Before there even was an Ireland, there were Irish government bonds. Indeed, the willingness of U.S. investors to take a punt on a state that didn't yet exist was one of the things that made Irish independence possible.
In January 1920, Irish rebels started to sell bonds in the U.S. to fund their war with the British government. The bonds were to become repayable after an independent Irish state had received international recognition, and they were repaid.
Honoring its pledges to foreign bond holders and bankers has been a pretty fundamental article of faith for Irish governments ever since, even during the dark days of the 1980s, when the debt burden was last at the level it is likely to reach in coming years.
But as Ireland enters what may be the final week of negotiations with its European Union partners, the possibility of default in the next few years is being taken seriously by a growing number of economists, both in and outside the country.
The government needs the €67.5 billion ($95.8 billion) it will receive from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund to make ends meet over the next three years, since there is little prospect that it will be able to borrow in the international bond markets any time soon. It isn't in a position to make demands, and yet it has to if it is to survive long enough to repair its finances.
To survive, it needs to rally the public to its cause, which is pushing ahead with a program of €9 billion in budget cuts to bring its deficit down to 3% of gross domestic product by 2015.
To do that, it needs to convince voters that the rest of Europe is on their side and counter the widespread belief that the French and German governments in particular, along with the European Central Bank, are less than charitably inclined.
The first source of grievance is the belief that the previous government signed a bad deal, and that the interest rate charged by the European Financial Stability Facility is punitive, since it is significantly higher than its cost of borrowing and higher than the rate Greece is being charged.
The second source of grievance is the debts owed by Irish banks, in most of which the state now has a majority stake. Many Irish voters find it hard to understand why these debts should be repaid, given that they were contracted by what were then private companies that behaved recklessly. They believe the European Union is insisting on repayment of these debts because the bonds are owned by French and German banks.
The third source of Irish suspicion about the European Union's intentions is the corporate tax rate, which both the French and German governments appear determined to see raised. Inside Ireland, it seems blindingly obvious that an increase in the tax rate now would prompt the flight of foreign companies, and a sharp decline in economic output that would make it impossible for the government to pay its debts. But nobody can figure out why France and Germany would want to push Ireland into default.
The government has already had its request for a cut in the interest rate charged by the EFSF turned down, though it seems pretty confident it will eventually get a deal.
Since then, the government has increasingly drawn attention to the fact that "burden sharing" by holders of Irish bank bonds would be another way of limiting the increase in its debts that could see them reach 125% of gross domestic product by 2015.
By burden sharing, the government probably means some form of buy-back from investors, under which it would cancel the debts at a significant discount to their face value. Another option could be a write-down with an extended repayment term.
It seems that in the weeks since the Feb. 25 election, the government has become convinced that reducing the cost of fixing the banking system, or lengthening the period over which it will have to pay those costs, is necessary if it is to make sure that it can repay its own debts.
The government has repeatedly stated that it will honor those obligations, and during the election campaign even the left-of-center Sinn Fein party pledged to avoid default.
In a recent pamphlet, government lawmaker Paschal Donohoe acknowledged that "the idea that Ireland should default on sovereign debt is gaining ground."
But he went on to argue that such a move would be disastrous, forcing a much more rapid reduction in government spending, and a longer period of low growth, if not outright contraction.
"Far from a step to economic salvation, a ...default would prolong our national stay in financial ruin," he wrote. "Our government must and will do all it can to ensure our country does not face this prospect. The remainder of our economic sovereignty and security is too precious to gamble with."
For everyone involved, this period involves big risks. The EU may not be persuaded, and Ireland may have no option but to default on its government debt, either because the numbers just don't add up, or the people won't bear it.
Alternatively, even if the EU obliges, investors may take the suggestion that Ireland might default seriously enough to boycott its government bonds for a very long time, long enough for the money from the EU and the IMF to run out.
For the government, the dream outcome would be one in which the EU agreed to cut the interest rate on EFSF loans, allow a rescheduling of banks' bonds, and leave the corporate-tax rate untouched. It may also be the only outcome that will see Ireland avoid the default that would be a betrayal of its own history.
Write to Paul Hannon at email@example.com