nd - Early in the morning TF 37 RVed with Task Unit TU 112.2.6 and
Replenishment continued throughout the
day with TF 37 steering a south westerly course.
Destroyer NAPIER detached from TU 112
and joined TF 37.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112.2.6
and steered north westerly at 23 knots towards the operational area off the
island of Shikoku.
23rd - TF 37 en route to operational
24th - At 0300 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0345 hours in approximate position
32N, 135E the CAP was flown off and first Ramrod launched against the
port of Tokushima on the island of Shikoku, a well defended target
with around 200 AA guns
During the course of the day 416
sorties were flown of which 260 were against targets in the Inland
Sea and the Islands of Shikoku, Kyushu and Honshu. In these sorties a
Firefly of 1772 Sqd was the first British aircraft to overfly Tokyo; and an
Avenger of 848 Sqd became the first British aircraft to bomb Japan.
A Ramrod of six Avengers of 849 Sqd
from VICTORIOUS, two Corsairs from FORMIDABLE and two Fireflies
INDEFATIGABLE carried out a strike against shipping in Beppu Bay,
Kyushu. During the sortie they located the escort carrier KAIYO 13600 tons,
in the north of the bay and carried out an attack in which she
was hit by bombs from the Avengers. KAIYO was seriously damaged and driven aground by her crew to prevent her sinking.
(This was the only attack on an enemy
aircraft carrier carried out by the FAA in the war)
the day the FAA had flown 131 CAP sorties and 284 Ramrod sorties dropping a
total of 93 tons of bombs.
At dusk all aircraft were
recovered and CTF 37 assumed tactical command and TF 37 steered easterly.
25th - At 0300 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0345 hours the CAP was flown off
and first Ramrod was launched. The targets were the same as the day before.
In the evening a group of bogies was
intercepted approaching TF 37; they turned out to be Aichi B7A's,
reporting name GRACE. Hellcats from FORMIDABLE intercepted the attackers,
shooting down three and driving off the remainder.
At dusk, after all aircraft had been
landed on, CTF 37 assumed tactical control and steered southerly towards the
replenishment area, 'BRITISH TIZZY'.
26th - In the
morning TF 37 RVed with Task Unit 112 which consisted of oilers HMS OLNA 12660grt, 16 knots [the OLNA
was a new vessel and equipped for
abeam refuelling], RFA's WAVE GOVERNOR 8190 grt, 15 knots and WAVE KING 8190 grt, 15 knots, MV CARELIA 8038 grt, 12 knots, and MV
GLENARTNEY, ammunition issuing ship MV ROBERT MAERSK 2294 grt, 14 knots,
stores issuing ship MV CORINDA 3376 grt, 12 knots, and escort carriers CHASER, RULER and SPEAKER, escorted by light cruiser
ARGONAUT, destroyers NORMAN and NEPAL, sloops CRANE,
PHEASANT, WOODCOCK and REDPOLE, frigates ODZANI and DERG and minesweeper HMAS PIRIE.
Following the RV the replenishment
KING GEORGE V refuelled from the OLNA by the abeam method.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for
(26/7/45 the Potsdam declaration, which
was an ultimatum demanding the immediate unconditional surrender of the
armed forces of Japan, was agreed by the President of the United States,
the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the
Prime Minister of Great Britain. The declaration ran to 13 clauses. Clause
13 stated 'we call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the
unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide
proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The
alternative for Japan is complete and utter destruction'. The declaration
was passed to the Japanese ambassador in Switzerland on 27/7/45. The Japanese, however, ignored the
ultimatum, prompting President Truman to approve plans to drop atomic
weapons on Japan)
27th - In the morning replenishment
KING GEORGE V re-ammunitioned from ROBERT MAERSK
embarking 94 x 14in shells and 155 cordite cases. This was the first time a RN
battleship had re-ammunitioned with heavy calibre
shells whilst under way.
ARGONAUT joined TF 37.
HMCS UGANDA detached from TF 37
for Pearl Harbour then Esquimalt.
(UGANDA detached from TF 37 and
returned to Canada following the passing of Canadian legislation preventing
service in Pacific by any personnel who
had not volunteered for this duty)
At the end of replenishment TF 37
detached from TU 112 and steered north westerly back towards the
28th - At 0330 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0400 hours, in approximate position
31-30N, 134E, the CAP was flown off and first Ramrod was launched. The
targets were the port of Harima, attacked by 20 Avengers, and targets of
opportunity, mainly in and around the Inland Sea. The naval base of Maizuru
was attacked by fighters.
FAA aircraft sank coast defence
ship No 4 in Ise Bay and the coast defence ship No 30 off Yura.
At dusk all aircraft were recovered
and CTF 37 assumed tactical command.
29th - At 0330 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0400 hours the CAP was flown off
and first Ramrod was launched but was recalled when it was found that fog
was obscuring the targets.
At 1200 hours KING GEORGE V
screened by destroyers UNDINE, ULYSSES and URANIA, and designated Task
Unit TU 37.1.2, detached from TF 37 and steered northerly to RV with the US
Task Unit TU 34.8.1., to carry out a bombardment of the city of Hamamatsu.
