Daily Papers

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We investigate the sets of joint probability distributions that maximize the average multi-information over a collection of margins. These functionals serve as proxies for maximizing the multi-information of a set of variables or the mutual information of two subsets of variables, at a lower computation and estimation complexity. We describe the maximizers and their relations to the maximizers of the multi-information and the mutual information.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

A major barrier to deploying current machine learning models lies in their non-reliability to dataset shifts. To resolve this problem, most existing studies attempted to transfer stable information to unseen environments. Particularly, independent causal mechanisms-based methods proposed to remove mutable causal mechanisms via the do-operator. Compared to previous methods, the obtained stable predictors are more effective in identifying stable information. However, a key question remains: which subset of this whole stable information should the model transfer, in order to achieve optimal generalization ability? To answer this question, we present a comprehensive minimax analysis from a causal perspective. Specifically, we first provide a graphical condition for the whole stable set to be optimal. When this condition fails, we surprisingly find with an example that this whole stable set, although can fully exploit stable information, is not the optimal one to transfer. To identify the optimal subset under this case, we propose to estimate the worst-case risk with a novel optimization scheme over the intervention functions on mutable causal mechanisms. We then propose an efficient algorithm to search for the subset with minimal worst-case risk, based on a newly defined equivalence relation between stable subsets. Compared to the exponential cost of exhaustively searching over all subsets, our searching strategy enjoys a polynomial complexity. The effectiveness and efficiency of our methods are demonstrated on synthetic data and the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

We provide a concise framework for generalized ensemble theory through a matrix-based approach. By introducing an observation matrix, any discrete probability distribution, including those for non-equilibrium steady states, can be expressed as a generalized Boltzmann distribution, with observables and conjugate variables as the basis and coordinates in a linear space. In this framework, we identify the minimal sufficient statistics required for inferring the Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, we show that the Hadamard and Vandermonde matrices are suitable observation matrices for spin systems and random walks. In master equation systems, the probability flux observation matrix facilitates the identification of detailed balance violations. Our findings provide a new approach to developing generalized ensemble theory for non-equilibrium steady-state systems.

We study the problem of optimally projecting the transition matrix of a finite ergodic multivariate Markov chain onto a lower-dimensional state space. Specifically, we seek to construct a projected Markov chain that optimizes various information-theoretic criteria under cardinality constraints. These criteria include entropy rate, information-theoretic distance to factorizability, independence, and stationarity. We formulate these tasks as best subset selection problems over multivariate Markov chains and leverage the submodular (or supermodular) structure of the objective functions to develop efficient greedy-based algorithms with theoretical guarantees. We extend our analysis to k-submodular settings and introduce a generalized version of the distorted greedy algorithm, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we illustrate the theory and algorithms through extensive numerical experiments with publicly available code on multivariate Markov chains associated with the Bernoulli-Laplace and Curie-Weiss model.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Bandits with preference feedback present a powerful tool for optimizing unknown target functions when only pairwise comparisons are allowed instead of direct value queries. This model allows for incorporating human feedback into online inference and optimization and has been employed in systems for fine-tuning large language models. The problem is well understood in simplified settings with linear target functions or over finite small domains that limit practical interest. Taking the next step, we consider infinite domains and nonlinear (kernelized) rewards. In this setting, selecting a pair of actions is quite challenging and requires balancing exploration and exploitation at two levels: within the pair, and along the iterations of the algorithm. We propose MAXMINLCB, which emulates this trade-off as a zero-sum Stackelberg game, and chooses action pairs that are informative and yield favorable rewards. MAXMINLCB consistently outperforms existing algorithms and satisfies an anytime-valid rate-optimal regret guarantee. This is due to our novel preference-based confidence sequences for kernelized logistic estimators.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

Mixture of experts (MoE) are a popular class of statistical and machine learning models that have gained attention over the years due to their flexibility and efficiency. In this work, we consider Gaussian-gated localized MoE (GLoME) and block-diagonal covariance localized MoE (BLoME) regression models to present nonlinear relationships in heterogeneous data with potential hidden graph-structured interactions between high-dimensional predictors. These models pose difficult statistical estimation and model selection questions, both from a computational and theoretical perspective. This paper is devoted to the study of the problem of model selection among a collection of GLoME or BLoME models characterized by the number of mixture components, the complexity of Gaussian mean experts, and the hidden block-diagonal structures of the covariance matrices, in a penalized maximum likelihood estimation framework. In particular, we establish non-asymptotic risk bounds that take the form of weak oracle inequalities, provided that lower bounds for the penalties hold. The good empirical behavior of our models is then demonstrated on synthetic and real datasets.

Offline preference optimization allows fine-tuning large models directly from offline data, and has proved effective in recent alignment practices. We propose generalized preference optimization (GPO), a family of offline losses parameterized by a general class of convex functions. GPO enables a unified view over preference optimization, encompassing existing algorithms such as DPO, IPO and SLiC as special cases, while naturally introducing new variants. The GPO framework also sheds light on how offline algorithms enforce regularization, through the design of the convex function that defines the loss. Our analysis and experiments reveal the connections and subtle differences between the offline regularization and the KL divergence regularization intended by the canonical RLHF formulation. In a controlled setting akin to Gao et al 2023, we also show that different GPO variants achieve similar trade-offs between regularization and performance, though the optimal values of hyper-parameter might differ as predicted by theory. In all, our results present new algorithmic toolkits and empirical insights to alignment practitioners.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

Moment restrictions and their conditional counterparts emerge in many areas of machine learning and statistics ranging from causal inference to reinforcement learning. Estimators for these tasks, generally called methods of moments, include the prominent generalized method of moments (GMM) which has recently gained attention in causal inference. GMM is a special case of the broader family of empirical likelihood estimators which are based on approximating a population distribution by means of minimizing a varphi-divergence to an empirical distribution. However, the use of varphi-divergences effectively limits the candidate distributions to reweightings of the data samples. We lift this long-standing limitation and provide a method of moments that goes beyond data reweighting. This is achieved by defining an empirical likelihood estimator based on maximum mean discrepancy which we term the kernel method of moments (KMM). We provide a variant of our estimator for conditional moment restrictions and show that it is asymptotically first-order optimal for such problems. Finally, we show that our method achieves competitive performance on several conditional moment restriction tasks.

