Daily Papers

Can every robot in a swarm predict the same future collective state from only local observations and bandwidth-limited messages? We formulate this as decentralized shared-state prediction and introduce Collective-State JEPA (CS-JEPA), a recurrent joint-embedding predictive architecture whose output at every robot represents one common future token field. At deployment, each robot uses a 16-frame local history and one 64-float recurrent message per directed edge; there is no global pooling, target encoder, episode clock, or recorded future action. After pretraining without downstream collective labels, frozen representations are evaluated with ridge probes fitted on 6, 12, or 24 globally labeled episodes. Against raw-future reconstruction with the same receiver anchor and deployment capacity but 9,607 additional training-only parameters, a prospectively registered five-seed follow-up improves prediction-error and inter-robot-agreement label-budget AUC on in-distribution, ring, mutual-kNN, and unseen-size families up to 108 robots. Every effect favors CS-JEPA in 5/5 outer seeds. In a separate sealed eight-seed follow-up, matched action-conditioned predictors receive each candidate four-step plan before producing receiver-local predictive representations. CS-JEPA reduces branch-value MSE by 45.5% and improves within-context candidate-score Pearson correlation by 0.1291, with both effects favorable in 8/8 seeds, including at unseen N=32. These results support common-future JEPA targets as a label-efficient primitive for decentralized swarm prediction under topology and size shift, with additional evidence of planning-relevant value estimation.

Model misalignment, prompt injection, or operator misuse could lead AI agents operating frontier-lab accounts to exfiltrate model weights, poison training data, or weaken release gates. Existing benchmarks do not test whether defenders can detect this activity among routine work under a limited review budget. We introduce MOLE, an open benchmark of 150 AI-operated accounts sharing 9 stateful services over 30 workdays, with 12 threats and 8 corpora from four models totaling roughly 20 billion tokens. Of 39 agent models, 72% complete most assigned harmful objectives and agent refusal does not predict completion. MOLE enables comparison of 40 monitors across corpus generators, observability levels, and threats; even the best evaluated monitor in our single-day audit-event comparison misses nearly half of completed harm. MOLE also enables monitor development: benchmark-guided search improves a mid-tier monitor by 49-64%, while selective use of a stronger monitor improves budget-AUC by 10% over applying it to every account-day at comparable modeled cost.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

LLM-guided evolutionary methods, such as AlphaEvolve, have emerged as powerful approaches for challenging computational optimization problems, such as circle packing. However, prior work typically optimizes performance gain over a fixed number of iterations. We argue that practical optimization should maximize gain per unit cost. To this end, we propose FrugalEvo, a cost-aware evolutionary framework where a stronger, higher-cost LLM explores solution strategies, and a cheaper LLM implements them and iteratively refines the resulting code. We also design a cache-efficient evolution process, where our harness and prompts maximize the sharing of prefixes across different evolution steps, to improve cache reuse. To measure solution quality throughout a fixed cost budget, we introduce Budget-Aware Area Under the Curve (BA-AUC), defined as the area under the best-so-far evaluation score curve over cumulative LLM cost, up to the budget. Across 10 mathematical and systems optimization tasks, FrugalEvo matches or surpasses state-of-the-art baselines, including OpenEvolve, ShinkaEvolve, AdaEvolve, and EvoX, in final solution quality and achieves higher BA-AUC on 9 tasks. It also achieves higher average performance than these baselines on 10 algorithmic optimization tasks from ALE-Bench-Lite. Notably, on circle packing, FrugalEvo achieves new state-of-the-art performance with GPT-5.6 Terra and Luna for only 1.68 USD and with GLM-5.3 and its Flash variant for only 0.55 USD, matching or surpassing all baselines, including multi-agent methods such as CORAL and SwarmResearch, which cost approximately 50 USD on average.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

We release PaMIR (Public Arrival-ordered Measurement for Inference in Risk), an open benchmark for credit-default prediction when labels are scarce and arrive late. The field's reference benchmark studies use eight datasets each, only two or four of them public. PaMIR brings together 19 public datasets with binary default labels -- 1.24M loans, firms and card accounts from nine countries -- rebuilt from pinned source snapshots by one leakage-audited recipe and never redistributed; to our knowledge it is the one of its kind as of today. Every model is a single function, scored under a repeated i.i.d. split and a label-delayed stream in which each application is scored on arrival, with AUC reported by label budget; fleet means are withheld unless every dataset is scored. A synthetic-data harness tests generated training rows without letting a generator see held-out rows. This report describes release 0.4.0 of this living benchmark.