(TU 34.8.1 was under the command of Rear
Admiral John F Shafroth USN and consisted of battleships SOUTH DAKOTA,
flag Rear Admiral Shafroth, MASSACHUSETTS, and INDIANA, 4 heavy cruisers and
10 destroyers. Aircraft carrier BON HOMME RICHARD was attached to provide a CAP and spotter aircraft. The city of Hamamatsu was a transport
hub, with several important armament factories, including the Nakajima
aircraft factory, Suzuki Motors et al. The target for KING GEORGE V was
the Japanese Musical Instrument Company which was manufacturing propellers)
bombardment commenced, destroyers URANIA and ULYSSES were in collision
in which the ULYSSES sustained slight damage
hours 20075 yards from her target, KING GEORGE V opened fire; she fired
265 x 14in shells, of which only seven hit the target.
During the bombardment the UNDINE twice opened
fire on small groups of ships, which were probably fishing boats.
hours fire was checked and KING GEORGE V steered east the southerly to
rejoin TF 37.
This was the last time KING GEORGE V or any other British battleship fired their main armament in
30th - At 0330 hours AC 1 assumed
At 0400 hours the CAP was flown off
and first Ramrod was launched but the first strike was again confronted by
fog over the coast. The targets for the day were airfields around Tokyo and
the Maizuru naval base.
At 0600 hours KING GEORGE V and
destroyers UNDINE, ULYSSES and URANIA rejoined TF 37.
After the last aircraft had been
recovered TF 37 set course southerly away from Honshu and towards the
replenishment area. CTF 37 assumed tactical command.
31st - At 0900 hours TF 37 RVed with
TU 112 which consisted of oilers HMS OLNA, RFA's WAVE GOVERNOR and WAVE
KING and the MV CARELIA stores
supply ships MV GLENARTNEY and MV CORINDA,
ammunition issuing ship MV ROBERT MAERSK, escort carriers CHASER,
RULER and SPEAKER, the corvette converted to a radar and radio maintenance
ship HMNZS ARBUTUS, escorted by destroyers NORMAN and NEPAL, sloops
CRANE, PHEASANT, WOODCOCK and REDPOLE, frigates ODZANI and DERG and minesweeper HMAS PIRIE, in replenishment area,
When GAMBIA and ACHILLES came upon
the ARBUTUS they gave her a rousing welcome.
At 1000 hours replenishment commenced.
The weather in the area was less than ideal, with a heavy
swell running caused by a succession of typhoons to the east of the area.
However, because the British were now mastering replenishment at sea (RAS)
the weather did not affect the operation as much as it would have done just
a few weeks ago.
KING GEORGE V again refuelled by
the abeam method and was able to take on fuel at 840 tons per hour. (KGV
maximum fuel capacity 4100 tons, average capacity 3886 tons).
KING GEORGE V also
re-ammunitioned, embarking 80 x 14in shells and 64 cordite cases from
During the replenishment the Rear Admiral
destroyers, Rear Admiral Edelsten was transferred by jackstay from BARFLEUR to the SPEAKER for passage back to Manus.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for the night.
1st - In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for the night.
2nd - In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for the night.
3rd - In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.
On completion of the RAS, TF 37 set course
northerly for the operational area.
4th - En route to the operational area a special signal
was received from Fleet Admiral Nimitz to all units of the US third Fleet
ordering them to cease offensive strikes and stay at least 300 miles from
the coast of Japan and sail northerly.
(During the day, destroyer USS BENHAM joined TF 37 she was
carrying British Liaison Officers who had come to confer with Vice Admiral,
Sir Bernard Rawlings about the forthcoming dropping of the first A Bomb)
Sailing north easterly.
(During the day the BENHAM detached from TF 37 as she was leaving
Rawlings signalled, 'Very sorry to release the first American Man-of
War I have had under my command')
(At approximately 0245 hours three B29
Superfortress' of the 509th Composite Group took off from the North Field
airbase on the Island of Tinian. At 0815 hours over the city of Hiroshima [seaport, industrial centre and headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army,
position 34-23N, 132-26E]
one of the B29's, Enola Gay,
piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbets dropped
the first uranium-based Atom Bomb, code named LITTLE BOY. The effect of the
blast was the equivalent of 12700 tons of TNT, fires destroyed a built-up area of about four square miles and huge
damage was done outside that area. An estimated 140,000 people
died from either the direct, or indirect effects of the bomb)
At 0815 hours TF 37 was steering a north easterly
course in approximate position 34-30N, 146E, they were 770 miles west of
At 0900 hours TF 37 RVed with TU 112
which consisted of oilers RFA's WAVE KING and DINGLEDALE and MV SAN AMADO
7365grt, 12 knots, stores
supply ships MV GLENARTNEY and SS FORT
WRANGELL 7213grt, 10 knots, ammunition issuing ship MV ROBERT MAERSK,
escort carriers ARBITER, CHASER and RULER, escorted by destroyers
NORMAN and NIZAM, sloop PHEASANT, frigate BARLE and minesweepers HMAS BALLARAT and BURNIE.