A ubiquitous feature of data of our era is their extra-large sizes and dimensions. Analyzing such high-dimensional data poses significant challenges, since the feature dimension is often much larger than the sample size. This thesis introduces robust and computationally efficient methods to address several common challenges associated with high-dimensional data. In my first manuscript, I propose a coherent approach to variable screening that accommodates nonlinear associations. I develop a novel variable screening method that transcends traditional linear assumptions by leveraging mutual information, with an intended application in neuroimaging data. This approach allows for accurate identification of important variables by capturing nonlinear as well as linear relationships between the outcome and covariates. Building on this foundation, I develop new optimization methods for sparse estimation using nonconvex penalties in my second manuscript. These methods address notable challenges in current statistical computing practices, facilitating computationally efficient and robust analyses of complex datasets. The proposed method can be applied to a general class of optimization problems. In my third manuscript, I contribute to robust modeling of high-dimensional correlated observations by developing a mixed-effects model based on Tsallis power-law entropy maximization and discussed the theoretical properties of such distribution. This model surpasses the constraints of conventional Gaussian models by accommodating a broader class of distributions with enhanced robustness to outliers. Additionally, I develop a proximal nonlinear conjugate gradient algorithm that accelerates convergence while maintaining numerical stability, along with rigorous statistical properties for the proposed framework.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Dueling bandits is a prominent framework for decision-making involving preferential feedback, a valuable feature that fits various applications involving human interaction, such as ranking, information retrieval, and recommendation systems. While substantial efforts have been made to minimize the cumulative regret in dueling bandits, a notable gap in the current research is the absence of regret bounds that account for the inherent uncertainty in pairwise comparisons between the dueling arms. Intuitively, greater uncertainty suggests a higher level of difficulty in the problem. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the problem of contextual dueling bandits, where the binary comparison of dueling arms is generated from a generalized linear model (GLM). We propose a new SupLinUCB-type algorithm that enjoys computational efficiency and a variance-aware regret bound tilde Obig(dsum_{t=1^Tsigma_t^2} + dbig), where sigma_t is the variance of the pairwise comparison in round t, d is the dimension of the context vectors, and T is the time horizon. Our regret bound naturally aligns with the intuitive expectation in scenarios where the comparison is deterministic, the algorithm only suffers from an tilde O(d) regret. We perform empirical experiments on synthetic data to confirm the advantage of our method over previous variance-agnostic algorithms.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We used a dataset of daily Bloomberg Financial Market Summaries from 2010 to 2023, reposted on large financial media, to determine how global news headlines may affect stock market movements using ChatGPT and a two-stage prompt approach. We document a statistically significant positive correlation between the sentiment score and future equity market returns over short to medium term, which reverts to a negative correlation over longer horizons. Validation of this correlation pattern across multiple equity markets indicates its robustness across equity regions and resilience to non-linearity, evidenced by comparison of Pearson and Spearman correlations. Finally, we provide an estimate of the optimal horizon that strikes a balance between reactivity to new information and correlation.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

We study best arm identification (BAI) in linear bandits in the fixed-budget regime under differential privacy constraints, when the arm rewards are supported on the unit interval. Given a finite budget T and a privacy parameter varepsilon>0, the goal is to minimise the error probability in finding the arm with the largest mean after T sampling rounds, subject to the constraint that the policy of the decision maker satisfies a certain {\em varepsilon-differential privacy} (varepsilon-DP) constraint. We construct a policy satisfying the varepsilon-DP constraint (called {\sc DP-BAI}) by proposing the principle of {\em maximum absolute determinants}, and derive an upper bound on its error probability. Furthermore, we derive a minimax lower bound on the error probability, and demonstrate that the lower and the upper bounds decay exponentially in T, with exponents in the two bounds matching order-wise in (a) the sub-optimality gaps of the arms, (b) varepsilon, and (c) the problem complexity that is expressible as the sum of two terms, one characterising the complexity of standard fixed-budget BAI (without privacy constraints), and the other accounting for the varepsilon-DP constraint. Additionally, we present some auxiliary results that contribute to the derivation of the lower bound on the error probability. These results, we posit, may be of independent interest and could prove instrumental in proving lower bounds on error probabilities in several other bandit problems. Whereas prior works provide results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime without privacy constraints or in the fixed-confidence regime with privacy constraints, our work fills the gap in the literature by providing the results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime under the varepsilon-DP constraint.

We study the problem of detecting the correlation between two Gaussian databases XinR^{ntimes d} and Y^{ntimes d}, each composed of n users with d features. This problem is relevant in the analysis of social media, computational biology, etc. We formulate this as a hypothesis testing problem: under the null hypothesis, these two databases are statistically independent. Under the alternative, however, there exists an unknown permutation sigma over the set of n users (or, row permutation), such that X is rho-correlated with Y^sigma, a permuted version of Y. We determine sharp thresholds at which optimal testing exhibits a phase transition, depending on the asymptotic regime of n and d. Specifically, we prove that if rho^2dto0, as dtoinfty, then weak detection (performing slightly better than random guessing) is statistically impossible, irrespectively of the value of n. This compliments the performance of a simple test that thresholds the sum all entries of X^TY. Furthermore, when d is fixed, we prove that strong detection (vanishing error probability) is impossible for any rho<rho^star, where rho^star is an explicit function of d, while weak detection is again impossible as long as rho^2dto0. These results close significant gaps in current recent related studies.