Sparse GNN training reduces computation, but deciding which edges to keep can be costly. Reusing one sparse graph is cheap, but locks training to a fixed topology, while varying it across epochs can require repeated sampling or recomputation. We introduce EDiS (Edge-Disjoint Subgraph sparsification framework), which separates one-time structural extraction from per-epoch graph composition. EDiS decomposes the graph once into cacheable edge-disjoint subgraphs, then recombines them into graphs with edge-budget constraints across epochs and retention ratios without re-extracting structure. Our default construction uses feature-based scores and successive maximum score covering forests, while the same composition mechanism also supports alternative edge selection rules. We provide a combinatorial analysis of the per-epoch sampler, the composition step that draws a training graph from the cached decomposition. We show that, under the default covering-forest selector, the stored decomposition deterministically preserves high-score cut edges, and we derive a selector-agnostic conditional bound on high-score cut survival in composed training graphs. Across 19 homophilic, heterophilic, and large-scale node classification benchmarks against 17 baselines under the same edge budget, EDiS achieves the highest mean benchmark score (accuracy/ROC-AUC) and the lowest average rank and gap-to-best among ranked methods. Ablations show the clearest benefits of structural decomposition and epoch variation at tight edge budgets.

Understanding the physics of planetary magma oceans has been the subject of growing efforts, in light of the increasing abundance of Solar system samples and extrasolar surveys. A rocky planet harboring such an ocean is likely to interact tidally with its host star, planetary companions, or satellites. To date, however, models of the tidal response and heat generation of magma oceans have been restricted to the framework of weakly viscous solids, ignoring the dynamical fluid behavior of the ocean beyond a critical melt fraction. Here we provide a handy analytical model that accommodates this phase transition, allowing for a physical estimation of the tidal response of lava worlds. We apply the model in two settings: The tidal history of the early Earth-Moon system in the aftermath of the giant impact; and the tidal interplay between short-period exoplanets and their host stars. For the former, we show that the fluid behavior of the Earth's molten surface drives efficient early Lunar recession to {sim} 25 Earth radii within 10^4{-} 10^5 years, in contrast with earlier predictions. For close-in exoplanets, we report on how their molten surfaces significantly change their spin-orbit dynamics, allowing them to evade spin-orbit resonances and accelerating their track towards tidal synchronization from a Gyr to Myr timescale. Moreover, we re-evaluate the energy budgets of detected close-in exoplanets, highlighting how the surface thermodynamics of these planets are likely controlled by enhanced, fluid-driven tidal heating, rather than vigorous insolation, and how this regime change substantially alters predictions for their surface temperatures.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a central paradigm for post-training large language models (LLMs), particularly for complex reasoning tasks, yet it often suffers from exploration collapse: policies prematurely concentrate on a small set of dominant reasoning patterns, improving pass@1 while limiting rollout-level diversity and gains in pass@k. We argue that this failure stems from regularizing local token behavior rather than diversity over sets of solutions. To address this, we propose Uniqueness-Aware Reinforcement Learning, a rollout-level objective that explicitly rewards correct solutions that exhibit rare high-level strategies. Our method uses an LLM-based judge to cluster rollouts for the same problem according to their high-level solution strategies, ignoring superficial variations, and reweights policy advantages inversely with cluster size. As a result, correct but novel strategies receive higher rewards than redundant ones. Across mathematics, physics, and medical reasoning benchmarks, our approach consistently improves pass@k across large sampling budgets and increases the area under the pass@k curve (AUC@K) without sacrificing pass@1, while sustaining exploration and uncovering more diverse solution strategies at scale.

Inference-time scaling for text-to-image generation has progressed from simple Best-of-N (BoN) sampling to guided search methods that verify and steer candidate trajectories at intermediate denoising steps. These approaches focus on when and how often to verify during denoising but largely treat the cost of generation itself as fixed. Moreover, the standard practice of comparing methods by number of function evaluations (NFEs) counts only denoising forward passes and ignores verifier overhead, which can distort efficiency rankings. We show that under wall-clock evaluation, simple BoN already matches or outperforms several guided search techniques, suggesting that compute is better spent on broader exploration than on repeated intermediate verification. This motivates Flash-BoN, which generates a large pool of inexpensive draft candidates by combining three complementary acceleration knobs: timestep truncation, layer skipping, and activation proxies into a single configuration optimized once per model. An efficient multi-stage verification procedure then identifies the most promising draft, which is refined at full quality. Across three benchmarks and three model scales, Flash-BoN consistently outperforms all baselines under fixed wall-clock budgets, with gains that grow at larger model scales (+8% AUC). We further show that our strategy combines well and improves existing orthogonal techniques such as reflection-based prompt optimization (+16% AUC). The gains correlate with increased candidate diversity, which also enables draft-guided selection to accelerate RL post-training convergence.