At 1000 hours TF 37 commenced replenishment.
At dusk TF 37 detached from TU 112 for the night.
7th - In the morning TF 37 continued with
replenishment from TU 112.
Destroyer NIZAM detached from TU 112 and
joined TF 37.
In the late afternoon TF 37 detached from TU 112
and steered north westerly towards the operational area.
8th - On arrival at in the operational area the
weather was unsuitable for flying operations so TF 37 turned south easterly
seeking better weather.
Due to the weather conditions no offensive action
was carried out.
(At 1700 hours Moscow time on 8/6/45 the Japanese ambassador to
Russia, Naotake Sato was summoned to a meeting with the People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
Molotov. At the meeting he was informed that at 1800 hours Moscow time, midnight 8/8/45
Japanese time, the USSR would declare war on Japan.
Within one hour of the meeting the Soviet army invaded
(On 8/8/45 Admiral Halsey circulated advanced copies of his
Operation Plan 10-45 for the initial occupation of Japan and setting up
Task Force 31, the Yokosuka Occupation Force. The plan included a symbolic
British Force comprised of seamen and Royal Marines)
9th - At 0330 hours AC 1 assumed tactical control.
At 0400 hours in approximate position 38-35N,
144-12E the first CAP and Ramrods were launched. The target of the first
Ramrod was the port of Matsushima.
At 0500 hours TF 37 was in approximate position
39N, 145-30E and steering west south westerly when GAMBIA (flag Rear
Admiral Eric James Patrick Brind), NEWFOUNDLAND and destroyers
TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT and TERPSICHORE, forming Task Unit TU 37.1.8, detached
from TF 37 to RV with US Task Unit TU 38.8.1.
flying over Onagawa Bay, a Ramrod led by Lieutenant Grey RCNVR, sighted a
number of Japanese ships and dived in to attack. Furious fire was opened on
the aircraft from army batteries on the ground and from warships in the Bay.
At 0920 hours Lt Robert Hampton 'Hammy" Gray flying
Corsair Mk IV KD658 115/X, from 1841 Squadron on FORMIDABLE selected for
his target an enemy warship. He swept in oblivious of the concentrated fire
and made straight for his target. His aircraft was hit and hit again, one
bomb was shot off and the airplane caught fire, but he kept on. He pressed on
to within fifty feet of the Japanese ship and let go his bomb. He scored a direct
the AMAKUSA below the No. 2 gun platform and penetrating into the engine
room before exploding. His target, the escort AMAKUSA, of the Etorofu Class, 870 tons, 3 x 4.7" and 4 x 25mm, sank
almost immediately in position 38-26N, 141-28E, with the loss of 71 crew.
Lieutenant Gray did not return from the mission.
(On August 31, 1945, Lt. Hampton Gray was officially awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross, and on November 13, 1945, he was further
awarded the Victoria Cross. This was only the second VC awarded to the FAA
in the whole war)
GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND and destroyers
TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT and TERPSICHORE forming TU 37.1.8 RVed with US TU
38.8.1 to carry out a bombardment of the Japan steel works and docks at
(TU 34.8.1 was under the command of Rear
Admiral John F Shafroth USN and consisted of battleships SOUTH DAKOTA,
flag Rear Admiral Shafroth, MASSACHUSETTS,
and INDIANA, heavy cruisers CHICAGO, BOSTON, QUINCY and SAINT PAUL and
10 destroyers. US aircraft maintained a CAP over the force)
hours from an average range of 14,000 yards,
opened fire. They made four passes and in total fired
803 x 16" shells, 1,383 x 8" shells and 733 x 6" shells.
The bombardment caused more damage than the July bombardment and large
quantities of pig iron were destroyed. The sounds of the bombardment were
broadcast live on radio in the U.S.
At 1450 hours the bombarding force checked fire
and departed from the scene to return to their respective Task Forces.
During the retirement TU 37.1.8 was attacked by
enemy aircraft, which were engaged by the ships of the Task Unit. GAMBIA
was credited with shooting one down.
(At 0349 hours three B29 Superfortress' of the 509th
Composite Group took off from the North Field airbase on the Island of
Tinian. The first B29 to take off was Bockscar piloted by Major Charles
"Chuck" Sweeney; this aircraft was carrying a Plutonium atomic
bomb code named Fat Man. The other two B29's were the Great Artiste and the
Big Stink; both were carrying recording instruments, but Big Stink also
carried two British observers,
Leonard Cheshire VC and Professor William G. Penney.
hours Bockscar reached the RV and immediately spotted Great
Artiste. The Big Stink was nowhere in sight. The two aircraft
then circled for 40 minutes waiting for the Big Stink which failed to show.
hours, Bockscar and The Great Artiste finally head in the direction of
Kokura. The Big Stink was nowhere to be seen. The additional 30
minutes that Bockscar and the Great Artiste took to wait ended up costing
the mission clear, visual bombing conditions over Kokura. These
crucial minutes saved Kokura from utter destruction and placed Nagasaki
forever in the history books.
hours the two B29's arrive over Kokura. They
visibility over the city was obscured by clouds and smog.
