Unlike other countries in the region, Saudi Arabia has deeper resources and strategies that it can use to stave off serious threats in the short term.
What Makes the Kingdom Different
Bernard Haykel is professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University where he also directs the Transregional Institute and the Project on Oil and Energy in the Middle East. He is writing a political history of Saudi Arabia.
March 14, 2011
The quick and relatively peaceful ouster of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt in the recent Arab uprisings has given the general and false impression that regimes in the Middle East are frail and easy to topple. The war in Libya is proving otherwise, as do the limited demonstrations in Saudi Arabia on March 11.
Two things are worth keeping in mind about this region: 1) the countries differ from one another in socio-political structure and history and 2) the regimes have varying claims to legitimacy — some stronger than others — as well as different coercive abilities. In other words, Saudi Arabia is not Libya, nor is it like Egypt or Yemen.
The avuncular King Abdullah is popular amongst his subjects. His family, the Al Saud, are numerous and deeply rooted (they’ve been ruling since at least the 1740s) and are not the product of European colonialism or some military coup. Furthermore, given the size of oil revenues, they have enormous economic means at their disposal to co-opt the population and to put in place economic development policies that can provide jobs for a young and restless population. Finally, large numbers of Saudis cannot imagine the country remaining unified without them in power and, moreover, have too much to lose if the regime is overthrown.
The so-called “Day of Rage” did not come off last week because the Shiites, about 10 percent of the population, made a terrible blunder by demonstrating early and frequently, thereby giving a sectarian tinge to what otherwise would have been a national movement for reform.
The Shiites gave the Sunnis, who make up 90 percent of the population, an excuse to bond together. Furthermore, the regime in Riyadh, which has been stating that Iran is behind many of the revolts in Bahrain and elsewhere, was able to confirm some of its claims when the Shiites started demonstrating, with and without provocation from Riyadh. And now that Saudi troops have entered Bahrain, presumably to quell Shiite-led protests and to back its Sunni rulers, Riyadh is signaling that any opposition to its rule will be considered part of a broader Iranian plot against it.
Saudi Arabia has many of the conditions that have led to the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt, namely the political and economic problems associated with a youth bulge. However, unlike other countries in the region it has considerably deeper resources and strategies that it can draw upon to stave off a serious threat in the short term. One of these is to play the sectarian card.
Over the longer term, it will certainly have to put into effect policies of reform, economic and political, if it is to remain stable and the authority of the Al Saud unchallenged. It has started doing this with the reforms of King Abdullah, albeit tentatively. More effort is needed, namely to put in place an industrialization plan that will provide the three million new jobs needed over the coming decade, a more open political system that can root out corruption and allow non-royals to have power in the decision-making process. Such steps will become urgent if the price of oil falls, as it has done cyclically in past decades, and the regime’s ability to co-opt the opposition becomes constrained.
There is one additional issue that bears repeating: Saudi Arabia has 25 percent of the world’s proven petroleum reserves and produces around 9 million barrels of oil a day, and potentially 12.5 million barrels if all its claimed spare capacity is indeed produced. Because of this accident of geology and this production capacity, Saudi Arabia cannot become unstable without the world coming literally to a standstill. The kingdom is in a category by itself with respect to energy markets and its role in the global economy. One need only look at the behavior of financial markets whenever its fate is in question to know this with certainty.