In the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, a randomized probability matching policy called Thompson sampling (TS) has shown excellent performance in various reward models. In addition to the empirical performance, TS has been shown to achieve asymptotic problem-dependent lower bounds in several models. However, its optimality has been mainly addressed under light-tailed or one-parameter models that belong to exponential families. In this paper, we consider the optimality of TS for the Pareto model that has a heavy tail and is parameterized by two unknown parameters. Specifically, we discuss the optimality of TS with probability matching priors that include the Jeffreys prior and the reference priors. We first prove that TS with certain probability matching priors can achieve the optimal regret bound. Then, we show the suboptimality of TS with other priors, including the Jeffreys and the reference priors. Nevertheless, we find that TS with the Jeffreys and reference priors can achieve the asymptotic lower bound if one uses a truncation procedure. These results suggest carefully choosing noninformative priors to avoid suboptimality and show the effectiveness of truncation procedures in TS-based policies.

A key challenge of modern machine learning systems is to achieve Out-of-Distribution (OOD) generalization -- generalizing to target data whose distribution differs from that of source data. Despite its significant importance, the fundamental question of ``what are the most effective algorithms for OOD generalization'' remains open even under the standard setting of covariate shift. This paper addresses this fundamental question by proving that, surprisingly, classical Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) purely using source data (without any modification) achieves the minimax optimality for covariate shift under the well-specified setting. That is, no algorithm performs better than MLE in this setting (up to a constant factor), justifying MLE is all you need. Our result holds for a very rich class of parametric models, and does not require any boundedness condition on the density ratio. We illustrate the wide applicability of our framework by instantiating it to three concrete examples -- linear regression, logistic regression, and phase retrieval. This paper further complement the study by proving that, under the misspecified setting, MLE is no longer the optimal choice, whereas Maximum Weighted Likelihood Estimator (MWLE) emerges as minimax optimal in certain scenarios.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

We investigate stochastic combinatorial multi-armed bandit with semi-bandit feedback (CMAB). In CMAB, the question of the existence of an efficient policy with an optimal asymptotic regret (up to a factor poly-logarithmic with the action size) is still open for many families of distributions, including mutually independent outcomes, and more generally the multivariate sub-Gaussian family. We propose to answer the above question for these two families by analyzing variants of the Combinatorial Thompson Sampling policy (CTS). For mutually independent outcomes in [0,1], we propose a tight analysis of CTS using Beta priors. We then look at the more general setting of multivariate sub-Gaussian outcomes and propose a tight analysis of CTS using Gaussian priors. This last result gives us an alternative to the Efficient Sampling for Combinatorial Bandit policy (ESCB), which, although optimal, is not computationally efficient.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Differentially private learning algorithms inject noise into the learning process. While the most common private learning algorithm, DP-SGD, adds independent Gaussian noise in each iteration, recent work on matrix factorization mechanisms has shown empirically that introducing correlations in the noise can greatly improve their utility. We characterize the asymptotic learning utility for any choice of the correlation function, giving precise analytical bounds for linear regression and as the solution to a convex program for general convex functions. We show, using these bounds, how correlated noise provably improves upon vanilla DP-SGD as a function of problem parameters such as the effective dimension and condition number. Moreover, our analytical expression for the near-optimal correlation function circumvents the cubic complexity of the semi-definite program used to optimize the noise correlation matrix in previous work. We validate our theory with experiments on private deep learning. Our work matches or outperforms prior work while being efficient both in terms of compute and memory.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

In this paper, by introducing Generalized Bernstein condition, we propose the first Obig(sqrt{p}{nepsilon}big) high probability excess population risk bound for differentially private algorithms under the assumptions G-Lipschitz, L-smooth, and Polyak-{\L}ojasiewicz condition, based on gradient perturbation method. If we replace the properties G-Lipschitz and L-smooth by alpha-H{\"o}lder smoothness (which can be used in non-smooth setting), the high probability bound comes to Obig(n^{-alpha{1+2alpha}}big) w.r.t n, which cannot achieve Oleft(1/nright) when alphain(0,1]. To solve this problem, we propose a variant of gradient perturbation method, max{1,g-Normalized Gradient Perturbation} (m-NGP). We further show that by normalization, the high probability excess population risk bound under assumptions alpha-H{\"o}lder smooth and Polyak-{\L}ojasiewicz condition can achieve Obig(sqrt{p}{nepsilon}big), which is the first Oleft(1/nright) high probability excess population risk bound w.r.t n for differentially private algorithms under non-smooth conditions. Moreover, we evaluate the performance of the new proposed algorithm m-NGP, the experimental results show that m-NGP improves the performance of the differentially private model over real datasets. It demonstrates that m-NGP improves the utility bound and the accuracy of the DP model on real datasets simultaneously.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

We develop policy gradients methods for stochastic control with exit time in a model-free setting. We propose two types of algorithms for learning either directly the optimal policy or by learning alternately the value function (critic) and the optimal control (actor). The use of randomized policies is crucial for overcoming notably the issue related to the exit time in the gradient computation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by implementing our numerical schemes in the application to the problem of share repurchase pricing. Our results show that the proposed policy gradient methods outperform PDE or other neural networks techniques in a model-based setting. Furthermore, our algorithms are flexible enough to incorporate realistic market conditions like e.g. price impact or transaction costs.