Sweeney's orders were specific in that the atomic bomb had to be
dropped visually on the target.
At 1132 hours Sweeney made the decision to reduce power to
conserve fuel and head for secondary target, Nagasaki, 95 miles to the south.
hours Bockscar and the Great Artiste arrive over Nagasaki.
hours Fat Man explodes with a force of 22,000 tons of TNT. Three
shock waves were felt by both planes.
of Nagasaki was destroyed and out
a population of 270,000, approximately
70,000 people were dead by the end of the year.
the Big Stink missed the RV
Group, Captain Cheshire and Professor Penney did see
the Nagasaki detonation from the air at a distance)
At 1202 hours, the time of the explosion TF 37
was approximately 880 miles to the north east of Nagasaki.
During the day the aircraft of TF 37 flew 137
CAP sorties and 258 Ramrod sorties dropping 105 tons of bombs.
At dusk following recovery of all aircraft CTF
37 assumed tactical control.
At approximately 2100 hours
GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND and destroyers
TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT and TERPSICHORE rejoined TF 37.
10th - At 0330 hours AC 1 assumed tactical
(At 0230 hours The Japanese Supreme War Guidance Council held a
meeting. After the meeting their readiness to accept the Potsdam
Declaration was transmitted to the US Government through the neutral
Governments of Switzerland and Sweden. The official reply of the US
Government was received on the 13/8/45, but the Japanese learned the purport
of the reply from a San Francisco broadcast on the 12/8/45. The Supreme War
Guidance Council reconvened on the 13/8/45 and continued the meeting until
late at night, discussing the American reply)
At 0400 hours the first CAP was launched.
At 0500 hours the first Ramrod was launched. The
target was shipping in Onagawa Bay, and targets of opportunity in northern
During the day aircraft
of TF 37 flew 132 CAP sorties and 227
Ramrod sorties dropping 90
tons of bombs.
At dusk all aircraft were recovered and CTF 37
assumed tactical command.
TF 37 withdrew to the east for replenishment.
11th - En route to replenishment area.
12th - In the morning TF 37 RVed with TU 112 and
turned on to a south westerly course and commenced replenishment.
(During the British Pacific Fleet's operations against the
Japanese, Replenishment at Sea - RAS - was always a problem; but by mid August the supply situation
had become critical. Also it had been planned that by mid August the BPF
would return to Manus and if necessary to their main base at Sydney for
repair, re-supply and rest. However, the indications were that the Japanese
may well be about to surrender and Rawlings wanted to keep at least a token
British Force in the area.
Nimitz' orders specified that the Allied fleets were to continue pressure
on Japan until the 13/8/45, a problem for both Halsey's Third Fleet and
Rawlings' TF 37. Halsey's fleet needed resupply and rest, both of which
could not be had at sea, and Rawlings' force was scheduled to return to
Manus on the 10th.
Third Fleet though didn't have any RAS problems since the USN had now built
up a large and sustainable Fleet Train. In the event both Halsey and
Rawlings compromised, Halsey retained most of the Third Fleet off Japan and
Rawlings would keep a token force on station that would refuel from the US
At dusk TF
37 detached from TU 112 for the night
13th - In the morning TF 37 RVed with TU 112 and
VICTORIOUS, IMPLACABLE, BLACK PRINCE, EURYALUS, ACHILLES, GRENVILLE, UNDINE,
URANIA, URCHIN, ULYSSES, QUIBERON, QUICKMATCH, QUALITY and QUADRANT
detached from TF 37 and set course for Manus.
KING GEORGE V refuelled from US oiler the USS SABINE 7470 grt, 18 knots. Whilst
KING GEORGE V was along side SABINE, battleship USS MISSOURI
(Flag of Admiral Halsey) went alongside the other side and as
Halsey stated in his
memoirs. 'I went across to 'the Cagey Five' as we called her, on an
aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice Admiral Rawlings.
completion of replenishment the remaining units of TF 37, namely, KING
GEORGE V, INDEFATIGABLE, GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND, BARFLEUR, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE,
TEAZER, NAPIER, NIZAM, WAKEFUL and WRANGLER were re-designated TG 38.5 and
were fully integrated into the US Third Fleet, under the command of Vice
Admiral John S McClain USN.
Around midday TG 38.5 turned on to a
south easterly course.
During the day aircraft from INDEFATIGABLE carried out 21
Ramrod sorties against
targets in the Tokyo area. They also flew 42 CAP sorties.
14th - TG
38.5 steering south westerly.
