These events were the occasion of many speeches both in the senate and in the popular assembly.
The citizens rejoiced, and only the dictator refused to credit either rumour or dispatch, and declared that even though the story were all true, he feared success more than adversity.
Then Marcus Metilius, tribune of the plebs, cried out that this was past all bearing: not only had the dictator prevented a successful engagement being fought while he was present, but
he even objected now that the victory was won, and persisted in drawing out the war and wasting time, in order the longer to remain in office, and to continue, both at Rome and in the army, in sole possession of authority; for one of the consuls had fallen in battle, and the other —under
the pretext of pursuing the Punic fleet —had been sent a great way off from Italy; the two praetors were employed in Sicily and Sardinia, neither of which required a praetor at this time;
and Marcus Minucius, the master of the horse, that he might not see the enemy or [p. 287]
carry out any military operation, had been kept1
almost a prisoner.
Thus it had actually come to pass that not only Samnium —whose territories, as though they lay beyond the Ebro, had already been surrendered to the Phoenicians —but Campania, and the districts both of Cales and Falerii had been utterly laid waste; while the dictator sat still at Casilinum and used the legions of the Roman People to protect his own estate.
The army — eager as it was to fight —and the master of the horse had virtually been cooped up and confined within the rampart; and their swords, as though they had been captured enemies, had been taken from them.
At last, when the dictator had gone away, they had come out from behind their works, as if released from a blockade, and had routed and put to flight their enemies.
For all these reasons, if their ancient spirit had still animated the Roman plebs, he would boldly have proposed the abrogation of Quintus Fabius's command; as it was, he should move the adoption of a moderate measure, to wit, the elevation of the master of the horse to a footing of equality with the dictator.2
Yet, even so, they must not let Fabius rejoin his army till he had first installed a consul in the place of Gaius Flaminius.
The dictator refrained from making speeches to the people, in a cause that was far from popular. Even the senate listened coldly when he spoke in high terms of the enemy, and charging the reverses of the past two years to the rashness and
ignorance of the Roman generals, declared that the master of the horse must answer to him for having fought against his orders.
If his authority and [p. 289]
strategy should be paramount, he would soon let3
people know that with a good commander fortune was of little moment; that mind and reason were in control;
and that to have preserved the army in its hour of danger, yet without disgrace,4
was more glorious than to have slain many thousands of the enemy.
After making several speeches to this purport, yet without effect, and presiding over the election of Marcus Atilius Regulus5
to the consulship, that he might not take a personal part in the dispute about the command, on the day preceding the bringing forward of the resolution he left by night for the army.
When at break of day the plebs assembled in their council, though at heart they were inclined to dislike the dictator and to favour the master of the horse, yet they wanted sufficient courage to come forward and advocate a course which most of them approved, so that the motion, despite its exceeding popularity, lacked support.
One man alone was found to urge the passage of the bill. This was Gaius Terentius Varro, praetor of the year before, whose antecedents were not merely base but even sordid.
It is said that his father had been a butcher, who peddled his wares himself, and that he had employed this very son about the menial tasks associated with that calling.