The framework of reinforcement learning or optimal control provides a mathematical formalization of intelligent decision making that is powerful and broadly applicable. While the general form of the reinforcement learning problem enables effective reasoning about uncertainty, the connection between reinforcement learning and inference in probabilistic models is not immediately obvious. However, such a connection has considerable value when it comes to algorithm design: formalizing a problem as probabilistic inference in principle allows us to bring to bear a wide array of approximate inference tools, extend the model in flexible and powerful ways, and reason about compositionality and partial observability. In this article, we will discuss how a generalization of the reinforcement learning or optimal control problem, which is sometimes termed maximum entropy reinforcement learning, is equivalent to exact probabilistic inference in the case of deterministic dynamics, and variational inference in the case of stochastic dynamics. We will present a detailed derivation of this framework, overview prior work that has drawn on this and related ideas to propose new reinforcement learning and control algorithms, and describe perspectives on future research.

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

Mixture-of-experts (MoE) model incorporates the power of multiple submodels via gating functions to achieve greater performance in numerous regression and classification applications. From a theoretical perspective, while there have been previous attempts to comprehend the behavior of that model under the regression settings through the convergence analysis of maximum likelihood estimation in the Gaussian MoE model, such analysis under the setting of a classification problem has remained missing in the literature. We close this gap by establishing the convergence rates of density estimation and parameter estimation in the softmax gating multinomial logistic MoE model. Notably, when part of the expert parameters vanish, these rates are shown to be slower than polynomial rates owing to an inherent interaction between the softmax gating and expert functions via partial differential equations. To address this issue, we propose using a novel class of modified softmax gating functions which transform the input value before delivering them to the gating functions. As a result, the previous interaction disappears and the parameter estimation rates are significantly improved.

In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for bounding the cumulant generating function (CGF) of a Dirichlet process (DP) X sim DP(αν_0), using superadditivity. In particular, our key technical contribution is the demonstration of the superadditivity of αmapsto log E_{X sim DP(αν_0)}[exp( E_X[αf])], where E_X[f] = int f dX. This result, combined with Fekete's lemma and Varadhan's integral lemma, converts the known asymptotic large deviation principle into a practical upper bound on the CGF logE_{Xsim DP(αν_0)}{exp(E_{X}{[f]})} for any α> 0. The bound is given by the convex conjugate of the scaled reversed Kullback-Leibler divergence αKL(ν_0Vert cdot). This new bound provides particularly effective confidence regions for sums of independent DPs, making it applicable across various fields.

We consider the problem of estimating the optimal transport map between two probability distributions, P and Q in mathbb R^d, on the basis of i.i.d. samples. All existing statistical analyses of this problem require the assumption that the transport map is Lipschitz, a strong requirement that, in particular, excludes any examples where the transport map is discontinuous. As a first step towards developing estimation procedures for discontinuous maps, we consider the important special case where the data distribution Q is a discrete measure supported on a finite number of points in mathbb R^d. We study a computationally efficient estimator initially proposed by Pooladian and Niles-Weed (2021), based on entropic optimal transport, and show in the semi-discrete setting that it converges at the minimax-optimal rate n^{-1/2}, independent of dimension. Other standard map estimation techniques both lack finite-sample guarantees in this setting and provably suffer from the curse of dimensionality. We confirm these results in numerical experiments, and provide experiments for other settings, not covered by our theory, which indicate that the entropic estimator is a promising methodology for other discontinuous transport map estimation problems.

In this work we present a new method for the estimation of Mutual Information (MI) between random variables. Our approach is based on an original interpretation of the Girsanov theorem, which allows us to use score-based diffusion models to estimate the Kullback Leibler divergence between two densities as a difference between their score functions. As a by-product, our method also enables the estimation of the entropy of random variables. Armed with such building blocks, we present a general recipe to measure MI, which unfolds in two directions: one uses conditional diffusion process, whereas the other uses joint diffusion processes that allow simultaneous modelling of two random variables. Our results, which derive from a thorough experimental protocol over all the variants of our approach, indicate that our method is more accurate than the main alternatives from the literature, especially for challenging distributions. Furthermore, our methods pass MI self-consistency tests, including data processing and additivity under independence, which instead are a pain-point of existing methods.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Stochastically Extended Adversarial (SEA) model is introduced by Sachs et al. [2022] as an interpolation between stochastic and adversarial online convex optimization. Under the smoothness condition, they demonstrate that the expected regret of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) depends on the cumulative stochastic variance sigma_{1:T}^2 and the cumulative adversarial variation Sigma_{1:T}^2 for convex functions. They also provide a slightly weaker bound based on the maximal stochastic variance sigma_{max}^2 and the maximal adversarial variation Sigma_{max}^2 for strongly convex functions. Inspired by their work, we investigate the theoretical guarantees of optimistic online mirror descent (OMD) for the SEA model. For convex and smooth functions, we obtain the same O(sigma_{1:T^2}+Sigma_{1:T^2}) regret bound, without the convexity requirement of individual functions. For strongly convex and smooth functions, we establish an O(min{log (sigma_{1:T}^2+Sigma_{1:T}^2), (sigma_{max}^2 + Sigma_{max}^2) log T}) bound, better than their O((sigma_{max}^2 + Sigma_{max}^2) log T) bound. For exp-concave and smooth functions, we achieve a new O(dlog(sigma_{1:T}^2+Sigma_{1:T}^2)) bound. Owing to the OMD framework, we can further extend our result to obtain dynamic regret guarantees, which are more favorable in non-stationary online scenarios. The attained results allow us to recover excess risk bounds of the stochastic setting and regret bounds of the adversarial setting, and derive new guarantees for many intermediate scenarios.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Climate-economic modeling under uncertainty presents significant computational challenges that may limit policymakers' ability to address climate change effectively. This paper explores neural network-based approaches for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems arising from models that incorporate ambiguity aversion in climate mitigation decisions. We develop a continuous-time endogenous-growth economic model that accounts for multiple mitigation pathways, including emission-free capital and carbon intensity reductions. Given the inherent complexity and high dimensionality of these models, traditional numerical methods become computationally intractable. We benchmark several neural network architectures against finite-difference generated solutions, evaluating their ability to capture the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, technology transitions, and optimal climate policy. Our findings demonstrate that appropriate neural architecture selection significantly impacts both solution accuracy and computational efficiency when modeling climate-economic systems under uncertainty. These methodological advances enable more sophisticated modeling of climate policy decisions, allowing for better representation of technology transitions and uncertainty-critical elements for developing effective mitigation strategies in the face of climate change.