(Early in the morning US aircraft dropped leaflets over Japan
containing the Allied peace proposals; up to this time the Japanese
population where not aware of these proposals. When this event was bought
to the Emperors attention, fearing
a backlash by the Japanese military, Hirohito convened an immediate meeting
with Suzuki and his government. Following the meeting Hirohito asked the
Swiss government to relay to the Allies a message stating that he had
issued an Imperial Rescript that denoted Japanese acceptance of the
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. The message also stated that he was
ordering his commanders to cease fire and to surrender their forces, and
to issue such orders as might be required by representatives of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. The decision to
accept the Potsdam Declaration and agreeing to surrender was broadcast by
Domei Tsushinsha, the Japanese Federated News
At midday TG 38.5 was
in approximate position 33-30N, 144E at which point they turned westerly
and steered WNW towards Honshu.
hours, President Truman announced that a cease fire was in effect, and that
the war was over)
15th - TG 38.5
steering WNW towards Honshu.
Early in the morning
was authorised to carry out a strike against kamikazes on Kisarazu
airfield, 30 miles south of Tokyo.
Seafires of 887 and four Seafires of 894 Squadrons were assigned as escorts
to six Avengers of 820 Squadron and four Fireflies of 1772 Squadron, for the
hours when the Ramrod was over Odaki Bay, they were jumped by ten Mitsubishi
A6M5 (Zeke) and four Mitsubishi J2M Raidens (Jack) of the 302nd
Kokutai. In the ensuing dogfight, the Seafires claimed seven shot down, three
probable's and four damaged. While this was a confused action with some US
Navy Hellcats flying nearby also joining in, it is very possible that Sub‑Lieutenant
Gerry Murphy, who destroyed two Zeros, fired the last shots of the
final dogfight of the Second World War. One Seafire and an Avenger were
lost. The pilot of the Seafire, Sub Lt Fred Hockley RNVR, was captured and
executed after the cease fire.
At 0900 hours Admiral Nimitz signalled all US naval forces
including TG 38.5, 'Japan has surrendered, cease all offensive actions, take
all war time precautions for defence'.
Admiral William F. Halsey's cease fire order to the US Third Fleet,
which included TG 38.5 was memorable, he signalled, 'It now gives me great
pleasure to order all units of Magnolia (code name for TF 38) to cease fire.
However, fire on all enemy planes, not vindictively, but in a friendly sort
At 1120 hours KING GEORGE V signalled TG 38.5 with a flag hoist 'End Hostilities and splice the Mainbrace',
this was just after INDEFATIGABLE
had recovered her aircraft. As the signal was being hoisted a Japanese
Judy aircraft came out of
cloud and headed straight for INDEFATIGABLE. Fortunately he was
followed by a US Corsair from the TF 38 CAP that shot him down and he
splashed between INDEFATIGABLE and GAMBIA with bits of the crashed plane
falling on GAMBIA.
Following this incident, all forces remained alert and CAP's were
During the day 47 CAP sorties were flown.
16th - TG 38.5 remained on patrol approximately 150 miles southeast of Tokyo,
replenishing as necessary from the USN Fleet Train.
Vice Admiral Rawlings addressed the ships companies of TG 38.5; his
speech was also broadcast to the US Third Fleet.
(On 16/8/45 the Admiralty sent the
following message to all British naval vessels:
'The surrender of the Japanese Empire brings to an end six years of
achievement in war unsurpassed in the long history and high tradition of
the Royal Navy.
The phase of naval warfare which came to an end three months ago
enriched the record of British sea power by such epic actions and campaigns
as the Battle of the Atlantic, the domination of the Mediterranean, the
maintenance of the Russian supply lines and the great combined operations
of 1943 and 1944. The world wide story is completed with the inspired work
by sea and air of the British Pacific Fleet and the East Indies Fleet. The
Board are deeply conscious of the difficulty and novelty of the problems
facing the British Pacific Fleet, the patience and skill with which they
were overcome, and the great contribution in offensive power made by the
Task Force operating with our American Allies. No less memorable is the
work of the East Indies Fleet in the protection of India and Ceylon and in
operational support of the Burma campaign,
At this moment our eyes are turned to the Far East and it is fitting
to recall in remembrance those who gave their lives in the days of disaster
in 1941 and 1942. To their relatives and to the relatives of all officers
and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines and of the Naval Forces of the
Commonwealth and Empire and of all in Admiralty service who have paid the
full price of victory, the Board extend their profound sympathy.')
17th - TG 38.5 remained on patrol approximately 150 miles south
east of Tokyo.
18th - Off the south coast of the Island of Honshu,
TG 38.5 was
joined by battleship DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC BPF Admiral Frazer) and
destroyers WAGER and WHELP.
19th - TG 38.5 remained on patrol off Honshu.
(On 19/8/45 Japanese delegates lead by
Lt Gen T. Kawabe, who had become Vice Chief of the General Staff in April,
plus fifteen other members arrived in Manila to discuss the surrender
arrangements with General MacArthur. These arrangements included the entry
of Allied warships into Tokyo Bay and for naval and marine forces to land
in the vicinity of Yokosuka Naval Base on L-Day, which was scheduled for
20th - TG 38.5 carried out a RAS.
(Mid morning the high speed transports
USS BAR, SIMMS and PAVLIC commenced the embarkation of British and
Commonwealth seamen and Royal Marines who were to form the token
Commonwealth force to be landed in Japan on L Day. BARR embarked
approximately 160 from KING GEORGE V and GAMBIA, the SIMMS approximately 100
from NAPIER, NIZAM and GAMBIA and the PAVLIC 160 from GAMBIA and NEWFOUNDLAND)
(L-Day had been originally scheduled
for 26/8/45 but on 20/8/45, a threatening typhoon forced Admiral Halsey to
postpone the landing date until 28/8/45. Allied ships were to enter Sagami
Wan, the vast outer bay, on L minus 2. On 25/8/45, word was received from
General MacArthur that the anticipated typhoon would delay Army air
operations for 48 hours, and L-Day was consequently set for 30/8/45 and the
entry of the Sagami Wan ordered for the 28/8/45)
23rd - In preparation for entry in Tokyo Bay, KING GEORGE
V, INDEFATIGABLE, GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND, BARFLEUR, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE,
TEAZER, NAPIER, NIZAM, WAKEFUL and WRANGLER were re-designated TF 37.
DUKE OF YORK, WAGER and
WHELP were designated TG 30.2
(With the typhoon imminent in the area of
the Third Fleet operations and with the losses that incurred in the typhoon
of 18/12/44 in mind; Halsey was
not anxious to keep his ships, many of them small vessels crowded with
troops, at sea in typhoon weather, and he asked and received permission
from MacArthur to put into Sagami Wan one day early. Therefore the entry
into Sagami Wan was bought forward to 27/8/45 and L-Day became 29/8/45)
(To facilitate the safe entry of the
Allied Fleet into Sagami Wan, the Japanese were ordered to provide pilots. At
0800 hours the Japanese destroyer HATSUKAKURA with two Japanese emissaries,
six interpreters, and thirteen pilots embarked, arrived off Sagami Wan and was met by destroyer USS
NICHOLAS. The pilots were transferred to the NICHOLAS who then distributed
them around the Allied Fleet; the pilots for the British ships were
embarked on the WHELP. The Japanese emissaries were taken to meet with Rear
Admiral Robert B. Carney, Halsey's Chief of Staff, and Admiral Badger on
board MISSOURI to receive instructions for the surrender of the
Yokosuka Naval Base and to guide the first Allied ships into anchorages. A
problem that became apparent during the meeting concerned the sweeping of
mines in the Uraga Strait at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. The Japanese had
been warned as early as 15/8/45 to begin minesweeping in the waters in
Tokyo Bay to facilitate the operations of the US Third Fleet. They said a
lack of suitable minesweepers had prevented them from clearing Sagami Wan
and Tokyo Bay )
In the morning TF 37 and TG 30.2
together with the US Third Fleet, guided
by the local pilots,
anchored in Sagami Wan. All ships were
on the alert and
ready for any treacherous move on the part of the
Japanese, and battle ensigns were flown, but the entry was without
GEORGE V had been continuously at sea for 52 days (since 6 July)
and had steamed a total of 19,200 miles, a record for an RN
aircraft carriers, except USS COWPENS, remained out at sea ready to
launch air strikes if there was any sign of Japanese treachery.
COWPENS and DesDiv 99 were detached to
form TG 35.1.6, which conducted flight operations immediately off Sagami
Wan during the afternoon.
(At sunset there was a strange
phenomenon. The setting sun appeared to descend squarely into the crater of
Mount Fujiyama, the spectacle had such symbolism that anyone with a camera
endeavoured to get photographs of it because it clearly told of Japan's
INDEFATIGABLE and destroyers
BARFLEUR, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT, TERPSICHORE,
TEAZER, WAKEFUL and WRANGLER
remained at sea with TF 58 off the
Japanese coast to the east of Tokyo, with her aircraft ready to respond to
any Japanese treachery.
evening two British POW's hailed one of the US Third Fleet
picket boats from the shore of Sagami Wan. They were picked up and taken on
board light cruiser USS SAN JUAN,
the command ship of a specially constituted Allied Prisoner of War Rescue
Group. Their harrowing tales of life in the prison camps and of the
extremely poor physical condition of the prisoners prompted Admiral Halsey
to order the rescue group to stand by for action on short notice)
- At anchor in Sagami Wan.
(At about 0630 hours, US minesweepers
REVENGE, TOKEN, TUMULT and POCHARD entered Uraga Strait and commenced to
sweep north up the channel. The REVENGE thus became the first Allied ship
to enter Tokyo Bay.
At 0900 hours the minesweeping force
was followed into Uraga Strait by TG 31, the Yokosuka Naval Base occupation
force. TG 31 comprised light cruiser USS SAN DIEGO (Flag Rear Admiral
Oscar C. Badger USN), destroyers USS SOUTHERLAND, STOCKHAM, TWINING,
YARNALL and WEDDERBURN and high speed transport USS GOSSELIN with photographers
and members of the press embarked.