Does semantic communication require a semantic information theory parallel to Shannon's information theory, or can Shannon's work be generalized for semantic communication? This paper advocates for the latter and introduces a semantic generalization of Shannon's information theory (G theory for short). The core idea is to replace the distortion constraint with the semantic constraint, achieved by utilizing a set of truth functions as a semantic channel. These truth functions enable the expressions of semantic distortion, semantic information measures, and semantic information loss. Notably, the maximum semantic information criterion is equivalent to the maximum likelihood criterion and similar to the Regularized Least Squares criterion. This paper shows G theory's applications to daily and electronic semantic communication, machine learning, constraint control, Bayesian confirmation, portfolio theory, and information value. The improvements in machine learning methods involve multilabel learning and classification, maximum mutual information classification, mixture models, and solving latent variables. Furthermore, insights from statistical physics are discussed: Shannon information is similar to free energy; semantic information to free energy in local equilibrium systems; and information efficiency to the efficiency of free energy in performing work. The paper also proposes refining Friston's minimum free energy principle into the maximum information efficiency principle. Lastly, it compares G theory with other semantic information theories and discusses its limitation in representing the semantics of complex data.

Bayesian optimization (BO) has established itself as a leading strategy for efficiently optimizing expensive-to-evaluate functions. Existing BO methods mostly rely on Gaussian process (GP) surrogate models and are not applicable to (doubly-stochastic) Gaussian Cox processes, where the observation process is modulated by a latent intensity function modeled as a GP. In this paper, we propose a novel maximum a posteriori inference of Gaussian Cox processes. It leverages the Laplace approximation and change of kernel technique to transform the problem into a new reproducing kernel Hilbert space, where it becomes more tractable computationally. It enables us to obtain both a functional posterior of the latent intensity function and the covariance of the posterior, thus extending existing works that often focus on specific link functions or estimating the posterior mean. Using the result, we propose a BO framework based on the Gaussian Cox process model and further develop a Nystr\"om approximation for efficient computation. Extensive evaluations on various synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate significant improvement over state-of-the-art inference solutions for Gaussian Cox processes, as well as effective BO with a wide range of acquisition functions designed through the underlying Gaussian Cox process model.

For a sequence of random variables (X_1, X_2, ldots, X_n), n geq 1, that are independent and identically distributed with a regularly varying tail with index -alpha, alpha geq 0, we show that the contribution of the maximum term M_n triangleq max(X_1,ldots,X_n) in the sum S_n triangleq X_1 + cdots +X_n, as n to infty, decreases monotonically with alpha in stochastic ordering sense.

Conjoint analysis, an application of factorial experimental design, is a popular tool in social science research for studying multidimensional preferences. In such experiments in the political analysis context, respondents are asked to choose between two hypothetical political candidates with randomly selected features, which can include partisanship, policy positions, gender and race. We consider the problem of identifying optimal candidate profiles. Because the number of unique feature combinations far exceeds the total number of observations in a typical conjoint experiment, it is impossible to determine the optimal profile exactly. To address this identification challenge, we derive an optimal stochastic intervention that represents a probability distribution of various attributes aimed at achieving the most favorable average outcome. We first consider an environment where one political party optimizes their candidate selection. We then move to the more realistic case where two political parties optimize their own candidate selection simultaneously and in opposition to each other. We apply the proposed methodology to an existing candidate choice conjoint experiment concerning vote choice for US president. We find that, in contrast to the non-adversarial approach, expected outcomes in the adversarial regime fall within range of historical electoral outcomes, with optimal strategies suggested by the method more likely to match the actual observed candidates compared to strategies derived from a non-adversarial approach. These findings indicate that incorporating adversarial dynamics into conjoint analysis may yield unique insight into social science data from experiments.

The higher-order correlation clustering problem is an expressive model, and recently, local search heuristics have been proposed for several applications. Certifying optimality, however, is NP-hard and practically hampered already by the complexity of the problem statement. Here, we focus on establishing partial optimality conditions for the special case of complete graphs and cubic objective functions. In addition, we define and implement algorithms for testing these conditions and examine their effect numerically, on two datasets.

In this paper, we consider a varying terminal time structure for the stochastic optimal control problem under state constraints, in which the terminal time varies with the mean value of the state. In this new stochastic optimal control system, the control domain does not need to be convex and the diffusion coefficient contains the control variable. To overcome the difficulty in the proof of the related Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle, we develop asymptotic first- and second-order adjoint equations for the varying terminal time, and then establish its variational equation. In the end, two examples are given to verify the main results of this study.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

We investigate an active pure-exploration setting, that includes best-arm identification, in the context of linear stochastic bandits. While asymptotically optimal algorithms exist for standard multi-arm bandits, the existence of such algorithms for the best-arm identification in linear bandits has been elusive despite several attempts to address it. First, we provide a thorough comparison and new insight over different notions of optimality in the linear case, including G-optimality, transductive optimality from optimal experimental design and asymptotic optimality. Second, we design the first asymptotically optimal algorithm for fixed-confidence pure exploration in linear bandits. As a consequence, our algorithm naturally bypasses the pitfall caused by a simple but difficult instance, that most prior algorithms had to be engineered to deal with explicitly. Finally, we avoid the need to fully solve an optimal design problem by providing an approach that entails an efficient implementation.

Given a set of K probability densities, we consider the multimarginal generative modeling problem of learning a joint distribution that recovers these densities as marginals. The structure of this joint distribution should identify multi-way correspondences among the prescribed marginals. We formalize an approach to this task within a generalization of the stochastic interpolant framework, leading to efficient learning algorithms built upon dynamical transport of measure. Our generative models are defined by velocity and score fields that can be characterized as the minimizers of simple quadratic objectives, and they are defined on a simplex that generalizes the time variable in the usual dynamical transport framework. The resulting transport on the simplex is influenced by all marginals, and we show that multi-way correspondences can be extracted. The identification of such correspondences has applications to style transfer, algorithmic fairness, and data decorruption. In addition, the multimarginal perspective enables an efficient algorithm for reducing the dynamical transport cost in the ordinary two-marginal setting. We demonstrate these capacities with several numerical examples.

Minimax problems are notoriously challenging to optimize. However, we demonstrate that the two-timescale extragradient can be a viable solution. By utilizing dynamical systems theory, we show that it converges to points that satisfy the second-order necessary condition of local minimax points, under a mild condition. This work surpasses all previous results as we eliminate a crucial assumption that the Hessian, with respect to the maximization variable, is nondegenerate.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) show promising results for graph tasks. However, existing GNNs' generalization ability will degrade when there exist distribution shifts between testing and training graph data. The cardinal impetus underlying the severe degeneration is that the GNNs are architected predicated upon the I.I.D assumptions. In such a setting, GNNs are inclined to leverage imperceptible statistical correlations subsisting in the training set to predict, albeit it is a spurious correlation. In this paper, we study the problem of the generalization ability of GNNs in Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) settings. To solve this problem, we propose the Learning to Reweight for Generalizable Graph Neural Network (L2R-GNN) to enhance the generalization ability for achieving satisfactory performance on unseen testing graphs that have different distributions with training graphs. We propose a novel nonlinear graph decorrelation method, which can substantially improve the out-of-distribution generalization ability and compares favorably to previous methods in restraining the over-reduced sample size. The variables of the graph representation are clustered based on the stability of the correlation, and the graph decorrelation method learns weights to remove correlations between the variables of different clusters rather than any two variables. Besides, we interpose an efficacious stochastic algorithm upon bi-level optimization for the L2R-GNN framework, which facilitates simultaneously learning the optimal weights and GNN parameters, and avoids the overfitting problem. Experimental results show that L2R-GNN greatly outperforms baselines on various graph prediction benchmarks under distribution shifts.

Bayesian optimisation is a popular approach for optimising expensive black-box functions. The next location to be evaluated is selected via maximising an acquisition function that balances exploitation and exploration. Gaussian processes, the surrogate models of choice in Bayesian optimisation, are often used with a constant prior mean function equal to the arithmetic mean of the observed function values. We show that the rate of convergence can depend sensitively on the choice of mean function. We empirically investigate 8 mean functions (constant functions equal to the arithmetic mean, minimum, median and maximum of the observed function evaluations, linear, quadratic polynomials, random forests and RBF networks), using 10 synthetic test problems and two real-world problems, and using the Expected Improvement and Upper Confidence Bound acquisition functions. We find that for design dimensions ge5 using a constant mean function equal to the worst observed quality value is consistently the best choice on the synthetic problems considered. We argue that this worst-observed-quality function promotes exploitation leading to more rapid convergence. However, for the real-world tasks the more complex mean functions capable of modelling the fitness landscape may be effective, although there is no clearly optimum choice.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Generalized self-concordance is a key property present in the objective function of many important learning problems. We establish the convergence rate of a simple Frank-Wolfe variant that uses the open-loop step size strategy gamma_t = 2/(t+2), obtaining a O(1/t) convergence rate for this class of functions in terms of primal gap and Frank-Wolfe gap, where t is the iteration count. This avoids the use of second-order information or the need to estimate local smoothness parameters of previous work. We also show improved convergence rates for various common cases, e.g., when the feasible region under consideration is uniformly convex or polyhedral.

Dictionary learning is a classic representation learning method that has been widely applied in signal processing and data analytics. In this paper, we investigate a family of ell_p-norm (p>2,p in N) maximization approaches for the complete dictionary learning problem from theoretical and algorithmic aspects. Specifically, we prove that the global maximizers of these formulations are very close to the true dictionary with high probability, even when Gaussian noise is present. Based on the generalized power method (GPM), an efficient algorithm is then developed for the ell_p-based formulations. We further show the efficacy of the developed algorithm: for the population GPM algorithm over the sphere constraint, it first quickly enters the neighborhood of a global maximizer, and then converges linearly in this region. Extensive experiments will demonstrate that the ell_p-based approaches enjoy a higher computational efficiency and better robustness than conventional approaches and p=3 performs the best.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

We propose a new framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial process, in which we simultaneously train two models: a generative model G that captures the data distribution, and a discriminative model D that estimates the probability that a sample came from the training data rather than G. The training procedure for G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake. This framework corresponds to a minimax two-player game. In the space of arbitrary functions G and D, a unique solution exists, with G recovering the training data distribution and D equal to 1/2 everywhere. In the case where G and D are defined by multilayer perceptrons, the entire system can be trained with backpropagation. There is no need for any Markov chains or unrolled approximate inference networks during either training or generation of samples. Experiments demonstrate the potential of the framework through qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the generated samples.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

The optimal policy in various real-world strategic decision-making problems depends both on the environmental configuration and exogenous events. For these settings, we introduce Contextual Bilevel Reinforcement Learning (CB-RL), a stochastic bilevel decision-making model, where the lower level consists of solving a contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP). CB-RL can be viewed as a Stackelberg Game where the leader and a random context beyond the leader's control together decide the setup of many MDPs that potentially multiple followers best respond to. This framework extends beyond traditional bilevel optimization and finds relevance in diverse fields such as RLHF, tax design, reward shaping, contract theory and mechanism design. We propose a stochastic Hyper Policy Gradient Descent (HPGD) algorithm to solve CB-RL, and demonstrate its convergence. Notably, HPGD uses stochastic hypergradient estimates, based on observations of the followers' trajectories. Therefore, it allows followers to use any training procedure and the leader to be agnostic of the specific algorithm, which aligns with various real-world scenarios. We further consider the setting when the leader can influence the training of followers and propose an accelerated algorithm. We empirically demonstrate the performance of our algorithm for reward shaping and tax design.