At 1300 hours TG 31 anchored off
Yokosuka. The Japanese Base commander Vice Admiral Michitaro Totsuka then
reported aboard the SAN DIEGO and in conference with Rear Admiral Badger
they completed the necessary arrangements for the actual occupation of the
hours TF 37 and TG 30.2
prepared to get under way from
Sagami Wan to enter Tokyo Bay.
0545 hours TG 30.1 comprising USS MISSOURI (Flag Admiral Halsey) screened by destroyers USS
NICHOLAS, TAYLOR and O'BANNON entered Uraga Strait and proceeded into Tokyo
Bay. TG 30.1 anchored off Yokosuka at 0920 hours.
hours TG 30.2 comprising DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC BPF) and destroyers WAGER and WHELP entered Uraga Strait and proceeded into Tokyo Bay.
(There was a strong feeling among the
crews of the ships of the British Pacific Fleet that DUKE OF YORK, who
had not fired a shot in anger in the Pacific, should not have the
honour of leading the Fleet into Tokyo Bay)
The US TF 35 (including TG 35.90 Support
Force) followed TG 30.1.
At 0620 hours TF 37 comprising KING
GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral 2ic BPF), GAMBIA, NEWFOUNDLAND, NAPIER
and NIZAM entered Uraga Strait and proceeded into Tokyo Bay. TF 37
anchored off Yokosuka at 1030 hours.
(As the Allied ships were entering Tokyo
Bay they were covered by an air umbrella of hundreds of planes from the TF
38 carriers off shore. Even larger numbers of US land-based fighters and
bombers from Okinawa and Iwo Jima patrolled the skies over the Japanese
(The evacuation of POWs had been taken
over as the function of the Supreme Commander General MacArthur. However the
TF 38 carrier aircraft surveillance flights carried out at tree-top height
with cameras had brought out a tremendous amount of detailed information
about the conditions and health, etc of the Allied POW's. Therefore Admiral
Halsey wanted to commence the recovery and evacuation at the earliest
opportunity. But MacArthur had not approved the Navy's initial offer to
start the evacuation as early as possible. However, the vast resources of
the fleet hospital ships, evacuation vessels, food, clothing etc, were
ready to swing into action. In the hope that the Navy would get the go
ahead to at least initiate
action around the waterfront, Admiral Halsey included the hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE with the first
group of ships to enter Tokyo Bay)
following news of the condition of
Nimitz authorized Halsey to begin POW rescue
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived in Sagami Wan from US
Naval Air Base, Tanapag, Saipan, in a PB2Y Coronado seaplane.
After landing he boarded battleship USS SOUTH DAKOTA which then became
his flagship. After Nimitz embarked , she got under way
and entered Tokyo Bay)
(At 1300 hours light cruiser USS
SAN JUAN, high speed transports USS GOSSELIN and REEVES and hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE set course for the Omori POW camp which
was situated on an artificial island off Tokyo. When the Americans arrived
at the camp they found conditions unspeakable with evidence of brutality
and wretched treatment. Under the command of Commodore Rodger W. Simpson USN
they commenced immediate evacuation of the approximate 620 Allied
inmates, of which about 230 were British, to BENEVOLENCE. The Americans
also moved on to other camps in the Tokyo-Yokohama area.
At approximately 1910 hours the first RAMPs
(Recovered Allied Military Personnel) arrived on board BENEVOLENCE and
by midnight 739 men had been brought out.)
30th - At anchor in Tokyo Bay.
(The mission of the Fleet Landing
Force, TG 31.3, that contained approximately 3000 seamen and marines from
the US Third Fleet, 5400 marines of the US 4th Marines and approximately
420 British and Commonwealth seamen and marines; was to seize and demilitarize
the Island Forts in the Uraga Strait and to seize and occupy Yokosuka Naval
had been based on an H-Hour
for the main landing by the US 11th Airborne Division of 1000 hours, but last-minute word
was received from MacArthur early on 30/8/45 that the first serials of 11th Airborne Division would be landing at Atsugi airfield at 0600 hours.
Consequently, to preserve the value and impact of simultaneous Army-Navy
operations, H-Hour was bought forward to 0930 hours)
0900 hours the first British Troops, seamen and marines, landed from USS PAVLIC at Fort 4 at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. PAVLIC then moved on
to Fort 2 where British troops landed at 1015 hours. At both Forts the
white surrender flag was flying and a small group of soldiers were standing near the landing ramp
with a surrender flag. The surrender of the Forts was supposed to be to the
British, but the Japanese would only surrender to the Americans, so the
Stars and Stripes were raised by the British landing party. The landing
parties found coastal guns had been rendered ineffective and the few
Japanese remaining as guides and interpreters amazed the British with their
At 1040 hours USS SIMMS landed her
ANZAC troops on the island of Azuma Shima, which had been extensively
tunnelled for use as a small boat supply base.
RAN, CO of the NAPIER and
Captain (D7) was the first ashore and accepted the surrender of the
Island from the
Japanese Naval Commander, who had been in charge of
the base stores.
hours the USS BAR landed D Company, four Platoons from KING GEORGE V
and one from the GAMBIA, of the British Landing Force at Yokosuka Naval
Base. The landing force was under the command of Lieutenant-Commander
Davis-Goff RNZN from GAMBIA and he took the surrender of that section
of the Azuma Shima base
from Commander Yuzo Tanno, officer-in-charge of naval stores.