We study the problem of approximating stationary points of Lipschitz and smooth functions under (varepsilon,delta)-differential privacy (DP) in both the finite-sum and stochastic settings. A point w is called an alpha-stationary point of a function F:R^drightarrowR if |nabla F(w)|leq alpha. We provide a new efficient algorithm that finds an Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3}big)-stationary point in the finite-sum setting, where n is the number of samples. This improves on the previous best rate of Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big). We also give a new construction that improves over the existing rates in the stochastic optimization setting, where the goal is to find approximate stationary points of the population risk. Our construction finds a Obig(1{n^{1/3}} + big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big)-stationary point of the population risk in time linear in n. Furthermore, under the additional assumption of convexity, we completely characterize the sample complexity of finding stationary points of the population risk (up to polylog factors) and show that the optimal rate on population stationarity is tilde Thetabig(1{n}+sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big). Finally, we show that our methods can be used to provide dimension-independent rates of Obig(1{n}+minbig(big[sqrt{rank}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3},1{(nvarepsilon)^{2/5}}big)big) on population stationarity for Generalized Linear Models (GLM), where rank is the rank of the design matrix, which improves upon the previous best known rate.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

A simple and effective method for the alignment of generative models is the best-of-n policy, where n samples are drawn from a base policy, and ranked based on a reward function, and the highest ranking one is selected. A commonly used analytical expression in the literature claims that the KL divergence between the best-of-n policy and the base policy is equal to log (n) - (n-1)/n. We disprove the validity of this claim, and show that it is an upper bound on the actual KL divergence. We also explore the tightness of this upper bound in different regimes. Finally, we propose a new estimator for the KL divergence and empirically show that it provides a tight approximation through a few examples.

This paper concerns the problem of aligning samples from large language models to human preferences using best-of-n sampling, where we draw n samples, rank them, and return the best one. We consider two fundamental problems. First: what is the relationship between best-of-n and approaches to alignment that train LLMs to output samples with a high expected reward (e.g., RLHF or DPO)? To answer this, we embed both the best-of-n distribution and the sampling distributions learned by alignment procedures in a common class of tiltings of the base LLM distribution. We then show that, within this class, best-of-n is essentially optimal in terms of the trade-off between win-rate against the base model vs KL distance from the base model. That is, best-of-n is the best choice of alignment distribution if the goal is to maximize win rate. However, best-of-n requires drawing n samples for each inference, a substantial cost. To avoid this, the second problem we consider is how to fine-tune a LLM to mimic the best-of-n sampling distribution. We derive BoNBoN Alignment to achieve this by exploiting the special structure of the best-of-n distribution. Experiments show that BoNBoN alignment yields substantial improvements in producing a model that is preferred to the base policy while minimally affecting off-target aspects.

Understanding equilibration and thermalization in isolated many-body quantum systems is a central challenge in quantum physics. The traditional approach focuses on the study of the full state of the quantum system which, at equilibrium, is best described by the Diagonal Ensemble. Here, we present Observable Statistical Mechanics, a novel paradigm that shifts attention from the full quantum state to the statistics of measurement outcomes. This approach is grounded in the Maximum Observable Entropy Principle, positing that equilibrium measurement statistics tend to maximize observable entropy under conserved average energy. By focusing on accessible measurements, the theory accurately predicts equilibrium probability distributions without needing detailed microscopic information like the energy eigenstates. Extensive numerical experiments on 7 spin-1/2 Hamiltonians demonstrate the broad applicability and robustness of this framework.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Energy-based models (EBMs) are known in the Machine Learning community for decades. Since the seminal works devoted to EBMs dating back to the noughties, there have been a lot of efficient methods which solve the generative modelling problem by means of energy potentials (unnormalized likelihood functions). In contrast, the realm of Optimal Transport (OT) and, in particular, neural OT solvers is much less explored and limited by few recent works (excluding WGAN-based approaches which utilize OT as a loss function and do not model OT maps themselves). In our work, we bridge the gap between EBMs and Entropy-regularized OT. We present a novel methodology which allows utilizing the recent developments and technical improvements of the former in order to enrich the latter. From the theoretical perspective, we prove generalization bounds for our technique. In practice, we validate its applicability in toy 2D and image domains. To showcase the scalability, we empower our method with a pre-trained StyleGAN and apply it to high-res AFHQ 512times 512 unpaired I2I translation. For simplicity, we choose simple short- and long-run EBMs as a backbone of our Energy-guided Entropic OT approach, leaving the application of more sophisticated EBMs for future research. Our code is available at: https://github.com/PetrMokrov/Energy-guided-Entropic-OT

Let p denote a generative language model. Let r denote a reward model that returns a scalar that captures the degree at which a draw from p is preferred. The goal of language model alignment is to alter p to a new distribution phi that results in a higher expected reward while keeping phi close to p. A popular alignment method is the KL-constrained reinforcement learning (RL), which chooses a distribution phi_Delta that maximizes E_{phi_{Delta}} r(y) subject to a relative entropy constraint KL(phi_Delta || p) leq Delta. Another simple alignment method is best-of-N, where N samples are drawn from p and one with highest reward is selected. In this paper, we offer a closed-form characterization of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution. We demonstrate that any alignment method that achieves a comparable trade-off between KL divergence and reward must approximate the optimal KL-constrained RL solution in terms of relative entropy. To further analyze the properties of alignment methods, we introduce two simplifying assumptions: we let the language model be memoryless, and the reward model be linear. Although these assumptions may not reflect complex real-world scenarios, they enable a precise characterization of the asymptotic behavior of both the best-of-N alignment, and the KL-constrained RL method, in terms of information-theoretic quantities. We prove that the reward of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution satisfies a large deviation principle, and we fully characterize its rate function. We also show that the rate of growth of the scaled cumulants of the reward is characterized by a proper Renyi cross entropy. Finally, we show that best-of-N is asymptotically equivalent to KL-constrained RL solution by proving that their expected rewards are asymptotically equal, and concluding that the two distributions must be close in KL divergence.

The optimal stopping problem is a category of decision problems with a specific constrained configuration. It is relevant to various real-world applications such as finance and management. To solve the optimal stopping problem, state-of-the-art algorithms in dynamic programming, such as the least-squares Monte Carlo (LSMC), are employed. This type of algorithm relies on path simulations using only the last price of the underlying asset as a state representation. Also, the LSMC was thinking for option valuation where risk-neutral probabilities can be employed to account for uncertainty. However, the general optimal stopping problem goals may not fit the requirements of the LSMC showing auto-correlated prices. We employ a data-driven method that uses Monte Carlo simulation to train and test artificial neural networks (ANN) to solve the optimal stopping problem. Using ANN to solve decision problems is not entirely new. We propose a different architecture that uses convolutional neural networks (CNN) to deal with the dimensionality problem that arises when we transform the whole history of prices into a Markovian state. We present experiments that indicate that our proposed architecture improves results over the previous implementations under specific simulated time series function sets. Lastly, we employ our proposed method to compare the optimal exercise of the financial options problem with the LSMC algorithm. Our experiments show that our method can capture more accurate exercise opportunities when compared to the LSMC. We have outstandingly higher (above 974\% improvement) expected payoff from these exercise policies under the many Monte Carlo simulations that used the real-world return database on the out-of-sample (test) data.

This work presents an information-theoretic perspective to group fairness trade-offs in federated learning (FL) with respect to sensitive attributes, such as gender, race, etc. Existing works often focus on either global fairness (overall disparity of the model across all clients) or local fairness (disparity of the model at each client), without always considering their trade-offs. There is a lack of understanding regarding the interplay between global and local fairness in FL, particularly under data heterogeneity, and if and when one implies the other. To address this gap, we leverage a body of work in information theory called partial information decomposition (PID), which first identifies three sources of unfairness in FL, namely, Unique Disparity, Redundant Disparity, and Masked Disparity. We demonstrate how these three disparities contribute to global and local fairness using canonical examples. This decomposition helps us derive fundamental limits on the trade-off between global and local fairness, highlighting where they agree or disagree. We introduce the Accuracy and Global-Local Fairness Optimality Problem (AGLFOP), a convex optimization that defines the theoretical limits of accuracy and fairness trade-offs, identifying the best possible performance any FL strategy can attain given a dataset and client distribution. We also present experimental results on synthetic datasets and the ADULT dataset to support our theoretical findings.

Mixture of experts (MoE) has a well-principled finite mixture model construction for prediction, allowing the gating network (mixture weights) to learn from the predictors (explanatory variables) together with the experts' network (mixture component densities). We investigate the estimation properties of MoEs in a high-dimensional setting, where the number of predictors is much larger than the sample size, for which the literature lacks computational and especially theoretical results. We consider the class of finite MoE models with softmax gating functions and Gaussian regression experts, and focus on the theoretical properties of their l_1-regularized estimation via the Lasso. We provide a lower bound on the regularization parameter of the Lasso penalty that ensures an l_1-oracle inequality is satisfied by the Lasso estimator according to the Kullback--Leibler loss. We further state an l_1-ball oracle inequality for the l_1-penalized maximum likelihood estimator from the model selection.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

For observational studies, we study the sensitivity of causal inference when treatment assignments may depend on unobserved confounders. We develop a loss minimization approach for estimating bounds on the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) when unobserved confounders have a bounded effect on the odds ratio of treatment selection. Our approach is scalable and allows flexible use of model classes in estimation, including nonparametric and black-box machine learning methods. Based on these bounds for the CATE, we propose a sensitivity analysis for the average treatment effect (ATE). Our semi-parametric estimator extends/bounds the augmented inverse propensity weighted (AIPW) estimator for the ATE under bounded unobserved confounding. By constructing a Neyman orthogonal score, our estimator of the bound for the ATE is a regular root-n estimator so long as the nuisance parameters are estimated at the o_p(n^{-1/4}) rate. We complement our methodology with optimality results showing that our proposed bounds are tight in certain cases. We demonstrate our method on simulated and real data examples, and show accurate coverage of our confidence intervals in practical finite sample regimes with rich covariate information.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

We present a neural framework for learning conditional optimal transport (OT) maps between probability distributions. Our approach introduces a conditioning mechanism capable of processing both categorical and continuous conditioning variables simultaneously. At the core of our method lies a hypernetwork that generates transport layer parameters based on these inputs, creating adaptive mappings that outperform simpler conditioning methods. Comprehensive ablation studies demonstrate the superior performance of our method over baseline configurations. Furthermore, we showcase an application to global sensitivity analysis, offering high performance in computing OT-based sensitivity indices. This work advances the state-of-the-art in conditional optimal transport, enabling broader application of optimal transport principles to complex, high-dimensional domains such as generative modeling and black-box model explainability.