In the afternoon
USS PAVLIC re-embarked the British Landing Force from the island forts, and with
evacuated Japanese personnel, landed them at the Navigation School in the
Yokosuka naval base. The landing force then took over the area between
Azuma Shima and the area controlled by D Company.
(At 1030 hours USS SAN DIEGO (Flag Rear Admiral Oscar
C. Badger USN) tied up alongside in the Yokosuka Naval Base and Rear
Admiral Badger accepted the surrender of the Naval Base from the Japanese
Base commander Vice Admiral Michitaro Totsuka)
(When Admiral Fraser was informed that
evacuated British POW's were on board BENEVOLENCE he embarked on
WHELP and took passage to her. On board
BENEVOLENCE he spoke with the POW's and learned of the conditions they had endured
during their captivity. Admiral
Fraser having listened to their grim stories was clearly affected by
what he had seen and heard. When he returned to the DUKE OF YORK he was mad at the Japanese for their
treatment of the POW's)
Escort carrier SPEAKER and frigate DERG arrived in Tokyo Bay from Manus. SPEAKER was without
aircraft, having flown off all her aircraft to
INDEFATIGABLE and RULER. She was however the
first aircraft carrier to enter Tokyo Bay.
SPEAKER was to be used for the
evacuation of British and Commonwealth POW's.
Within minutes of SPEAKER dropping
anchor off the Omori POW camp, landing craft from the USS GOSSELIN came
alongside to disembark POW's.
31st - At anchor in Tokyo Bay.
During the day heavy cruiser HMAS SHROPSHIRE,
light cruiser HMAS HOBART and destroyers HMAS WARRAMUNGA and BATAAN
arrived in Tokyo Bay.
USS MISSOURI Admiral Halsey's flagship, preparations were
underway to host the formal surrender ceremonies on 2/9/45. MISSOURI
had been selected since she was named after President Truman's home state)
1st - At anchor in Tokyo
2nd - At anchor in Tokyo Bay.
(The surrender ceremony took place on USS
MISSOURI, which was anchored
in berth F 71, Tokyo Bay. It commenced at 0902 hours with an
introductory statement by General MacArthur after which he directed the
representatives of Japan to sign the two Instruments of Surrender. At 0904
hours Foreign Minister Shigemitsu signed, followed two minutes later by
General Umezu. General MacArthur then led the Allied delegations in
signing, first Fleet Admiral Nimitz as United States Representative, then
the representatives of China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Australia,
Canada, France, The Netherlands and New Zealand.
The chairs that the delegates sat on
were supplied from DUKE OF YORK.
At 0914 hours Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser
signed for the United Kingdom;
General Sir Thomas Blamey signed for
Colonel Lawrence Moore Cosgrave signed
Air Vice Marshall Leonard M. Isitt
signed for New Zealand.
Following a few brief remarks by
MacArthur, the ceremonies concluded at 0925 hours.
During the surrender ceremony a
massive flight of Hellcats and Corsairs from the US Task Group 38.1, which
was cruising off the south coast of Honshu Island, flew overhead)
3rd - At 1300 hours SPEAKER
escorted by DERG with RFA WAVE KING in company sailed from off Omori POW camp with 477 British and
Commonwealth RAMPs embarked. SPEAKER was the first vessel to sail down
Tokyo Bay with RAMPs. Every ship she passed had cleared the lower deck and
their crews were on the deck cheering and waving.
At 1400 hours SPEAKER sailed
passed KING GEORGE V from whom she received a tremendous round of
5th - KING GEORGE V and the
remainder of the British Pacific Fleet reverted to RN control.
8th - KING GEORGE V provided a
Royal Marine detachment to mount a guard at the British Embassy in Tokyo.
17th - The Union Flag was formally hoisted over the British Embassy
in Tokyo by a Marine from cruiser NEWFOUNDLAND who's Royal Marine
detachment had relieved the Marine guard provided by KING GEORGE V.
P o s
t W a r N o t e s
HMS KING GEORGE V remained in the Far
East as part of the Pacific Fleet after the surrender. During the immediate
post war period the ship was deployed in support of the allied forces in
Japan and visited Melbourne for an R&R period in late 1945. She took
passage to UK from Hobart in January 1946 with a call at Cape Town the next
month. After arrival at Portsmouth on 6th March she became Flagship of the Home Fleet until
1950 when placed in Reserve. Laid up in the Gareloch she was never re-commissioned and was placed on the Disposal List in
1957. Sold to BISCO for demolition by Arnott Young she was towed to Dalmuir on the Clyde to be de-equipped on 20th
January 1958. Demolition was completed at
Troon where she arrived during May 1959.
CONVOY ESCORT MOVEMENTS of
by Don Kindell
These convoy lists have not been
cross-checked with the text above
Date convoy sailed
Joined convoy as escort
(Note on Convoys)